PLATO'S

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO,
AND PHÆDO,

FROM THE TEXT OF BEKKER;

WITH

THE LATIN VERSION OF FICINUS;

AND

NOTES

BY

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DUBLIN:

PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,
FOR
WILLIAM CURRY, JUN., AND COMPANY;
SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL, LONDON.

M.DCCC.XXXIV.
TO

BARTHOLOMEW LLOYD, D. D.,
PROVOST OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

Dear Sir,

I beg leave to dedicate to you the following work, with the hope that it may not be found, in its execution, worthy of the sanction with which you favored the design.

I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to express my grateful sense of your unvaried personal kindness, and to record my individual concurrence in the general estimation of the energy and ability which you have so successfully devoted to the improvement of the interests, and advancement of the character of the University over which you preside.

I remain, Dear Sir,

With great Respect,

Most faithfully yours,

Charles Stuart Stanford.

18, College.
The Apology, Crito, and Phædo have been arranged in their present order, with the intention of affording a connected view of the conduct of Socrates at the periods, and with the attendant circumstances, which they were composed to commemorate, and which include the defence of the philosopher before his judges; his opinions and demeanour in prison, subsequent to his condemnation, with a detail of the important topics which engrossed his attention and discourse upon the day of his decease. Of these selections, it is hard to say whether the subject is more interesting, or the style more fascinating, partaking, as they do, of the leading characteristic of their great author's skill, and combining, as has been justly remarked of Plato's writings, the sublime of simplicity, with all that is beautiful in fancy and profound in thought.

From the commencement of the Apology, to the closing scene in the Phædo, may be considered as a
complete and accurate portraiture of the character, feelings, and philosophy of Socrates. Supported through his trial by a sense of the duty which he owed himself, as conscious of his innocence; enduring his imprisonment, from a sense of duty towards the laws of his country, and contemplating his appointed death, as a duty which he owed the Deity, and ought cheerfully to pay, he has left upon record an example of wisdom, fortitude, resignation, and piety, for which the annals of heathenism supply no parallel.

In preparing the following work for publication, the Editor has endeavoured to avail himself of the able exertions of preceding commentators. His object has been to select and condense the most valuable information which they severally afford, and where the necessary limits of the work interfered with the more copious discussion of any subject occurring throughout its course, sufficient has been said for immediate explanation, and the more inquiring student is referred to the authorities by whom it has been argued and developed at more considerable and satisfactory length.

The text of Bekker has been adopted, with but two or three, and these unimportant changes. Those who are desirous of collating the various readings in the several editions of the Apology, Crito, and Phædo, are referred to Priestley's Plato; the Editor of the present work having noticed very few, and those only by which the sense of any passage was manifestly influenced or altered: his wish having been to secure, in the first instance, an approved and corrected text, and then illus-
trate his author, rather than to crowd his annotations with minute and unnecessary discrepancies, which, however curious, are but little instructive, and by which commentators are too often led, in their conjectures as to what might have possibly been written, to overlook the more important consideration of the sense of the passage as it stands.

The Notes have been compiled principally from Bekker's edition of the Complete Works of Plato, comprising the greater number of commentaries hitherto published, which will be found detailed at length in the Prolegomena, and from the edition of the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, by G. Stallbaum, Goth. et Erford. 1833. The Editor has availed himself also, in many instances, of M. Victor Cousin's French Translation of Plato, which is accompanied by philosophical arguments, and historical and philological notes. This eminent writer who has confessedly attained to the highest rank amongst the professors of metaphysical science, has promised an introductory volume to the above work, containing an account of the Platonic philosophy, a desideratum which could not be more efficiently supplied.

In compliance with the desire of the Publishers, a Latin version has been annexed, that of Marsilius Ficinus, a Florentine, born A. D. 1433, and educated by Pletho, under the patronage of Cosmo di Medici, for the express purpose of translating the writings, and reviving the philosophy of Plato. It has undergone several requisite corrections by subsequent hands, and is generally considered a faithful version,
though far from elegant, or in any degree suitable to the original either in spirit or strength.

For the use of the new fount of Greek type in the University Press, the Editor begs to acknowledge his obligations to the Provost, by whom it was kindly allowed.

18, Trinity College,

Oct. 20th, 1834.
PROLEGOMENA.

SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
PLATO.\textsuperscript{a}

PLATO\textsuperscript{b} was born of Athenian parents, Aristo and Perictione, in
the island of Ægina, where his father resided after it had become
subject to Athens. The time of his birth is generally fixed in the
third or fourth year of the 87th Olympiad, 430 or 429 B.C.\textsuperscript{c} On
his father’s side his origin is traced to Codrus, and on his mother’s
through five generations to the family of Solon. In early life\textsuperscript{d} he

\textsuperscript{a} Compiled principally from Enfield’s History of Philosophy; Stanley’s History
of Philosophy, folio, 1687; Tennenann’s Manual of Philosophy; the Encyclop.
Metropol. Art. Plato; J. A. Fabric. Dissert. de Plat. ejusque Scriptis, &c.; and Bio-

\textsuperscript{b} His real name was Aristocles: the various conjectures as to the cause of its
having been changed, Brucker looks upon as uncertain and vague.

\textsuperscript{c} According to Corsin. and Fabric. on the 7th of Thargelion, 430 B.C. in the
third year of the 87th Olymp.; according to Dodwell a year later; to Dacier, in
the first of the 88th Olymp., upon the authority of Diog. Laert. But the first date
assigned, besides being in accordance with other circumstances, is supported by a

\textsuperscript{d} The birth of Plato is said to have been accompanied by a number of prodigies,
which doubtless owed their origin to the subsequent development of his character
devoted himself with great assiduity to the study of poetry, in which, as in the sister arts of music and painting, he made such progress as might be expected from a vivid imagination, exquisite sensibility, and a richly cultivated taste. His efforts in lyric, epic, and dramatic composition were far from unsuccessful, but with a modest distrust of his own poetical powers he committed an epic of some length to the flames upon his perusing the Iliad of Homer, and destroyed an elaborate effusion of his tragic muse upon hearing a discourse of Socrates, which prevailed in awakening his feelings to a sense of a more sublime and important pursuit.

It is probable, that Plato received the first rudiments of his philosophical education from Cratylus and Hermogenes, who inculcated the systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides. At the age of twenty years he became a disciple of Socrates, and continued with him for eight years, till that great and amiable philosopher fell a sacrifice to the rancour of party, disguised under the pretext of zeal for the national religion. By the advice of Socrates he resigned his poetical studies for the graver investigation of philosophical truths, to which he also sacrificed his early inclinations towards a public life, from which he was further diverted by a feeling of disgust, arising from the perpetual changes which took place in his time in the government of Greece, from the corruptions of the democracy, and the moral depravity of his countrymen.

While under the guidance and instruction of Socrates, Plato not unfrequently occasioned uneasiness to his fellow disciples and to

and attainments. Diogenes, Apuleius, Plutarch, and Lucian concur in the story of a swarm of bees having gathered round his cradle, and settled on his lips as he slept. This was not lost upon Cicero, de Divinat. lib. i. 36. "Platoni cum in cenis parvulo dormienti apes in labellis consedissent, responsum est, singulari illum suavitatem orationis fore, ita futura eloquentia provisa in infante est." It was also reported of him that he was born of a virgin mother, and that Apollo himself had condescended to become his father.

This was a dramatic piece which he had composed at the age of twenty. It consisted of three distinct tragedies and one comedy, forming what the ancients called a tetralogy. He destroyed it the very day before its intended exhibition, from the cause as above.


Xenophon. Memorab. iii. 6.
Socrates himself, by engraving upon the doctrine and precepts of the latter a class of opinions derived from sources totally distinct. He never failed, however, in the zealous attachment, nor changed from the devoted veneration, which he justly regarded his master as eminently entitled to deserve. Plato attended during the trial of Socrates, was one of those who offered to speak in his defence, (though refused leave by the judges to proceed,) and to be bound as a security for the payment of the fine: he attended him during his imprisonment, and was present at the discourse which occupied the last moments of Socrates, on the Immortality of the Soul.

It is supposed, with good reason, that during the life-time of Socrates, Plato had written the dialogues called the Lysis, Phædrus, the Banquet, and probably the Protagoras. Soon after the death of the philosopher, and the dispersion of his disciples, he withdrew to Megara, where he remained till the ferment subsided at Athens. During his sojourn there he is believed to have composed the Apology of Socrates, the Crito, and the Phædo, those affecting and beautiful dialogues which are so intimately connected with his master's history and its unhappy close.

At Megara he and the surviving friends of Socrates were hospitably entertained at the house of Euclid, under whom Plato studied the art of reasoning, and probably increased his natural zeal for disputatio

Anxious to obtain all the information which an acquaintance with the wisdom and learning, and an insight into the habits and manners of civilized countries could afford, he proceeded from Megara on a course of travels, and first visited that part of Italy called Magna Græcia, where he found the two philosophical schools of Heraclitus and Pythagoras, in direct opposition of system and

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a "The Memoirs of Socrates, written by Xenophon, afford a much more accurate idea of the opinions of Socrates and his manner of teaching, than the Dialogues of Plato, who every where mixes his own conceptions and diction, and those of other philosophers, with the ideas and language of his master. It is related that when Socrates heard Plato recite his Lysis, he said, "How much does this young man make me say which I never conceived." Enf. Phil. vol. i. b. 2. c. 4.

b Plato, however, for obvious reasons, denies this himself. See in Phæd. c. 2. and the conjecture of Forster in loc.
principle to each other; and in full repute and daily collision as, on the one hand, physical analysts and annihilators of existence, and as metaphysical realists and assertors of eternal relations on the other. Plato adopted the doctrines of Heraclitus as far as they related to physics, but was distinctly and decidedly opposed to the sceptical inferences by which those doctrines were accompanied as a necessary result. He embraced the notions of the Pythagoreans as to the permanence of essences, but he modified the doctrine considerably, by incorporating it with those notions of a moral system and an organizing Providence, which he had inherited from Socrates as part of the purer creed of Anaxagoras. In another important particular also he qualified the metaphysical system of Pythagoras: he considered the intellectual world as being in some degree embodied in the visible one. Instead of inferring, as the Pythagoreans had done, that things related were a semblance of the abstract relations, he thought that they participated in those relations. Some other differences subsisted between his notions and those of the Pythagoreans, on the origin and nature of numbers, which are involved in considerable obscurities, and on which it would be impossible to enter here.

He next visited Cyrene, where he became the pupil of Theodorus, under whom he studied mathematics, and from hence he is said to have travelled into Egypt; but there is no information which can be depended on, either as to the circumstances of his visit, or the length of his stay in that country. According to some accounts he assumed the character of a merchant, that he might travel with safety, and passed through the whole kingdom of Artaxerxes Mnemon as a seller of oil. Others relate that he visited the priests there, and was initiated in their profoundest mysteries.

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b Ancient writers vary so widely in their accounts of the life of Plato, that it is impossible to attempt to reconcile them. Diogenes Laertius asserts, that Plato visited Cyrene first, whence he proceeded to Italy, and from thence to Egypt.

c Diog. Laert.

d Apuleius, Plutarch.
But Plato himself speaks of the reserve maintained in Egypt towards strangers with regard to the peculiar institutions of the country, and asserts, that, so far from their mysteries being accessible to foreigners, "the animals of the Nile used to drive foreigners away by their meats, sacrifices, and rude proclamations."

The most likely reason of his visit, besides general curiosity, is that stated by Cicero, that he went for the purpose of completing his mathematical studies, and becoming acquainted with their astronomical systems. It must be attributed to the ignorance or vanity of the Alexandrians of a later period, that they insist upon Plato's having been indebted to the sages of Egypt for his earliest knowledge, and for those treasures of moral and political wisdom which he afterwards imparted to his countrymen. Plato's own authority is decisive on this point, which is to the effect, that though the abstract sciences were cultivated in Egypt with great success, the other liberal sciences were but indifferently attended to.

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a De Legg. lib. xii. p. 953. E. It has been asserted that Pythagoras learned his cosmogony in Egypt; the doctrine of transmigration, and the immortality of the soul. But it is more likely that he adopted the latter from Socrates, and the former from Pythagoras. It is not probable that Plato, in the habit of a merchant, could obtain access to the sacred mysteries of Egypt; for when Pythagoras was introduced by the recommendation of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, to Amasis, king of Egypt, a great patron of all learned men, that he might the more easily obtain access to the colleges of the priests, the king himself could scarcely, with all his authority, prevail upon the priests to consent to the admission of a stranger, or to permit his being made acquainted with their mysterious rites. Herodot. i. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sic. i. i. c. 2. Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 12. s. 1.

b "Cum Plato Ægyptum peragrat ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et cœlestia acciperet." de Fin. v. 29. upon which the author of the able and eloquent article in the Encyclop. Metropol. observes, that it is strange how this passage has been misinterpreted, and what latitude has been given to the term cœlestia here, even by some writers who were acquainted with another passage of Cicero, which is the best commentary on this, if indeed it stood in need of any. "Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerant, evocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quœreret: cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum con-

ferre."

c Cf. de Legg. lib. v. p. 746. B.
There are no better grounds, either, for supposing that during his residence in Egypt, Plato became acquainted with the doctrine of the Hebrews, and introduced into his own system the principles and precepts of their sacred books. This opinion has been eagerly maintained by several Jewish and Christian writers, but it has been satisfactorily proved to have had no other foundation than mere conjecture, and may be supposed to have originated in that zeal for the honour of revelation which would assign the Hebrew Scriptures or traditions as the source of all Gentile wisdom.

On his return to Greece, richly stored with the philosophical treasures of distant countries, Plato settled in Athens, and took possession of a small house and garden, which he purchased for three thousand drachmas, adjoining the groves and grounds which had been bequeathed by Academus, or Ecademus, to the public, and as it would appear within one common enclosure. There Plato put in execution a design, in contemplation doubtless long before, of forming a new school for the instruction of youth in the principles of philosophy. In this delightful retreat, accordingly, which, from its situation and scenery, was admirably calculated to charm and tranquillize the mind, and which harmonized so well with the study of philosophy and the muses, he opened the academy, and placed above the door of his school, to testify his high sense of the importance of mathematics as a necessary step to higher speculations, the celebrated inscription,

ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ.

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a Cf. Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1. where this opinion is examined and refuted at length.

b The sources of Plato's philosophy have been ascertained with some degree of precision to be as follows: his Dialectics he borrowed from Euclid of Megara; the principles of natural philosophy he learned in the Eleatic school from Hermogenes and Cratylus; and combining these with the Pythagorean doctrine of natural causes, he framed from both his system of metaphysics. Mathematics and astronomy he was taught in the Cyrenaic school, and by the Egyptian priests. From Socrates he imbibed the pure principles of moral and political wisdom; but he afterwards obscured their simplicity by Pythagorean speculations. Enf. Phil.

c Ex Egypto reversus Deliis exposuit sensum oraculi quod Graecos jussit aram, quæ in Delo crat, cubica ratione duplicare. J. A. Fabric. For an account of the
This new school soon obtained an extensive celebrity, to which the travels and reputation of Plato contributed not a little among his Socratic brethren. None of these had ventured to institute a school at Athens, except Aristippus, who had confined his instructions almost entirely to ethical subjects, and had brought himself into some discredit by the freedom of his manners. Plato, consequently, remained alone to inherit the patrimony of public esteem which Socrates had bequeathed to his disciples; and he was not deficient in the talent and energy which enabled him to extend the study of philosophy beyond the limits in which his master had enclosed it. The result was, that his school was crowded with pupils of the first distinction; even women\(^a\) are said to have attended his lectures, disguised in male attire. Among the illustrious names which appear in the catalogue of his followers are Dion, the Syracusean prince, and the orators Hyperides, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Isocrates.

His political wisdom stood so high that several states applied for his assistance in new modelling their respective forms of government. He rejected proposals of this nature from the Arcadians and Thebans, because they refused to adopt the plan of his republic, which required an equal distribution of property. He gave his advice in the affairs of Elis and other Grecian states, and furnished a code of laws for Syracuse; he was also in great esteem with several crowned heads, amongst others, Archelaus, king of Macedon, and Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily.

Plato is said to have visited the court of this latter prince at three different periods.\(^b\) The professed object of his first visit, which happened in the fortieth year of his age, is stated to have

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\(^b\) It seems well established that Plato, at some period, visited the court of Dionysius at Syracuse. One visit only of his is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus; but the spurious letters which have passed under the name of Plato, have given rise to very circumstantial accounts of three different visits. Of that visit which really took place, little can be satisfactorily said. Encyc. Metr. Art. Plat. Compare with this, Mitford, Grec. Hist. vol. v. 469. and note; vi. 7.
been a desire, on the part of the philosopher, to take a survey of the island, and particularly to examine into the wonders of Mount Ætna. While residing at Syracuse, he succeeded in converting Dion, the brother-in-law of the king, who, though possessed of distinguished abilities, had allowed them to merge in the luxurious dissipation of a licentious court. No sooner had he been inspired by Plato with a taste for that philosophy which leads to virtue, than he devoted himself with unwearied diligence to the pursuit of wisdom and truth, and endeavoured, in order that Dionysius might if possible be likewise reclaimed, to procure an interview between him and Plato. The free censures and unreserved opinions of the latter excited first the displeasure, and then the suspicions of the tyrant, and the philosopher, in endeavouring to secure his safety by flight, was sold as a slave at Ægina, the inhabitants of which were then at war with the Athenians, by Pollis, the master of the vessel in which he was returning, who had been bribed for that purpose by Dionysius. He was redeemed by Anniceris, a Cyrenaic philosopher, \(^a\) for the sum of thirty minæ, and so enabled to reach home.

He is said to have visited Sicily a second time after the younger Dionysius had succeeded to the throne, vacated by the decease of the elder, but his sojourn was unsatisfactory and brief. He returned again to Athens in consequence of the breaking out of a war, upon the adjustment of which Dionysius promised to send for him, and for Dion also, who having become obnoxious to the tyrant, was banished into Italy, and who had retired to Athens to confirm and complete, by a constant attendance upon the lectures of his master, and a diligent study and practice of his moral precepts, his conversion from the effeminate and enervating habits of his early life.

After no long time the third invitation arrived, which the philosopher would have gladly declined, pleading as an excuse the infirmities of advancing age; but he was prevailed on by the en-

\(^a\) Repayment having been afterwards offered to Anniceris by Plato’s relations, he refused the money, saying, with that generous spirit which true philosophy always inspires, that he saw no reason why the relations of Plato should engross to themselves the honour of serving him. Enf. Phil.
treaties of Dion and his family, and also by the urgent solicitations of some Pythagorean philosophers, and went accordingly. For a time every thing seemed to proceed favourably; Dionysius appeared to lend an attentive ear to the counsel and suggestions of Plato, who now, in the midst of a numerous train of philosophers, possessed the chief influence and authority in the court of Syracuse; and who, while Aristippus was revelling in splendid luxury, while Dionysius was indulging his natural acrimony, for which the court afforded such ample scope, and while Æschines was intent upon his favourite pursuit, the amassing of wealth, supported the credit of philosophy in a manner which his friends regarded as indicative of superior wisdom, but which was attributed by his detractors to pride.

Mutual distrust, however, soon intervened, and Plato was put in confinement by Dionysius, from which he was rescued with difficulty by the spirited interference of his Pythagorean friends, and once more restored in safety to Athens.

He now devoted himself with unabated assiduity to his school and the instruction of youth. Having enjoyed naturally a robust constitution, and having lived temperately, he arrived at the eighty-first, or, according to some writers, at the seventy-ninth year of his age, and died from the mere decay of nature in the first year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad. As he had never been married he left no natural heirs, but transferred his effects by will to Adimantus.\(^{a}\) A monument was raised to his memory in the academy, in-

\(^{a}\) Stanley, Hist. of Philosophy, part v. c. 12. "Thus continuing a single life to his end, not having any heirs of his own, he bequeathed his estate to young Adimantus, (probably the son of Adimantus, his second brother,) by his will; thus recited by Laertius.

These things Plato hath bequeathed and disposed: the Eniphistidean grounds bordering north, on the highway from the Cephisean temple, south on the Heracleans of the Eniphistides, east on Archestratus the Phrearian, west, Philip the Cholidian; this let it not be lawful for any man to sell or alienate, but let young Adimantus be possessor thereof in as full and ample manner as is possible. And likewise the Enerissiadean farm which I bought of Callimachus, adjoining on the north to Eurymedon the Myrminus, on the south to Demostratus Xypeteron, on the east to Eurymedon the Myrminus, on the west to Cephissus. Three minae of silver; a golden cup weighing 160; a ring of gold, and an ear-ring of gold, both together weighing four

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scribed with an epitaph written by his pupil Aristotle, in terms of gratitude and enthusiastic reverence.\textsuperscript{a}

It is from the works of Plato, principally, that the judgment is to be formed of his merits as a philosopher, and of the advantages which he conferred upon science. They are chiefly in the form of dialogues, and are justly considered as models of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit; they are also the only incontestible authorities respecting his opinions, although his entire system can only be attained by conjecture, as he had certain doctrines (\textit{αγαθα δοματα}) which he did not communicate except to those whom he entrusted with his \textit{esoteric} philosophy.\textsuperscript{b}

His language and style have been the subject of many and high encomiums from ancient and modern critics. Cicero gives it as an assertion of the philosophers, that if Jupiter were to speak Greek, he would speak like Plato;\textsuperscript{c} Aristotle describes his style as "a middle species of diction between verse and prose."\textsuperscript{d} Some of his dialogues are elevated by such sublime and glowing conceptions, as plainly indicate the basis of his early taste. The several characters are ably and consistently supported, the course of the debate distinctly marked, the scene depicted in the most lively and efficient colouring, and the style of expression in perfect harmony with the subject, time, and place.\textsuperscript{e} In a word, his profound and humane philosophy

\textit{drachms and three oboli.} Euclid, \textit{the stone-cutter, oweth me three minae.} Diana \textit{I remit freely.} I \textit{leave servants, Ticho, Bictas, Apolloniades, Dionysius, goods, whereof Demetrius keepeth an inventory. I owe no man anything. Executors: Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus.}

If this will be not forged that of Apuleius is false, who avers, that "the patrimony he left was a little orchard adjoining to the academy, two servants, and a cup wherein he supplicated to the gods. Gold no more than he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an emblem of his nobility."

\textsuperscript{a} \textit{Ibid.} "He died in the 81st year of his age, which number he completed exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born. For which reason the Magi at Athens sacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than man, who fulfilled the most perfect number, nine multiplied into itself."

\textsuperscript{b} Tennemann, \textit{Man. Phil. 130.}

\textsuperscript{c} Orat. c. 3. 20. Brut. 31.

\textsuperscript{d} Arist. \textit{apud. Laert.}

\textsuperscript{e} It must be allowed, however, that amongst other difficulties which are to
have ranked him as a writer amongst his country’s highest ornaments, while his works remain as a noble memorial of Athenian genius, elegance, and urbanity.\(^a\)

According to Thrasyllus\(^b\) he published his Dialogues in conformity to the rules of the tragic tetralogy. The first tetralogy has a common subject illustrative of the life which becomes a philosopher: every dialogue has also a double title, the one from the principal person concerned, the other from the subject.

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\begin{align*}
\text{The first Tetralogy} & : & \begin{align*}
\text{Euthyphron, or, Of Piety.} \\
\text{The Apology of Socrates.} \\
\text{Crito,—Of that which should be done.} \\
\text{Phædo,—Of the Immortality of the Soul.} \\
\text{Cratylus,—Of Etymology.} \\
\text{Theætetus,—Of Science.}
\end{align*} \\
\text{The second.} & : & \begin{align*}
\text{The Sophist,—Of Ens.} \\
\text{The Statesman,—Of Political Prudence and Sovereign Power.}
\end{align*} \\
\text{The third.} & : & \begin{align*}
\text{Parmenides,—Of Ideas, and the Intelligible Essence of Things.} \\
\text{Philebus,—Of Pleasure, and in what it really consists.} \\
\text{The Symposium,—Of the Good.} \\
\text{Phædrus,—Of the beautiful, the false, and the true.}
\end{align*}
\]

be met with in the writings of Plato, there are many which arise from the language in which he expresses his conceptions. Sometimes the reader is dazzled by the splendour of his poetical diction; and sometimes he is perplexed by studied ambiguities, and finds the same term used in different senses, besides different terms being employed to express the same meaning. He also frequently confounds the ideas and language of mathematics with metaphysics, and attempts, after the example of the Pythagorean school, to express philosophical conceptions by mathematical diagrams and proportions, which, added to the extreme subtlety of his speculations upon abstract and sublime topics, shall be frequently found to interfere materially with the perspicuity and intelligibility of his meaning and composition.

\(^a\) Encyc. Metropol.  
\(^b\) Diog. Laert. iii. 56. s.
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE

The fourth.

Alcibiades 1.—Of Human Nature.
Alcibiades 2.—Of Prayer.
Hipparchus,—Of the Love of Gain.
The Rivals,—Of Philosophy.

The fifth.

Theages,—Of Wisdom.
Charmides,—Of Temperance.
Laches,—Of Fortitude.
Lysis,—Of Friendship.

Euthydemus,—Of Disputation.
Protagoras,—The Sophist.
Gorgias,—Of Rhetoric.
Menon,—Of Virtue.

The sixth.

Hippias 1,—Of Honesty.
Hippias 2,—Of Deceit.

Io,—Of Poetry.
Menexenus,—The Funeral Oration.

Clitopho,—The Exhortation to Virtue.
The Commonwealth,—The best Condition of a Republic.
Timæus,—Of Nature.
Critias,—Of the Island Atlantis, (mentioned in the Timæus.)

Minos,—Of Law.
Laws,—Of Legislation.
Epinomis,—The Nocturnal Convention, or the Philosophers.

The seventh.

The eighth.

Epistles, in number thirteen; one to Aristodemus; two to Archytas; four to Dionysius; to Hennias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one each; to Leodamas, one; to Dion, one; to Dion's friends, two. a

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a Certain dialogues generally introduced into the editions of Plato, have been long ago admitted to be spurious by general consent. These are the Axioclius, Demodochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, Clitopho, and the two short dialogues on Justice and Virtue. Other dialogues generally received as genuine, the Hipparchus, Minos, the Epinomus, the Latter Alcibiades, the Rivals, Clitopho, and Theages, bear
From the writings of Plato, which were originally collected by Hermodorus, one of his pupils, is to be derived the knowledge of the philosophy and opinions of the earlier Academics, as of the founder of the sect himself, a brief outline of which may not inaptly be introduced here.\(^a\)

Philosophy was divided by Plato into three parts; Morals, Physics, and Dialectics. Under Morals he comprehended politics, and under Physics that science which was afterwards distinguished by the name of metaphysics. Of these sciences he clearly laid down the principal attributes and mutual dependencies, and drew the distinction between the analytical and synthetical methods. Philosophy, therefore, is under great obligations to him \textit{quoad formam}. She is no less indebted to him for the light he has thrown upon the above parts considered separately; though he did not profess to deliver a system of each, but continually excited the attention of others to further discoveries.\(^b\)

Wisdom, in the strict Platonic sense of the term, is the knowledge of those things which truly exist, and are comprehended by the intellect, particularly those which regard the Deity, and the human soul as distinct from the body. Philosophy is the desire of divine science, or the liberation of the mind from the body, and its direction towards those real essences, which are perceptible only by the understanding. A philosopher must possess a mind naturally inclined to contemplation, an ardent love of truth, a penetrating

\(^a\) It is impossible, as Wyttenbach justly observes, (Epist. Crit. ad Van Heusde, prefixed to the latter's Specimen Crit. in Plat. Lugd. Bat. 1818.) to convey, by an abstract, an adequate notion of the merits of the original, owing to some peculiar excellencies in Plato's method and style.

\(^b\) Tennemann, \textit{Man. Phil.} 133.
judgment, and a retentive memory: He must be also inured to the exercise of temperance and fortitude, that nothing corporeal may divert him from the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy, as it is employed in the contemplation of truth, is termed theoretical, and, as it is concerned in the regulation of actions, practical. Theoretical philosophy produces a contemplative life, in which the mind, occupied in meditations purely intellectual, acquires a resemblance to the divinity. Practical philosophy leads to an active life, and applies the principles of wisdom to the benefit of society. Besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the philosopher will inquie into the right conduct of the understanding, and the powers of speech, or will make himself conversant with the art of reasoning and disputation.a

The chief heads of Plato’s moral doctrine are, that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the proper perfection of man’s nature; that vice is a disease of the mind, originating in some delusion or misapprehension of our proper interests; that the real freedom of a natural being consists in his being able to regulate his conduct by the determinations of his reason; that every person who is not guided by his reason encourages insubordination in the faculties of his mind, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; that a course of virtuous conduct, independently of its advantages to society, is beneficial to the individual practising it, as ensuring that regularity of imagination, that tranquillity and internal harmony, which is the mind’s proper happiness.\b

Concerning politics, which Plato defined to be the application,

a Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.
\b Encycl. Metropol. Cf. de Repub. l. iv. p. 444. in Gorg. p. 491. 492. de Repub. l. ix. p. 577. in Phaed. c. 9. Albin. Eισαγ. είς τά τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔγγυματα. c. 27. See also the beginning of the fourth Book of Laws. The interesting research which Plato carried so far, respecting the supreme good, (especially in the Theaetetus, the Philolaus, the Meno, and the Republic,) belongs to the subject of morals. Virtue he defined to be the imitation of God, or the effort of man to attain to a resemblance to his original (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τό ἐννατόν); or in other words a unison and harmony of all our principles and actions according to reason, whence results the highest degree of happiness. Tennemann, Man. Phil. 136.
on a great scale, of the laws of morality, he has written at large in his Republic, and in his Dialogue on Laws. There is a good deal in his plan of a republic deserving of serious consideration; the great object of laws he judges to be to provide for the natural accommodation of the members of the community, as subsidiary and in subordination to the cultivation of their moral virtues. He considers the perfection of the state to consist not solely in the health, beauty, wealth, and strength of the individuals composing it, but also in their prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. He defines education to be that which qualifies men to become good citizens, and renders them fit to govern or to obey. He looks upon it as most important, that the early principles instilled into the minds of youth should be those of strict moral virtue, and considers that if poems and fables, early taught, are able to impress the mind through life with a belief of the most improbable fictions, that the same means might be applied, with equal success, for inculcating realities and important truths. Idleness he regards as the bane of all virtue, and urges to industry as the grand source not only of wealth but happiness. He perceives, with great clearness, the advantages resulting from the subdivision of labour, and points out the necessity and natural progress of such subdivision in proportion as civilization advances. As to crimes, he regards them as originating in a love of pleasure, in passion, or in ignorance and folly. But with these and other similar principles which are to be met with in his favourite system, Plato has embodied some which, to those who are conversant with mankind, and capable of entirely investigating the motives of human actions, will make the whole project appear chimerical, and the offspring of a mind replete with philosophical enthusiasm; his design, for instance, of admitting, in his republic, a community of women, in order to give reason an entire control over desire, and the perfection in the contemplation of abstract ideas, which he required in the civil functionaries of his imaginary state.

Dialectics, according to Plato, embrace the essence and the acci-

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a Encycl. Metrop. Cf. de Legg. l. i. i. ii. de Rep. lib. i.
b Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.
dents of things; concerning the former it makes use of division, definition, and analysis. Division separates the genus into its species, the whole into its parts, &c. Definition expresses the genus of the thing to be defined, and distinguishes it from all others by adding its specific difference. Analysis rises from objects of sense to intelligibles; from demonstrable propositions to axioms, or from hypothesis to experience. Induction rises from individuals to universals. Syllogism produces a conclusion by means of some intermediate proposition.¹

These topics are cursorily touched upon by Plato, and it is rather by example than by precepts that he teaches the true art of reasoning, or exposes the fallacies of sophistry. The ingenious artifices and deceptions practised by the sophists, are clearly represented in several of Plato’s dialogues, particularly in his Euthydemus and Sophist. The animadversions of Plato upon the rhetoric of his day, are not to be understood so much as a general and indiscriminate censure of the art itself, as an exposure of the technical refinements, the imposition, and absurdities of cotemporary rhetoricians. This must appear to be the case to any who may attentively study the dialogues connected with the subject.

On theology, the fundamental doctrine of Plato, as of the other ancient philosophers, is that from nothing nothing can proceed. This universal axiom he applied not only to the infinite efficient, but to the material cause.² Hence Cicero,³ Apuleius,⁴ Alcinous,⁵ and the later commentator Chalcideus,⁶ have correctly understood him as admitting two primary and incorruptible principles, God and Matter. Through the whole dialogue of the Timæus he supposes two eternal and independent causes of all things; one, that by which all things are made, which is God; the other that from

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² He represented the Divinity as the author of the world, inasmuch as he introduced into rude matter (ἐλη—τὸ ἄμορφον,) order and harmony. Tennemann, Man. Phil. 135.
³ Acad. Quest. 1. 1. c. 6. ⁴ L. i. p. 281. ⁵ C. 12.
which all things are made, which is matter. Plutarch seems to have given a just representation of the doctrine of Plato, when he speaks of matter as neither made nor produced, but as presenting itself before the great artificer to receive form and arrangement.a

Matter, according to Plato, is an eternal and infinite principle. His doctrine on this head is thus explained by Cicero.b "Matter, from which all things are produced and formed, is a substance without form or quality, but capable of receiving all forms and undergoing every kind of change; in which, however, it never suffers annihilation, but merely a solution of its parts, which are in their nature infinitely divisible, and move in portions of space which are also infinitely divisible. When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and these forms are produced, from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe." This doctrine Plato unfolds at large in his Timæus, and insists upon the notion that matter has no form, but is capable of receiving any. He calls it the mother and receptacle of forms, by the union of which with matter the universe becomes perceptible to the senses; and maintains that the visible world owes its forms to the energy of the divine intellectual nature.c

It was also a doctrine of Plato, that there is in matter a necessary, but blind and refractory force; and that hence arises a propensity in matter to disorder and deformity, which is the cause of all the imperfection which appears in the works of God, and the origin of evil. On this subject Plato writes with considerable obscurity, but as far as his meaning can be traced, he appears to have thought that matter, from its nature, resists the will of the supreme artificer, so that he cannot perfectly execute his designs, and that this is the

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a Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.
b Acad. Quæst. i. c. 1.
c Enf. Phil. ibid. It may be observed here that matter is not to be understood as body, but that from which bodies are formed. Body is that which is produced from matter by the energy of an efficient cause. This distinction is to be found in almost all the ancient systems of philosophy; it is necessary, therefore, in examining them not to understand the terms incorporeal and immaterial as synonymous. Enf. Phil. i. c.
cause of the mixture of good and evil which is found in the material world.

The principle opposite to matter in the system of Plato is God. He inculcated an intelligent cause, the origin of all spiritual being, and the framer of the material world.\(^a\) The nature of this great being, he pronounced it difficult to discover, and when discovered, impossible to divulge.\(^b\) The existence of God he inferred from the marks of intelligence, which appear in the form and arrangement of bodies in the visible world;\(^c\) and from the unity of the material system he concluded that the mind by which it was formed must be one.\(^d\) God, according to Plato, is the supreme intelligence, incorporeal, without beginning, end, or change, and capable of being perceived only by the mind. He distinguished the Deity not only from body, and whatever has corporeal qualities, but from matter itself, from which all things are made. He also ascribed to the Deity power and wisdom sufficient for the formation and preservation of the world, and supposed him possessed of goodness, which inclined him to desire, and, as far as the refractory nature of matter would permit, to produce the happiness of the universe.\(^e\)

By Ideas, Plato appears to have meant patterns or archetypes, subsisting by themselves as real beings in the divine reason, as in their original and eternal region, and issuing thence to give form to sensible things, and to become objects of contemplation and science to rational beings. In the Timæus it is argued, that the reason of the Deity (ἔλογίσμος τοῦ ἔσο) comprehends exemplars of all things; and that this reason is one of the primary causes of things. According to Plutarch,\(^f\) Justin Martyr,\(^g\) and Pseudo Origen,\(^h\) Plato maintains the three principles, God, Matter, and Idea. Laertius speaks of but two principles in nature, as according to the Platonic system, God and Matter, but he may be supposed to allude to those two sources only of being which are primary and

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\(^a\) Tim. t. iii. p. 29.
\(^b\) Tim. l. c. Ep. vii. t. iii. p. 341.
\(^c\) De Legg. p. 886.
\(^d\) Tim. t. iii. p. 30. Polit. t. ii. 174.
\(^e\) Polit. t. ii. p. 174. de Legg. x. t. ii. p. 899.
\(^f\) Plac. Phil. l. i. 9. 10.
\(^g\) Ad Græc. p. 7.
\(^h\) Philosoph. c. 19. p. 108.
independent; for the third, the Idea or exemplar, is to be considered but as instrumental and dependent on the efficient cause. "The exemplar," according to Seneca, "is not the efficient cause of nature, but an instrument necessary to the cause." This branch of the Platonic philosophy will be found explained, where it is made available for argument, in the course of the Phædo.

Visible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting shades, and ideas as the only permanent substances. These he conceived to be the proper objects of science to a mind raised by divine contemplation above the varying scenes of the material world. His impressions on the subject are appropriately expressed in a passage of his Republic, in which he compares the state of the human mind with respect to the material and intellectual world, to that of a man, who, in a cave into which no light can enter but by a single passage, views upon a wall opposite to the entrance the shadows of external objects, and mistakes them for realities. So strongly was he influenced by this impression, that Plato, in the election of magistrates for his Republic, required that none should be chosen who had not, by the habitual contemplation of the world of ideas, attained a perfect power of abstraction. It was another doctrine in the Platonic system, that the Deity formed the material world after a perfect archetype, which had subsisted eternally in his reason, and endued it with a soul. "God," according to Plato, "produced mind prior in time as well as excellence to the body, that the latter might be subject to the former."—"From that substance which is indivisible and always the same, and from that which is corporeal and divisible, he compounded a third kind of substance, participating in the nature of both." This substance, which is not eternal but produced, and which derives the superior part of its nature from God, and the inferior from matter, Plato supposed to be the animating principle of the universe, pervading and adorning all things. This third principle in nature is, in the Platonic system, inferior to the Deity, being derived from that divine reason which is the seat of the ideal world; wherein it differs completely from

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a Ep. 65.  
b Lib. vii. init. t. ii. p. 515.  
c Ibid. p. 518. Enf. Phil. i. c.  
d Tim. t. iii. p. 34.  
the Stoical doctrine of the soul of the world, which supposed the essence of the divine nature to be diffused through the universe.\(^a\)

Upon the foundation of the preceding doctrines concerning the Deity, matter, ideas, the soul of the world, and daemons,\(^b\) Plato raised the structure of his Physics.

To account for the origin and present state of human souls, Plato supposes that when the Deity formed the universe, he separated from the soul of the world inferior souls, which were thus mediately derived from the divine nature itself, equal in number to the stars, and assigned to each its proper celestial abode; but that these souls (for what reason does not appear) were sent down to the earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. He ascribes to this cause the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable, and maintains that it is only by disengaging itself from all animal passions, and rising above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, that the soul of man can be prepared to return to its original habitation.

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\(^a\) The doctrine of a twofold soul of the world, the one presiding over it (\(\upsilon\pi\epsilon\theta\-\kappa\sigma\mu\iota\omicron\) and the other residing in it (\(\iota\gamma\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\iota\omicron\)\)), was appended to the Platonic system by the later Platonists, to accommodate this system to the notions adopted by many of the Christian fathers respecting the divine nature. (Plotin. Ennead. iii. l. v. c. 2.)

It will appear evident, from an examination of the doctrine of Plato concerning God and the soul of the world, that it differs materially from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Plato did not suppose three subsistences in one divine essence, separate from the visible world; but taught that the \(\lambda\gamma\omicron\omicron\), or reason of God, is the seat of the intelligible world, or of ideas, and that the soul of the world is a third subordinate nature, compounded of intelligence and matter. Enf. Phil. l. c. See Cudworth’s Intellectual System, book i. c. 4. where the subject is discussed at length.

\(^b\) These Plato probably conceived to be subordinate divinities, produced at the same time with the soul of the world, (Tim. t. iii. p. 40. Coniviv. t. iii. p. 201.) and supposed them to have been appointed by the supreme Being to the charge of forming animal bodies and superintending the visible world; a doctrine which he seems to have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, and particularly from Timaeus the Locrian, according to whom, “the ruler of all assigned the inspection of human affairs to daemons, and committed to them the government of the world.” Enf. Phil. l. c.
With regard to the conduct which should be adopted and adhered to through the trials and perplexities of this life, so as to afford the most consoling hope of a happier life to come, Plato has laid down, through the course of his works, the most admirable and efficient precepts. From the system of the universe, as being regulated by a wise and beneficent providence, he argues against the captious querulousness of those who are induced to complain of or deny this governing influence, because they do not feel it sufficiently near in their circumstances or themselves so as to protect them against the common accidents and disasters of life. He argues against that contracted and selfish feeling which cannot comprehend how at times the general good must be promoted at the sacrifice of particular interests, and in all anxieties and difficulties suggests the patience and comfort which cannot fail to be derived from conscious virtue. To despair, under any circumstances, is a mark of disloyalty to Providence, who never eventually deserts that spirit which has aspired, as far as its faculties would permit, to assimilate itself in goodness to its great original, or suffers it, when thus purified and advanced to a congenial nature, to undergo any real calamity. Those, on the other hand, are really unfortunate, who have succeeded in the purposes of mischief and have become rooted in the delusions of vice. For it is an eternal and immutable law, the operation of which pervades the entire universe, and from the obligation of which no created being of whatever grade is free, that the rewards of virtue are not more unerringly sure than the punishment of vice.

It has been already observed, that, as preparatory to the study of theoretical philosophy, Plato required from his disciples a knowledge of the elements of mathematics. Upon this subject, although he has not left any express treatise, he has yet made frequent use of mathematical ideas and language to explain and illustrate his philosophical tenets; and he recommends these studies as peculiarly adapted to raise the mind from sensible to intellectual objects, and to inure it to abstract and general conceptions.

Such is a comprehensive sketch of the Platonic philosophy, which has been compiled, and of necessity contracted, from other and more extended treatises on this interesting and important subject. A good deal has been designedly omitted, or but slightly
noticed here, which, however, shall be found more largely and, it is hoped, satisfactorily explained and developed throughout the course of the following work, where it is practically applied; but sufficient, probably, has been said at the outset to give some insight into the character, system, and style of Plato, which in the study of this selected portion of his writings may not appear unuseful.

It is needless to enter here upon the praise or censure to which Plato has been subjected, in the extremes of both; it was only natural that where extraordinary ability and deserts demanded admiration and respect, envy and jealousy should essay to thwart the just award by the ready instrumentality of obloquy and detraction. His respect for his great master, if Plutarch may be credited, was exemplified in his life, in an assimilation of manners, in his equanimity of temper, and in that uniformity of character which is the best proof of sincerity and integrity; ὁτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁδὸς ἐν ἀκαδημίᾳ καὶ πῆς Διονύσιον ὁδὸς πῆς Διώνα.\(^2\)

The doctrines of Plato were expounded in the academy after his decease by his nephew Speusippus, of Athens (died B. C. 339.) He was succeeded by Xenocrates of Chalcedon, one of Plato's favourite pupils, (died B. C. 314.) who in his manner of expression resembled Pythagoras, having, for instance, defined the soul to be a self-moving number. After him Polemo of Athens presided at the academy, who considered the "summum bonum" to consist in a life regulated according to nature; and subsequently Crates of Athens. Finally Crantor of Soli, the friend and disciple of Xenocrates and Polemo, maintained the original system of the founder of the school, with the exception of a few alterations, applied principally to the popular doctrines of practical morality. The name of Crantor is the last of distinction in the Old Academy.

In Germany Plato has been a favourite study of the ablest philosophers, amongst others, John Reuchlin, Leibnitz, and Kant. Amongst his British admirers are to be reckoned Gale and More, Cudworth, Bacon, Berkeley, and Shaftesbury. The minds both of Milton and Gray were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Plato's writings. Of this there is sufficient proof in the Comus, II

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Penseroso, the Tractate on Education, and the Answer to Smecestymnus, of the former. The poems of Gray bear likewise an evident impression of the peculiar philosophical bent of the author's taste. This will appear still more obvious upon reference to his posthumous works, published by Mr. Matthias, in quarto, 1814, which evince upon the subject of Plato's writings, the most earnest study and laborious research.

EDITIONS OF PLATO'S WORKS.


Editio Princeps. Edited by Musurus. (See Roscoe's Leo X. vol. ii. 238—9. 4to. edit.) Although the editorial talents in this edition have been greatly excelled by subsequent scholars, it is still entitled to attention from the number of good manuscripts and ancient publications which were consulted in its compilation.


An elegant, rare, and respectable edition, the joint production of Valderus the printer, and Simon Grynæus, a well known scholar and critic. The Timæus and Politicus have the commentary of Proclus. The text is not so pure as that of the Aldine edition.


This edition, which, upon the whole, copies the preceding, has many curious passages and remarks. It was compiled by Arnoldus Arlenius, who, in travelling through Italy, collected some manuscripts of Plato, and in his own copy of Grynæus' edition marked down the corrupt passages of that work, supplied the chasms, and sent the copy thus corrected to Hopperus, the son-in-law of the printer Petrus, to have it published accordingly. Still it has many errors in common with that of Grynæus.


For the subjoined list and the accompanying remarks the Editor is indebted to that valuable work, "Introduction to the Classics," by the Rev. T. F. Dibdin, London, 1827.
Printed by H. Stephen. This celebrated and magnificent edition is well known in the history of classical literature. The first vol. is dedicated to Queen Elizabeth; the second to James the Sixth of Scotland, (then a boy, and subsequently James the First of England;) and the third to the Republic of Berne. This edition has been subjected to some animadversion. The assistance professed to have been received from different sources, is, in fact, from Ficinus, Aldus, Arlenius, Hopperus, and Cornarius, although their names are studiously suppressed. The Latin version is said not to be so faithful as that of Ficinus. See preface to Fischer’s Dialog. Platonis, Lips. 8vo. 1783; R. Simon’s Bibl. Choisie, t. i. 360; Brucker, Hist. Philosoph. Crit. t. i. c. xii. p. 659; and Harles, Introd. L. Gr. t. i. 397. The text of this edition is deemed very accurate and faithful.

—— Lugduni. 1590. fol. Gr. et Lat.
—— Francof. 1602. fol. Gr. et Lat.

These editions follow the order of Ficinus in the arrangement of the books, and contain his notes and commentaries. In the opinion of John Fabricius (Hist. Bibl. Fabric, t. iii. 189.) they are the best editions of Plato, and preferable to that of Serranus; from which, however, Harles dissents.


One of the few Greek writers, edited by the Bipont Society. The Greek text is taken from Serranus, and the Latin version from Ficinus. The first vol. contains an account of the manuscripts and editions of Plato; the ninth vol. has an excellent tract, or “Introduction to the Reading of the Works of Plato,” the illustrations and arguments of the Dialogues, in a separate volume, are by Professor Tiedemann. It is considered as one of the most beautiful productions of the Deux Ponts press.


The united labours of Bekker, Wolf, and Heindorf, appear in this truly critical and valuable edition. The Latin version is by Wolf. In the arrangement of the text numerous MSS. have been consulted. All the ancient scholia, deserving of being collected, are incorporated. One volume is devoted to an account of the life, doctrine, and writings of Plato.

A very excellent edition. The version, with the exception of the earlier part, which is that of Cornarius, is by the editor. The annotations are admirable, and the indices full and complete.

**Stalbaum.** Lipsae. 1821—25. 8vo. 8 vols. Gr.

These volumes form part of the series of Greek prose-writers, published at Leipsic. They contain the ancient scholia, "from a MS. in the Bodleian library, with the annotations of Ruhnken." The prolegomena and annotations are ample and learned.

There have been three Latin editions of Plato; the first by Marsilius Ficinus, Florence, 1491; the second by J. Cornarius, Basle, 1558; and the third by J. Serranus, Paris, 1578.

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**Detached Works of Plato.**

**Astius.** Politeia sive de Republ. Lips. 1801: reprinted in 1814: 8vo. Gr. Phaedrus, Lips. 1810, 8vo. Gr. with the scholia of Hermias, and a most ample editorial commentary.

**Beister.** Mario, Crito, Alcibiades: Uterque Berol, 1780. 8vo. Gr. with some notes of Gottleber and Schneider. Reprinted in 1790, 1812, and 1822. 8vo.


**Etwall.** Alcibiades et Hipparchus. Oxon. 1771. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. to which is prefixed the life of Plato by Olympiodorus.

**Findeisen.** Gorgias. Gotha, 1796. 8vo. Gr. The editor having died before the completion of his labours, the work was continued and completed by Haas. An excellent edition; with the scholia of Hermias.

last performance, which contains much more than its title announces, is in all respects, the most valuable as well as copious.

Forster. *Dialogi V.* Oxon. 1745. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

First and best edition. It was inaccurately reprinted in 1752.

Heindorf. *Dial. IV.* Lysis, Charmides, Hippias Major, Phaedrus. Berol. 1802. 8vo. Second edition, greatly improved from the publications of Bekker. The latter has a critical annotation on the *Apologia Socratis.* The same editor also published the Gorgias, Theetetus, Parmenides, and Enthymemus. Berol. 1806, 8vo. The labours of Heindorf, inasmuch as they contain according to Fuhrmann, many happy illustrations of difficult passages, are indispensable to the student of Plato.

Muller. *Chrestomathia Platonica.* Turici, 1756. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. The Latin version is that of Serranus.


Wyttenbach. *Phaedon.* Lvgd. Bat. 1810. 8vo. Gr. “We dismiss this volume by stating that the perusal of it has by no means diminished the respect which we had always entertained for the talents and erudition of the learned editor.” Mus. Crit. p. 258—61.

A Variorum Edition of the works of Plato has been published by Mr. Priestly, whose name stands deservedly high in the annals of Greek classical literature; in nine vols. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. Lond. 1826, comprising the annotations of the following editors: Bekker, Astius, Beister, Buttmann, Bockh, Baumgarten, Crusius, Cornarius, Creuzerius, Etwall, Fachse, Findeisen, Fischer, Forster, Gottleber, Heindorf, Heussde, Korner, Lange, Massey, Morgenstein, Muller, Nitzsch, Nurnberger, Pinzger, Raabe, Routh, Stallbaum, Stutzmann, Thomson, Winckler, Wyttenbach, and Zeunius.
The works of Plato have been translated into English by Floyer Sydenham, Taylor, and Spens. "Of Sydenham's translation," observes an accomplished writer, "every scholar will speak with respect, and every man of taste with fondness and regard. Its imperfect and unfinished condition bears with it a deep interest as a memorial of Sydenham's melancholy fate; when a man of the highest talents and most elegant accomplishments, after struggling with the inequalities of fortune, and suffering mortifications, not the less galling because concealed and uncommunicated, gave way to the sudden impulse of his indignant spirit, and quitted a world which he disdained to flatter."

"Spens' work bears the marks of being a version from the French, and not from the original. Taylor's translation is a lamentable contrast to the work of his predecessor Sydenham. It is deficient both in spirit and taste, and the difficulties of the original are not only increased by the translator's grammatical ignorance, but its obscurities are rendered still more impenetrable by idle comments written in the unintelligible jargon of the Alexandrian school."

A. Dacier has translated ten of Plato's dialogues into French, with a life of Plato, and an introduction to his Philosophy prefixed, Paris, 1699. Some of these dialogues had been previously translated by F. de Mauroix, Œuvres de Prose et de Poesie. t. i. 1685. From the French of Dacier an English version was published in 1701, called "Plato abridged." Dardi Bembo published an Italian translation in three vols. Venet. 1601. Selected dialogues were translated also by Sebast. Erici, with notes. The works of Plato were translated into Persian, according to Agathias, lib. ii. by command of Chosroes, king of Persia. Fabricius mentions also a translation of the Republic into the Hebrew tongue, as extant in Bibl.

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a The subject of this beautiful eulogy was a Master of Arts in Wadham College, Oxford. He proposed to publish a translation of the whole works of Plato, but nine dialogues only were completed. He was thrown into prison for a debt to a victualler, and died in 1787 or '88. He was generally beloved for the candour of his temper and gentleness of his manners. His circumstances excited sympathy among the friends of literature in England, and are said to have occasioned the institution of the benevolent Literary Fund.
XXXIV SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, ETC. OF PLATO.

Vatic. upon the authority of J. Bartoloc. Bibl. magna Rabbin. tom. iv. p. 353."

A catalogue of the various works written upon the subject of Plato, his doctrine, and writings, will be found in Tennemann’s Manual of Philosophy, translated by the Rev. A. Johnson, M. A. Oxford, D. A. Talboys, 1832.

Trinity College,

March 19, m.dccc.xxxv.

The edition of Matthiae’s Grammar, to which frequent allusion is made in the course of this work, is the fifth, revised and enlarged by John Kenrick, M. A. London, J. Murray, 1832.

The Reader will please to make the following Corrections:

Page 58. note; read—“without an additional,” &c.
— 99. note; for Sect. 63. read Lect. 63.
— 126. note; read—“deny that they were extant, in a collected form, in the time,” &c.
— 150. note; read—“If anywhere at all,”
— 173. note; for lorsqu’un read lorsqu’un.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.
ARGUMENT.

The Apology consists of three parts; of which the first contains the general answer of Socrates to his accusers, both open and concealed. He meets the objection, that he had brought his misfortunes on himself, by showing that death, which was only feared by those who pretended to wisdom, should never influence him to abandon the course assigned him by integrity and truth. He then proceeds, in a strain of well managed irony, to describe the loss which the Athenians should suffer in him, inasmuch as one who should prefer their interest to his own, and to the prejudice of his personal safety, was not likely to be met with again. He assigns as a reason for his withdrawing from the management of the republic, that his Genius, or Daemon, did not allow him to engage in civil affairs; that his appearance in public had not been different from that of any one in a private capacity, and that he had never fulfilled the office of a public preceptor, or given different instructions to one of his followers from what he prescribed to the rest. He then explains the cause why his acquaintance and conversation were so eagerly courted by numbers of the citizens, whom he proves plainly not to have been corrupted by him, from the sympathy they evinced in his distress, and their solicitude to extricate him from peril. In fine, he manifests to his judges his courage and magnanimity, by declining to avail himself of those appeals to their pity and compassion, which were usually adopted by the accused, and which he had refused to resort to, not through pride, but because such conduct would be but little consistent with his general reputation for wisdom. Besides, he would have shown but little respect for the laws, had he endeavoured by supplications and tears to mislead their ministers, and so to check the progress of justice and truth.

The second part of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have addressed to his judges, when he had been condemned by their first sentence, and was directed to assign his own penalty; an order with which he was so far from complying, that he asserted himself, on the contrary, to be worthy rather of public support in the Prytaneum; since it could not be just, that one who had never done injury to others should wrong himself. Having added, then, a few observations upon his plan of life, he offers to fine himself in a sum evidently expressive of his self-acquittal.

The third portion of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have said after he had been condemned to die; in which he first forewarns the authors of his sentence of the evils which were likely to befall them, in consequence of their injustice towards him; then addressing himself to those who had moved for his acquittal, he expresses his readiness to encounter death, which he had ceased to regard as a misfortune; the Deity having given him no intimation of any calamity having been likely to befall him, either at his departure from home, or when he came before the tribunal. Hence he was induced to hope, that what was about to occur was to be regarded as a blessing; for if death were an end of all consciousness, it could not be a misfortune, and if it were the passage to a better life, it should be a blessing. Therefore, he entertained no feelings of enmity or anger towards those by whom he was condemned, since he had learned to regard his decease as, in any case, desirable to himself. Adding a few words upon the subject of his children, he concludes in a manner worthy of the intrepidity and integrity which had made his life eminent, and his fame imperishable.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

§. 1. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθητε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οίδας ἐγὼ δ' οὖν

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.] This apology contains the substance of the defence delivered by Socrates, in answer to the accusations of Anytus, Melitus, and Lycon, who brought a two-fold charge against him; the introduction of new gods, to the prejudice of those already acknowledged, and the corruption of the Athenian youth. His accusers, influenced solely by an invidious jealousy of his great reputation, espoused, severally, the cause of the different classes to which, from the severity of his censures, the philosopher had become an object of extreme dislike. Anytus urged his condemnation in behalf of the craftsmen and burghers, whilst Lycon advocated the interests of the rhetoricians, and Melitus of the poets.

Several apologies were drawn up for Socrates by his own immediate friends, or admirers of his wisdom and integrity: of these, two only, beside the present, are now extant, one by Libanius, and the other compiled by Xenophon, from the instructions of Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus. As the writer was absent, himself, from Athens at the period of the trial, the work was but indifferently executed; it is useful, however, as corroborating the leading points of the above. Lysias, who was one of the most distinguished orators of the age, prepared a defence, which he submitted to Socrates, to be delivered in presence of the judges. It was highly and elaborately wrought, but the philosopher declined it, observing, that with all its merits as a composition, it was deficient in those qualities which were best adapted to evince the magnanimity, firmness, and dignity, no less requisite for the position in which he was then placed, than he had previously considered them for the purposes of his profession. Hence he preferred the plainness and simplicity, at all times characteristic of his argumentative discussions, and the efficacy of which he had long learned to appreciate, to the ordinary form of a forensic address, with which he was but little familiar, and which consequently, under the circumstances, it should have been hazardous to adopt.

The law which Socrates was accused of having violated, and by which he was condemned, appears, according to the digest and commentary of the learned Petit upon the Athenian laws, to have been the following, the second in the code: Θεσμὸς ἀιώνιος τοῖς Αθηναῖοι νεομένως κύριος τὸν ἀπαντα χρό-
καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· ἀτῶ πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοὶ ἀληθὲς γε ὅς ἔτος εἶπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὁν ἐφεύσαντο, τούτο ἐν ὃ ἔλεγον ὁς χρὴν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβείσθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς

von, Theouς τιμῶν καὶ Ἰωάς, ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ, ἐμπαινίους νόμους παρῴους, ἱδία, κατὰ εὐνάμενάν σὺν εὐφημία, καὶ ἄρχαίς καρπῶν πελάνουσι ἐπίστευς. The infringement of this law brought the offender before the court of the Areopagus, where he also received sentence, as appears in the case of St. Paul, Acts, xvii. 18, and Diodorus, surnamed Αθέως, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. As Socrates, however, though charged with a similar offence, does not appear to have been summoned before the same tribunal, Petit conjectures that it only took cognizance of such delinquencies, when committed by those who were not freemen of Athens, as in the instances mentioned above; "Licetque suspicari, civibus dicam (hujuscemod) non fuisse scriptam apud Areopagitas, sed peregrinis tantum, quales erant male compositum par B. Paulus et Diodorus." In Legg. Attic. Comment. S. Petit. § I. "Ο, τι μὲν."

Le Clerc, Art. Crit. i. p. 165. Amstel. reads ὀ μὲν; Cod. Coislin. 155. apud Montefulcon. Catal. bibl. Coisl. p. 218. Τί μὴν ἡμῖν πετυόνθει. Fisch. Tr. How, or, in what degree, you have been influenced, men of Athens, by my accusers. For the construction of ὑπὸ with a neuter verb, see Matthiae, Gr. s. 496. 3.

"Ω ἄνθρωπε Ἀθηναῖος."

In so addressing his judges, Socrates pays them a peculiar compliment; Ἀθηναῖος signifying not merely a citizen of Athens, but more emphatically, one who was worthy of such a privilege, as being eminently remarkable for every moral and social quality. See cap. 17. a med. ὅτι ὁ ἀριστε ἄνθρωπον Ἀθηναίος ὄν, &c. Stagg.

"Ὑπ’ αὐτῶν."

Pro eorum oratione. Stagg, who compares it with ὑπὸ φοβοῦ, ὑπὸ ὀδίας, ὑπὸ μίσους, &c.

"Ὀλίγον."


"Ὡς ἐποί εἰπεῖν."

For ὡς ἐν (ἐν) λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, in one word; or συντόμως, concisely. Fisch. There is some difference of opinion upon the exact meaning of this phrase. Le Clerc considers it as intended to soften or qualify an expression which might otherwise appear too harsh, and so compares it to the French, pour dire le mot. This is approved by Weiske, in reference to the passage in the text, and several other instances where the form occurs. Stephens also prefers a nearly similar interpretation, ut ita dicam; prope direxim. Thes. Ling. Graec. in voc. V. Cousin renders it, a parer franchement.

"Οὐδέν."

Several editions read οὐδέν; which, however, is the Ἑλληνικ form, and not likely to have occurred in an Attic writer.

"Μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῶν, κ. Τ. Λ."

But one, in particular, of the many falsehoods which they advanced, I wondered at in them; αὐτῶν being masculine, and referring to the accusers. Stagg. See Matthiae Gr. s. 317, and Obs.

"Ἐν ὃν."

By or through which; an ordinary acceptance of ἐν, especially in Pindar, when a mean or cause is assigned, on which something depends. Matthiae Gr. s. 577. Viger. c. lxx. s. 3. 11.

"Ὡς χρήμα, κ. Τ. Λ."

The imperfect. χρήμα, εἶτε, προσθήκεν, are often used, not for the presents, but like the Latin oportebat, debemum, to denote that something should be, or should have been, which is not; so Cic. Phil. i. 11, "Irasci quidem vos mihi—non oportebat."—Hence the accusers are to be understood as charging the Athenians with having neglected the precaution, which the character of Socrates had rendered indispensable, against deception on his part.
Aristoph. ἄρα μὴ αἰσχυνθῇναι ὅτι αὐτός ύπ’ ἐμοὶ ἐξελεγχθόσωσται ἔργον; επειδὰν μηδ’ ὁπωσιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτο μοι ἐδοξέων αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, ἐμὴ ἀρα δεινὸν καλῶσιν οὕτω λέγειν τὸν τάλθη λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντος, ὀμολογοῦν ἂν ἐγώγε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτος εἶναι ὑπὲρ. οὕτω μεν οὐν, ὡς περ ἐγὼ λέγω,

Δεινὸν.] Ingenious, keen, crafty, opp. to ἱπώτης, or eloquent. Hermog. Formul. Orat. iii. 9; and περὶ Μεθὸδου Δεινὸτητος. It is sometimes used with a preposition; Aristot. Pol. δεινός περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας. Aristoph. B. 968. δεινὸς εἰς τὰ πάντα; and with a preposition understood; Xen. δεινὸς ταῦτην τὴν τέχνην; more frequently with an infinitive; Plat. Prot. δεινὸς γράφειν. Aristoph. N. 243. δειν. φαγεῖν.

"Ορ.͜] Edit. Bass. and Forst. ὅ τι, which Heindorf, edit. 2nda, 1805, approves. Either reading is admissible, as τὸῦτο might be easily understood before ὅ τι, instead of which it is, however, more likely Plato would have written ὅ simply; whence the reading in the text has been sanctioned by the best authorities.

Μη’ ὁπωσιοῦν.] Ne tantillum quidem; nulla ex parte; nulla teneas. Stall. According to Phavorinus and Thom. Mag. ὁπωσιοῦν is the Attic form of ὁπως- ετῶν: whence, however, it must not be concluded that the latter was unusual with Attic writers. Ducer. ad Thucyd. vii. 49. Intp. ad Xen. Cyr. i. 4. 15. With this opinion of the philosopher, in regard to his own powers, compare Cic. Orat. iii. 16. "Quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is, qui omnium eruditorum testimonio, totiusque judicio Gracia; cum prudentia et acumen, et venustate, et subtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, coipa, quam se cuncto in partem dedisset facile princeps."


Εἰ μὴ ἀρα.] Unless perehance. ἀρα is very commonly subjoined to another word, and so takes nearly the signification of τοῦν or ἵνα. Aristid. Plat. Sympos. Εἰ μὴ ἀρα ἐν τῷ Ἡλλοῦρ πεδίῳ τὸ Ἐν Σεμπότον συνεκπειτοῖ: Νisi forte in Campus Elysias, ἵκεν. Viger.

Οὗτοι.͜] Correctly, instead of αὐτοῖ, which is found in several editions; because the former implies contempt; so Crit. cap. 4. a med. τοὺσ τοῦς συκο- φάντας, &c.

"Εγώγε:͜] I, indeed, at least, or, I, for one. Although γε as well as μὲν may be commonly rendered by quidem, indeed, and both particles are of a restrictive character, yet they differ in the following respects: μὲν regards the whole, and γε only parts of propositions; μὲν excludes other things, γε distinguishes something as most remarkable among other things, but not so as to exclude them; hence, μὲν has ὅ for its opposite, but γε ὅ has no opposing particle. The distinction effected by γε may, consequently, be twofold, in expressing what is least or what is greatest; the former is more common by which γε may be rendered as above; so Dem. de Corn. εἰ μὴ ὅλον, μέρος γε, &c.

Οὐ κατὰ τοῦτος.͜] Μοι oratorum esse istorum dissimilem, quam ego vera dicam, non falsa. Stall. Murectus Varr. Lectt. iii. 3. would omit ὅ, and so understand Socrates to say, that if his adversaries made eloquence to consist in truth, he was an orator upon their principle. But, as Fischer correctly observes, Socrates evidently intends to express his assent, should such be the opinion of his accusers, to its justice, and in proof of this, he did not act as they did, and deal in falsehoods; he was an orator, according to their principle, for he spoke the truth, but not according to their practice, for they dealt in lies. V. Cousin renders ὅβ κατὰ τοῦτον, by non pas a leur ma- nière. Κατὰ is frequently used to express similitude: as Gen. ii. 18. ὅπόθεν κατ’ αὐτὸν, h.e. ὅμοιον αὐτῷ, Hesych. and Phavor., as in ν. 20. ὅποθζ ὅμοιος αὑτῳ, which is rendered in the Vulgate, B 2
oυδὲν ἄλθησε εἰρήκασιν' ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πάς
σαν τὴν ἄλθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δι', ὥς ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλλιεπτημένους γε λόγους, ὡς περ ὦ
τούτων ρήμασι τε καὶ ὄνομασιν, ὡδε κεκοσμημένους,
ἄλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὄνο-
μασι πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἁ λέγω, καὶ μηδεῖς
ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. ὦδε γὰρ ἕν ὅ που
πρέποι, ὥς ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἥλικίᾳ, ὡς περ μειρακίῳ
πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίεναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ

adjutorium similis sibi. So Job, i. 8.

Gloss. κατὰ σε' ὁμοίως σοι.

Οὐδὲν ἄλθησε.] Several editions

read ἦ τι ὑ ὁδεῖν ἄλθηθ. κ. τ. λ. which

is approved by Stallbaum, and explain-

ed, nihil progenuendum veri dixerat.

The form ἦ τις η ὁδεῖν is negative, yet with

the expression of doubt, next to none.

Herod. iii. 140, ἀναβαίνει ὑ τις η ὁδεῖς

καί παρ ὑμᾶς ἄντων; whence

the passage may be rendered, according
to this reading, they have hardly spoken
any truth.

Πάσαιν τὴν ἄλθειαν.] Omnem

rem. Fisc. The whole truth; oppos. to

κεκαλλιεπτὴ λόγον, as εἰκῇ λεγόμενα, inscr.

to κεκοσμημένοι.

Κεκαλλιεπτημένου λόγους.] Valcke-

naer. Distrib. in Eurip. reliquum. ex-

plains καλλιεπτιν, uti oratione verum sa-

t eleganti, elegantier abierit; whence,

λόγοι κεκαλιεπτημένου ρήμασι τε καὶ

ὄνομασι, orationes et sententias venustis,

et verbis elegantibus composite.

The distinction must be observed here be-
tween ρήμασα and ὄνομασα; the for-

mer signifying the sentiments of the

speaker, the latter, the terms in which

they were conveyed. Κεκοσμημένοι,

sc. λόγους, orationes ornatas; baranges

set off by rhetorical ornament, tropes, &c.

Εἰκῇ λεγόμενα.] Orationem subito ac

sine previa meditatione quasi proflum.

STALL. His genius or angel prevented

Socrates from preparing a formal de-
fence, as appears from his reply when

pressed to do so by Hermogenes, the

son of Hipponicus, with whom he was on
terms of the closest friendship; ἄλλα

ναι μὰ Δι, καὶ ὥς ἢ ἐπιχειρησαν-

tος μον σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας

ἐναντίονται μοι τὸ ἱάμορον. Xen.

Socr. Apol. sec. iv. and Mem. iv. 8. 5.

Τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὄνομασι, h. e. nullo

verborum delectu institutum, sed verba quo

sponte quasi se offerant. STALL. Les

termes qui se présenteront a moi les pre-
niers. COUSIN. The phrase is incor-

rectly rendered by Fischer, verba vul-

garía et trita; Socrates merely asserts

his intention of expressing the truth in

the most simple and unpremeditated lan-
guage.

Ὑπερ τυ ἦλικίᾳ.] h. e. Non deceruit

seuem, quals ego sum. STALL. The ab-

stract term being used in the text for the

concrete; whence it is opposed to μει-

ρακίῳ. Socrates was upwards of se-

venty years old at the time of his pub-

lic accusation.

Μειρακίῳ.] A dimin. from μειραξ;

qu. εἰράζε, from εἰρω; qui jam est ea

stare ut fari possit. KOPEN. The period

of life to which μειράκιον is applied,

was generally considered subsequent to

that of the ἡδοντές.—πλάτστην, in

music and declamation, signifies, to fol-

low an affected style, in which sense it

is to be taken in the text. Its derivative

πλάτσμα, in music, signifies studied

ornament, as opposed to simplicity; in

declamation, an affected and dedi-
cate, as opposed to a bold and man-

ly delivery.—εἰς ὑμᾶς ἱσούναι, i. e.

εἰς τὸ ἐκκατάργημα εἰσίναι; so De-

necsth. adv. Spuation initi. ἀλλ' ὄστος

μὲν ἱερός φέρει, πολλακίς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἑθο-

μενοῦ εἰσίναι, and inscr. cap. 10.

οὐ τολμῶν ἀναφαίνειν εἰς τὸ πλάθος τὸ

ὑμῖν ὄραν, h. e. προβέβλειν εἰς εἰσίναινεν.

Hence it appears that ποῦς would be

incorrectly substituted, as some proposed,

for εἰς in the text. STALL.
Παρόμοια] I implore, conjure; so Phavorinus: pariesibai tov tov parantysthia dvinon exexe tov tov υμων εδιημαι και παοιμαι. Timaeus explains it likewise by παιρωμαι. Gloss. Platon., upon which Ruhnken: "Hujus rarissimae notionis ratio, nondum, quod sciam, explicata, pendet ab in- dole mediorem. Ut igitur et ιδιμα et μιπτo, άραι et ιδιμα μιτί μιθι volo, i. e. κυπιo, peto; sic παριμα admitto, παοιμαι ad me admeiti volo, i. e. precer, de- precor." Some derive it from τεμα, κυπίo. Abresch. Actuar. Thucyd. 376.

Καὶ ἐν ἄγορα.] Socrates was continually before the public. Early in the morning he used to frequent the gymnas- sia and the promenades. When the for- rum was most crowded, he was sure to be found there; and throughout the day, wherever he could meet with the greatest concourse. His discussions were nu- merous and lengthy, to which all who wished might attend. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 10.—ιτι των τραπεζων; in some editions this is preceded by και, which, however, is not noticed by Fieinus, as will appear by reference to the Latin translation. It does not occur either in a similar expression, Hipp. Min. p. 368. B. ἐν ἄγορα ἵτι ταις τραπεζαις; nor can it be correctly introduced in its or- dinary sense, for the τραπεζαι were in the forum, and Socrates alludes here to his custom of resorting to the tables of the money-changers, and conversing with the noble and wealthy citizens by whom they were frequented. The corres- ponding phrase to the above is και ἀλλωθι, h. e. in officinis et palestris: upon which Fisher quotes Aristid. Ovrat. Platon. T. iii. p. 223. ὁτι πλείστα Αθηναίων ἐτι των τραπεζων και των ἱραστη- ριων διελέγετο. "Ἀλλωθι is a form pe- culiar to the Attic writers, who use, however, ἀλλαγοθι in common with the rest of the Greeks. So Moris: "Ἀλλο- θι,—Ἀττικώς,—ἀλλαχθι—Ἀπτικώς, καὶ ἔλληνως.

Μητρας θυργανι.] This was a com- mon form of address adopted by the Grecian orators, when the subject of their discourse was likely to prove un- palatable to their hearers. θυργανι signifies to cause disturbance, to express disapprobation by tumult and noise, es- pecially at a public meeting

Διεστηρομ.] This was the basi- λεως εικαστηρομ, or regal tribunal, situated in the forum, near the Στοιχεια του Ἐλευθερου; and so called from the βασιλεως, or king-archon, the title of the second archon, who held his court of judicature in the royal portico, where he decided all disputes occurring between the priests and sacred families, the Ceryces, Eteatabudes, &c., to whom certain offices in the celebration of divine worship belonged by inheritance.

"Ἐνη γεγονος πλεον εξδομηκοντα.] More than seventy years old. When ἐλαττων, πληον, πλειον are followed by a numeral, ἡ, than, is often omitted. Thucyd. vi. 93. ἡ λεια ἑπραθη ταλε- των ουκ ἐλαττων πέστε και ἤκοσων. So in Latin, amplius.

Ἀτεχνος.] Ἀλθεως και χωρίς πα- νυσιασια, και ουν ἀπλάστως. Tim. Lec. Platon. I am, therefore, absolutely unacquainted with the form of language here: fully, ἐγω εγω ἐρμαυτων περι τις ἐνθαδε λέξεως. ἐγω, with an ad- verb, is elegantly joined, in the Attic, to a genitive case, taking in such instances, for the most part, the sense and force of the adverb; so ἕνθατως ἐγω, to be unable; τοιτων ὅλογως ἐγω, to ne- glect these things. By ἡ ἐνθαδε λέξες
Socrates intends to designate the peculiar character of a forensic address.

"Ως περ οὖν ἄν, κ. τ. λ. ["Åν is sometimes redundant, when the principal proposition to which it belongs is divided by a parenthesis, as in the text, and Soph. Antig. 466, ἀλλ' ἄν, εἰ τῶν εἰς ἑαυτὸς μητρὸς θανάτον ἀθαντον εἰς τεχνίαν νεκών, κείνους ἀν ἢ λέγοντων.—Matth. Gr. s. 600, 5.

Τοῦτο ἡκαίον:] 1. q. Τοῦτο ὡς ἡκαίον τι; so cap. 3. ταύτι μοι ἐκεῖ ἢκαίον λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

Ἀυτὴ ἄρετη:] The article being expressed, the sentence runs thus, αὐτὴ ἡ ἄρετη (sc. ut videat, utrum vera dicatur nece,) ἡκαίον ἢστιν. However, when the pronoun forms the subject, and the substantive the predicate of a proposition, the article is frequently omitted. STALL. V. Engelhardt ad Lachet. s. 1. "Αρετὴ here signifies the duty; in the Attic writers it is most commonly used to denote a moral virtue.

§ 2. Δικαιὸς εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι.] Me respondere par est, vel equum est. Marg. Steph. I am justified in defending myself; for τικαίως ἢστιν ἢμι ἀπολογίσασθαι, or ὡς ἐγὼ ἀπολογίσασθαι as Crit. ι. ἡμεῖς—ἐκαίοι ἡσ-
and instigated the adversities of Socrates; whence Horace, Sat. ii. 4. 3, "Anyti reum;" he was by birth an Athenian, son of Anthemion; and from the successful exercise of his trade as a tanner, had attained to great opulence, a circumstance which, together with the nature of his occupation, drew upon him the sarcastic ridicule of the philosopher, and also of Theopompos and Archippus. His considerable wealth, and the service he had rendered the republic in assisting Thrasybulus towards the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, and the restoration of public freedom, gave him a powerful and extensive influence among the citizens, of which he fully availed himself on the present occasion. He was subsequently condemned to exile, and retired to Hercules, where he was not allowed by the inhabitants to remain a single day.—Diog. Laert. ii. 38. 43. See cap. 10.

"Εκείνοι δεινότεροι."

It is beyond a doubt that Socrates here alludes to the invectives contained in the Nubes of Aristophanes. But many, with good reason, have conjectured that the philosopher does not intend to condemn the poet himself, whom it is unlikely that Plato would have introduced as in familiar converse with Socrates in the Symposium, had he been a bitter or implacable enemy. V. Fr. A. Wolf. Prolegomen. ad Nubes Aristoph. p. 3. sqq. and Reisig. Prefat. ad Nub. p. 12, sqq. Whence it may be concluded that the words in the text are rather intended to apply to the sophists and poets generally, who were not content with having ridiculed the philosopher and his tenets, in the first instance, but subsequently laboured to inflame against him the odium and angry passions of the ignorant crowd. It appears from the testimony of numerous ancient writers, that Socrates had proved a fertile subject for more than one of the comic poets, Euripus, amongst the rest, who treated him with considerable severity. V. Scholiat. Aristoph. ad Nub. v. 96. See infr. c. iii. εν τῷ Ἀριστοφ. κ. τ. ἅ. STALL.

"Μετέωρα φροντιστῆς."

A speculator in celestial matters. So Horace, Epist. ii. 12, 15, "Nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures." The title in the text was one by which, amongst the ancients, natural philosophers were commonly designated. It would appear that Socrates, in early life, had not confined his attention solely to ethics, but had engaged with some zeal in the subtle discussions of the philosophers in physical science; whence he is occasionally called, simply, φροντιστῆς, and his school or study, φροντιστήμων, Aristoph. Nub. 95, sqq. STALL. FORST. See Mitch. Aristoph. ii. p. 17. n.

"Ὑπὸ γῆς," Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Norib. Forst. ς ὑπὸ γῆς; but Bas. 2, ὑπὸ γῆς, which is the Attic form, and correct. Fisch. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, κ. τ. λ. So Aristophanes, of the disciples of Socrates; Σητοῦσιν οὕτω τὰ κατὰ γῆς—Nub. 118, and Οὕτω δὲ ἐξεζωδεσάν ὑπὸ τὸν Τάδαραφ. 193. FORST.

Καὶ τὸν ἤπτω λόγον, κ. τ. λ.] Aristoph. Nub. 113. ΣΤΡΕΨ."Εἶναι παρ᾽ ἀντίσει φαινέν ἄρμο τῷ λόγῳ. Τὸν κριτίττον, ὡστε ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἤπτωνα, Τοῦτον τὸν ἤπτων τοῖν λόγον τὸν ἀναφέρων Νεκρώ λέγεται ὕποι ταύτικα.

Ταύτην τίν πόθην.] Heindorf proposes to read οἱ ταύτην, κ. τ. λ.; but
the article is unnecessary since the partici-
ple κατασκευά. expresses the mode by
which this class of the accusers became
especially mischievous. Ίστι quod com
famae sparsorum graces et periculosi
accusatores extirparunt. STALL. mov
would seem to be required after φή-
μην, but Plato appears to have omitted
it, lest its subsequent repetition should
offend the ears of the auditors. FISCH.
'Εν ᾧ ἄν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε. ]
"Τωμ εκ τατε ὁμίλησε δίκαιον, θα
maxime credere possediss." WOLF; ap-
proved by Stall. who understands by
ἀν—ἐπιστεύσατε, the liability to which
childhood is subject of having its con-
didence abused, and not that the judges
had actually been imposed upon, by
those who would willingly have availed
themselves of youth and inexperience to
instil the more easily their unfounded
prejudices. Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 509.
c.
Μειράκια.] Serranus reads παιδί
ς κἀ μειράκια ἄτεχνως, q. d. in-
feriore cetera etiam quattuor; explain-
ing μειράκια by πωετικοί, and joining
ἄτεχνως with it, to make the phrase
more emphatic; and some of you abso-
lutely children; Forster, however, and
after him the later editions, adopted
the reading as supr. Ficinus, Lat. in-
terp., appears to agree with Serranus.
'Ἐρήμην.] Δίκη is understood in
ἐρήμην, a cause or trial, in which one of
the litigants fails to appear; or in which,
as above, the accused is not present.
This was called, εἰς τὴν κυρίαν οὐκ
ὁφθήναι, or μὴ ἀπαντήσαι; so De-
mesth. in Mid. 540. 22. ed. Reisk. Δί-
κην ἐν τοῖς λαχω ὑποστοι κατηγο-
ρίας, ἔλλον ἐφικα. (I obtained a de-
cision against him in his absence; on his
failure of appearance.) Ωίγος ἀπήνητι. Bas'. Ellips. by Sweyer. Whence ἐρήμην
κατηγορίαν, to accuse one in his absence.
According to the Athenian code, a day
was appointed for the accused to answer
the charges preferred against him; if
he did not appear, he was condemned
in consequence, and the sentence was
called εἰς ἐρήμην κατηγορίας θήραι,
and ἐρήμην ὀφλισάκανεν. But if, within
the space of ten days, he presented him-
self, with any feasible excuse for his ab-
sence, the former sentence was annulled;
and this proceeding was called ἐκό μὴ
ὁδηγό, after which the trial went on
afresh. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. xx.
Κωμῳδίσται.] Ald. Bas. 1. 2.
Norib. Steph. κωμῳδίσται; but the
text is correct. Κωμῳδίσται, 'Αττικῶνά
κωμῳδίσται, Ἑλληνικῶς. Morris
apud Pierson. Socrates alludes here
to Aristophanes and the comic poets
already mentioned.
Φθορά καὶ εἰμαβολὴ χρώμενον.] i. e.
Φθοροντες καὶ εἰσαβδόλους. STALL.
Ἀπηρώται.] Most perplexing:
tales qui minime possint appragnari et
covinere. STALL. Fischer explains κα-
τήγορος ἀπότομον by criminatores inex-
pressuables, quod appragnare, conferencre,
aut omnino non aut agere licet. Some
editions read ἀπεράτοται; but a simi-
lar use is made of the reading in the
text, in Lysid. where ἀπότομοι προσφη-
ροσθαι is applied to those whom it was
difficult to manage in argument. Fici-
nus must have adopted the former, as he
renders the passage, *hi omnes infiniti om-nino sunt*, which is plainly incorrect.  

"Αναβιβάσασθαι."] To bring forward.  
Scap. Lex. "In voce media *αναβιβάζο-μαι*, ascensurum produco, prodire facio, produco.*"  

Σκαμαχεῖν.] To contend with a shadow.  

Εἶν.] This term was used by the Attic writers to express their having discussed sufficiently one branch of a subject, and their engaging in another.  
Stall. ad Euthyphr. p. 88. sqq.  

"Εξελίσθαι τίν έιαβολήν.] h. e.  
Adimere et evelere animis vestris malam de me opinionem. Stall. who explains *ειαβολήν* by *μαλα επιθετήν καταγγελίαν* and *εργαλείον διαγγελίαν*.  

Πλέον τί.] Socrates was desirous to effect something further than the mere removal of the unfavorable impression caused by the calumnies of his adversaries, from the minds of his judges; he wished it to be replaced by one of an opposite character, which he trusted to establish in the course of his defence.  

Γραφήν ταύτην.] Γραφή means an indictment or legal accusation of a public delinquent; *έικη*, as opp. to *γραφή*, is applied to a private cause, suit, or action, pleaded in a court of justice; but, taken absolutely, it signifies either public or private suits, *Γράφεσθαι* *γραφήν* is an ordinary form, as also *γράφεσθαι τι*-*να*; hence the verb is often used with a double accusative, as in the text.
"Oc per oin katagoryon, k. t. l.] Debet accusatio eorum ut libellus accusatorum propri dictorium recitari.—Stall. Ἀντωμοσία. Tim. Plat. Lex. γραφή κατά τίνος ἐνορκος, περὶ ὧν ἰδείκνυσα βοῦν. At Athens, an oath was required of both parties at trial; the plaintiff swore ἀλήθεια κατηγορεῖν, to allege the truth; the defendant, ἀλήθεια ἀπολογῆσαι, to make true defence. This oath, on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, was called ἀντωμοσία; a term which was also applied to the information upon oath of the accuser; accusationis formula, Fisch; written upon a tablet, whence ἀναγύναι, supr. and delivered to the judge. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. vol. i. c. 21. 

Περιεργάζεται.] Is officiously inquiry. Περιεργάζεσθαι, proprie est curioso aliquam rem tractare adeoque niumin studii in re aliqua ponere; deinde curare ea, qua nihil ad te pertinent: curare res iuanes, vanas, inutiles, ut supr. Stall.

Ἐπουράνια.] i. q. Metéora, supr. c. 2. and infr. c. 10. So Senece, Quest. Naturr. ii. 1, "celestial etiam sublimia vocat, hoc est, nubiā, imbes, nives, et humanas motura tontiura mentes, quæcumque aec factum putitur." Fisch.

Τὸν ἦπτῳ λόγον κειστὸν.] Quintil. ii. 16. 3. "Nam et Socrati obiecitum comici, docere eum, quomodo pereore causam meliorem faciat." Fisch.

Ἀεροβατεῖν.] Hesych. interp. eis τὸν ἄμμο περιστεῖν. See Aristoph. Nub. 226, where Socrates is introduced as suspended in a basket in the air, and to the inquiry of Strepsiades, πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ τι εἴρας, αὐτιβολά, κατεστε μου, replying, ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἤλιον. In like manner Alarisi, the Pythagorean, was called Αἰθροβατής.—Porphy. in. Vit. Pythag. sec. 29. According to Stallbaum, the learned have erred in concluding, that from Socrates having been, in the first instance, represented by Aristophanes as morose in his disposition, and ridiculous in his pursuits, he was subsequently condemned as a slanderer and a sophist. For a considerable time had elapsed since the first representation of the clouds; the play was unsuccessful, and the poet and philosopher were on such terms of intimacy afterwards, that the former could either never have intended to be seriously malicious; or, if he had been carried away so far as to commit a wanton injury upon an innocent and inoffensive object, he found good reason to regret his error. Hence Stallbaum infers that the allusion which Socrates makes to the comedy, is at once ironical and sarcastic; he appears to talk gravely upon a subject which in reality afforded only occasion for mirth, and so inflicts a severe censure upon the folly of his accusers, who, in the warmth of their animosity, availed themselves of arguments which were either unfounded in fact, or merely advanced in jest. Victor Cousin, in his Nouveaux Fragmens Philosopiques, Paris, 1829. p. 151. sqq. gives it as his opinion, that Aristophanes made a complete distinction between the doctrine of Socrates and his character and abilities. V. Aristoph. Brunck. p. 65. t. 2. "Ἀλλὰμ πολλῶν φλαρίαν." See Aristoph. Nub. 223. sqq. 

"Οὐν ἐγὼ οὖνεξ, κ. τ. λ.] "Οὐν is governed of πείρα, before ἐπαίω, which is used in construction either with a ge-
Aполoγία Σωκράτους. 11

rhitorician, born at Leontium, a town of Sicily. According to Suidas, he was the first who moulded rhetoric to an art. His talent for extemporaneous eloquence commanded the admiration and respect of all Greece; and during an abode of some years at Athens, in the office of ambassador, he received from that state the most flattering testimonies of their consideration. He enriched himself by giving courses of public lectures, for which he exacted from each of his disciples one hundred minae. Pausanias relates, Phoc. ch. 18, that he presented the temple at Delphi with a gilded statue of himself, and that after a life full of glory, he died, aged one hundred and five years; according to Diog. Laertius, Suidas, and Philostratus, at one hundred and nine years old. Diog. Laert. 9. 52. Cic. de Orat. i. 22. iii. 32. Platon. Gorg.—Prodicus was born at Ceos, one of the Cyclades, he was a rhetorician and physician, a disciple of Protagoras, and cotemporary of Democritus. Xenophon has preserved his beautiful allegory, the judgment of Hercules. He devoted himself with great assiduity to ascertaining and fixing the exact meaning of words. His instructions were never gratuitous, and he justified his conduct in this particular by his favourite maxim from Epicurus; 'α ἐὰ χεὶρ τῶν χειρική μίζει ἐός τι καὶ λαβῇ τι.—Hippias was born in Elis, a city of Peloponnesus; in wealth, reputation, and prosperity, he was in no respect inferior to Gorgias, to whose eloquence his own bore a marked resemblance. He was charged with several missions of importance by the Lacedemonians, and always acquitted himself with high credit and honourable distinction. Platon. Hipp. Min. Cratyl. passim.

Προίκα.] Κατὰ ἑωρείαν, ἄνευ μισθοῦ, Σηχολ.

Τούτων πείθουσι.] The usual kind of anacolouthon is that of a writer commencing a period in the way which the process of his speech requires, but afterwards, and especially after some interpolations which make the hearer forget the beginning of the construction, passing over to a new construction; as in the text, where the τούτων in the beginning of the sentence refers to the sophists already mentioned, and both the process of the speech, and its emphasis, required the new period to commence with any one of them is capable of persuading young people, &c. The following proposition must then have had the infinitive to correspond to οίων τε ἔστιν. But farther on, the mention of the young people being interpolated with circumstances rendered necessary to establish a contrast, (the young people, who are at liberty to have a gratuitous intercourse with any of their fellow-citizens whom they like,) the writer forsakes his construction, of which the grammatical junction is now obscured, and finds it more natural to refer with a second τούτων to the νέους, and to commence a new construction, τούτων πείθουσι—i.e. those sophists persuade the young people, &c. Buttmann's Intermed. Gr. Gr. pp. 422, 423. The terms ξυνεῖται and ξυνοικία are applied to the habits of intercourse which existed between master and pupil; whereas auditors or disciples are generally called οἱ ξυνοίκους. Stal.

'Ανήρ Πάρος.] Evenus, born in the island of Paros, a sophist and elegiac poet. Harpocr. in voc. ἄνω-γράφων Εὐρύπου ἐλεγείον ποιήσας, ὀμόνυμοις ἄλληλοις, καθάπερ Ἑρα-τοσθένης ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἀρχονογραφῶν,
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

Poris, ὑπὸ ὑσθῶμην ἐπιδημοῦντα ἐτυχον γὰρ πρὸσ-  
"ων ἀνδρὶ δέ τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλεῖον ἡ  
ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου. τοῦτον  
οὖν ἀνήρμον—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν δύο νείε—Ωι Καλ-  
λία, ἢν δ' ἦγο, εἰ μὲν σοῦ τῷ νείε πόλω ἡ μόσχω  
ἐγενέσθην, εἰχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ  
μισθώσασθαι ὅσ' ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθο ποιή-  
σειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν: ὅδ' ἄν οὕτος ἦ τῶν  
ἰππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνϑρώ-  
ποω ἔστον, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν μῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;  
τίς τῆς τουιάτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολι-  
τικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἴμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ  
τὴν τῶν νεόν ἀθησίν. ἔστι τις, ἐφην ἔγω, ἦ οὐ;  
Pάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὦς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἦγο, καὶ ποιάτος; καὶ  
πόρου διδάσκει; Εὐνήνος, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος,  
pέντε μνών. Καὶ ἔγο τὸν Εὐνήνον ἐμακαρίσα, εἰ ὡς  
ἄληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς  

Ἀρφιστήροις ἴσην Παρίους εἶναι  
γωνιζέσθαι εἰ ὅσιν τῶν νεότερων  
mάνων. μέρημα εἰ θατέροι αὐτῶν  
καὶ Πλάτων.

"Ον ἢγο ὑσθῶμην ἐπιδημοῦντα.| Ad  
quem enim aliando animam adderti in  
nostra urbe commerciante. STALL.  
Socrates had not seen Evenus, but had  
heard from Callias what he was going to  
state concerning him. It is probable  
that Ficinus read ἔσθην or ἐσώμην,  
See Lat. interp.

"Ος τετέλεκε, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. qui  
inter omnes, qui apud nos sapientes  
student, plurimum recens sohists  
solit. STALL. The wealth of Callias  
was proverbial, whence it is said that  
he was commonly called, simply, ὁ  
πλούσιος. But his profligacy was ex-  
treme, and his extravagance unbound-  
ed; failings which the sophists were  
not slow in turning to their own advantage.  
Xenoph. Sympos. i. 5.

"Νυ εἶ ἔγω.| Ἐφην εἰ ἔγω. Schol.  
Αὐτῶν.| Ald Bas. 1. Norib. αὐ-  
tῶν. Bas. 2. αὐτῶς.

"Επιστάτην.| Soph. in Ajace, ποι-  
νῶν ἐπιστάτην, gregis curatores, orili-  

Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους. Μισθώσασθαι—μισθῶν,  
locare: μισθώσασθαι, conducere, redi-  
mere. STALL.

Πέντε μνών.] The Attic mina was  
equivalent to a hundred Attic drachmas.  
Hence it appears that Evenus was much  
less exorbitant than the sophists pre-  
viously mentioned, Gorgias, of Leon-  
tium, &c. It is said of Procles, that he  
received fifty minas from each of his au-  
ditors, individually, for a single lecture.  
Forst.

Εἰ ὦς ἄληθῶς ἔχει.| The Greeks  
often quote the words of another nar-  
ratively, and yet suddenly change into  
the oral, recta, as if the person himself  
spoke. Thus they put ὦς, ὦτι itself be-  
fore the actual words of the speaker.  
Matthiae Gr. s. 529. 5. So Socrates, as  
supr., repeats the observation he made  
to Callias after his comment on the good  
fortune of Evenus.

p. 22. ἐκτελέω; but Socrates would not  
have expressed himself as if the value of  
the knowledge which the children of  
Callias derived from Evenus consisted in  
its cheapness, πέντε μνών, supr. The
να είδει, ἐξ ὑπονοούντας μονομενήν τε καὶ ἰβρυνόμην ἢν, ἕνεκεν ἡπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἅλλα οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

§ 5. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἀλλ' ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; ποθὲν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι ἀντὶ αὐτῶν γεγοναυ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιοῦν γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσαυτὴ φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τί ἐπράτεις ἄλλοιοι ἤ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε ὦν ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. Ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κακῶν ὑμῶν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ' ἐστι τούτο ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκούετε δὴ, καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξῳ τισὶν ὑμῶν παίξειν, εἰ μέντοι ἵστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἑρῶ. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἅλλα ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὄνομα...
Μελίζω τινὰ ἣ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον. [Maj. sorptionia quam que in hominem cadat: sapientiam humana excellitior. Fischi. When it is not a substantive that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it, (where in Latin quam pro is used), then ἣ κατὰ or ἣ πρώς is put after the comparative. Matthiae Gr. s. 449.]

"Ἡ οὖν ἐκεῖ οἷς τί λέγω. [Alloqui non habeo quod de ea dicam. Steph. Forster would prefer ἤν οἷς, κ. τ. λ. as if Socrates were at a loss by what name he should call this greater than human wisdom of the sophists. But the text is more likely to be correct as it stands; for Socrates, who was liberal of his irony whenever it could be introduced with effect, may be fairly considered to have purposely placed the sophists in a dilemma, as being either possessed of divine wisdom, or none at all. Fischi.]

Εἴπι διαβαλὼ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.] h. c. mei calamantiam causa, Statull. εἴτε frequently signifying with the prospect, or in order to. Matthiae Gr. s. 585. The possessive pronouns are equivalent in signification to the genitives of the personal pronouns, Matthiae Gr. 466, as appears in the above passage; so Homer, Odysse. xii. 302, σὸς τὸῦς. Iliad. xix. 320. v. 336. ἐμὴν ἄγγελην, i. e. περὶ ἵμαν. Sophocl. (Ed. t. 969, τῇ ἐμῇ ποίη). Plat. Gorg. εὐνοίᾳ τῇ σῇ. Compare also Salust. Jug. c. 14. "Vos in mea injuria despecti estis." Liv. ii. 1. "regium metum" for "metu regis," and iii. 16. "terrorem servilem" for "terrore servorum."

Μέγα λέγειν.] h. c. admirabile quid diece. Statull.—Οὐ γὰρ ἠμῶν ἦν τὸν λόγον. By this Socrates intends to remove all appearance of presumption or self-sufficiency on his part, and so to conciliate the good will, while he commands the attention of his auditors. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 2. 2. "Necneus hic sermo est."

Ἄξιόχρεων.] Properly solvent, one to whom money may be safely entrusted; hence, as in the text, creditable. So the Latin locupletis is asserted of a competent wealth. Hesych. ἀξιόχρεως, ἀξιόπιστος. Suid. ἀξιόχρεως ἰκανός, ἰχέγγυος, ἰχεπίστος.


Χαιρεθῶντα.] Χαιρεθῶν ὁσίως ὁ Σωκράτης ἱοχώς ἦν καὶ ὅρφος, τὸ δὲ ἵθος συνιστάντης καὶ κόλας, πρῶς δὲ καὶ κλέπτης καὶ αἰχμηρός, τὴν δὲ περιοικίαν πίνης. Ἐπολὼς μὲν οὖν ἐν Πόλει εἰς τὴν χροῖναν πτέρων αὐτὸν καλεῖ, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ ἐν "Ορι- νοι νυκτερεία" ἐν ἐν Τελμισεύσιν
Purposes.

"εἰς αὐχημήρων καὶ πίνητα. Εὐπολίς

οἱ ἐν Κολάχεν Καλλίων κόλακα λήγεις,

'Αριστοφάνης δὴ ἐν Δράμασι ελέητησιν,

ἐν δὲ ἔκλαις νυκτὸς αὐτὸν παῖδα καλεῖ,

SCHOL. Xenoph. Memoram. ii. 3.

'Ὑμοὶ τῷ πλῆθοι ἐτάφοις] Lysias,


108. makes frequent use of the term

πλῆθος in reference to the advocates of

the popular cause, in which sense it is
tobe understood in the text—Ἐννέψυχος

tύν φυγήν ταύτην. Upon the capture

of Athens by Lysander, and his subse-

qucnt appointment of the thirty tyrants,

a great concourse of the Athenians,
dis-

gusted with their government, retired to

Thebes and Megara, whence they soon

afterwards returned under the conduct of

Thrasybulus, and restored the re-

The φυγή took place a. I. Olymp. 94;

the return to the city, a. 4. Olymp. 94.

Meursius de Archont. iii. 13. 15; and

Socrates drank the hemlock a. I. Olymp.

95. Laert. ii. 44. Gellius, xvii. 21. whence

tύν φυγήν ταύτην; expressive of a re-

cent event. The verbs κατέρχεσθαι and

κατάρχεσθαι are commonly used to

those who return from exile to their na-

tive land. So Tho. Magister and Pha-

vor. Κατάρχομαι, ὅταν εἰς τῷ πό-

λιν, ἄρ ἄξιος, ἀπαντήσω, ἵπποπεῖν. Schol.

Arist. ad Rann. 1196: ἰδίος ἴππῶν φυγάδουν χρώναι τῷ κατάρχεται.

Xaerephon.

ὁ Xaerephon, BECK.

Charecrates ill.

Mauuiuasb] Mauuiusba, h. l.
est oracular simi editi jubere, h. e. consu-

dere, interrogare, sciscitari. Stull.

"Ὁ περὶ λέγων.] This phrase is to be

taken parenthetically: Plato frequently

uses ὁ περὶ λέγων for ὁ λέγω in reference
to an expression not long preceding; it

is to be understood in the text as al-
luding to the ἥρας, which Socrates

had already deprecated more than once.

Hence Stephanus would read, καὶ (ὑπὲρ

λέγων) μὴ θορυβεῖτε, as in Crit. ὑπὲρ

(ὑπὲρ λέγου) μὴταυτα φοβομένος, ἀποκαθήμες σώσαι παύτων, κ. τ. λ. Σο

Apol. ei oūn me (ὑπὲρ εἰπον) ἐπὶ
tουτοῦ ἄριστο, κ. τ. λ. The other

mode of construction by which ὄρθος

should be made to depend on ἥρας,

is harsh, and at variance with its ordi-

cinary government in its present sense:

θυρυβοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπὶ τοῦτο,
tουτοῦ ἐνικα, ἢ ἐπιθυρυβοῦ τοῦτο,

are among its received forms, in which

it will seldom be found with a simple ac-

cusative.

"Ἡρας γὰρ ἐκή, ἢ τις.] When the

Greek writers resume their subject after

a parenthesis, they generally repeat the

same verb, or one similar in substance
to that which had preceded the inter-

ruption, with the addition of a particle

γὰρ, ἐκή, or ὡν. Matthiae Gr. s. 615.

s. 616.

'Ανείλεων.] 'Αναρείν, to make an

oracular response; Xen. Mem. i. 3. 1,

announce oracularly. In Herodot.

freq. to lift up the voice, (φωνήν, or a

similar word, unstressed) and so deliver

an oracle or prophecy, the voice rising

from the depth of the sanctuary. Domn. Gr.

Lex. According to Laertius, ii. 37,

the response of the oracle was, 'Ανερῶν

ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφότατος,—

Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 144. Σοφός

Σοφοκλῆς, σοφότατος δ' Ἑφιππᾶς:

'Ανερῶν ἐπὶ παύτων Σωκράτης σοφώ-

τατος. Socr. in Xen. Apol. a. 11. ἁπα-

λεν ὁ Ἀπάλλων, μηδὲν εἶναι ἀνθρώ-

πων ὰμοι ἐκείνους, μήτε ἐκαὶ ὧντες,

μήτε σωφρονιστέρου.

'Ανελθοῦν.] Charecrates. Xen. Memo-

ar. ii. 3.
§ 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω, μέλλω γάρ ὡς διδάξων ὄθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γάρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεπιμούθην ὑπωσί. Τὰ ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τὶ ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὐκε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὄν; τὶ οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάςκοι εἰμὲ σοφώτατον εἰναί; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πον ψεύδεται γε' οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρό- νον ἁπόρων τὶ ποτε λέγει, ἑπειτα μόνης πάνω ἐπὶ ξήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην ἤλθον ἐπὶ τινα τὸν δοκοῦντον σοφῶν εἰναί, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ πουν, ἐλέγξου τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι Οὐθὸς γ' ἐμοί σοφότερος ἐστί, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησα. διασκόπον οὖν τούτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὑμᾶς γὰρ κοπῶν τοιοῦτον τι ἐπαθοῦν ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγό- μενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξεί μοι οὖτος ὁ ἀνήρ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἅλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ̂κ. κατείτα ἐπειράμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἰωνό μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἰ δ' οὐ̂κ. εἰνεύθειν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχῆμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀτίμων ἐλογίζομην ὅτι Τοῦτον μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερος εἰμί κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναι,
"Os per ovv ovv oida.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 625.

§ 7. Metà taaut' ovv ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ὡς, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῖμενος καὶ ἐδείκτω ὁτι ἀπηχθάνομην, ὁμως δὲ ἀναγκαίου ἐδοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι: ἵτεόν ὦν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τὶ λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντάς τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. Καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι,—ἀδεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὁμᾶς

the visitation of the gods. Matthiae Gr. s. 284.

него куна.] The opinions of both ancients and moderns upon the origin and efficacy of this and other equally strange oaths, by the oak, plane tree, &c. of which the philosopher frequently made use, are various and undecided. Some have supposed that the daemon of Socrates was intended by the dog; Pet. Petit. Observatt. Miscell. 4. 7. Others, that the dog was sworn by as the emblem of fidelity; Joach. Camerar. Opusc. de R. R. p. 28; and that consequently νὴ τὸν κύνα was equivalent to the Latin medius fidius. Olympiodorus, in Vit. Platon. ex Gorg. explains it of the Egyptian deity Anubis. Forster coincides with those who imagine that Socrates adopted these oaths after the example and upon the authority of Rhadamanthus, who avoided swearing by the gods themselves. So the Schoiastic : Ῥαϊμανθος ὅρκος αύτός ὁ κατὰ κυνὸς ἢ χηνὸς ἢ πλατάνον ἢ κραοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλον τοιοῦτον. Οἷς ἴν μεγίστος ὅρκος ἀπαντι λόγῳ κών, ἐπετὰ χήρθεθα δ' ἐστίγμα Κρατίνος ἐν Χείρος, κατὰ τοιοῦτον ἐξ νύμου ἀφάνεια, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ θεόν οἱ ὅρκοι γίγνονται. τοιοῦτοι ὅτι καὶ οἱ Σωκράτους ὅρκοι. There are some, however, who imagine that Socrates used such oaths in ridicule of the generally received divinities.
'Επαθών τι τοιούτων οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον, εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δειν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεις εἶνα] ἵππονιντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἀνδρεὶς πρὸς τὸ φρονίμοις ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ώμην τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξει, ὥσ περ πόνον τινὸς πονοῦντος, ἴνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. Μετα γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τὲ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς,

object of his singular approval, engaged freely in all the difficulties connected with the ultimate discovery of the truth, in order that his own experience might lead to a satisfactory conviction, i. e. ἵνα—ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο; that the prediction might be incontrovertible. So V. Cousin. "Mais il faut achever de vous raconter mes courses et les travaux que j'entreprise pour m'assurer de la vérité de l'oracle."

Τῶν διθυράμβων Suid. Διθύραμβος, ὡμος εἰς Δίονυσον, i. e. Dithyramb means the Bacchic hymn. The first author of the Dithyramb was, according to some, Lasus Hermonensis, in the time of the first Darius; according to others, Arion Methymnæus, in the time of Periander. But as it appears from Pindar and his scholiast, Pind. Olymp. xiii. the antiquity of it was so great that the inventor could not be known; the very word occurring in these Dithyrambic verses by Archilochus, who was prior to both Lasus and Arion; Ως διωμνυῖσοι ἀνάκτος καλὸν ἡδὴρκεί μέλος ὁι διθυράμβων, οἴνυν συγκεραύνωθες φρένας. Athen. p. 628. The etymology of the word is doubtful as its import; various derivations have been assigned it, which are registered by Gerard Vossius in his Institutio Poetica, iii. 16. 2. The most common etymology is διθύραμβος for διθύραμος, double-doored, i. e. he who has passed through two doors; in which term allusion is supposed to be made to the double birth of Bacchus—from the womb of Semele and the thigh of Jove. For a copious account of the Dithyramb, see the Theatre of the Greeks, edit. 3. 1830. from which admirable work, and indispensable to the classical student, this note was compiled.
όσο ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιηματα, ἂ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἄν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰτείν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθεν ὀμοί δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅλιγον αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ παρόντες ἄν βέλτιον ἐλέγοι περὶ ὁν αὐτοὶ πεποίηκεσαν. ἐγὼν οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλιγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦν ἄταποιεῖν ἄ τποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ φώσει τινί καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφοί καὶ γὰρ οὖτοι λέγονσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὑν λέγουσι. τοιούτου τι μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ

"Επ' αὐτοφόρῳ.] Schol. ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ Τοῦ, ἐπ' ὁδηγ. Suid. ἐπ' ὁδηγ.οῖς.

"Α μοι ἐδόκει—πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς.] h. e. quod ab his maxima diligentia composita videbantur. STALL. Δημητρίων ἂν. The part, ἂν frequently gives to the indic. the signification of being habitual, customary; Demosth. pro Cor. 301. None of the ancient orators has been of such a various influence, άλλα οἱ μὲν γράφον οὐκ ἄν ἐπρέπειν, ὡς ἐπερεπέδοι. οὗτος ἄν ἐγραφεῖ, it was not usual for him, who proposed laws, to be an ambassador, and vice versa. Compare also Soph. Philoct. 290. 92. Buttmann's Interm. Gr. Gr. s. 139. Obs. 5.

Αὐτῶν.] This genitive depends on the comparat. βέλτιον, and refers to the poets; it is omitted by Ficinus. Fiscl. Οἱ παρόντες ἄν βέλτιον, κ. τ. λ. Omnes qui aderant, melius istis de carminibus solebat judicare, que illi ipsi composuerent. STALL. So V. Cousin: De tuis eos qui erant tu présents, il n'y eu avant presque pas un qui ne fût capable de rendre compte de ces poèmes mieux que ceux qui les avaient faits. Wolfe renders οἱ παρόντες, qui hic adsunt, as if it referred to the judges; incorrectly, for Socrates evidently alludes to those who were present at his discussion with the poets.

Ἐν ὅλιγῳ.] Acts, xxvi. 28. ἐν ὅλιγῳ μετ' ἐνθυμίας Χριστιανῶν γενέσθαι; where Michaelis understands χρόνια, so as to make the signification in a short time, which is equivalent to the ordinary interpretation, almost. Blackwall in Class. Sac. v. 2. p. 84. Ficinus correctly renders ἐν ὅλιγῳ, bheeii. Ποιούσι.] Stephens omits ἄ τποιεῖν; which is found, however, in all other copies, and translated as part of the text by Ficinus and Serranus. Fischer supposes the omission to have occurred not by the direction of Stephens, but by the negligence of the transcribers, which was not subsequently remedied.


Τοιοῦτόν τι, μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος.] Hence the strictures of Aristophanes upon the dithyrambic and tragic poets, in Avib. 1538. Τῶν ἐνθυμιστέων γὰρ τὰ λαμπρὰ γίνεται Ἀεία καὶ σκιώτα γε καὶ κανανγία Καὶ πτεροῦσθαι, κ. τ. λ.; and his Scholast in loc. πλείω-ηγαρ αὐτῶν ἡ λίξες τουατήρ' ὃς τι οὔις ἐλάχιστος' ὡς οἱ παροιμία. Καὶ ἐνθυμιστικοποιοῦσιν οὖν ἔχεις ἐλαττώνα. FORST.
The verbs *ai* or *ai* and *i* or *i* are sometimes found with the genitive, instead of the accusative, which otherwise is the more usual case with them; e. g. Thuc. 5. 53. 3, τό *εισαγεν* το *τι* *παράκυκλον*, Plat. Apol. Soc. c. 7. *καμάρι*—οὐκ ἄνιστατον, for *αν* ἄνιστατον, *καὶ καλάν* *εισπραμένοντος*, *καὶ καλάν* *εισπραμένοντος*. And *ει* *αποκεφαλίσθη*, ἀλλ' *ηπίσταστον* ἢ *εγώ* ὦκ ἡπιστάμην καὶ *μον* *ταυτη* *σοφότεροι ήσαν*. ἀλλ', ὦ *δνρες Αθηναίοι*, *ταυτών* *μοι ἐδοξαν* *ἐχειν* ἀμάρτημα, ὦ *περ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί* καὶ οἱ *ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί*: ἄν τὸ τῆν *τέχνην* καλῶς ἔξερ- γάξεσθαι ἔκαστος ἡ *ζιον* καὶ *τάλλα* *τὰ μέγιστα* *σο- φότατος* ἐστιν, καὶ *αυτῶν* *αὐτή* ἡ *πλημμέλεια* *ἐκεῖνη* ἡ *τήν* *σοφίαν* ἀπέκρυπτεν. ὦ *οτρ ἐμοι* *ανερωτάτων* *ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ*, πότερα *δεξαίμην* ἐν οὕτως ὁς *περ ἐχω* *ἐχειν*, μή τέ τι *σοφὸς* ὦν *τήν* *ἐκεῖνον* *σο- φίαν* *μήτε* *ἀμαθῆς* *τήν* *ἀμαθίαν*; ἡ *αμφότερα ᾗ* *ἐκεῖνον*
PLATONOS

§. 9. Καὶ οἷα χαλεπῶτατα, λογιχαί δε τὸ χρησμώ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ, ὥς περ ἔχειν.

Σ. 9. ‘Εκ ταυτησι δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, οὐ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγονακι καὶ οἷα χαλεπῶτατα καὶ βαρύτατα, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβόλας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι, ὦνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντας, σοφὸς εἶναι. οὖνται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταύτα αὐτοῦ εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ ὅντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὁλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ’ οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὑνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα

§. 9. Καὶ οἷα χαλεπῶτατα,] h. e. longe gravissimae et acerrimae. STALL. τοιαῦτα being understood before οἷα; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8. 11. ἐδεικτος τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ὡς ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἑνώμονεστατος. See Matthaeus Gr. s. 461. Viger. de Idiot. sec. 8. v. vi.

Τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει κ. τ. λ. ] h. e. quam tamen revera deus videatur sapiens esse. STALL. τὸ δὲ is an elliptical expression, not easily supplied, which introduces a proposition opposed to what has been stated before, nearly like the English as however, but as yet. Heind. ad Plat. Theat. 37. Buttum. ad Menon. 37. and Int. Gr. Gr. s. 150. Sometimes, however, it is more fully expressed; De Repub. iv. p. 443. τὸ δὲ γε ἅλθε, τοιοῦτον μὲν τὶ ὅν—ἡ ἐκασύνη. Tim. p. 86. τὸ δὲ ἅλθε, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολούθια—νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε: in which sense it is to be taken in the text; but as yet truly the Deity, ἵνη. "Etenim artificium cum δὲ coniunctus indicat id, quod aliī cuidam ita opponitur ut pro vero haberii debat." STALL.

Τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι. This was in reality the grand point which Socrates was labouring to prove; the mere nothingness of human wisdom contrasted with the divine intelligenc. Laetant. de Ira Dei, c. i. 7. "Vidit (Socrates) ex parte aliqua veritatem, futastaturque est etiam in judicio, siue traditur a Platonе, quod nulla esset humana sapientia." KAI οὐδενός. ] Et vero, sc. immo nul·lius pretio. STALL. Ruining. p. 217. ἵναι, or ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οὐκ; incorrectly, for καὶ by itself has the force of atque adeo, immo, vero; as c. 16. ὅτου τι, καὶ σιμ·κρόν, ὄβελος ἑστιν. Besides ἵναι καὶ καὶ καὶ μᾶλλον are not conformable to the rules of Greek construction, which would require μᾶλλον ὅτι, or ὅτι simply; for ὅληγον ἡ ὑδεν καὶ ὅληγον καὶ ὑδεν, with similar forms, occur frequently in the best writers: so infr. c. 10. εἰδο· των ἣ ἡ ὁλίγα ἡ ὑδεν. FISCH.

Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ’ οὐ λέγειν. ] h. e. atque videtur (sc. Deus) non de socratæ hoc àcere. STALL. τοῦτο being referred to sophon εἶναι. Λέγειν τινά for λέγειν περὶ τινος, is a usual form with Attic writers: Cf. in Citron. froniastion, it εἰρονίοι ὦ πολλοὶ ὑμᾶς. Aristoph. Acharn. v. 593. τοῦτο λέγεις σὸν στρατηγον. Some editions for τοῦτο οὐ read τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σ. as if it should be understood διεκτικὸς for ἐμί; but the adversative particle in the succeeding member of the sentence manifestly requires the negative οὐ, as in the text. Other editions read τοῦτο, as referring to the oracle, or propose τοῦτον, depending upon ἕνεκα or χάριν understood, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; Lat. Interpr.; however the objection already stated holds good against all but the adopted reading.
The poverty, indeed, of Socrates was such, that he is said to have valued his whole house and substance at five Attic minae; Xenoph. Econom. ii. 3; whence he was commonly called Πένης. Libanius, in Apol. Socr. p. 640., mentions that eighty minae were bequeathed him by his father, which he lost by some mischance, and ever after lived in distress.

§ 10. Pro δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οίς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστὶν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἑξεταζομένων τῶν ἁν-

"quod quodque abstulit, nihil ostendit."

§ 10. Οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων. Socrates uses this expression, in order that the cause of the odium against him may be made more apparent.
θρόπων, καὶ αὐτὸι πολλάκις ἐμὲ μμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπι-
χειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κἀπείτα, οἷμαι, εὐρίσ-
κουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἄν-
θρόπων, εἰδότων δὲ ἡ ὦλιγα ἡ οὐδέν. ἐντεθεῖν οὖν ὁι
ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομεν ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οἷς αὐτοῖς,
καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Ψωκράτης τίς ἐστὶ μιαρῶτατος καὶ
dιαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοὺς ἑρωτᾶ ὁ
τι ποιῶν καὶ ὁ τι διδάσκων, ἐχοσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖ
ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἢν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ
πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταύτα λέγου-
σιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομί-
ζειν καὶ τὸν ἐπτω λόγον κρείττον ποιεῖν τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ,

Μμοῦνται.] Fisch. μμοϊρένει τοι, τότε, and οὕτως are
elegantly subjoined to participles: Mat-
thiae Gr. s. 603,) which has been adopted
by Ficinus; but εἶτα and ἐπείτα are
frequently used for καὶ εἰτα and καὶ
ἐπείτα, in constructions similar to that
in the text, where εῖτα has the force of
καὶ τότε, and then.

Ἐγκεφαλίζουσιν ἄλλους εξετάζειν.] This
practice of the young men, and the indif-
ferrnt repute in which philosophy came to
be consequently held by the vulgar, has
been thus forcibly described by Socrates:
Plat. De Rep. vii. 148. Οἶμαι γὰρ
σε ὅν αἰτηθήναι ὅσι οἱ μειράσκαι,
ὕπα τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γενώνται, ὡς
παῖδα αὐτοὶ καταρχώνται, ἀεὶ εἰς
ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι καὶ μιμοῦμενοι
τῶν εξελέγοντας, αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐξε-
λέγουσι, καὶ σεβόμενες, ὥσπερ σκηλέκα,
τοῖς εἱλκωσι καὶ σπαραττοῖς τοῖς
λογιζούσιν ἂν—καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐΓ
αῖτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας
πέρι εἰς τῶς ἄλλους λαβόμενη.

Forst.

Διὰ ὅλιγα ὃ ὁ ὕποτε.] Stallbaum
prefers εἰ ὁ λίγα ὃ ὁ ὕποτε, as more
emphatic, explaining ῥ, αὐτὰς. So
Plat. Phadr. p. 211. B. βραχίᾳ ὃ ὁ
ὑπότε. Aleiphron. iii. 4. ὁ λίγα ὃ ὁ ὕποτε
αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον.

Ἄλλοι αὐτοῖς.] sc. Quod se erro-
ris et insœtis ab illis corrigi patientur.
Stall, who thus explains the passage,
which contains a bitter irony: nisi isti
succurrent, quum tamen sibi potius de-
beant, ut qui se patientur refutari ab il-
lis adolescentulis. The sentence is far
more effective in this way than by
adopting with Stephens, Ficinus, and
others, the common reading ὁ ὁ ὕποτε;
which should probably have been ὁ ὁ
ἐκκίνος, had Socrates intended to refer
to the youths.

"Ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα.] Steph. ὃτι τὰ μ.
καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ὑπετει καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νο-
μίζει καὶ τ. ἡ. λ. κρ. ποιεῖ μ.; but this
reading is at variance with that adopted
by the greater number of copies, which
sanction the text as supr., and seems to
have arisen from an attempt to make
the passage more obviously intelligible;
which, however, is easily effected by re-
peating εἰκασκον at the end of the sen-
iv. 417.; by which it becomes the com-
monplace answer which Socrates asserts
to have been generally given, for want
of a better, to the question ὃ τι ποιῶν
καὶ τ. εἰκασκον ὃ τ. εἰκασκον: a preceding
construction being a very general cause of
a deviation from the regular construc-
tion, whence that used in the question is
continued in the answer. Matthiae Gr.
s. 631. 2. extr. Ficinus has adopted
the reading of Stephens, omitting ὑπετει,
and making τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς de-
pend, with θεοὺς, upon μ. νομίζει,
which is evidently at variance with the
sense of the passage.

Τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, κ. τ. λ. ] h. e. For I
imagine, they would be unwilling to con-
fess the truth, that they are convicted of
an affection of knowledge, while they are possessed of none. "Οτι κατάδικοι— 
προσποιούμενοι. See Matthiae Gr. s. 296. Hicendorf. μὲν τι εἰδέναι; ήν τι 
need not be expressed, as it is implied in οὖν ὅτι following.

Πολλοί.] Persevering; so in Latin, multi in opere is asserted of those who 
are intently engaged in any occupation. Fiscip. This interpretation is preferable 
to the ordinary one, numerosos, or that commended in Abresch. Anuet. 
Thucyd. p. 328. s. velenont, which is expressed sufficiently by σφοιροί, 
preceded.

Συντεταγμένων.] In a well-arrang-
ed or orderly manner. A metaphor 
taken from an army in battle array; 
so ἐκθέτοις in Ctes. τὴν μὲν παρα-
σκευήν ὄροι, ὥ Αθηναίοις, καὶ τὴν πα-
rωτάταν ἵσα γεγένηται. Socrates makes 
use of this term to signify the systemat-
ic proceeds of his adversaries in the 
diffusion of their calumnies, and the 
plans which they concerted to ensure 
their effect; hence παθανός, ὁ. εἰς 
καὶ persiunendum. Stal1. Some copies 
read συντετειχμένως; Ficinus appears to 
have united the force of both readings; 
Lat. Interp.

"Επιπλήκασιν ἵμων τὰ ὅτα.] 
Plat. Lyaid. p. 201, C. ήμων γονοῦ 
ἐκκεκύμικα τὰ ὅτα καὶ ἐμπέλακε 
Λύσιός. Lucian, Amor. s. I. T. V. 
p. 265, ed. Bip. ισωτίκης παιδίας ἣ 
ζωνιών πεπλήμονας τὰ ὅτα.
Μέλιτος—ὑπίπ τῶν ποιητῶν.] Me-
litus, who stood forward as the accuser 
of Socrates on behalf of the poets, 
was himself a tragic poet, but of indifferent 
repute; whence his σκέλες incurred 
the satirical censure of Aristophanes;
Ran. v. 1337. He was very young at 
the time when he submitted the indict-
ment of Socrates to the archon, s. Bas-
leae; and remarkable for his excessive 
arrogance, which may have irritated him 
the more against Socrates, and led him 
more eagerly to resent the strictures of 
the philosopher upon the class to which 
he affected to belong. Socrates had but 
little personal knowledge of him; a fact 
which has induced many to suppose that 
Melitus was rather an instrument in the 
hands of others than one who had volun-
tarily made a private pique the subject 
of a public inquiry. But there was 
another circumstance which might have 
contributed to mature his growing en-
nuity. When, amongst the many char-
acters of the thirty tyrants, an order 
was issued for the apprehension of Leon, 
Niceratus, and Antiphon, three men of 
distinguished eminence in the common-
wealth, Critias was most anxious to in-
volve his master, Socrates, in the execu-
tion of Leon, who was remarkable in 
those turbulent times, for a blameless 
life, and unblemished character. A 
message from the Thirty required the 
attendance of Socrates, with four others. 
Critias, himself, gave the order for them 
to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon and 
bring him to Athens. Socrates resisted 
this order, knowing its purpose, and dis-
obeyed it, as being most unjust. The 
other four, of whom Melitus was one, 
scrupulous, or less scrupulous, or ful-
filled their directions; in consequence 
of which Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon 
were apprehended and condemned. See 
infr. c. 22. Mitford's Greece, iv. 46. 47. 
Andocid. de Myster. p. 46. Orat. t. iv. 
ed. Reisk.

Τῶν σημαντικῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.] 
Socrates evidently alludes again here
with some severity to that principle in the Athenian constitution by which ignorant artificers, if qualified by wealth, were permitted to meddle with the government of the state. Anytus, who had been banished by the thirty tyrants on account of his opulence and influence, on his return enjoyed an ample share of those civil honours in the management of the republic, which, from the time of Clisthenes, had been accessible to the above-mentioned class. And hence Socrates mentions him as the advocate not of the ἐμποροὺς merely, but with bitter irony of the πολιτικοὶ also. "Χενο-
phon," says Mitford, "begins his memorials of his revered master with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn to death a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth." Ἐλιαῖοι, though for authority not to be compared with Xenophon, has nevertheless, I think, given the solution. "Socr-
ates," he says, "disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the evils of absolute monarchy." "Σω-
κράτης δὲ τῷ μὲν Ἀθηναῖον πολιτείας ὡκ ἤρεικτό τοι τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἐώρα τὴν ἐδρακρατίαν οὕσαν. Ἐλιαῖοι. Var. Hist. iii. c. 17. So Aristotle, Polit. v. c. 10. "Ἐναντία ἔ ἀι πολιτείαν Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννικῆς, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, ἢς κεραμικὴ κεραμικής καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἢ τελευταία Τυραννικῆς. Socrates, moreover, as he says of himself, Xen. Apol. s. 29, had attacked Anytus, after his usual custom, with considerable warmth, because he preferred that his son, the heir of such ample wealth, should rather be instructed in his own trade, by which that wealth might be increased, than be educated on a scale suitable to the situation, which the young man was already possessed of sufficient claim and right to maintain in the control of the state. This supplied one of the pretexts against Socrates, as a corrupter of the youth, whom he was supposed to have allured from the profits of their several occupations to indulge in the ease and indolence of a philosophical life. To have been charged with an accusation of this nature at Athens, where such especial care was devoted to industry and invention in the mechanical arts, even of itself, was likely to terminate unfavourably to the accused.

Lycon, who assisted in arranging the prosecution of Socrates, was one of the ten orators, originally instituted by Solon, whose duty it was to defend the interests of the state in both senate and assembly; to recommend what was likely to result to the public advantage, and to dissuade from such measures as might endanger its security. They were called Ρήτορες, and sometimes Συνήγοροι; but from a wanton abuse of their privileges and influence, and a ready sacrifice of principle whenever it interfered with their popularity or peculations, their very name became odious to all good men; whence it may easily be seen how Lycon became the enemy of Socrates. See Aristoph. Vesp. 1292, where Lycon is introduced with Antipho, another of his class.

Ταύτ' ἐστιν ὕμιν, κ. τ. λ. i. e. hae sunt illa, que me volis vere expositionum et narraturum me esse ante dicebam. Stahl. Socrates referring here to c. 1. ὕμις ὑμοῦ ἀκούσαθε πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Oid. ὑποστελόμενος. 'Ὑποστελ-
λήθαια, properly signifies to withdraw one's self, to depart secretly; thence to dissemble or disguise. Dresig, de Verb. Med. 1. 140.

Τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι.] Norim,
οτι αυτη εστιν η διαβολη η εμη και τα ατια ταυτα εστι. και εαν τε νυν εαν τε αυθις ζητηστε ποτα, ουτως ευριστετε.

§ 11. Περι μεν ουν ονι πρωτοι μου κατηγοροι κατηγοροιν αυτη έστω ικανη ἀπολογια προσ υμας προς δε Μελιτον τον άγαθον τε και φιλοπολιν, ος φησι και τους υστερους κατηγοροιν, λαβωμεν αυ την τουτον αντωμοσιαν. εχει δε πως δοδε Σωκρατη φησιν αδικειν τους τε νεους διαφθειροντα και θεους, ους η πολις νομιζει, ου νομιζοντα, έτερα δε δαιμονια καιναι το μεν δη εγκλημα τουτον εστι τουτον δε του εγκληματον εν έκαστον εξετασομεν. Φησι γαρ δη τους νεους αδικειν με διαφθειροντα. εγω δε γε, ου ανδρες Αθηναιοι αδικειν φημι Μελιτον, ότι σπουδη χαριντιζεται, ραδιος εις

we ob eadem fore in odium incurrere.—Fisc.

§ 11. Αυτη έστω—ἀπολογια.] See c. 1. n. extr. Αυτη άρειη.

Τον άγαθον τε και φιλοπολιν.] 'Αγαθος was generally used by the Greeks as expressive of respect towards the individual to whom it was addressed; in the present instance it is rather ironically applied. According to Suidas and others, φιλοπολις is the common, and φιλοπαρος the Attic dialect; but this is erroneous, for both are equally familiar to the Attic writers; Ducq. ad Thucyd. vi. 92; but they differ in sense, as φιλοπαρος would be used by an Athenian to designate a lover of Greece; φιλοπολις, a lover of Athens. STALL.

Αυθις γαρ δη—λαβωμεν αυ.] See c. 3. init. n. "Ωσπερ ουν, Socrates having explained away the charges of one class of his accusers, proceeds now to the refutation of the charge upon oath, as it were, preferred against him by the other; hence αυθις αυ.— STALL.

Ἡ ουδε.] Someway thus. Socrates does not profess to give the exact terms of the indictment, but merely its import. According to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 40. the bill of the indictment was ex tant in the time of the Platonie philosopher, Phavorinus, in the temple of Cybele, at Athens, where the ἕμωσια γράμματα, or public records, were kept: Η ελ αντωμασια της είκης τοιτον είχε τον τρόπον άνικεσθαι γαρ έτι και γην, φησι Φαξιμιρην, και τα τη Μητρωφη Ταΐς έγραφαστο, και άνθρωπολογησατο, Μελιτος Μελιτον, Πισθες, Σωκράτεις Σωφρονισκος, Λασκητής. 'Αλκης Σωκρατης ου και μην λοις νομιζαι θεους ου νομιζαι, ετερα δε και θεους και ποιηματοις άλλης δη και τοις νυσι έσεφθειν. Τημημα θανατος v. Xen. Mem. Socr. init. Socrates, in his defence, inverts the order of the charges, as thus alleged against him. "Οτι σπουδη χαριντιζεται.] Schol. August. εισπρατελεται, σκωπτει: Tr. jects too seriously: for Melitus, in charging Socrates with a crime of which he was incapable, and affecting, himself, an interest about the instruction of the youth, which he did not feel, is said χαριντιζεθαναι, to ject or jibe; but in reference to his accusation of Socrates, for corrupting the youth, and his steady prosecution of the charge, he is said by the philosopher, σπουδη χαριντ. by which
δὲ φασιν καθιστῶς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσ-
ποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κύδεσθαι, ὃν οὐδὲν τοῦτῳ
πότετε ἐμέλησεν. ὃς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειρά-
σομαι καὶ ὑμῶν ἐπιδεῖξηι.

§ 12. Καὶ μοι δεύρο ὁ Μέλιτης, εἰπέ, Ἀλλο τι περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὁ βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;
'Eγγε. Ἰδι δὴ γὰρ εἰπὲ τούτους, τίς αὐτῶν βελτίως
ποιεῖ; δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οἰσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ
дейθείροντα ἔξευρών, ὥς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοίοι
καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίως ποιοῦντα ἢδι εἰπὲ
καὶ μήνυσον αὐτὸς τίς ἐστιν. ὥρας, ὁ Μέλιτης, ὅτι

a serious impression was effected upon ridiculous grounds.—προ-
ποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κύδεσθαι, rashly putting men upon trial.

§ 12. [Depr.] "Absolute nomin-
qua. (omission imperativo ἤτοι, ὅλεο ant simili.) pro adeside. Aris-
topt. In pace, ἐνέργον οἷο, ὧν ἀδικε ὑμ. Musaeus. Δεύρο μοι εἰς φελοτήτα, ἡ ἀδεσ ἡμί. Hinc factum est adverbium
adhortandi, idem significans quod φέρε, ἀγε, ἀγετάμ. Plato in Apol. καὶ
μοὶ ἐνέργον εἰπὲ, ἀγετάμ διε ἡμί. Sepr. Lex.

Ἀλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ, κ. τ. λ. Ἀλ-
λο τι is used in questions, but in such
only, as are intended to elicit an acknow-
ledgment or confession; never in such as
are employed merely for the sake of in-
formation; hence ἀλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ
ποιῆς, ὅπως; κ. τ. ὃ δον not est leem it of
great importance? are you not very so-
licitous that? &c. The form ἀλλο τι
ἡ περὶ πολ. or πλεξτ. is also common;
but when is omitted, the interrogation
is in ἀλλο τι, alone, not in the other
words of the sentence—ὡς, ὅπως—ἴσον-
ται. The indicative of the future (as
the optative) is construed with ὅπως,
when something is to be signified, which
is contemplated as future at the time de-
noted by the principal verb. Wherefore
that tense occurs in construction with a
present, as in the text, a future, and a
past tense: ἐτοιμοὶ ἐστίν, ἔσονται,
ὕσιν, πρᾶττεν ὅπως ἔσται—κριμα-
τῶν μὲν ὅπως αἰσχύνη ἐχμελομένοις,
ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα: Plat.
Απολ. c. 17. Βουλευσόμεθα περὶ τῶν
τέκνων, ὅπως ὁ βέλτιστα παλαί-
σομεν αὐτά. Χερ. Κε. vii. 12. ἢπαθο-
λίεσθε ὅπως μήτ' ἀγαθὴν μηδὲν ἡ-
φισθῆσθα, πολλῶν τι ἐνδεικτῇ ὀσοθθ. Viger. by Seager. v. VII. s. x. v. 4. III.
xi. v. 8. IX. vii. 3.

Ἄλλον γε σοι. Steph. in marg.
quam id ibi casa sait. Those impersonal
verbs, or impersonal constructions, when
the preposition dependent on such a verb
(commonly an ἐνθα., or a sentence with
ὁτι, and the like) properly is the actual
subject of the verb, are treated as cases
absolute, in two different ways: 1. when
it is a mere relation of time, it is the gen.
2. in any other combination, we have
the accusative neuters, διηνήσασιν αὐ-
τοῖς παρεῖναι οὐκ ἠκούσας, they do not,
thought, though they have been told (ἐκκη-
ται) to be present, and this is the case
with all verbs commonly called imperso-
nal: Δία τι μένες, ἔξω ἀπέκαθα, why do you stay when you are at liberty,
(it is allowed to you) to go, (ἐκείν.)
Plat. Phaed. 28. Δις καὶ τρίς τα αὐτά ἐφήκαν, ὡς οὖ πάντα ἐντορῶν—ὡς ἀπος ὁδοῖ αὐτῶ μέλον τοῦ τοιοῦτον.
Buttmann. Int. Gr. Gr. s. 129. 111. s.
Matthiae Gr. s. 564.

Εἰμί εἰσάγεις τοιούτοις.] The term
εἰσάγεις was used either in reference to
the magistrates, who, in any cause upon
which they were not warranted in de-
termining, were obliged to refer to the
cognizance of the judges, which was
generally called εἰσάγεις τῆς δικαίως
εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον; or in reference to the
accuser, who was sued, εἰσάγεις
κατά τίνος εἰς τὸ δικ. to impeach, to sue or bring another before the court.—The cause itself was called ἕκη εἰσα-γόγνιος, and the person that entered it, εἰσαγωγεύον.—τούτωσι in the text is equivalent to εἰς εἰκαστήριον. infr. c. 17.


Νὴ τὴν Ἡραν.] It was usual, among the Greeks, for men to swear by the goddesses. V. Ernest. ad Xen. Mem. 1. 5. 5.

Τῶν ὀφελοῦντων.] i. q. τῶν βελτίων ποιοῦντων.

Οἱ βουλευταί.] See c. 20. n. Ἄρχην ὀνειμαῖαν—ἡράκα.

'Εκκλησιασταί.] Those were so called who either took an active part in the debates, or who merely stood by and listened to the business of the Athenian 'Εκκλησία, or public assemblies. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. v. i. c. 17.

'Ερον κατέγυνος ὑστυχιὰν.] You convinced me of great ill-fortune. Verbs compounded with κατά (against, with a genitive,) which represent an action as taking place to the disadvantage of a person or thing, take the genitive of the person or thing against which the action is directed, together with the accusative of the thing which is this passive object of the verb. Matthiæ Gr. s. 378. Aeschin. adv. Ctes. s. 12. τὰς ἄν οὖν ἱμάς τολμήσει τοσαίτην ἄνελευθερίαν καταγγέλλαι τοῦ ἐμὸν τοῦ Ἀθηναίων.
'Ean te—ou phize, e. t. l.] Whether you and Anius deny or admit it. It has been proposed to read mi' phize, on the grounds that mi' is the negative particle by which et, ean, deora, and igma should be properly followed; but ei or ean et o6 is not equivalent to ei or ean el mi'. In all passages in which the former phrase occurs, o6 is to be referred to some following verb with which it is intimately connected in sense and construction: as ei de ou moixeusis, fonoisicis ei, now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, &c. Epist. Jac. ii. 11. ei de too ou doste oun aghelov, but if he will not give, i. e. if he refuse, &c. Hom. ii. 0, 296. So in the text, ean—ou phize, whether you do not confess, i. e. whether you deny, &c. Seng. Viger. c. VIII.

Ei eic—iaphizei.] h. e. Magna fuerit adolescentium felicitas, si unus tantum eos corrupit, quod tu aias.—Stall. Socrates so expressing himself, as if he founded his conclusion upon his admitting what Melitus had previously asserted to be true. Cf. c. 27. a med. polli mi6 et 'an me philopinika i6uco—ei ou6os allogi26s eim. c. 17. sub. fin. ei men eu 6aunta le6ou iaphizei6ou to6s vein, taic' et 6u blab6ara. Ei with the indic. and in the apodosis the opt. with etn, viz. when the condition contains a determinately expressed case, and the apodosis is uttered with the expression of a mere conjecture, or contains a consequence which is merely possible or probable, forms one of various deviations from the general rules affecting the opt. and conjunct. after conditional particles. See Matthia Gr. s. 524.

§. 13. 'Eti dei 6m6n eite, ou pro6s Diou Melite, poterov esteiv oikeiv ame6on ev polilais xristovis e ponuropis; ou 'tan ap6krimai ou6en gar to6i xalatps6a e6p0t. ou6oi ei men ponuropi kakov ti6 e6ragk6ntai to6s aei e6gnatato eau6oun ou6as, ou 6 a6agoi a6ag6n ti;

muev tis o 'beltivos oios T' o6n poieiv 'h papan ol6gon, oi 6pikoi' oi de polloi eam per xin6osi kai xrountai 'ipto6is, dia6phie6ou6ouv; ou6 xou6os echai, ou Melite, kai perie 'iptpov kai tov a/llov aptan6v 66wv; pantovs de' pou, eam te sv kai 'Anutos ou fhi6te eam te fhi6te' polly gar a6n tis eu6daimonia e6i perip to6s ne6ous, ei eis men monos auto6is dia6phie6rei, oi de a/lloi ofelou6- svv. allla gar, ou Melite, ikanv6s eptideikvvas ou ti6ud6ppote efpronv6sas tov6v ne6ov, kai safh6s apofai' nevs ti6n santvou amelievan, ou ti6ud6n sou me6melike per6i 6n eme eisag6v.

§. 13. "Eti de 6mwn eite, ou pro6s Di6ws Melite, poterov estin oikein ame6on ev politais xristo6is 6 ponnepois; ou 'tan atopkrimai ou6en gar to
calipop 6ropw. ou6c o6i me6 ponnepoi kakov to i e6ryagk6ntai to6s aei e6ynapato eau66n 6ntas, o6 6 a6adoi a6ado6n ti;
Paulus. \*Eστιν οὖν ὁς τις ποιεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὁ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσθ' ὁς τις ποιεῖται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὗ δὴ τα. Φέρε ὅ, τότε ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὅς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκοίντα ἡ ἀκόντα; Ἐκοίντα ἔγογξε. Τί δὴ τα, ὃ Ἔλιτ; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμὸν σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόςδε ὅν, ὅστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθον[δι ν] ἠγὼ δὲ δὴ ἔι τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὅστε καὶ τοῦτ ἂγνω, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθῆρον ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κυνικεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ, ὅστε τοῦτο τῶ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκῶ ποιῶ, ὅπε φης σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὃ Ἔλιτ, ὃ ὁμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότων οὐδένα ἁλλ΄ ἦ οὗ διαφθείρο, ἢ ἐι διαφθείρο, ἀκὼν, ὅστε σὺ γε κατ᾿ ἀμφότερα ψεῦδει. ἐι δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρο, τῶν τοσοῦτων ἐκαὶ ἀκόντων ἁμαρτημάτων ὅν δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν εσ-

πᾶς, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν βαρύνουσα. καὶ βλάπτων ἀδύνατον γὰρ μιᾶν λέξιν εἰρήνηι διὸ ἔχουσαν περισσώμενα. Δίνου σὲ τῷ πλῆθος εἶναι όσον ὡς ἔτοι, ἄγνωσι ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔτους ἡ κηντ" ἡ ἐκτιστὴ ἐκτὰν καὶ Δωρίκας ἐτὰν.

Ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The following are the terms of the law to which Socrates alludes; Demosth. c. Steph. orat. ii. p. 1131. Νόμος. τοῖν ἀντικόν ἐπάναγκε Εἶναι, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἄλλους τῷ ἐρωτήμαν, μαρτυρίζει ὡς μὴ. FORST.

Καὶ ποιηστὶ τῶν ποιοῦντα.] Ficinus has omitted the translation of this phrase in his Latin transl., it is implied however in διαφθείροντα preced. Fisch. Τηλικότερο ὅν. Melitus was but a young man at this time, s. 14. sub. fin. καὶ ποίηστα, κ. τ. λ. and Socrates was more than seventy years old, c. 1. a med. τῇ τῇ ἑλληcis, and n. in loc.

Εἰς τοσοῦτον ἁμαρτίας.] The neuters τοῦτο, τοσοῦτο, τοὔτε, with a preposition, often take a genitive as a definition; Thuc. 1. 49. ξυνέπεσον ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγ-

κης, they came to this, with respect to necessity, i. e. into such necessity; where in Latin co with the genitive is used, co necessitatis adducti sunt, co dewent progressi sunt, &c. Matthia Gr. s. 341. Buttmann. Intern. Gr. Gr. s. 132. Obs. 4. ἤκω is a remarkable instance of that class of verbs which appear to have something in them which disturbs the succession of the tenses; instead of being rendered I come, it is constantly to be considered as a praterite, I am come, i.e. I am here. Crito. init, "Ἀρτι ἢκες ή πάλαι. Eurip. Hec. 1. ἢκω νείρων, κ. τ. λ. So in the text, to such a degree of stupidity have I come, as to be igno-


Οἱμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον—οὐδὲνα.] sc. πείσεθαι σοι; a common elipsis after οἴμαι δὲ καὶ, to be supplied by the principal verb from the preceding member of the sentence. STALL.

Νόμος—ἰστιν.] Νόμος, besides its primary signification of a law, is also affirmed of a custom, habit, or usage, founded upon natural principles, in any
of which latter senses it is to be taken in the text. For it is evident that private advice and admonition, and not a formal public accusation, should be adopted as the most salutary and efficient means of correcting such errors as arise from inattention and ignorance. Hence there is no need of requiring, with Rudinger, any particular law, as expressly alluded to in the text, and bearing especially upon the subject under discussion. Fisch.

II. § 14. 'Αλλὰ γὰρ, ο ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἦστιν οὐ γὰρ ἐλεγον, ὅτι Μέλιτω τοῦτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πόστοτε ἐμέλησεν. 'Ομως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἢμῖν, πῶς με φης διαφθείρειν, ὧ Μέλιτε, τους νεωτέρους; ἡ δὴλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἢν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μη νομίζειν οὐς ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἐπερὰ δαμόνια καὶνά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτὸν τοίνυν, ὧ Μέλιτε, τοῦτον τῶν θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἦστιν, εἰπὲ ἐπὶ σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοίς. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δυναμὴ μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἰναὶ τινας θεοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἰναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεον οὐδὲ ταυτή ἀδικῶ, οὐ

neológos; Matthiae Gr. s. 619.

'Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν. Intell. ἤμε φης διαφθείρειν τοὺς νομίζειν.

Οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις. Ἡ ταῦτα depends upon the part. εἰνάκοις following. STALL.

ὤν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἦστιν.] 'Ὅν depends here upon λόγος; and not, as Rudinger and others have supposed, upon περὶ, which they require either to be understood or supplied. It has been already remarked, c. 9. supr., that λέγειν τινὰ is an equally legitimate construction as λέγειν περὶ τινὸς; whence λόγος τινὸς and λόγος περὶ τινὸς may likewise be indifferently used. See c. 9. a med. λέγειν τον Σωκράτη, extr. τοῦ θεοῦ λατ. rece. On νῦν τί σου ὁ λόγος λόγος ἦστιν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν, i.e. περὶ αὐτῶν. Eurip. Med. 541. οὐκ ἂν ἢν λόγος σίθεν, i.e. περὶ σοῦ. Schafer. ad Sophoc. Antig. v. 11. μέθος φίλων, i.e. περὶ φίλων. STALL.
μέντοι οὖς πέρ γε ἡ πόλις ἄλλ' ἑτέροις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, οτι ἑτέροις; ἥ παντάπασι μὲ φής οὐτε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς το παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὅ θαυμάσιε Μέλιτε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἦλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡς περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μᾶ Δί, ὡ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἔτει τὸν μὲν ἦλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. 'Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὥς φίλε Μέ-

"Ἤνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις." Ἰνα τί, why or wherefore, is an elliptical form, to be supplied as denoting present or past time, by γίνεται or γένοιτο. Schaeffer would rather understand γέγονεν in ἦνα τί, and supplies the phrase, τί γέγονεν, ἦνα, c. g. Acts, vii. 26. "Ἤνα τί αὐτίκει τελώσαι;" which he explains: τί γέγονεν, ἦνα ἄνωτε οὐκ ἐλήνυνεν. Cf. Terent. Phorm. iii. 3. "quam obrem ut quidnam facturus," where ut quidnam is equivalent to ἦνα τί. Liv. iv. 49. "quid ut a volis sperent." Bos. Ellips. Gr.—Οὐδὲ ἦλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην. Dacier understands this question as ironical, and would thence infer that Socrates intended to expose the folly of the Athenians in regarding the sun and moon as divinities. But the commentator appears to have forgotten that the sun and moon were not only the principal objects of religious veneration amongst the Persians and other barbarous nations, but that they were worshipped by the Greeks also, by whom they were venerated under the titles of Apollo and Diana, and who dedicated a common temple to both in their own proper name. Now, it is well known that although Socrates was free from many of the grosser superstitions of his country, and, deeply impressed with a reverential belief in one, great, first cause, was always inclined to repropate the absurd extremes incidental to polytheism, still he was not certainly exempt, nor could it have been expected, from the errors of a system, which unaided reason might prevail to modify, but never to destroy. It is most likely then that he put the question seriously to Melitus; the more so as he afterwards disavows the theory which should have been utterly inconsistent with the belief that he professed.

Μᾶ Δί," Melitus replies in the negative: Ἔνα τί—οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. which is to be supplied from the question preceding.

Ἀναξαγόρον. Anaxagoras, born at Clazomenae in the first year of the seventh Olympiad, was a disciple of Anaximenes, the hearer and associate of Anaximander, who has been generally considered the founder of the Ionic sect, having been the first to teach philosophy in a public school. At the age of twenty Anaxagoras went to reside at Athens, where he devoted himself with diligence and success to the study of eloquence and poetry, and where he became conversant with the writings of Homer, of whose merits as an author and a moralist he entertained as high an opinion as that recorded by the Roman satyrist; Horat. Epist. i. 2. The repute of the school at Miletus attracted him thither, where he studied the philosophical doctrines of Anaximenes and his predecessors with considerable zeal and distinction, and after a residence of some years returned to Athens, where he gave private lectures in philosophy, and numbered among his pupils Euripides, Péricles, and as some say, Socrates and Themistocles. His high character, and his open derision of some of the popular superstitions drew upon him the envy of his cotemporaries and the enmity of the Athenian priesthood. He was imprisoned and condemned to death, but through the influence of Péricles, the penalty was commuted to fine and banishment. He retired accordingly to Lampsacus, where he died, aged seventy-two years, and
whose inhabitants expressed their opinion of his attainments by the following inscription upon his tomb:

Ενθάδε πλείστον ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τέφρα περίσσων
Οὐρανίου κοσμοῦ κείται Ἀναξαγόρας.

According to Plutarch, whose testimony is confirmed by that of Plato and Aristotle, Anaxagoras was the first of the Ionic philosophers who separated mind from matter, and attributed the modifications of the latter to the control of a supreme and pure intelligence: Νως ὁ ἐκασθόμην τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος.

The particular branch of his doctrine, alluded to in the text, is mentioned by Diog. Laertius, ii. 8, 9, who states that Anaxagoras conceived the sun to be a µύζτρον ἐπάπυρον, an ignited mass, of iron, as some take it, or of stone, as it appears to have been understood by Socrates, who endeavours, in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7, 7, to refute the opinion: φάσκειν εἰ τὸν ἦλιον λίθον ἐπάπυρον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἡγήσω, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πορί ὄν ὀψί ἄμαχον, ὀψιν πολύν χρόνον ἀντέχει, etc. Cf. infr. καὶ ὅπως ἄποτα ὄντα. The moon, Anaxagoras judged to be inhabited like the earth, and divided into hills, vallies, lakes, &c. Hence the charge of asserting, τὸν ἦλιον λίθον—εἶναι, τὴν ἐν σελήνη γῆν, which Melitus urged against Socrates, whom he knew to have been the hearer of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, if not actually the disciple of the latter himself.—Βιβλία.—Diog. Laertius, ii. 11, and Clemens Alexandr. state, that Anaxagoras was the first who ἐπέδικεν συγγραφή, libro a se scriptum edidit: but, according to some, Anaximander was the first who committed to writing the principles of natural science: others assert it of Pherecydes, a native of the Isle of Scyrus, the first preceptor of Pythagoras. See Lucret. i. 831. sqq.
as the sentiments of the philosophers were expressed chiefly by the chorus, as supra, in Orest., and as the orchestra was the situation assigned to the chorus; οὐ καί οἱ χοροί γέουν, Phot. Lex. Ms. from whence it always took a part in the action of the drama, joining in the dialogue through the medium of its κορωφάιος, or leader, so Socrates intends to say that he should bring ridicule upon himself, were he to lay claim to those doctrines as his own, which the payment of a drachma, at most, for a seat in the theatre, should satisfy the auditors had originated with another:—Εἶ πάνω πολλοῦ, even at most, or for the highest price; fully, εἶ ἀντί πάνω πολλοῦ τιμήματος ο ἀργυρίων. Originally no payment was required for seats in the theatre at Athens, but the strife and confusion consequent upon a gratuitous admission, and the immense crowds which endeavoured to avail themselves of the privilege, occasioned the passing of a law, by which the entrance price was fixed at one drachma for each individual. This regulation, which bore hardly upon the poorer classes, was repealed by the influence of Pericles, who omitted no chance of popularity, and a decree brought in, by which the price was reduced to two oboli; and even these were made payable out of a public fund. From the text, however, it would appear that as high a sum as a drachma was demanded for the best places, while the ordinary were set at two oboli.—Harpoc. and Suid. θισθηκά. Theat. Greek. cap. iii. 2.

"Εἰσεξει—ἐνυπτθέντι καὶ διαπερτηρημον."

Expressive of the modesty of the speaker, and used elegantly for ἐνυπτθήσαται καὶ διαπερτήτατα, as Cyrop. viii. 8. 7. οὐκ ξανά σταυτά διαδεσκομένοις, b. c. διαδεσκονται. Fisch.

Γνωστεται—ἐμοὶ χαριντι.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 349. Obs. 2.—Ο σοφὸς δ’—απιτεν σελειτ ἱλε. STALL.

§. 15. Η μοι φαίνεται.] b. c. Quatenn., quomodo nihil videatur. STALL. Socrates proceeds to prove the inconsistency of Melitus, who at the same time denied and admitted that he believed in the gods.
νησθέ μοί μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

"Εστιν ὁς τις ἀνθρώπων, ὁ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὁ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἦθος ὁς τις ἱππος μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἑπιτικά δὲ πράγματα; ἥ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἀριστε ἀνδρών εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρινασθαί, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοσί. ἄλλα τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἦθος ὁς τις δαίμονία μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἡς ὑψησας, ὃτι μόνις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαίμονια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὖν καίνα ἐίτε παλαιά: ἄλλ' οὖν δαίμονία γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμονία νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δὴ που

'Ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ.] In his usual method of interrogation, and deducing his conclusions from the replies of his opponent.

Καὶ μὴ—θορυβεῖτω.] It is to be supposed that Melitus, who was fully aware of the object which Socrates had in view, and equally so of the unerring skill by which it could not fail to be established, felt but little inclination to entangle himself in his own concessions, and sought rather by blustering upon extraneous subjects to divert the attention of the judges, and evade the hold of his too powerful adversary.

Ὡς ὑψησας—ἀναγκαζόμενος.] Ut ne juventi eo quod auge aliquando respondulis. HEIN DOR F. Casaubon, ad Pers. Sat. i. 112, remarks, that ἄναγκαζα, as the Latin jureure, besides being synonymous with βοηθήν, to assist, has also the force of deletare, to delight, in which latter sense it is to be taken in the text. So V. Cousin; que tu mi' obliges de répondre enfin, &c. Stephens reads ὅκυνησας, which has been adopted by Ficinus, v. Lat. Interp., and approved by Fischer, who renders ὃς ὅκυνησας, quam cunctatus es! quam tergiversatis es! quam longus necisti moras!—as alluding to the surprise of Socrates in having, at last, contrary to his expectation, extracted an answer from Melitus. Fischer understands, further, the succeeding part of the sentence, ὅτι μόνις ἀπεκρ. ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκ., as explanatory of the nature of this hesitation on the part of Melitus. This, however, is objected to by the advocates of the present reading, who, in the case of the proposed emendation, look upon the latter part of the sentence as an unnecessary repetition. Stallbaum would prefer ὃς ἐν ὑνήσας.

Διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ.] Most of the editions read διωμόσω, in which they are followed by Ficinus, and the Latin translations, and which has been adhered to by Ruhnken ad Tim. Gloss. Plat. voc. Διωμόσια. But the reading in the text scarcely admits of a question; for Socrates wished to show that his belief in the tutelary influences of some presiding genius or divinity had not only been conceded to him in the course of the verbal admissions of Melitus, but
pouler anagn kervizei eme estin. oux oytos exeei; exei de tithym gar se omologounta, epeidi ouk aposkinei. tois de daimones ouk hti theous ge hgyu-
meba h theon paides; phi phi ou. Pnn pny. Oukoun ei per daimonas hymoumai, ws ou phi, ei me theoi tinves exis ou daimones, tou av ein o gyn homa se aitip-
tesei kai haristizesthai, theous ouk hymoumenon fa-
nav eme theous av gynesthai polin, epeidi per ge dai-
monas hymoumai] ei de av oi daimones theon paides exi
vodoi tinves h ek nymphon h ek tynon allon, ou di

that it had been acknowledged in the very terms of the indictment, upon oath, of the accuser; cap. 11. supr. Besides the Attic writers use agoomia, not omo-

m, consequently not ephomia. Tim. Plat. Lex. Diamosia, oukou ei upo twn evanomiewn enomwvnoy tois mev gynvntos, oti paion evklei tov ou, oti ouk epiroyn. So Suid. Lexicon 

Rhet. Ms. Diamosia oukou 1atov, ouv omvnon ou phvnon avvna evwvoties ou fygvaties, amvtorias gar vmyvnon me-
ta ta eipeta toin parwnta logon (o mev) ou h mnv alhmy katagyromenivn kai eikouo ou ei h mnv alhmy apolel-
yvta kai eikouwv, vmyvnon ei kai

prin eipeta, ton avtou oukou evfao-
tivos, epenxhodhes hhem th evmyon, ouh ouk eikovn nekymeniv, evwelen iantrv evparwmenov, ei eixpatahmen. Antigrafy, in the passage above, is equivalent to antwmosia, cap. 3. supr. 

Suid. Phavorin. v. Antigrafy—Plato

ton ei en ty Sokratous apolosia to aitve kade antwmosian, kai antw-

grafy. Hesych: Antigrafy to ei en ty antwmosia. 

ei ei daiony, k. t. l.] V. Cousin 

Oeuvres de Plat. tom. i. p. 336: "Socrates admettait une revelation sura-
turelle qui lui enseignait en toute oc-

sion ce qu'il devait faire et surtout ce qu'il devait eviter. Il croyait sentir en lui quelque chose au-dessus de l'human-

nity qui l'ecloignait et le dirigeait. Il ne disait pas que ce fut un etre positif; il s'arretait au fait dont il avait la con-

science, et le servait de l'expression: ti daionyn, non pas un dieu tout-a-fait, mais une espce d'intermediaire entre les 
dieux et les hommes, quelque chose qui

appartient a la nature des demons que la 

mythologie paillonne place entre le ciel 
et la terre. The Orthodoxie du tems ne 

reconnaissait pas la precieusement ses dieux, 

avec leur histoire et leurs non propre,

accuse Socrates de substituer a la religion 
etable comme diamhva, c'est a dire, une 

religion nouvelle, fondue sur un mysti-
cisme demoniaque. Soit, repond So-

crate a Mutilus, du moins alors ne suis-

je pas athee. Car enfin tu ne m'accuses 

pas d'admettre l'accident sans le sujet, 

l'adjectif sans le substantif. Si j'ad-

mets ti diamhva, quelque chose relatif aux 
demons, il faut que tu m'accordes 

que j'admet des demons, diamhvas. Or, 

les demons sont ennemis des dieux, ou 
dieux eux-memes; donc j'admet des 
dieux." 

Noho tini h ek nymphon. Socrates 
speaks thus in compliance with the pop-

ular belief, that demons were the off-
spring of the intercourse between the 
gods and nymphs, or some other class 
of women. [h ek tynon allon.] It was 

not his business to attack this error now, 

though it is certain that such was not 
his own opinion, for he had adopted the 

theory of Pythagoras, that demons or 

angels and heroes were descended from 

the deity, to whom they owed their 

origin, as light owes its own to a lumi-

nous body. In his Timeus, also, speak-

ing of the generation of angels or demons, 

he asserts it to be beyond the reach of 

human nature. Dakier. See Hesiod, 

"Erat. k. Hmu. I. 120. sqq. For the opi-

nions of Aristotle, Democritus, and Epi-

curus upon the subject of those inferior 

intellegences, see Enfield's Philosophy, 

B. 2. ch. ix. s. 1. ch. xiii. and ch. xv.
καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἥγοιτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὅμοιος γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὡς περ ἂν εἰ τίς ἕπτων μὲν παῖδας ἥγοιτο [ἡ] καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἥμιονοι, ἕπτους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἥγοιτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὁ Μέλιτε, οὐκ ἐστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειράμενοι ἥμων ἐγράψατ χίν γραφήν ταύτῃ, ἡ ἀπορῶν ὁ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδικήματ᾽ ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἀν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώ- που, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶ καὶ δαίμονι καὶ θεία ἤγεισθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς μήτε ἱρώους, οὐδεμία μηχανῇ εστὶν.

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἅδικως κατὰ τὴν Μελίτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἵκαια καὶ ταῦτα ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆ μοι ἀπέχ-

'Ων εἰ καὶ λέγονται.] Empir. Hipp. 474. 'Εκ τὰ ἐν τῷ χρήματι πεσοῦσ', ὡς εἰ σὲ, πῶς ἂν ἐκεῖσθαι εἰκος. Thuc. 1. 23. εἰκας ἡθελον δοῦμαι ἐν Πελοπ- τοννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν, εἰ ἂν ἂμφό- τηροι ἔμηθασιν, ὡς παρ' ἡς: so in the text, where the relative ὥν, referring to τινον ἄλλοιν joined with a preposition, is used without it. Matthie Gr. s. 595. extr.

'Ἡγείας [ἡ] καὶ ἀδικ. Forster was the first who proposed to remove the particle ἥ, in which he was followed by Schleiermacher, to whose judgment Bek- ker would have gladly deferred, had he not been restrained by the authority of the MSS., whence he has enclosed it in brackets as supr. Fischer defends the text as it stands, as males may have for their sires either horses or asses. Wolf also justly preserves the ἥ, and renders it vel atherum. Οὐκ ἐστιν ὅπως—οὐχὶ.] You have by all means preferred this indistinct, etc. Matthie Gr. s. 452. Obs. 2. Ὄπως σὲ σὸ τίνα πεσόνεις, κ. τ. λ.] b. c. But there is no possibility of your persuading, by any means, a man with even a moderate share of sense, that the same individual can believe in the attributes of demons and divinities, and dis- believe in the existence of demons, gods, and heroes themselves. Stephens explains the passage: multo autem fieri modo po- test, ut ullis, qui tantillum sane mentis habeat, persuasere, ejusdem esse hominis, et dem. et divina (aliqua esse), et versus ejusdem, negue d. n. n. h. esse, existi- mare; et Stallbaum: non poteris cui- quam persuadere, amnis hominis esse, et credere esse daemonium quidam ac divi- novm, et versus credere nec daemonum nec dnos esse.

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ἄνδρες —] So- crates having closed his defence of the particular charges alleged against him, proceeds to the discussion of some other subjects which these charges involved. And first he complains in a degree of the odium excited against him amongst the crowd, and the dangers of its termin- ating in his death. But at the same time, with a simple and touching elo- quence, he inculcates the value which a good man should attach to his duty and integrity, and how little life should be regarded as the forfeit of adherence to high principle. Οὐ πολλῆς μοι ἐκεῖνα ἐπιστ. ἄπολ.] Seem to me to require no great defence; as Plut. Gorg. p. 461. A. οὐκ ἄλγης συνονύσας ἔστιν; it requires no short conversation. Matthie Gr. s. 316.
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θεῖα γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἕαν περ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλιτος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλὰ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ ὑπὶ καὶ φθόνοι. ἀ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἁγαθοὺς ἀνδρας γῆρικεν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν ὑπόθεν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στὴ.

Ἰσως δ' ἄν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σωκράτης, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτίθεντο, εὖ οὐ κυν-δυνεῖς νυν ἀποθανεῖν; Ἔγῳ δὲ τοῦτῳ ἄν δικαίων λόγων ἀντίσημω, ὅτι Ὑδ καλῶς λέγεις, ὁ ἀνδρομέ, εἰ οἶει δεῖν κῦντυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ᾤν ἡ τεθ-

νάναι ἄνδρα ὑπὸ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφέλος ὑστιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, πότερον δικαία ἡ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἀνδρός ἁγαθοῦ ἔργα ἣ κακοῦ. φαύλοι γὰρ ἄν τοῦ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἰεν τῶν ἡμιδέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευκάρσιν, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νίος, ὅς τοιοῦτον τοῦ κῦντυνον κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὡστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἡ μῆτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομενῷ Ἐκτορα

Ἀληθές.] Αἰδ. ἀληθῆς; incorrectly, for it must be referred to the preceding. Fisch.

Ὀ ἐμὴ αἰρήσει. ] h. c. Quod efficiec, ut condemner neque absoluev judicium senten-
tias. STALL. Ficinus. and all the Latin translations, have erred in explaining αἰρήσας by permut; αἱρεῖν in its foren-

sic sense signifying merely to bring about a conviction, unconnected with any pe-
nalty whatever. It is properly a term used in warfare, and applied to the capture of an enemy, or the storms of a

city, whence it was transferred, like others of its class, to the forum, and means facere ut revers condemnatur judi-
cium sententias. Fisch.

Ἀλλ'] ἢ—διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος.] These words, as Fiscker correctly ob-
serves, might have been omitted, for they were already implied in τοῦτ' ἐστιν supr.

However the ancient writers were frequently in the habit of adding, generally after a break in the sentence, some words by which the preceding member of the sentence might be better defined, or the subject more vividly recalled.

Οὐδὲν ἐν ἐπίνου μὴ ἐν ἐμοί στῆ.] For there is no danger of its stopping with me. Steph. in marg. haud enim ti-

mendum est, ne hac in me cessent, vel fames faciant. Fischer: neque vero, vel enim, (ἀ δὲ γὰρ) nihil periculum est, ne ego sim ultimus, quem damnat invidia et odium multitudinis. V. Cousin: car

it ne fuit pas espérer que ce fût s'arrêté à moi. So in Phid. cap. 34. sub fin. ouvèn ἐπίνου μὴ φοβηθῇ.

Εἰτ' οὖν αἰσχύνει. ] Εἶτα and ἐπι-
ta are used in questions of impatience and sarcasm, as supr. Matthiae Gr. s. 603.

Ὑπολογίζεσθαι.] i. q. φροντιζειν, movere, rationem habere. Fisch.

Ὁ τῆς Θετίδος νίος.] See Iliad. xviii. 94. sqq.—Παρὰ τό αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖνai, pra turpitudinis macula et opinione, h. e. ne dicetur mortem Patrocli amici sequano animo tulisse. Fisch. παρα, pras-
ter, with an accusative, being one of the forms for the construction of the compara-
tive. Matthiae Gr. s. 455.
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sula of Pallene with Macedonia, where it bordered on Thrace. While the Athenians were before the town a skirmish occurred, in which Alcibiades, who, though still very young, had joined the expedition, was wounded, and his life preserved by Socrates, who managed to have the prize of valor, which he had manifestly earned himself, bestowed upon his favourite pupil. V. Laert. ii. 22. sqq. Athen. iv. 15. Cic. de Divin. 1. 54. Plut. Alcibid. Thucyd. i. 56. sqq. "АПΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ."

νυς ύμεις εἰλεσθε ἀρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαϊα καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίω, τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ἐτατητοῦ ἐμενον ὡς περ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκυιδύνευον ἀπομανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ παττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήσθην τε καὶ ὑπελαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δειν ζην καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἠμαντοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἣ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦ πράγμα λίποιμ τὴν τάξιν. δεινον μεν ἄν εἰη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθὸς τὸν ἀν με δι-καίως εἰσάγου τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοῖς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδίως θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὄνω. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δε-διέναι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφῶν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστίν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τῶν θάνατον οὐδ᾽ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὅ τὸν ἄγαθον, δεδίασι δ᾽ ὡς εἶ ἐιδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστίν αὐτή ἡ ἐπουείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαὶ εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν ἢ ἐγὼ δὲ, ὃ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἰσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώ-πων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερος τοῦ φαίνει εἶναι, τοῦτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδώς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀλικου ὀω
follows after participes, whose meaning it thus repeats for the sake of emphasis. Matthiae Gr. s. 610. 7.

Τῇ βελτίων.] Εἰ γαίες superior presit. Serran. περιφραστικάς. Βελτίων signifying here, one who excels another in authority and influence. So melior is used for potentior, Horat. Epit. 1. 10. 34. "Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis Pellebat," &c.; and those are designated as Optimates, who are possessed of the most considerable power in a republic. Stephens renders it meliori, or præstantiori, which Fischer approves and explains by sapientiori, præstuntiori.

Πρὸ ὁν ὑῶν τῶν κακῶν, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates had just asserted that an unwarrantable disobedience to a better than himself, either god or man, was, in his conviction, both criminal and dishonorable; he now proceeds to say that he never should feel afraid of, or inclined to fly from what, for all he knew, might be a blessing, sooner than feel so affected with regard to those things which he knew to be actually evil. See Matthiae Gr. s. 575. voc. πρὸ—Φοβήσθαι and φείγεσθαι πρὸ τῶν κακῶν—ὑμῖν οὖν, is used for φοβήσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακὰ ὑμῖν ὧν ὡς ὑμῖν ὑπάρχωμεν, which reads and supplies it thus: ὡστε οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ὑμᾶς ἵνα ἔφθαστε καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὁμοίωμεν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχωμεν, or ἐξίσοις ὑμᾶς, etc. But the force of οὖν may either be carried on to the firm refusal of Socrates to alter his conduct, on the condition of his acquittal, or it may be presumed that this is one of the many interruptions familiar to the philosopher, by which the sense was only meant to be suspended during one or more parentheses, and yet was neglected to be afterwards supplied, owing to the greater importance of the subjects thus introduced.

Ἀπιστήσαντες.] Ald. Bas. 1. Not. ἀπιστήσαντες. Steph. Forst. ἀπεισιθήσαντες; Bas. 2. ἀπιστήσαντες, sanctioned by Eusebius, and certainly the most correct. For ἀπιστεῖν, ἀπιστεῖν, and ἀπιστεῖν are not merely used in reference to those who distrust, who place no confidence in others, but to those also who, from this want of confidence, resist being led by any whom they mistrust.

Τὴν ἀφίγιν.] From the first, at all. Ἀποκτεῖναι.] To condemn to death, vote the death of. Sententias damnare mortis, Staul., in which sense it occurs also cap. 18. infr. and Xenophon. Mem. IV. 8. 5, where it is opposed to ἀπολέσειν.

Ἡμὺ τὴν ὑμῶν—εἰσφαθρήσαντα.] Those who could not admit the use of ἤν with the future, have proposed to read εἰσφαθρήσαντο: but almost all the editions support the reading in the text. Matthiae, Gr. s. 599. d. states that ἤν is sometimes joined with the indicative of the future, to designate as only probable, that which the future alone would declare decidedly about to happen; but the quotations adduced in proof can be otherwise explained by anacol-
krates, νόν μὲν Ἀντώφ οὖ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφιείμεν
σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ὑτε μηκετὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕτ-
τῇ πειρατίβειν μὴ δέ φιλοσοφεῖν εἶν δέ ἀλὸς ἐτι-
τοῦτο πράττουν, ἀποθανεί. εἰ οὖν με, ὁ περ ἔιτον, ἐπὶ
toútov ἀφίοιτε, ἐποιμ' ἀν ὑμῖν ὑτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ
ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισο-
μαι δὲ μάλλον τοῦ θεοῦ ἑν ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐως περ ἄν
ἐμπυνεό καὶ οἶος τε ὁ, οὐ μὴ παῦσομαι φιλοσοφῶν
καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύμενος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτι
ἀν ἄει ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οία περ ἐκοθα, ὑτι
'Ω ἀριστε ἄνδρων, Ἀθηναῖος ὁν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίσ-
της καὶ ἐνδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἠσχύν, χρυμά-
tων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελόμενος, ὅτως σοι ἔσται
ὁς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ καὶ
ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὅς βελτίστη ἔσται,
οὐκ ἐπιμελεὶ ὑπὲρ φρονίσεως; καὶ ἐάν τις υμῶν ἀμ-
φισβητήσῃ καὶ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὔνοο ἄφησω
αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμ, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάζω

tha, various readings, &c. Whence he
concludes, that it is even very doubtful
whether the genuine Attic was ever used
ἂν with the future indicative; for this
usage is found, in Euripides, only in
lyrical passages, and perhaps was still
prevalent in the old language. Daves,
Misc. Critic. p. 101, denies that ἂν is
used with the future, in which he is fol-
lowed by most English critics. Brunck
and Wolf express themselves doubtfully
343. See in Phadon, cap. 5. init. οὗ,
ὑποστιών ἂν, etc.
'Εφ' ὑτε. For ὑτε, ὅραν condi-
tionem that. This should be, properly,
ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὑτε, as Thucydidès, 3.
114. says, στοιχῖα καὶ ξημμαχιάν ἐπούμα-
σαντο...ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὑτε μη-
tε. 'Αμπρακιώτας μετὰ 'Αλκαρμάνων
στραταίων ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίων, &c.
Thus ὑτε, Thuc. 3. 34. 75. 114. 5. 94.
7. 82. But because the relative pro-
perly refers to the demonstrative, so, ac-
cording to Gr. s. 473, they said ἐπὶ τού-
τῳ, ὣς ο ὑτε, or with the preposition
repeated, ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὧς υτε as supr.
Matthiæ Gr. s. 479. a.
'Ασπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ. Ἐσπά-
ζεθαίν, aliquem salutare ita ut eum am-
plectaris; φιλῶν, salutare aliquem ita
ut eum oseeius; whence the passage in
the text means: gratis laetoque animo
vestram humilitatem et clementiam am-
plector atque veneror. Stalt.
Μαλλον τῷ θεῷ. Stephens com-
pares this passage with Acts, v. 29,
πειθαρχεῖν εἰ τῷ μάλλων, ἡ ἀνθρώ-
πος.—Ἔως περ ἂν ἠμνήσω. So Cicero
p. red. ad Quir. 10. "damn anima spi-
rabo mea!"
Καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος. So cap. 9. extr.
to θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνείκειςμεν, ὅτι οὐκ
ἐστι σοφῶς.
'Ισχύν. Ficinus has mistaken the
sense of this word in explaining it poten-
tia, it is here expressive of the wa-
nymity and resolution which consist in
the contempt of wealth and worldly
grandeur. The qualities of the body
are not uncommonly affirmed of the
mind; so Xenoph. Ἀρο. 34. uses μῆμη,
as synonymous with μενυμάτης, s. 33.
It is evident, from what Socrates con-
times to say, that ἵσχεν is opposed to a concern about riches and an anxiety for dignity and fame.

Νέωτέροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροι. See Matthias Gr. s. 415. Obs. 1.

Μᾶλλον εἰ τοῖς ἄστοις ὅσο μον ἐγγ. A similar construction occurs, cap. 30. a med. καὶ χαλεπώτεροι εἴσονται ὥσο νεώτεροι εἰσ. Cf. Liv. ii. 51.


Μῦτε σομάτων ἐπιμελείσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] Neither to be solicited for the body nor for riches, prior to, nor with such zeal, as for the soul. It is impossible not to observe in what grand and beautiful relief these noble sentiments of the philosopher stand out upon the dark ground of pagan superstition. But while this amazing exercise of self-instructed mind may well furnish a subject for surprise and admiration, it must be remembered that reason is but the dawn within ourselves, revelation the day-spring from on high, that can alone mature its light.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—ταῦτ' ἂν εἰς βλαβερά' εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνῃ ἂν, ο βαίνεις Ἄθηναίοι, ἡ πείθομες Ἄνωτῷ ἡ μῆ, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε με ἡ μή ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοί οὖκ ἂν ποιήσωτος ἄλλα, οὔτε εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.
§. 18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὃ άνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατε μοι ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, ἀλλὰ ἀκούειν καὶ γάρ, ὅστε ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὅνησεθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἀπαντᾷ ἔρειν ὑμῖν καὶ ἀλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ὑστοσ βοήσετε, ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τούτο. Εὖ γὰρ ήστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον οὖν οἴμαι ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ ἐμείῳ βλάψετε ἢ υἱὸς αὐτοῦς, ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἀν ἀβαίσειν οὔτε Μέλιτος οὔτε Ἀντούς. οὔδὲ γὰρ ἀν δύναιτο οὐ γὰρ οἴμαι θεμιτῶν εἰναὶ ἀμείνοι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μὲν ἐν ή ἐξελάσσειεν ἡ ἀτυμάσσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὖντος μὲν ἢσος οἰκι- finitive in participle futures, see Matthiae Gr. s. 599. d.

Μέλλω—τεθυναί.[1] Stallbaum remarks upon this construction, that the Greeks, desirous to express more effectively the sadness attendant upon death, used the past tense, as if the event had actually occurred. Thom. Magister. v. μέλλω, suspects this form to be an error of the transcribers; he admits the present and future infinitives with μέλλω, and the infin. of the nor. with ἦν, which he would also supply before μέλλω, in the text. But the use of the perf. for the pres. infin. is by no means unusual; it occurs in Crito cap. 1. sub. fin. ἦ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκατο ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δὲ ἐφικμένων τεθυνναί με, and cap. 29. infin. a me. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μέλλων ἀφόρθια ὅτι ἀπολογησάμενος τεθυνναί ἢ ἐκείνως ὦν. Cf. Demosth. de Corom. p. 301. πῶς ὦκ ἀπολογιζον πολλαῖς ἵστι ἐκάιις. Some make τεθυνναί, in the text, the pres. infin. from τεθυνμα. See Matthiae Gr. s. 599. d.

§. 18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε.] Socrates proceeds to another part of his defence of common interest, like the preceding, to the Athenians and himself. For he proves that his condemnation and death should be accompanied by considerable injury and loss to the state, and in the progress of his pleading continues to exhibit that unbending fortitude in his manner, and freedom in his language, which, mingled occasionally with judicious irony, had characterized his dis-
cussions through life, and which drew from Cicero the remark, that Plato had brought forward Socrates, so defending himself, on trial for his life, that he less resembled a suppliant or a culprit, than the master and guide of his judges.

Μεῖω βλάψετε.[2] According to the analogy of ποιεῖν πινέιν κακά, the verbs φελεῖν, βλάπτειν, and others in which the idea of “doing” is implied, take, beside the accusative of the person, another accusative neuter plural of an adjectival, where the English uses the adverbs “more,” “very,” as supr. Matthiae Gr. s. 415. Obs. 3.

Δύναιτο.] Stob. Trinacvēl. ἐναιαντο; οὑ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν αἰτινίᾳ, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ; either reading is equally admissible. Fich.

Οὐ γὰρ οἴμαι θεμιτῶν εἶναι.] h. c. Neque enim legibus divinae supeditae respondere existimò. Stal. Αμείνοι ἀνείρι, i. q. θεμιτῶν ἀνείρι, but used in the dative, from its proximity to εἶναι, on which it depends by attraction. See Buttmann. Interned. Gr. Gr. s. 142.

Ἀποκτείνει—ἡ ἐξελάσσει—ἡ ἀτυμάσσει. 1. Ἀποκτείνειν est facere ut quis morte damnetur atque interficatur; ἐξελάσσειν, facere, ut quis vel omnem civitatem amalliat vel certe maxima et praecipua civitatis commoda atque jura. Stal. There were three degrees of ἀτυμία, infancy, or public disgrace. I. When the criminal retained his possessions, but was deprived of some privilege, which was enjoyed by
other citizens. 2. When he was, for the present, deprived of the rights of citizenship, and had his goods confiscated, as in the case of those indebted to the public exchequer, until the debt was discharged.

3. When the criminal, with his children and his posterity, were for ever deprived of the rights of free citizens, both sacred and civil. Potter, Grec. Antiq, v. 1. c. 25. Ficinus and Dacier, who follows him, have rendered ἀτίμασιν incor- rectly; v. Lat. Interpr.

4. Ἀλλα τὸν μάλλον.] Intell. ήθομα μέγα κακόν.

Ἐπιχείρων ἀποκτινύναι.] Theodoret. ἐπιχειρών ἀποκτινύναι; incorrectly, for ἀποκτινύναι is the Attic form. Monis: Ἀποκτινύναι, Ἀττικῶς: ἀποκτινύναι, 'Ελληνικός. Fisch.

Μὴ τι ἵζωμ.—καταψυχήσαμενοί.] h. c. ne teuere repudielis hoc Apollinis beneficium, vobis tributum, quem je suisit vos ob errores et vita castigare atque ad virtutis studium ehortari. Stall. Tr. Lest in condemning me you may offend in any wise against the gift of the God to you; περί with an accus. signifying frequently in adversus, against, as Aristoph. Nubb. 990. περί τούς σαυτοῦ γονίας κακοφυγέων: ύμῖν being the dat. upon κατών; see c. 9. n. extr. Διὰ τῶν τοῦ θ. l. c. 17. sub. fin. τῷ θεῷ ὑπαρχόντων. Cf. Cic. Legg. "ōt obtemperatum scriptis legibus."

Προσκειμένον τῷ πόλει, κ. τ. λ.] The sense of this passage depends upon the signification of μύωπος, which may be interpreted either as a gadfly, according to Fischer in loc. Rigalt. ad Ones. c. 1. p. 17. and Blomfild. Gloss. ad Lesb. Chyl. Prom. 583. or a spur, which is approved by Ficinus, Serranus, Wolf, Schleirnacher, and others, who suppose that Socrates represents himself as a horseman or charioteer, obliged by the direction of the deity to rouse the activity and energies of a noble but indolent steed, the type of the republic, by the application of the spur, which represents his own discourses and exhortations. In the former signification, which from the preceding, τι καὶ γελοιότερον εἴπον, and the customary style of the speaker, is likely to be more expressive and correct, Socrates may be understood as comparing himself to a gadfly adhering to, and rousing the dormant faculties of the fine but lazy animal, which needed such excitement to keep its powers in action and alive. This latter explanation agrees better not only with the scope, but the terms of the argument; προσκειμένον τῷ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θ., upon which see Matthiae Gr. s. 496. 3., προστεθεικέναι, and προσκαιδέσων infr. which are all in keeping with, and refer most happily to this view of the subject. —Νωθεστιρίφων, Suid. interpr. βραχυτηρίφων.

Οἶον ὁ με —τοιούτοι τινα.] Τοιοῦτον τιν. is joined by apposition to οἶον preceded to facilitate the completion of the
'Ismos an oun dozexen atoton einai, oti di' evw idia men tauta euvbouleuvo perimou kai polu-

sentence, de oun eis k. t. l. Stal.

'Meios e eisow—ravious an atokteinase.] At vos, offensi forstian, velut dormitantes quim excitantur, me fereis, atque Anyto obsequiti temere occidetis: poshac reliquum tempus perdormiscessit, nisi quem aliam deus nobis miserit, cura permane vestri. Wolt. In which, it will be observed, there is a marked allusion to the simile as supr. Upon tach' anv see Matthiue Gr. s. 599. e. s. 600. 5.

Olou uto tov th.—deisodai.] See Matthiue Gr. s. 536.

Ou gar anthetaopyvo eisw.] h. e. non videtur esse consilli et arbitrii humani. Stal. Every one being most inclined to devote his attention and regard to what most nearly concerns his own welfare and interest, and such having been especially the case at Athens, where the neglect of personal and domestic duties came little short of a crime. —'Anveixetai tovov oikeiow ameloumenov, ergov animo negligere rem familia- rem, res suas perire sinere; Matthiue Gr. s. 550. b.

Oude oioi te evyn, anpanasach.] Were incapable of having the effrontery to say, that I, de.

§ 19. Tausta euvbouleuvo.] i. q. taui-
πραγμονών, δημοσία δε ου τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς το πλῆθος τὸ ύμέτερον ἔμβουλευειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αὐτίν έστιν ὁ ύμεῖς ἐμοί πολλάκις ἄκηκοατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μου θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνῇ], ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικομιστῶν Μέλιτος ἐγράφατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ᾽ ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῇ τις γιγνομένη, ὧν ταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὁ ἀν μέλλων πράττεων, προτρέπει δὲ οὐ ποτε. τούτ᾽ ἐστιν ὁ μου ἐναντίοντα τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἐναντίονσθαι εὖ γὰρ ὅστε, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολόλη καὶ οὔτ’ ἄν ὕμνος ὑπελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἄν ἐμαυτοῦ. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθη γο γὰρ ἤστιν ὁς τις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὕμνο ὤντε ἄλλο πλήθει οὐδενὶ γυνησίων ἐναντίομενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλά ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽

τα παρακελεύεσθαι, c. 18. cohortari ad studium sapientiae et virtutis. Fisci.—Πολυπτρεγεμών, intermeddling in the affairs of others; an expression used by Socrates to express one of the causes of the prejudice of the Athenians against him. Θείον τι καὶ θαμόνον.] See c. 31. n. Τη γὰρ εἰςβίωσα μοι, κ. τ. λ.—Φωνη. This word, which appears to some to have been inserted as an explanation of the preced. θείον τι, etc. is to be found in all the copies, and is approved by Forster. Fischer would reject it as a mere gloss, rendered wholly unnecessary by τούτ’ ἦστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῆ τις γιγνομένη, following. Ἐπικομιστῶν ἐγράφατο.] Socrates alludes here to the terms of the ἄνωμοσια; Ἐτερα ἐι δαιμόνια. c. 11.—Ἐπικομιστικοῦ, i. e. ἐπισφείν, χελεφάζειν; to expire to public derision. Κορυφοῖς and ἐπικομισταῖς have a similar signification, owing to the practice of the old comedy, the entire poem of which, as Schlegel remarks, is one great jest, which again contains within itself a world of separate jests. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 4. 1 sqq. Προτρέπει δὲ οὖποτε.] Cic. Divin. i. 54: “Hoc nimimum est illud, quod de Socrate accipiamus, quaque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum sepe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod daemonium appellation, cui semper parnaret, nonquam impellenti sepe revocanti.” Ἀπολόλη.] Ἀπόλλοσθαι, ἐγείρει εἰς patria, aut in vincula congiici, aut morte demus. Fisci. One who escaped these penalties was said σώζεσθαι.—Ἀπολ. καὶ—ὑπελήκη. The primitive termination of the p. perfect, act. and med. appears to have been εα, which occurs in Homer and Herodotus, c. g. in the perf. med. πεποίθη, Od. i. 44. συνεβίαι, Herod. 9. 58. This εα was changed, as in the augment, sometimes into η, whence the Attic and Doric form ώ, χείρη, sometimes into εί, with the addition of ν. Matth. Gr. s. 188. Obs. s. 198. 3. Οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει.] See cap. 10. n. Τοι δὲμοουργῖον, κ. τ. λ. a med. Γνωστώς, seriously, sincerely.
\[\text{ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.} \]

\[20.\] Megálá ε' ἐγώνευ ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξωμαι τουτοῦ, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μελλεῖ ὅλογον χρόνον σωθῆσεσθαι, ἵδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

\[§. 20.\] Καὶ εἰ expresses something hypothetical, even if; εἰ καὶ, something actual, although, notwithstanding that; καὶ εἰ ἀθάνατος ἦν, even if I were immortal; εἰ καὶ θυγάτης εἰμι, although I am mortal. Εἴη δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαία, ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰν μὲν ἄρχων ὁδεμίαν πώποτε ἥρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δὲ· καὶ ἐτυχέν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ ᾿Αντιόχεις πρωτανεύουσα, ὅτε υἱὸς τοὺς δέκα στρα-

Kai ei... Kai ei expresses something hypothetical, even if; eis kai, something actual, although, notwithstanding that; kai ei athanatos hen, even if I were immortal; eis kai thygates eimi, although I am mortal. Ei de ymion fortka men kai dikaina, allithe de. Egho gar, ws andres Athenaioi, allan men arkhon othedimian potopote herxa en tih polei, ebouleusa de kai etuxhen hemon he phul Athionixis protanevousa, oste uieis touz deka stra-

\[\text{Καὶ εἰ.} \] Kai ei expresses something hypothetical, even if; eis kai, something actual, although, notwithstanding that; kai ei athanatos hen, even if I were immortal; eis kai thygates eimi, although I am mortal. Ei de ymion fortka men kai dikaina, allithe de. Egho gar, ws andres Athenaioi, allan men arkhon othedimian potopote herxa en tih polei, ebouleusa de kai etuxhen hemon he phul Athionixis protanevousa, oste uieis touz deka stra-

\[\text{Σ. 20.} \] S. 20, "In sic igitur sita autem, aut, κ. κ. λ. \] Steph. in marg. Me cum esse, qui nonini contra jus et aequum esset ero sint, mortis metu: non cedendo autem, simul sim interitis.

\[\text{Ὑπεκάθισμα.} \] Hl. Bas. 1, Steph. Norib. ὑπέκαθισμα but Motii: ᾿Εκάθωμα, ᾿Αττικῶμα, ἐκάθωμα, ᾿Ελληνικῶς. ᾿Φορτικὰ καὶ ἕκακωμά. \] Athenian and retardant.

\[\text{Ἄρχον ὁδεμίαν—ἤρξα.} \] H. 1, kathismen kathismen magistratum gessi. Stahl, whence, it will be observed, the term archon could not be properly applied to the senatorial office.—Εἴδοξα εἰς. \] Socrates belonged to the senate of five hundred, Boulη τῶν πεντακόσιων, out of whom were chosen fifty officers, Protanmos, to preside in the senate during thirty-five days, or five weeks. These fifty officers were divided into five decuriae; each decuriae being to govern for the space of one week, during which time they were called Protarchous, out of whom one, elected by lot, presided over the rest for each of the seven days. This president of the proedri was termed ᾿Επιστάτης, and to his charge the public seal, the keys of the citadel, and the public exchequer were committed. The phylē, or tribe out of which the protanmones were chosen, was called the phylē protanoneousa, and Socrates was the ᾿Επιστάτης of the Antiochean tribe, of which his birth-place, Alopece, was a ᾿υμος, or borough, at the period stated in the text. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1, c. 13, c. 9.

\[\text{Τὸν ἐκα στρατηγῷ.} \] Every year ten generals were appointed at Athens, called Στρατηγοὶ, who were intrusted with the command of all the forces and warlike preparations, to be managed as they judged best. About the period of their institution, it frequently happened upon occasions of moment that they were all sent out together, but afterwards it was considered unnecessary, and perhaps inexpedient, for so many to be sent out, with equal power, to superintend the military arrangements, and consequently, though the same number continued to be appointed every year, they were not all obliged to attend the wars, but one, two, or more, as occasion required. Upon the deposition of Thrasybulus and Aleibiades, the ten generals alluded to in the text, Conon, Dionclicon, Leon, Pericles, Erasistrates, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protonachus, Thrasyllus, and Aristogenes, were appointed in their stead. Eight of these ten generals of the commonwealth were on board at the battle of Aeginae, a small island between Lesbos and the main, where the Lacedaemonian fleet, under Callicratidas, encountered that of the Athenians under
Conon. During the engagement twenty-five Athenian vessels were sunk or disabled, and at the conclusion of the battle, which terminated unfavourably to the Lacedaemonians, a council of war was held to consider what steps should be adopted next. Diomedon proposed that the wreck should be collected, and the dead, and immediate relief afforded to such as might be discovered still alive, either floating on the ruins of the galleys, or endeavouring to save themselves by swimming. Erasinides recommended that the whole fleet should at once proceed to the assistance of Conon. Thrasyllus differed from both, and prevailed in his advice, that forty-six ships should remain to collect the wreck, while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Mitylene. None of the generals took the command of the squadron appointed for the former purpose; it was committed to Tharmenes and Thrasybulus, who had held high naval commands, but were then in the subordinate rank of captains of triremes. The generals were meanwhile to proceed with the main body of the fleet to Mitylene. Both designs were frustrated by a storm, which compelled all the vessels to shelter at Arginusae, and the crews of the wreck were thus left to perish. Upon this charge, preferred against six of the eight generals who returned to Athens after the engagement, Diomedon, Pericles, Lysias, Aristocrates, Erasinides, and Thrasyllus; (the other two, Protonachus and Aristogenes, having remained with Conon at Samos;) by Archedemus, the popular orator at Athens, and Tharmenes, already mentioned, who unaccountably appeared as principal accuser, they were sentenced and put to death. Socrates, as one of the prytanes, opposed this proceeding to the last for many reasons, independent of its illegality: for each of the accused should have had a separate day for trial, a provision contained in the decree of Canonus, which was strongly urged by Euryptolemus, the relative of Pericles, and intimate of Diomedon, but in vain. Xen. Hel. 1. c. 7. s. 10. Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. cap. 5. Mitford’s Greece, iii. 431—439.

The battle of Arginusae was fought in the year of Callias, not long before the Apotheosis (Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. p. 427.) which were in the month of Pyanepsion. This action may therefore be fixed to the third month of Callias, B.C. 406. Clinton’s Fasti Hellen. p. 271.

"Ἀναρείσθαι, συγγραμμα τοιηων tollere, ut sepeliantur, STALL.

"Αθρόους κρίνειν.] h. e. de omnibus simul sententias ferre, STALL., which has been already shown to be illegal; whence pararomós. Xen. Memor. i. 18. επιθυμήσαντος τού έχον παρά τοὺς νόμοις—μια ψήφῳ—άποκτειναι πάντας. 11. Gr. i. 7. 11. ή ει της βουλής ήν μια ψήφῳ άποταναι κρίνειν: while the laws decreed that this inquiry should be held upon each individual separately; κρίνειαν τούς άνερας έτιχα έκαστον. Xen. Hist. Gr. as supr.

"Εσ εν άυτον. χρον.—ήδε.] Xen. Hellen. i. 7. 12. και ου πολλος χρόνον στερουν μετέραλ τοις Ἀθηναίοις, κ. τ. Χ.

"Ημηκτιώθηρ.] In allusion to the opposition which Socrates made to the unlawful resolution of Callixenus, that the people should ballot by wards; that there should be for each ward two vases; and that proclamation should be made by the herald, informing the people that whoever deemed the generals criminal, in neglecting to save from the waves those who were conquerors in battle, must put his die in the first vase; whoever deemed them innocent, in the second: that the punishment, in case of condemnation, should be death. Mitford, iii. p. 453. Xenophon. Mem. iv. 4. 2. Hellen. i. 7. 9. 14. 15. Cf. Socrates in Ἀσχίν. Dial. iii. 12. p. 102. οὐκ ἤπει-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

... ενδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ρητόρων, καὶ ύμῶν κελευντών καὶ βοώτων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὑμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμῶν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἢ ἔτι δημοκρατο-μένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκονται αὐτῷ μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἁγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνοις Λέοντα τοῦ Σαλαμίνον, ἵνα ἀποθάναι: οὗ δὲ καὶ ἀλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αἰτίων. τοτὲ μέντοι

ῥήμην τὴν γνώμην, 1. c. ῥοπολο συνε-τελείας ποιούσαι σεβασ-μαία ferei καὶ συμμετείχαμεν. — Forst.

'Ενδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν. — 'Ενδεικ-
νόμινα, αἰληθὲς ἐν αἰθέρι φασινον διε-
σχεθηκαίν μαδ ομιασίας ταυτίζοντο δις-
τε: ἀπάγειν, αὐτοκράτηρ ημι-
τιλ. Hence enéxiés, a prosecution, and ἀπαγωγή, a conveying to prison. Fischer reads ὑπάγειν in the text, which he supports by references: but the following are sufficient to support the adopted reading: Demosth. adv. Lep-
των, ἐνέξεις αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγω-
γην. — Τῶν ρητόρων. — See cap. 10. 
sub. fin. ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητορῶν. 

Οἱ τριάκονται — με πέμπτοι. — See κ. 10. n. Μελετ. — ὑπ. τ. ποιητ. — πέμπτον αὐτῶν, h. e. με εἰς ὅπως αὐτὸν; so Xen. H. Gr. ii. 2, 11. γερέθη προσβείνοντο — ἐκάστος αὐτοῦ, h. e. ἵνα εἰς εἰς ἄνων; and 2 Pet. ii. 5. ὄγ-
δον Νοέ — ἐρίλακεν, h. e. Νουσάνυμ εἰς σεπλεν ἄνων, Fisch., Μετατέφρ. μεταπέμπεσθαι, signifies sometimes, to send one to bring another — and also to send one with full powers, as in the text, confirmed by προστάτες, ἁγαγ. ἐκ Σα-
λαμίνου, following. Serran.

Οἰκον. — Tim. Gloss. Plat. ὅλος, ὁ ὅλος, οἰκος περιφερείς, ἐν ὧ τοί πρωτανείς συνειστώντα. Pollux, ix. 155. ὁ ὅλ-

λος, ἐν ὧ πρωτανείς ἐπιστῆς ἡμέ-
ρας περιτυχον τῆς τῶν πεινακ-
σίων μοιλῆ, ἡ πρωτανέωσα φολη. — Pausan. 1. 5. τοῦ βουλευτηρίου τῶν πεινακοσίων πληθύνθη ὅλος ἐστὶ κε-
λομήρη, καὶ θέουσα τι ἑκατέρα ἡ πρωτανείς. It was so named from its circular form and coved roof; and was called also Πρωτανείων, according to Timaeus, from its having been a corn 

store, ποτῶν ταιμοίον. 

Λέοντα τοῦ Σαλαμίνον. — Leon, 
distinguished for his virtues as his opu-
site, was one of the ten generals al-
ready mentioned, born at Salamis, but 
a freeman of Athens. Upon the ap-
pointment of the Thirty, he retired, a 
voluntary exile, to his native island; 
the avarice, which, no less than cruelty 
and revenge, formed a leading charac-
teristic of the new administration, hav-
ing warned him that his life, if he re-
main at Athens, might become the penalty of 
his wealth; a result which, it appears, 
was only deferred, and against which 
his character proved no protection. v. 
c. 10.

Ἀναπλήσαι αἰτίων. — h. e. com-
maculare culpae et criminibus. — Stal-
From the united evidence of Xenophon, 
Lysias, and Plato, it appears that the 
most abominable policy guided the mea-
ures pursued at this period by the 
Thirty. Revenge and avarice had then 
full sway; many suffered death for pri-
vate eminities; many merely for their 
wealth. Every eminent man was to be 
destroyed or gained: but, as means were 
wanting to attach a sufficient number 
by favours, the infernal expedient was
practised, of forcing men to a community of interest through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in the same guilt, and obnoxious to the same resentment; and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became common cause. Mitford's Greece, iv. p. 46.—'Αναπλησίας, Suid. Interpr. αναπληρώσας. ο δε Πλάτων αντί τοι μολύνει, having infected or defiled: in which sense the verb occurs in the description of the plague at Athens, Thu. cyd. ii. 51. ετέρων ας' ετέρων θεραπείας αναπιπλάμενοι, ὠσπερ τά πρόβατα. —contagione infecti; which Gesner, in Thes. L. L. v. Impleo, compares with Livy, iv. 30. "Vulgatae qualitatem in homines morb, et primo in agrestes ingrauerit servitiae. Urbis deinde impletur." Ruhnken. ad Tim. Lex. Plat. v. αναπλησίας.

Θανάτον μεν μίλει—οίον ὑποτιμ.\] Moreo morte nullo prorsus modo. Fisch. εἰ μη ἄγροι, ὥς με ἄγροι. Serran, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; the sense, however, is the same, as Socrates intends to apologize for the use of a term, which, though expressive, was considered, probably, too homely or inelegant by the refined and scrupulous Athenian.

Τὸ πάν μίλει.] b. c. ormiu, omni-

bus modis nihili cura est. STALL. Steph. in marg. me nisi hoc dictu agrestius erat, nihil mortem curaver; ut autem nihil injustum neque impium perpetreram, in eo vero neam omnem cum variat; vel nisi hoc dictu subagrestre erat aut etiam subrusticam. FISCH.

"Εκείνη ἡ ἀρχή." So ἡ τῶν Τρια-

κοντα—ἐπικληται, percurreti et mo-

vore aliquem ita ut quasi extra se rapa-


Ωίχυμην ἀπίων οἰκαίει.] h. c. con-

tinuo abiti. STALL. Frequently, in-

stead of a simple verb denoting to go away, its participle is joined with οἰχο-

μαι, e. g. ωιχετ' ἀποπτάμενος, for ἀπέπτατο, ii. β. 71. ωιχετο φεύγων, be escaped. Herod. 1. 157. Matthie Gr. s. 559. c. Seneca remarks, in reference to the conduct of Socrates upon this occasion, de Tranq. Anim. c. 3. "inter trigrata tyrannos liberum (So-

cratem) incessisse;" and Consol. ad Helv. c. 13. "aliquando solum trigrina-

tyrannos in ordinem redegisse."

Εἰ μη μὴ ἄριθ—καταλίθηρ.\] The government of the Thirty lasted four years, from its commencement until its overthrow, by Thrasybulus.

§ 21. 'Ar' οὖν ἂν μι οἰσθε, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthie, s. 508. h.—ταγανόθαι, i. q. σωζέσθαι, c. 19.
ΑΠΟΔΟΣΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥ. 53

δ' ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπράξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι καὶ ἰδία ὁ αὐτὸς ὁδος, οὐδεὶς πάπτοτε ἐνυχωρήσας οὐδέν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὐτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὐδεὶς, οὐς δὴ οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασίν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἰναί. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πάπτοτ' ἐγενόμην' εἰ δέ τις ἐμὸν λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοὶ ἀκούειν, εἰτε νεώτεροι εἰτε πρεσβύτεροι, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐφθάνησα. οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίω καὶ πένητα παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἔρωτάν, καὶ εάν τις βουλήτη ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὅν ἄν λέγω, καὶ τούτων ἐγώ, εἰ τε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἰτε μή, οὐκ ἄν δικαίος τὴν αὐτίαν ὑπέχουμι, ὅν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδεν' μηδὲν πάπτοτε μαθῆμα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πάπτοτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδία ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἱστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

§. 22. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ δὴ ποτὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρονοι τινες πολὺν χρόνου διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ

Οὐδὲ—ἀν ἄλλ. ἀνθρ. οὐδ. ] sc. ἐπιγέμετο. Τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι.] Τοιοῦτος is explained by οὐδεὶς πάπτοτε ἐνυχωρησάς, κ. τ. λ. following. Ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἰναί.] In allusion to Alcibiades and Critias, whose views were said to be owing to the instructions of Socrates, a calumny which he now proceeds to refute. Xenoph. Mem. Soc. i. c. 2, 12. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ὁ κατάγορος, Σωκράτει ἐμμηνότα γενομένω Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πάλιν ἐπωμάσατα, etc. Lescines, Orat. in Timarch, p. 217. mentions the intimacy of Socrates with Critias in his early life, as the principal cause of his condemnation.

Τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ.] The task assigned to Socrates, by Apollo, of convincing the Athenians of their errors, and rebuking them accordingly, as well as exhorting them to the study and practice of virtue.

Οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμ. ] In reference to the avarice of the sophists. c. 4. 

Παρεῖν ἐμαυτῶν ἐρωτήμ.] b. c. com. facio et petestiter me interrogandi, StALL., when the infin. act. is used for the passive, Matthiae Gr. s. 532. u. Kai ian τις, l. q. καὶ παντι, ὅσις ἐν βούλ. k. t. l. ἐὰν τις καὶ ὅσις admitting of frequent interchanges.

Οὐκ ἄν ἐικ. τὶν αἰτ. ὑπέχ.] b. c. hoc recte nihili tribus non poterit. StALL. §. 22. Χαίροντει — εἰςτρίβοντες.] Verbs which express any emotion of the mind, take in the participle the object, or operative cause, as supr., which in Latin is expressed by quod, or by the accus. with the infin. When the se-
άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἰς ποιόν, ὦτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰο-μένοις μὲν εἰναὶ σοφοῖς, οὕτω δὲ οὐ' ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγάδεσ. ἔμοι δὲ τούτω, ὦς ἐγὼ φημὶ, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνω-νίων καὶ παντὶ πρόπωρ, ὥς πέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὦτιον προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦ-τα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἀλήθη ἐστί καὶ εὐδελεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι ἔγωγε τῶν νεατέρων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διείθραρκα, χρήν δὴ ποι, εἰ τὲ τινες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέας ὁδῶν αὐ-τῶν ἐγὼ κακὸν πόποτε τι ἐννεβούλευσα, νῦν αὐτῶν ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸι ἧθελον, τῶν ὀικείων τινάς τῶν ἐκείνων, πα-τέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἀλλοὺς τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἰ περ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπώθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταύθω, οὐς ἐγὼ ὄρω, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτος, ἐμὸς ἥλικιώτις καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβοῦλου τοῦδε πα-τήρι ἐπείτα Ἀνασιαίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Ἀισχύνοι τοῦτον

could verb refers to a different subject from the first, then, according to the different construction of the verbs, the gen., dat., and accus. are used: χαίρων and ἡσθαί take the object in the caive, as infr. χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένους, κ. τ. λ. Matthiae Gr. s. 555. i.

Τοῦτο—προστέτακται.] Intell. τὸ ἐξεταζέναι.

Παντὶ τρόπῳ.] Divination by dreams, sacrifices, birds, cats, &c. by which the Athenians believed that the pleasure of the gods was signified to men, Steph. in marg. qua (ratione) ισχύει πόλι ταίας αἰαν αἰαναῖς ὠρίνα ἀνείμην ἀνδρῖν, ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν, ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν, ισχύει πόλι ταίας αἰαν αἰαναῖς, ἀνείμην ἀνδρῖν, ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν, ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν. ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν, ἀπὸ τοῖς ἀνδρῖν.

Καὶ εὐδελεγκτα.] Quae redargui pos- siat, si non vera sint. Serran. The term is more generally used in reference to what is easily refuted or disproved, but in consequence of ἀλήθη preceded, it must admit of the extension of its ordinary sense, as given by Serranus. Tr. easily confirmed.


Κακῶν—τι ἐννεβούλευσα.] This, as well as κακῶν τι πεπώθεσαν, καὶ κακὰ ἐργάζομαι, infr. refers to the charges advanced against Socrates of his having led his associates astray, and instilled into their minds an enmity to their coun-try and contempt of their gods.

Ὑπακοι—ἐνταύθω.] Have come to be present here.—Ὑπακοί—ἐνταύθω, ἔχεινοι ἴδια ἴδιαν ἐστιν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδιαν ἴδια

Stall. 

Κρῖτων οὔτος.] See in Criton. init. Critobulus, the son of Crito, the contem-porary of Socrates, ἥλικιώτης, and of the same borough, Allopece, ἥμισθοτις; was a disciple of Socrates, and was pre- sent at the trial, as were also Lysanias, the father of Ἀσκλίνες, who belonged
πατήρ’ ἐτι ὁ Ἀντιφόων ὁ Κηφισιέως οὐτοσι, Ἔπιγένυνος πατήρ. ἀλλοι τούνν οὐτοὶ, ὃν οἱ ἁδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγονασι, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοσοδοτίδου, ἁδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδωτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθεὶς—, καὶ Πάραλος ὁδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, ὃν ἣν Θεάγης ἁδελφὸς ὁδε τ’ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὐ ἁδελφὸς οὔτοςι Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁδε ἁδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἠχώ ύμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὃν τινα ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐκτὸς βόλῳ παρασχέσθαι Μελίτου μάρτυρα ἐι δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέω εἰ τι ἔχει τουούτοι. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ πάν τουναντίον εὑρῆσετε, ὁ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακῷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὃς βασὶ Μέλιτος καὶ Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάς ἄν λόγου ἔχοιεν βοη-

to the borough of Spheitus, of the tribe of Acamas; Antiphon to that of Cephisus, or Cepheisèa, of the tribe of Erectheus, &c. Ἀλλα οἱ τοῦνν οὐτοὶ,] "Malle ἅπλον ζητεῖτο est oratio neque commodum est h. I. istud τοῦνν, igiter, ut depravata habe verba videantur, sic fortasse corrigenda; ἀλλοι τι ἐνταῦθα." So Heindorf, who seems however to have unnecessarily restricted the signification of τοῦνν, which is frequently used in oratorical transitions in the sense of jam vero, as Isocr. in Panegyr. τῶν τούνν τὰς παρηγορεῖς καταστησάντων, δικαίως ἐπαινομένων, etc.; i. e. jam vero, cum il suo jure laudentur, qui publicas celebrites instituierint. Demosth. pro Corone. ἐπειδὴ τοῦνν ἐπαινήσατο τῷ εἰρήμην ἤ πόλει, etc.; jam vero, postquam respublicam praecepta dedisset. Viger, c. viii. s. 9. v. 9.

[Ὅσιν οὐκ ἂν—καταδεηθείη.] Steph. in marg. Ποταμίου (Theodotius) non jam eam (Nicostratunm) rogare possit, ne contra me lessetur, neque testimonio suo legitima meam et improbitatem illa vincesur, ne me sententias vestris condemnandum tradat. Καταδεηθείη, aliquem preficeo vincere ac commovere. STALL.

Πλάτων—Ἀπολλόδωρος.] See in Phedon. c. 2. sub fin.; of the others mentioned above nothing is known connected with any interest, further than their having been the friends and disciples of Socrates. Plat. in Theo. and Demosth. de Repub. ii. p. 357.

[Ἑγὼ παραχωρῶ.] h. c. per me ei hoc levet. STALL. I give him leave. The accused was not allowed in an Athenian court of justice to interrupt the accused in the progress of his defence. But it happened not unfrequently that, as in the present case, the defendant, when he felt that he had truth and justice at his side, challenged the accused to refuse his statement, and volunteered to resign a portion of the time allotted to himself, for his adversary to reconcile his charge with some contradictory evidence on the part of the accused. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 21.

[Λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες.] Would have an excuse for defending me; lest it should appear that they had associated indirectly with an individual by whose impiety and iniquity their own characters had become liable to a similar imputation.
§ 23. Their o"ντες: οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθρατοι, πρεσβύτεροι ὡδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθούντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλῇ ἥ τὸν ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅν ἐξήστασε Μελίτω μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι:

§ 23. Εἰκὲν δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες ἢ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχωµι ἄν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν τι ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ὑσῶς τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δὲ ἂν τὶς ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθείς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλαττῷ τουτοῦ τῶν ἀγώνων ἁγώνα ἀγωνίζομενος ἐδείηθ' τε καὶ ἴκετευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἔλεηθεν, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν ἐρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδύνευον, ὡς ἂν δόξαμι, τὸν ἐσχατὸν κίνδυνον. τάχι ἂν οὖν τὰ ταῦτα ἐννοήσας ἀνθραδέστερον ἄν πρὸς με σχοινή, καὶ

Οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες.] Their relatives: so Eurip. El. 337. ὁ ἐκείνου τεκὼν, his father. Thucydides is remarkable for using participles as substantives, in which case they frequently take a genitive or possessive pronoun. Thuc. i. 128. βάσιλεῖ προσῆκοντίς τινες. i. 36. τοῦ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ (το εἶος) . . . τὸ θερασῦν (το θάρσος). ii. 19. τὰ ἐν Πλαταίᾳ τῶν ἑξελθόντων οὐρ- βαίων γενόμενα. Arist. Eel. 1118. ἢ εἰμι κεκτημένη. Eurip. Iph. A. 1280. τὸ εἰμοι βουλόμενον, his will.

'Ἀλλ', ἡ τῶν ὀρθῶν.] 'Ἀλλ', ἡ signifies except, unless, and therefore usually follows a negative, or an interrogation implying such. Οὔκ—ἀλλ', ἡ is to be explained by supposing a member of the sentence to be omitted on account of the doubt or ignorance of the speaker or writer, which omitted member is to be joined by means of ἢ to a preceding one: Aristoph. in Pae. 473. οὔτεν Ἀρχιῖον πάλαι ἄλλῃ ἡ κατεγέλων τῶν τακτι- ποδοφόρων, i. e. ἄλλῃ ἡ κατεγέλων, ἢ ὅτι οὔτε ὅτι καταφύγειν. So supr. ἄλλ', ἡ τῶν ὀρθῶν τε καὶ δίκαιων λόγ., ἡ, ἢ οὔτε οὔτε ὅτι πίνα ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ. Seag. Viger. viii. s. ii. 10. See in Phaedon, c. 50. n.

§ 23. Τι.] Ald. Bas. I. Norib. του. Steph. 11, which is the more correct, the pronoun being often elegantly joined to σχοινί, πάνω, and such particles, by Plato, Xenophon, and others. FiscM.

Τάχα δὲ ἂν τὶς ἀγανακτήσειεν.] Socrates proceeds to assign his reasons for not bringing forward his children, as was customary with the accused at Athens, to move the compassion of the judges in his favour, a resource which he held to be inconsistent with his own character, and opposed to the spirit of the laws. That it was not unusual to employ the tears and entreaties of wives and daughters to avert a threatened sentence will appear from Aristoph. Pint. 383. s. Vesp. 566. s.

'Ελάττω — ἁγώνα ἁγωνίζομεν.] h. e. capitis agentis minus periculo sumus. StalL.

Οὐδὲν—ποιήσω.] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. "Hii, et talibus, rationibus adducti. Socrates, nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplyx fuit." Dithacésteron—σχοινί.] Should be more obstinately prejudiced against me: the term ἀθάνατος being applied to a a judge, who, although the accused,
might have expected an acquittal, from the justice of his cause, should refuse his sanction thereto, from the requisite form of supplication not having been previously adopted.


Οὐκ ἀδίκως μὲν—ἐγώς.] H. c. No-"林 equidem quenquam estrum hoc animo esse. Fiscm. It might, probably, be more effectively rendered, I do not take it for granted, or, admit and estab- lish it as a principle; from which latter sense of the verb ἀδίκωμα derives its meaning, as a philo-sophical term; So-ocrates by no means intending to assert, that the judges should be necessarily so disposed towards one who conscientiously rejected an alternative, with which, under the circumstances, he might have been expected to comply. But address- ing them on the supplication, εἰ δὲ οὖν sc. τοῖς ὑμῶν ὄντος ἐξη, that some amongst them might have been influenced by such a feeling, he uses the terms, as supr., in the sense proposed. Nearly in a similar sense, V. Cousin appears to have understood the text: S'il y a ici quelqu’un qui soit dans ces sentiments, ce que je ne saurais craindre, mais j’en fais la supposition, etc.; though he fails in assigning the requisite force to ἐγώς. Pindar loses sight of the meaning al- together.

Τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου.] Odysseus t. 163. Ὀμήρον ἀπὸ ὡς ὄρος ἐστὶ παλαιδέστερον οὐκ ἀπὸ πέτρας; where Pindelo, before she recognises Ulysses, inquires into the circumstances of his birth.


Οὐκ ἀδίκως μὲν—ἐγώς.] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. de Socrat. "Asbilibique liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi duc- tanm, non a superfilia." "Ἀλλάς λόγος.] Alia questio est, ad hanc sermonem non pertinet. STEPH.

Τοῦτο τοῦτομα ἤσοτο.] i. e. Flo- rentem tanta sapientiae laude, STALL., to which Socrates subjoins, to obviate the charge of presumption, εἰτ οὖν—
§ 24. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δοξῆς, ὃ ἄνδρες, ὑπὲρ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ ἑιναι δείξθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ ἐνδέμου ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ

Diaphorontes—εἰς ἀρετὴν.] Εἰς, with respect to, quod satisfit ad, a general reference, which in English is often expressed by the more definite on account of, in consequence of. Matthiae Gr. s. 578. e.

Ὅτε ἡμᾶς χρῆ ποιεῖν.] h. e. necque nos decent tali fuerere—ne, si nos faciāmus, vos decest ea concedere et permettere. Stāll.

Τὰ ἐλευνὰ ταῦτα ἑρματα.] These doleful tragedies; alluding to the custom already mentioned, of endeavouring to awaken the sympathies of the judges by the tears of wives and children.—Eisáγοντο. See c. 12. n. Ἐμί εἰσαγέσις, κ. τ. λ.

§ 24. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δοξῆς.] h. e. sed præterquam quod illud existimationi maxs non respondiuerit. Stāll.
§ 25. To μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε,
which, in the first instance, the judges decided against him; it remained then for Socrates, in compliance with the usual form, intended, in some degree, to exonerate the judges, and confirm their sentence, by obliging the accused to acknowledge his guilt, to condemn himself to one of three penalties, perpetual imprisonment, a fine, or banishment. Such a confession, however, should have seriously involved the character of Socrates, and impaired, in no small degree, the truth and sincerity of his previous defence. Accordingly, in the triumph of conscious innocence, instead of submitting to a penalty, he demanded a reward, and was only prevailed on at length, from a desire of gratifying the wishes, and tranquillizing the apprehensions of his friends, to amerce himself in a fine, which, being incompetent himself, they undertook to pay.

It has been questioned whether this trial, founded upon such an indictment, should not rather have been classed with the ἄγνοιας ἀτίμησε, but there were criminal causes, and degrees of the guilt imputed, in which, as well as in civil causes, the punishment was discretionary with the judge. Of such a character, it is plain, was the present trial, in which, as Cicero remarks, de Orat. l. i. "Socrates was not only condemned by the first sentence of the judges, which determined whether the criminal should be condemned or acquitted, but by that, also, which the laws obliged them to pronounce afterwards." According to Xenophon, Apol. Socr. p. 23, Socrates, in asserting his innocence, subsequent to his condemnation, declared that if every charge had been completely proved, still, all together did not amount, pursuant to any known law, to a capital crime. In the Public Economy of Athens, by Boeckh, one of the most valuable works in classical literature, the subject of damages, fines, and penalties for illegal acts is ably and comprehensively discussed. And though with a particular view, as affecting the public revenue, still the general question is made easily intelligible. See vol. ii. 97. sqq.

ΠΑΛΑΣΙΟΣ

αλλα τε μοι πολλα ξυμβαλλεται, και ουκ άνελπιστον μοι γέγονε το γεγονος τουτο, αλλα πολυ μαλλων θαυμαζω εκατερων των ψηφων των γεγονότα αμιθμον. ου γαρ ομην έγογε ουτο παρ' ολιγον έσεσθαι, αλλα παρα πολυν δε, ως έοικε, ει τρεις μόναι μετεπεσον των ψηφων, αποτεφευγη αν. Με-
λιτον μὲν οὖν, ὥσ εἰμοί δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποτέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποτέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δήλον τούτῳ γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Δύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὅφελε χιλίας δραχμᾶς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέρπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται δὴ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ θανάτου. Εἴειν ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὡμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὡς ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίοι; ἡ δήλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τι ἀξίος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μάθων ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἥσυχίαν ἢγον, ἀλλὰ ἀμελήσας ὄν περ ὁ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγορίῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐξουσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἰναι ἡ ὦστε εἰς ταῦτα.

Κἂν ὅφελε χιλίας δραχμᾶς.] He should have been liable to a penalty of a thousand drachmas, not having obtained a fifth part of the suffrages. Melitus escaped the fine to which those who, having commenced a prosecution, failed in obtaining a fifth of the suffrages, were liable, in consequence of Anytus and Lycon having devoted their interest and advocacy to the cause, which, without them, should have terminated in the discomfiture and disgrace of the prominent accuser.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται, κ. τ. λ.] The accuser was accustomed to subjoin to the indictment, ἀντιροφία, whatever penalty appeared to him to have been deserved by the accused, unless the law had already prescribed what the precise penalty should be. For which τιμᾶται, to estimate a crime at such a price, with a dat. of the person and a gerund. of the punishment, was the technical phrase; and to which were opposed ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, to estimate or assign a penalty for one's self, and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι, which has a similar purport, Pollux. viii. 150. Xen. Apol. 23. Melitus. c. 11. supr. made death the consequence of Socrates' conviction. See Boeckh, Econ. of Athens. ii. 99.

Παθεῖν ὡς ἀποτίσαι.] The question put to the accused was, ὡσιν χρῆ, οὐ τι ἀξίος εἶ, παθεῖν, ὡς ἀποτίσαι: the former referring to corporeal, the latter to pecuniary punishment.

'Ο τι μᾶθον—οὖς ἠσυχίαν ἦγον.| Quod non recevis a discipulo. Bocc. See Mat. Gr. s. 567. Ficinus misunderstands the passage altogether. Tr. What penalty do I deserve to suffer or pay, because [ὅ τι μαθὼν] during my life I have not kept quiet, etc.

'Ον περ οἱ πολλοὶ.] Intell. ἐπιμελοῦνταί: a word being sometimes obligatory to be supplied of an opposite tendency to the preceding one expressed.—Mat. Gr. 634. 3.

Δημηγορίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν.] Τῶν ἄλλων is used here as in Gorg. s. 54. ὑπὸ τῶν πολίτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξων, h. e. ἐξων ὄντων: δημηγορία, signifying a popular ha-rangue, or the province of one who dealt in such, which could not be properly designated by ἀρχὴ. Fischer reads ἐμμοιρησμῶν, but on the strength of a conjecture, which he fails in establishing, that at Athens ἐμμαρχον and ἐμμοιρησμοί were synonymous. By ἐμμοιρησμοῖ καὶ στάσεων Socrates intends an allusion to the troubles of his own times, in which he was not otherwise engaged than, as has been already shown, in a manner which was creditable to his country and honorable to himself.

'Επιεικέστερον.] i. e. Supposing myself to be possessed of too much integrity.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ιόντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἢι οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὀφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ίδία ἐκαστον ἰδὼν ἐνεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην ἐνεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦν, ἐπὶχειρῶν ἐκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μή πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμιληθείη ὁποῖς ὃς βελτιστὸς καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἐσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως' τῶν τε ἄλλων ὄντω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἀξίων παθεῖν τοιοῦτον ὄν; ἀγαθὸν τί, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν την ἀληθεία τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτα γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὃ τι ἦν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πέντε ἐνεργετὴν, δειμένων ἄγεων σχολῆν ἐπὶ τῇ ύμετέρᾳ παρακαλεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἐσθ' ὃ τι μάλλον, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὖτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μάλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἱπποῖ ή ἐνυφρίδη ἤ ζεύγει νευκίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονιάς δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς
to ensure my security by having recourse to such practices.

Ἐνεργέτης.] This was an honorary title conferred upon such as had deserved well of the state, and to which στήρ was not un frequently joined: Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 317. ed. Lips. "Viri principes, in quo reges repulicce Atheniensiis energeatas tum horum gra- φēnai cæ eximium decus adiectave- runt."

Μάλλον—οὕτως ὑπ.] This was not an unusual form with the Greek writers; Cf. Min. 318. E. Οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὃ, τι τοῦτον ἀναβεβαστέρον ἐστιν, οὖν οὕτως χρὴ μάλλον ἐνλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοῦ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐγγὺς ἐξαραμ- τάνειν. Dial. Eryx. p. 392. C. Ὑπὸ τέι τῶν σιγερών τοὺς ἀπὸ μάλλον ὅργι- ζουστον ὄντως ὡς ἀν μίλλονα χαλεπώ- τατοι εὑροῦν. Hesid.

Ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι.] This was one of the highest honours in the Athenian commonwealth; to be supported at the public expense in the Pryt-
τις, ἐκείνα 'Ολυμπίασιν ἡσύχησιν ἐνέχυσεν ὁ δεῖν, πρὸ τοῦ προτερπαταία.

Τοῦτον τῆς.| h. c. si confiteri me oportet, quum adininationem maiorine converserim, fatero, me succerisse, ut quotidiannis mihi in Prisciano eicuis publice praebentur. Eiscu. Cf. Lucian. Proemeth. iv. p. 188. tom. i, ἐγὼ οἷς ἔγορα τῇ ἑν Προπανώι στήσεως, εἴ τὰ εἰκάκαι ἐγκυμόντος, ἐτιμησάμην ἐν ἐμαυτῷ.

§ 27. "Ἰσως ὁν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτι λέγων παράπλησιός ὑποκείμενος περί τοῦ συκτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆς, ἀπανταδιδόμενος τῷ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ δὲ ἀνδρεῖς Ἄθηναίοι, τουοῦν, ἀλλὰ τοὐνῦλε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼ ἦναι μηδενὰ ἁδικεῖν ἀνδρῶπον, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω. ἄλγου γὰρ χρόνῳ ἀλλή-λοις διελεγμέθη, ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγόμαι, εἴ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡς περ καὶ ἀλλοι ἀνδρῶτοι, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἑκέραν μονὴν κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπεισόδητε ἄννυν δ’ οὐ μέδειν ἐν χρόνῳ ἄλγος μεγάλας διαβολάς ἀπολύειν. πεπεισμένοι δὴ ἐγὼ μηδενὰ ἁδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἁδικήσειν καὶ κατ’ ἐμαυτῷ ἑρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἀξιός εἰμί τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεις θαυμοῦν τοιοῦτον τιμῶν ἐμαυτῷ. τί δεῖται; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο,
Méliotós — τιμᾶται.] This verb is used in the middle voice in reference to the accuser and accused: τοῦτον τιμησάμενος, infr. in the active of the judges; ἦσος γὰρ ἂν μοι τοῦτον τιμῆσατε, infr. "Ελομαί τι ὄν ἐν ὑμ. ὅτα."

1. q. Ἐλομαί τι τοῦτον, οὐ ἔκλειμον, ἢ ἐν ὑμεῖς ὃτι κακὰ ἄστιν: οὐ, Ἐλομαί τι τῶν ὑμ. ὑμαῖν, κακῶν ὄντων: both of which constructions appear to be combined in the text. STALL. Cf. Gorg. p. 481. D. αἵτθανομαι ὄνν σου ἐκάστοτε καὶ περ ὄντος ἐννοοῦ, ὅτι, ἤτες' ἂν φή σου τὰ παίδια, καὶ ὃπως ἂν φή ἔχειν, ὃς ἐνναμύνον ἀντέλησαι, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένοι.

Τούτης Ἔνδεκα.] These magistrates were selected from the ten tribes, one from each, to whom was added a registrar, γραμματέας, to complete the number, eleven. They were called also νομοφήλακες, keepers of the laws, from the nature of their office, which consisted in superintending the execution of male-factors, and taking charge of such as were committed to the public prison. Heasch. "Ἐνδέκα· ἀρχοντες, οἱ παρε-διώνωτοι οἱ θανάτω κατακύκλωσθεντες. Etymol. M. e Lex. Rhetor." Ἐνδέκα — προστατικίς των ἑσμωτριών. Cf. in Crito. c. 2. οἱ τούτων κύριοι. In Phaedon. c. 2. οἱ ἀρχοντες. These magistrates sat as judges in a court called Ἱπποκύντου μέσον; see Potter, Graec. Antiq. 2. c. 21.

Διείσθατα ἐὼς ἂν ἐκτίσω.] Those upon whom a pecuniary fine was imposed, were imprisoned until it was discharged; which in the case of Socrates would have been a perpetual confinement, as he had not the means of paying it, so that this would be the same as if he had sentenced himself to the custody of the eleven at once; ταυτόν μοι ἐστίν ὃ περ, etc.

Εἰ αὖτος ἀλὸγοτέσσερες εἰμι.] Cf. e. 12. supr. extr. Ἐι εἰς — εἰσαρθείη; and e. 17. extr. Εἰ μὲν ὄν——διαφθείη· ταῦτ' ἂν εἰς βλα.

"Ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτάς, κ. τ. λ." This is to be taken ironically, as also infr. καλὸς ὄν ἂν μοι ὡς εἰς. Fiscu.
βομένω καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζήν. εὗ γὰρ οἴδ᾿ ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἔμοι ἀκροάσσονται οἱ νέοι ὄς περ ἔνθαδε. κἂν μὲν τούτων ἀπελαύνω, οὕτω έμέ αὐτοί ἐξελώσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εάν δὲ μη ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἴκειοι δι’ αὐτοὺς τούτους.

§. 28. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴηποι, Συγών δὲ καὶ ἰσνυχίαι ἀγώνω, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷος τ᾿ ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζήν; Τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινάς ύμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ ἀδύνατον ἱσνυχίαι ἄγειν, ὡς πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευμένοι· εάν τ᾿ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγάθον ὃν ἀνθρώπος τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἄρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲν ύμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὡς ἂν ἀνεξήτατος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώποι, ταῦτα δ᾿ ἐπὶ ἥπτον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ έχει μὲν οὕτως ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὡς ἄνδρες, πείθειν δε ὡς οὕτως. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμίου οὕκ εὔδησμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἕξιον κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτίμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὁσα ἐμέλλον ἐκτίσειν οὔδεν γάρ ἂν ἐβλάβην νῦν δὲ —οὐ γὰρ έστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην

Ἐξελώσι. Ἐλάω, the th. of ἐλάω, seldom occurs in the present tense, but ἐλάω, ἐλαζ, ἐλά, &c. infin. ἐλάω, is in prose the Attic future. Buttm. Int. Gr. Gr. p. 252. So Mæris: Ἐλαω, Ἀρτικὸς Ἐλαω, Ἐλληνικός. §. 28. ὡς εἰρωνευμένοι.] Εἰρωνεία, as applied particularly to Socrates, signifies a method of argument conducted chiefly by affecting ignorance, and putting cautious questions; the answers of the antagonist furnishing their own refutation, and often exposing him to ridiculous contradictions. Donneg. Gr. Lex.

Μέγιστον ἁγάθον ὃν.] Many editions omit the participle ὃν, incorrectly; Phryn. p. 120. Τυγχάνων καὶ τοῦτο προσεκτέων. Οἱ γὰρ ἀμελεῖς οὕτω λέγουσι, φίλος σοι τυγχάνως, ἴχθρος μοι τυγχάνως· οὕτως εἰ τῷ φόρματι τὸ ἄρετον προσβέβαι, φίλος μοι τυγχάνως ὄν, ἴχθρος μοι τυγχάνως ὄν. Οὕτω γάρ οἱ ἰσχαίοι ἀγαπατοῦσι. Ce. c. 17. suppr. οὖν εἰ τυγχάνοι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κ. τ. λ. ἂν έκεῖσάτος βίος.] Τίς εὰ, quam quis, neque ipsa suosa animam excudit neque enne ab aliis excuti jubes, ut vident. verone sapiens sit et virtute ornatus, an sibi videatur tanti multa tali esse; ut rideat, quam longe progressis sit in studio sapientia et virtutis, quantum spiritum restet quod sit confestandum. Fiscel. Βίος οὗ biotις ἡ θυεῖ νῦν. Hesych. interpr. ἀγάθη: a joyless existence. Ce. in Criton. c. 8.

Νῦν εἰ—οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν.] After νῦν εἰ intell. οὐ εὔναμαι τοι τιμήσασθαι
§ 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνον, ὃς ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτης ἄπεκτότατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν φήσοντε γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ύμῖν ὅνειδίζετε. εἰ γοὺς περιεμείνατε ὁλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄν ύμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὃτι πόρρῳ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ύμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψυχισμένους θανάτου. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς χρῆματαν. Most editions join γ' ἐνεκα χρόνον, which with what follows, but do not attempt any explanation of γαρ. The aposiopesis, as in the text, is decidedly more correct. Cf. Plat. Sympos. S. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ὰν ὁ Ἔρως καλὸς ἀν εἰς γὰρ «νε» εἰς ὄν γὰρ ἵστων εἰς ἰντελ. οὐ καλὸς ἔχει. —Εἰ μὴ ἄρα. Sometimes εἰ μὴ expresses, not so properly a condition as the sarcastic nisi forte, unless forsooth. Matthiae, Gr. s. 617. e.

[Ἐγγυασθή. ] Intell. φασί, ὑπερχωνοῦται, or some such word, the sense of which is implied in κελεύουσι πρεξελ. —Ἐγγυητῆς] Eynmol. Μ. ἀνακεχομενος εἰκη. —Αξιοχρεως μὲν ἵστων ὁ ἐπιλύσαι τι ικανός. Ammon. Fisc. § 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνον.] Socrates having amerced himself, in obedience to the laws, in a penalty of thirty mina, it remained for the judges to pass the decretory sentence confirming the fine. But irritated by the independent spirit and dauntless energy of his demeanour and defence, and too successfully tampered with by the perse- verning assiduity and art of his accusers, they decided upon his death. What follows Socrates is supposed to have addressed to them when acquainted with the result. Οὐ πολλ. γ' ἐνεκ. χρόν, proper non longum temporis spatium. Steph. i. q. εὐτελεστάτων ἐνεκα κηρύ. ονων. Serran. Socrates having arrived at a very advanced period of life, his accusers, by succeeding in their malicious designs, secured but an unenviable triump, that of anticipating by a very short interval his natural decease, εἰ γοὺς πρεξελ. &c. inf.—Ονομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν, you shall incur, from those who are anxious to calumniate the city, the censure and reproach, etc. [Ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο.] Sc. ἵκε τεθ.νάσα. Ἡμῶρον ἢν ἵσται τοῦ βίου,] h. e. atertem necem co protexit esse, ut non longum sit reliqua vitae spatium. Stal. So Plutarch. Vit. Demosth. p. 846. E. ὁφεῖ ποτε καὶ πῷρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας ἡσαμεθα Ἀριστοκράτης γράμμασι ἐννυχάνειν. Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 310, 3.
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἡσώς με οἴεσθε, ὃ ἀνδρὲς, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἰς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ φίλην δεῖν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεὶ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐαλωκά, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀνασχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μή ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὐ ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἂν ἴδιστ' ἦν ἄκουειν, θρηνοῦντος τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλά καὶ ἀνάξει ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι': οἰα δὴ καὶ εἴδοσθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἄκουειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ὀφθην δεῖν ἑνεκά του κινδύνου πράξανι ὑπελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλεις οὔτως ἀπολογησάμενος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀγροῦμαι ὡδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἥ ἐκείνος ἦν' οὔτε γάρ εν δίκη οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμε οὔτε ἄλλον ὑπέναι δεὶ τούτο μηχανάσθαι ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πάν τοιών θάνατον; καὶ γάρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δήλων γίγνεται ὁτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφυγοί καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἔφ' ἱκτείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διακόνων' καὶ ἀλλαὶ μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσίν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὡστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾶ πάν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν, ὃ ἀνδρὲς, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπῶτερον πονηρίαις τάττον γὰρ θανάτου θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂτε βραδίς ὅν καὶ πρεσβύτης υπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἂτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὥστε ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττους, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν

*Ἰσως με οἴεσθε, κ. τ. λ.| Perhaps you imagine that I have been convicted from a deficiency in arguments such as I could have persuaded you by, had I thought it incumbent on me to make every exertion by word and deed to escape from punishment.—ἀπαντα ποιεῖν, πάν ποιεῖν, omne lapidem movere, nihil intemperate retinemere. Stall.

'Εκείνος.| Ilintell. ἀπολογησάμενος.

'Ωστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον.| See Matthiae Gr. s. 540. Obs. 3.

'Εάν τις τολμᾶ πάν ποιεῖν.| Steph. in marg. si quis sustinuerit quidvis facere et dixeret; q. d. si quem non pudet quidvis f.

'Εάλων.| Socrates plays upon this word, which signifies properly to overtake and seize one by running, and uses the phrase υπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων in reference to his having been condemned himself to death by the judges; and υπὸ τοῦ θάττους, τῆς κακίας, in reference to his accusers, who were consigned to infamy by the voice of truth.
'Οφληκότες μοχθήριαν καὶ άδικίαν.]

§. 30. Το δε δη μετα τοτο ἐπιθυμω υμιν χρησιμοδησαι, ω καταψηφισμενοι μου και γαρ ειμι ήδη ενταύθα, εν φα μάλιστ' ανθρωποι χρησιμοδοσιν, οταν μελλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημι γαρ, οι εμε ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν υμιν ήξειν ευθὺς μετα τον έμων θανατον πολυ χαλεπωτέραν νη Δι'. ή οιαν εμε ἀπεκτόνατε. νυν γαρ τοτο εἰργασθε οἴομενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι του διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοι βίον. το δε υμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβησται, ους εγώ φημι. πλείους έσονται υμας οι ἐλεγχοντες, ους νυν εγώ κατείχον, υμεῖς δε ουκ ήσθανεσθε και χαλεπώτεροι έσονται οσφ νεω-

h. e. a veritate imprudibilis et injustitiae convicti et condemnati. StalL.—Το τιμησαι έμων, paratus sum peccare, qualis e obvis esthibatur, h. e. mori. FisCH.——Μη τριβους εχειν, h. e. recte se habere: μητρα,quecumque conveniat, et decent viros honestos et bonos: recta, honesta. FisCH.

§. 30. 'Εν υ ενικα άθρωπωλ χρησιμοδησαι. The ancients believed that as death, and consequently the period of disunion between soul and body, approached more nearly, the dying were endowed with the faculty of foresight, and the spirit, freed from its material fetters, and mingling with the more congenial elements of the celestial world, was thus enabled to prophesy the course of human events. See Cic. de Divin. i. 30. Davis, interpr. Cf. Eustath. in Illiad. p. 1089. "Εστι ει έχει ομηροι παλαιων, ως άπαλλασσεμενιν σώματος ή ψυχι, και θεια φύσει εγγίζουσα, εχει τι μαντικης. 'Αρτέμιωνα ει φασι, τον Μιλησιον, λεγειν εν τω περι άνειρων, ως οτε άθροισθη ή ψυχη ές άλου του σώματος, πρω το εκθρηναι μαντικωτατη γινεται. Cf. Illiad. xxii. 358.

Aeneid. iv. 622. Instances of prophetic inspiration, towards the close of life, are not rare in Holy Writ; See Genesis, c. 49. Deuteronomy, c. 33, etc.

Τιμωρίαν υμιν ήξειν. According to Laertius, and others, this prediction of Socrates was borne out by the result. The Athenians, with their characteristic fickleness, soon found cause for a bitter repentance of their most iniquitous and merciless proceeding. Melitus was torn in pieces, and the rest of the accusers, and their party, were either expelled the state or died by their own hands, while every possible respect was paid to the memory of Socrates, as a benefactor of the republic.

"Η οιαν εμε ἀπεκτόνατε. h. e. quam qua me affectis. StalL.—Το τιμησαι έλεγχον τοι βίον. ένικαν ενεται, υμεις ουκ έσονται πολυ ομοθρωπωλ ουκ έσονται. Cf. Lat. Interpr.
teroi είσι, καὶ υμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ
οὕσεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἄνθρωποις ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὅνει-
δίεσι τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι ὦκ ὄρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς δια-
νοεῖσθε οὐ γάρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὕτε πάνω
δυνατῇ οὕτε καλῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ καὶ καλλίστῃ καὶ
ράστῃ, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρα-
σκευάζειν ὅπως ἐσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισμαίνοις μαντευσάμενοι ἀπαλ-
λάττομαι.

§ 31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμαίνοις ἰδέως ἀν δια-
λεχθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τοῦτοι πράγματος, εὖ
ὁ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολοῖαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ
ἐλθόντα με δὲ τεθνάαι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὁ ἄνδρες, παρα-
μείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνου, οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει διαμο-
θολογησαι πρὸς ἁλλήλους, ἐως ἐξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς
φίλους οὕσιν ἐπιδείξαι εὐθέω τὸ νυνί μοι ἐξυμβεβηκός
τί ποτε νοεῖ. 'Εμοί γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ—ॐμᾶς
γὰρ δικασταὶ καλῶν ὄρθως ἂν καλοῖν—θαυμασίων
τι γέγονεν. ἥ γὰρ εἰσδοθεῖ μοι μαντικῇ ἡ τοῦ δαι-
μονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνω πυκνῇ ἂεί
ἡν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροὶς ἐναντιομενήν, εἰ τι μέλλου-
μι μὴ ὄρθως πράξειν νυνὶ δὲ ἐξυμβεβηκέ μοι, α' περ

Μὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κολούειν.] This verb signifies, literally, to amputate, or
main by cutting short, thence to hinder, prevent, or suppress. Κολούειν. Hesych. 
interpr. καλέσει.

§ 31. Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] sc. οἱ "Εὐδέκα.
C 27. supr. Into their custody the con-
demned were committed by the judges
upon which they gave the necessary
directions to the attendants, ὑπηρέταις,
to prepare everything for the execution
of the sentence. By ἀγχολαν ἄγονι
Socrates alludes to their having been so
occupied at the time, as by οἱ ἐλθόντα
μὲ ἐξ τῶν to the prison whither he
was to be immediately led. Διαμυθο-
λογῆσαι, confabulare; h. e. disserere,
collequ; Cf. in Phadon. c. 14. sub.
finally.

Δικαστὰς καλῶν.] If I called you
judges. Matthiae Gr. s. 558.

Εἰσδοθεῖ μοι μαντικῇ.] Intell. φω-
νῖ—Η τοῦ δαιμονίου, h. e. ea (vox
vaticinatrix) videlicet, quam θεωνιо
illi, de quo mentionem supra injeci, do-
beo. Stahl. Socrates, c. 19. supr.,
speaking of this φωνῆ, calls it θείον τι
καὶ δαιμονίον, something of a celestial
and angelic character; in the text he
mentions it more directly as the warn-
ing and admonitory influence, τοῦ δαι-
μονίου, of his guardian genius. Schleier-
macher would omit ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου,
as a mere gloss upon μαντικῇ; but
Socrates evidently intends to express
here the mode in which the agency of
his genius was made effectual, and the
nature of the result.

Εἰ οὐ καλλοῦμεν.] h. e. qualiscunque
in eo essem, ut, etc. Stahl.
Orāte καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰνθεὶα ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἰναι. ἐμοί δὲ οὔτε ἐξίοντι ἐῳδεν οὐκοθεν ἡμαντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταῦθι ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἑρείν' καὶ τοῖ ἐν ἀλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ, νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν οὔτ' ἐν ἐργῷ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡμαντιώτατι μοι. τι οὖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνον; ἐγὼ μὴν ἐρών κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ἐνυμβεβηκός τούτῳ ἀγαθῶν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὑρθος ὑπολαμβανομεν, ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακῶν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡμαντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσθάνος σημείον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

§ 32. Ἐννοησομεν δὲ καὶ τηδὲ, ὡς πολλῇ ἐλπὶς εστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυνόν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστι
APOPLOGIA SOKRATOUS.

tο τεθνάναι: ἣ γὰρ οἶνον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδ’ αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἐχειν τον τεθυντα, ἤ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολῆ τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθενδε εἰς ἀλλον τόπον. καὶ εἰτε ὅι μηδεμία αἰσθησις ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οἶον ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ’ ὑναρ μηδεν ὀρά, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἄν εἰ μ’ ὅθανατος. ἐγ’ γὰρ ἄν οἵμαι, εἰ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τήν νύκτα ἐν ἡ οὔτω κατέδαρθεν ὡστε μηδ’ ὑναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τάς ἄλλας νύκτας

soul survived, and others that it perished with the body. In either case he argues that death is not an evil; as an eternal and dreamless sleep it should of necessity be unaccompanied by any feeling of either pleasure or pain arising from past or present circumstances, whereas if death were merely an affection of the body by which the spirit was wholly un-influenced, it should not only outlive its mortal frame, but enjoy the pure and perfect happiness arising from communion with the just. It must be understood, however, that Socrates only treats of this alternative with reference to those whose lives, like his own, had been such as to warrant them in the anticipation of future felicity; the eternal punishment of the guilty, in the world beyond the grave, was a no less prominent feature than the former in the doctrine and discipline of this exalted sage.

"Ἡ γὰρ οἴνον μηδὲν εἶναι.]: h. e. τοιώτον τι ὡστε μηδὲν εἶναι, as also infr. εἰ δ’ ἄν οἴον ἀποδήμασι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος. Eusebius and Theodoret, in quoting this passage, read μηδὲν τι εἶναι, whence the conjecture of Heidufl, μηδὲν ἐν εἶναι.


Kai εἰτε δ’ ἡ μηδεμία.—]: "Eiat εἰτε refers to the second hypothesis, εἰ δ’ αἱ οἶον, κ. τ. λ., further on.

θαυμάσιον κέρδος.]: Aristotle, though brought up in the school of Plato, deduces, from the same principles as those in the text, a very different conclusion: Eth. Nicom. iii. 6. τοῦ διατάτου τινς ἕνθατος μήσαος γὰρ καὶ οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ τεθνῇται διότι, οὔτε ἅγαθον, οὔτε κακόν εἶναι. Epicurus, however, uses this Socratic argument against the fear of death, which he asserts that philosophy is able to conquer by teaching that it is not a proper object of terror, since while we are, death is not, and when death arrives we are not; so that it neither concerns the living nor the dead. Enfield’s Philosophy, v. 1. p. 514.

Ἑγὼ γὰρ ἄν οἴματι, κ. τ. λ.]: i. e. For I imagine that if one were obliged; having selected the particular night during which he slept without dreaming, and having contrasted with this the other nights and days of his life; were obliged [I repeat] to consider and say how many days and nights he had passed, through his existence, better and more agreeably than this night; I think [I say] that not only a private person, but the mighty sovereign himself, would find them easily counted [i. e. very few] in comparison with other days and nights; i. e. in a life where sorrow and suffering are admitted to be so widely disproportionate to its pleasures and tranquillity, it must be also conceded that the enjoyment of the latter is as limited and transient as the influence of the former is extended and enduring.—Μὴ ὅτι έἰσϊται, h. e. οὐ βίον άλλων. STALL. Ὄμη δ’ οὔτε, for οὐς ὁπότοις, see Matthæi Gr. s. 624. 4.—Τόν μέγαν μιασίλα, the king of Persia, so called κατ’ Άζορήν,—εἰςτιθημητον άμφιάτα, dies admodum per-quant. Pollux. iii. 88.
Ovid [πλαίσιον.]—Fischer, from Eusebius, reads πλειόν; adopted by Fici-

νις; but πλείον is preferable in the sense of longior, more lasting.

Μίνως τε καὶ Ραδάμανθες, κ. τ. λ.]—For this construction see Matthiae Gr. s. 474. b. and the parallels alluded to in the text, were classed among the judges of the lower regions, probably from some popular superstition originating in, and connected with the Eleusinian mysteries. For Triptolemus was said not only to have instructed the Athenians in agriculture, but to have suggested a code of laws, especially relating to the boundaries and division of lands, whence he obtained the title of θεσμοφόρος. Creuzer, Mythol. iv. p. 101. sq.

Μίν γὰρ.—Profeetos, Buttm. Θαιματικὴ—ης εισαρήβη, κ. τ. λ.]—See Matthiae Gr. s. 633. p. 1145. Conversatio decretabilis, si colloqui licebit cum P. etc. Wölfe opp. to ϕαιλη ἡ ἀποδημία, supr. vita, peregrinatio, ἐπικίνδυνα, neque brata. Fisc.—Παλαρή-

βηζει—stoned by the Greeks, through the stratagem of Ulysses, v. Αἰνειδ. ii. 81. sq. Socrates, in Xenoph. Apol. s. 26, mentions the similarity between the cause of Palamedes and his own. Luci-

an, in allusion to this, as also to the passage in the text, makes Palamedes the sole companion of Socrates in the infernal regions. Ajax, son of Telamon, slew himself when Ulysses was adjudg-

ed, in preference, the armour of Achilles, Homer, Odys. λ.
τόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχουμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Ἀιάντι τῷ Τε-
λαμώνος καὶ εἶ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἀδικὸν τέθηκεν ἀντιπαραβάλλομεν τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἁμένα εἶπ. καὶ
dὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευ-
νώντα ὡς περὶ τῶν ἑνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφὸς ἔστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μεν, ἔστι δὲ οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν
tις, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί, δεξαίωτα ἐξετάζοι τὸν ἐπὶ
Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἡ 'Οδυσσεά
ἡ Σίσυφον, ἡ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἶποι καὶ ἄνδρας
cαι γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἔννειναι καὶ
exetazein amyxanov an eih euudaimonias pantos. οὐ
dή πον τοῦτο γε ἐνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι' τά τε
gar alla euudaimonesteroi eisw ois ekei tov euθaide,
καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἄδανατοι εἰσιν, εἰ πέρ γε
ta legeomena alithē estin.

§. 33. 'Αλλὰ καὶ ύµᾶς χρῆ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί,
evëlpidas εἶναι πρὸς τῶν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι τοῦτο
diaνοεῖσθαι ἀλήθες, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνδρι ἀγαθῷ κακὸν
ουδὲν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἡ αισθήσει, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται

'Ἀντιπαραβάλλομεν — ἁμένα εἰπ.] This is to be understood as an expla-
nation of θαυμαστὴ διαστραβῆ, supr. whence there is no necessity for in-
serting, with Viger, καὶ before αντι-
παραβάλλα, or of reading with Stephens, 
ἀντιπαραβάλλομεν, and consequently
explaining the passage, οὐκ ἂν ἁμένα εἰπ ἢ 
ἵπ διάγειν ἀντιπαραβάλλοντα, 
καὶ ήδη καὶ ἐξετάζοντα, κ. τ. λ.—
Fisc.

'Ἡ ἄλλους μυρίων ἂν τις εἴποι.] Stephens proposes οὖς μιρίων, proba-
bly following Ficinus. v. Lat. Interpr.
Fischer would separate the passage from what preceded altogether, and so make
a new sentence of it. But the construc-
tion is fully explained in Matthiae Gr.
s. 474. d. s. 472. 3. Cf. Gorg. 483. D.
'Εστι ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρόνῳ εἰπέτατο ἡ ἑλλη-
νὴ ἑπτάρευσεν; ἦ δὲ 
patéra αὐτοῦ εἰπέν τούς Σκύλας; ἢ
ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι πολλὰ λε-
ˈgein. Pluton. c. 43. καὶ ἄλλα ποι
μυρία, κ. τ. λ. Heusd.

'Αμήχανον ἂν εἰς εὐδαιμόνιας.] h.
c. invenustum esset respectu felicitatis. 
STALL. i. q. ἁμήχανον ἂν εἰς εὐδαι-
μονία. Cf. Theatet. p. 175. Λ. ύποτι
αὐτῷ καταφέρεται τῆς σμικρολογίας. 
See Matthiae Gr. s. 320.—Ἐξετάζειν—
Socrates intends by this, that he would
examine into the principles and feelings,
by which those with whom he expected
to associate had been influenced during
their lives, and the wisdom of which they
actually were, or imagined them-

§. 33. 'Αλλὰ καὶ ύµᾶς χρῆ.] i.e. 
Vos judices qui me absolviatis. Cte.
Tusc. 1. 41.
υπό θεον τα τούτου πράγματα; ουδε τα εμα νυν άπο του αυτομάτου γέγονες, αλλα μοι δηλον έστι τούτο, οτι ήδη τεθύνανας και απηλλάξαται πραγμάτων βέλτιον ήν μοι. δια τούτο και εμε ουδαμου άπέτρεψε το σημείον, και έγογε τοις καταψηφισαμένοις μοι και τοις κατηγόροις ου πάνυ χαλεπαίνων. και τοι ου ταύτη τη διανοία κατεψηφίζωτο μοι και κατηγόρονν, αλλα οίμενοι βλάπτειν τούτο αυτοις άξιοι μεμφεσαν.

Τοσούνδε μεντοι αυτων δεόμαι. τοις νιεις μοι, έπειδαν ήβησοσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ο άνδρες, ταύτα ταύτα λυπούντες α' περ έγω ύμας έλύπουν, εαν ύμιν δοκούν η χρημάτων η άλλον τον πρότερον έτιμε λεις τα ή αρετά; και εαν δοκοσι τι ειναι μηδέν μόνοις, άνειδίζετε αυτοίς άσε περ έγω ύμιν, οτι ουκ επι μελούνται άν δει και οιντα οι είναι άντες ουδενός αξιου και έαν ταύτα ποιήτε, δικαια πεπονθώσ έγω έσομαι υφι ύμων αυτός τε και οι νιεις.

'Αλλα γαρ ήδη ώρα άπιέναι εμοι μεν άποθανου-

"Οτι ήζη θεωνιναι—βιλιτων ήν μοι."

Cf. Young, Ν. Τ. iii. 495—500. 511—515.

Death is victory;

It binds in chains the raging ills of life:

Lust and Ambition, Wrath and Avarice,

Dragged at his chariot-wheel, appalled his power.

That ills corrosive, cares importunate

Are not immortal too, O Death, is thine.

And feel I, then, no joy from thought of thee,

Death, the great Counsellor, who man inspires

With every nobler thought and fairer deed!

Death, the deliverer who rescues man

Death, the rewarder who the rescued crowns!

Ου πάνω."

Νην μαρτυρειν. Σταλλ.

Δεομαι, κ. Τ. Λ."

Peto a vobis, Atheneus, quum filii mei adolescerunt, ut cos uilescemini, casdem illis molestius exhibente [λυποιντει, h. e. cos ad virtutem cohortantes, tentantes eorum sapientiam, convincentes cos stultitiae. Σταλλ.]

quas ego vobis exhibere conueream, si, aut pecunia, aut ullius omnino rei, quam virtutes studiosiores esse videantur.—

Ficinus. — Τιμωρήσασθαι—λυποιντεις, Salvini, adopted also by Pichius.

'Αλλα γαρ ήζη άρα."

This simple but essentially sublime conclusion is in perfect accordance with the tone of the entire Apology. It was in vain to present the intrepid front of integrity and innocence to the iniquitous array of those dark and malignant passions, which were the more effective and successful because unscrupulous in the extent and character of their resources. The vaguest and most unfounded falsehoods were brought to bear upon the clearest truth; detraction and envy were busied in misinterpreting the amiable proposals of a wise and beneficent philosophy: the language and exhortations that were addressed with a moral, were received as with a depraved intent; the correction of vice was stigmatized as presumption, and encouragement to virtue condemned as a crime. The accusers prevailed, and the annals of Athens were stained with a reproach perhaps unparalleled. But the object of this deadly persecution, undaunted through its progress, met calmly its result. He forgave the act of his accusers, for, so far, he was alone concerned, but he deprecated the motive, for it affected the well-being of society
μένυ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένους· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμείνου πράγμα, ἀδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ.

at large. In fine, he addresses them:
“"It is now time to depart—for me, to die; for you, to live; but which to the happier destiny, the Deity alone can tell."

How admirable, observes Dr. Brown, is that goodness which knows so well how to adapt to each other feelings that are opposite, which gives to man a love of life, enough to reconcile him, without effort, to the earth, which is to be the scene of his exertions; and which, at the same time, gives those purer and more glorious wishes which make him ready to part with the very life he loved.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.
ARGUMENT.

The scene of this dialogue is the prison to which Socrates was committed, previous to the execution of his sentence. Crito, his friend and disciple, enters for the purpose of persuading him to take advantage of the means provided for his escape. He finds Socrates in a tranquil slumber, and gazes for a while with wonder upon so calm a rest, unbroken by any dread of impending death. The philosopher awaking, expresses his surprise at the unusual calmness of his friend's customary visit; and learns that he came as the harbinger of dismal tidings, the sacred galley, whose return was the signal for the death of Socrates, having been that day expected to arrive from Delos. He implores his master, in terms of the strongest affection, to secure his safety by immediate flight, and seeks to shew by arguments of no ordinary weight, that Socrates was called upon by the obligations due to his friends, his family, and himself, not to reject this favourable chance, which devoted affection had laboured to procure. But the efforts of the most sincere attachment, and most tender expostulation, proved as ineffectual as the dread of positive and instant danger, the noble firmness of Socrates could not be undermined, and by the example of his death, he gave the last great lesson in that wisdom and virtue which he had inculcated by precept during life.

He opposes the arguments of Crito upon the following grounds:

That the opinions of men should be disregarded in comparison with the judgment of the Deity.

That not life, but to live virtuously, should be the object of our desires.

That justice is the life, and injustice the death of the soul.

That we should not requite evil for evil, or resent the wrongs we may receive.

That it is better to die than live unrighteously.

That we must obey the laws of our country, which the injustice of man furnishes no pretext for treating with disrespect. And that the laws of this world have kindred laws in that to come, which revenge the insults put upon them here.

Stallbaum supposes Plato to have composed this dialogue for a double purpose: one, and his primary design, being to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and the other, his secondary, to teach, from the precedent of Socrates, that a good man, under any circumstances, should render implicit obedience to the dictates of established law.

Crito is eventually overcome by the cogency and truth of the philosopher's objections, and abandons his design as untenable, when brought to the test of a strict and unyielding morality.
§. 1. Τι τηρικάδε ἄφιξαι, ὑ Κρίτων; ἦ οὐ πρὸ ἐτι ἐστίν;
ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
ΚΡ. "Ὁρθρός βαθύς.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.] This dialogue is also entitled Κρίτων, ὑ περὶ πρακτέων in several editions; in others, ὑ περὶ δαίμων ἀληθώς καὶ ἐκαίων, for which Thrasyllos is adduced as authority, quoted by Laertius, iii. 57. ἐπιλαξε ἀπὶ χρησκαι ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστῳ τοῦ βιβλίου τῆς μίας ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπάρματος τῇ ἐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. Καλείς Α. Ἀκ. Α. ὃς ἄρεις ἀλλαξάτων, quoted by Diogenes, Diog. Laert. iii. 35, the part imputed to Crito in this dialogue belonged in reality to Ἀσκληπιός, but as the latter was the friend of Ἀριστιππος, who was Plato's enemy, it was inscribed as above.

§. 1. Τι τηρικάδε] Why have you arrived so very early.—Τηρικά and πηνίκα are used properly, and by the Attic writers, to signify a certain time of the day, as the morning, noon, or evening. Cf. Phrynic. p. 14. Πηνίκα μὴ εἰπες ἀντι τοῦ πώς ἐστι γὰρ ἡμέρας ἐπικριτικῶν οὖν, εἰπόντος τινός, πηνίκα ἀποδημήσεις; ταῖς εἰπτες μετὰ ἐδώ, ἦ, τρεῖς, ἡμέρας, οὐκ ἄρθρῳ ἄρθρες; ταῖς δὲ εἰπτες, ἐδώ, ἦ, περὶ μὲ-

σημβριαν, ἄρθρῳ τρεῖς.—Τηρικά, in its ordinary usage, signifies then, this, or that time.—Πρῶ, before day.


"Ὅρθρος βαθύς.] Early dawn. Crito answers more accurately the general question of Socrates, ὑ οὐ πρῶ ἦτι ἵστε; supr., for πρῶ, like the Latin mane, signifies any period of the early morn, ὀρθρός, the very point of day break, primum diluculum punctum. Scap. Lex. "Ubi nox abit, nec tamen orta dies." Ovid. Amat. i. 5. 6. Cf. Phrynic. p. 120. Ὀς ἐς ἀρχαῖα ὀρθρὼν, καὶ ὀρθρῶνσθαι, το πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ἐς λόγῳ ὑπάκαι τις χρήσαι.—ὁρθρος βαθύς, primum diluculam, as in Luke, xxiv. 1. Φίλιπ.
phoniz\\wires of the \wires of the Athenian state.\\n
The Athenian state was a complex \wires of the \wires of the Athenian state.\\n
The Athenian state was a complex \wires of the \wires of the Athenian state.
KRITON.

theúdeis' kai építptdés se ouk ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγης. kai pollá_kis mēn δὴ se kai πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ ἡμῖν, τοῦτις ῥαδίως αὐτήν kai πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Kαὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὃ Kρίτων, πλημμελεῖς εἰς ἀγανακτεῖ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεὶ ἡδὴ τελευτῶν.

ΚΡ. Kαὶ ἄλλοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἐξυμποροῖ ἄλασκονται, ἄλλα οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλίκια τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. "Εστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ αὕτης;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὃ Σώκρατες, φέρον χαλεπῆν, οὐκ, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἄλλοι ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτη-

γωμαίως ἐτελεύτα; c. 38. a med. ὡς ἡεῖς καὶ ἐφερεῖς, &c. Matthiae Gr. s. 480. Obs. 3.

"Ἰνα ὡς ἡδίστα διάγης." The conjunctive is used after ἵνα, ὡς, ὡς, and ὡς, although the preceding verb be in the time past, when the verb which depends upon the con-

junction denotes an action which is continued to the present time; e. g. Hlad. 5. 127. ἁλλὰν ὃ αὐτοὶ ἀπ' ὄρθιομῳ ἔλον, ἢ πριν ἐπήνει, ὢρ′ εἰ γνωστέρας ἡμῖν θεόν, ἢ ἕλτι καὶ ἀνέρα, because at the time at which Minerva is understood to édage: Cf. Persius, v. 139. "Contentus parergas, si vivere cum Jove teonds."
δείοις πάσι καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρείαν, ἢν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ήν ἐνέγκαμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκτα ex Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὗ τοι δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥδειν τήμερον ἔξ ὄν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἣκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σούνιον καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεί αὐτό. δήλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥδει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ ἐσαύριον ἔσται, ὡ Σῶκρατες τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

§ 2. ΣΩ. ΑΛΛ', ὁ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἁγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεόις φίλον, ταύτῃ ἑστο. οὐ μέντοι οἴμαι ἥδειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩ. Ἔγώ σοι ἐρώ. τῇ γὰρ ποτν ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνῄσκειν ἡ ἡ ἄν ἐλθῇ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοιν κη τῆς ἐπιστούσης ἥμερας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ἥδειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος

"Er τοῖς βαρύτατοι.] h. e. ἐν τοῖς φίλοις εἰς βαρύτατο τὴν ἐνέγκαμι. See Matthiae Gr. s. 290.
'Tίνα ταύτην.] Intel. φερεῖ, h. c. τις ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ ἁγγεία ἡν φέρεις. Ἕ τῷ πλοῖον.] See in Phaedon. c. 1.
Τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, n.
Ἐξ ὄν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν.] i.e. q. εκ τούτων ἀπαγγέλλουσι: secondum ea, que illi noniand. STALL. Cicer. Epist. xvi. 22. "ex tuis epistolis."
§ 2. Τύχῃ ἁγαθῇ.] h. e. quod bene feliciterque vertat. RAAE. Cf. Plaut. 
Ant. iv. 10. 57. "quod honum, faustum, felix, fortunatumque sit."
Ταύτη] Οὔτως, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
HEVECH.
"Υστεραίᾳ—ἡ ᾑ. ] Lit. I must die on the day later than (i.e. the day subsequent to) that on which the vessel arrives:

Τῆς τούτο δῆ.] These particles are to be taken in an affirmative sense, but with restrictions. See Seag. Viger. viii. s. 4.
"Αλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας.] But the day after. "Ολίγον πρότερον.] i.e. Which I saw this very night a little before you arrived: consequently after midnight, when the ancients supposed that dreams were true. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 10. 33. "Quirinus Post mediam noctem visus quum sonnia vera."
KRITON.

"Beautifulluvius.

κινινυειες. Κινινυειει. εγγυζεις.


Ipiexoriev. "Εν αυτη χειροποιηθα χαλη και ευεξης, λευκα ιματια ζχουσα, καλεσα με και ειπειν

3. Ω εμοι. Ηματι κεν τριτατω Φθηνη ερβωλουν ικοι.

K. 3. Ωτοπον το ευπτυνιον, η σωκρατες.

O. 'Εναργης μεν ουν, ως γαμοι δοκει, ο Κριτων. Σ. 3. K. Αιαν γε, ώς εοικεν. Άλυς δαιμονε

σωκρατεσ, έτι και νυν εμο δειδου και σωζητη, ύς εμοι, έαν συ αποδανης, όμω με ξυμφορα έστιν, άλλα

be understood in the language of the vi

sion as the abode of Socrates after his de

ease: v. Apol. Socr. c. 32. and to which

his life was merely the passage. So Aristoi
tic interpreted the dream of his friend

eudemus of Cyprus, to whom a youth of

remarkable beauty appeared, and told

him that in five years more he should re

turn home. C. Div. i. 25. Laert. ii. 35.

It. Antonin. iv. 17. "Ωσπερ ει τις σοι

συναν ειπεν, ώτι αυριον τελυνηζ, η

παντως εις τριτην.

Ως άτοπον—] Ως θαμασ αν και παραδοξον, Thom. Μαγ. —'Εναργης,

so clear, that there could be no mistake

to its import. Cf. Lucian. Sorn. tom

i. p. 4. Graev. Ωνηρος—'Εναργης ουτως,

οστε μεθην απολειπεσαι της ολη

θειας.

"Ετι και νυν. It would hence ap

pear that Crito had made some previous

efforts to prevail upon Socrates to save

himself by flight. Unless ετι may con

vey an allusion to the advice which Crito

and others had formerly given upon the

subject of the fine, v. Apol. Socr. c. 28—

'Ος έρωι, κ. τ. Λ., i. c. Siuere, if you die,

not one calamity only shall befal me; but

besides my having lost a friend, such as I

never may obtain again, I shall, further,

seen to many who do not thoroughly know

both, to have neglected when I might have

preserved you, had I been willing to en

crouch upon my wealth. Upon the con

struction δω οιος σε ων σε δωκεν, κ. τ. Λ.

the terms in which it is to be supposed

that Crito would be reproached for his

apathy, see Matthia, Gr. s. 529. 5.

G 2
χώρις μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσθαι τουλώτου ἐπιτηδείον οἶον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω, ἦτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σε μὴ σαφῶς ἵσασιν, ὲσοι τῶν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἦθελον ἀναλίκειων χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καὶ τοῦ τίς ἂν αἰσχίνων εἰπ ταύτης δόξα, ἦ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλεῖον ποιεῖσθαι ἡ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡθέλησας ἀπιέ

ναι ἐνθέδε ἡμῶν προδυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὠ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ἄν μᾶλλον ἄξιοι προντίζειν, ἠγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξαθι ὦς περ ἄν πραχῇ.

ΚΡ. 'Αλλ' ὦρᾶς ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὠ Σώκρατες, καὶ τής τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νῦν ὅτι οἴοι τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εάν τις ἐν αὐτῶι διαβεβλημένος ἦ.

ΣΩ. Εἴ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὠ Κρίτων, οἴοι τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἴνα οἴοι τε ἠσαν ἃ καὶ ἀγάθα τὰ μέγιστα καὶ καλῶς ἄν εἶχε.
4. To verify this we must turn to the Latin adjunct quo. See: Viger, c. iii. 8. 1.

The difference between "μην" and "οντας" is, that "μην" is used when it is certain; but "οντας" is often used instead of "οντας" for the purpose, sometimes, of irony. See: Viger, c. viii. 4. 4. — Proctor of court.

The proverbial litigious disposition of the Athenians, and the gross mismanagement of their government and judicature, gave birth to the evil which, with the name of sycophancy, so peculiarly infested the state. The term sycophanta, which sometimes signifies false witnesses, but more properly denotes common harassers, derived from the Attic form, as αἰσχύνει and ἐντρέπει. c. 14. a med.

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Krîtōn.

νῦν δὲ οὐδέσποτα ὁδιντε τε' οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοννί ζε' τούτο θ' τι ἄν τύχωσιν.

§. 4. KR. Ταῦτα μὲν δ' ὡς ἄντως ἐχέτω' τάδε δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἀρά γε μή ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐάν συν ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συνοφάνται ἤμιν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὥς σε ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ὁπώτιν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συνχα χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι
praest turtois pathein; ei hay tis tonotou phoibei, eis-
sou autou xairew! hmeis hay ton dikaiou esmen sosten-
santes se kivundenein tou tou kivunun kai ean
dehi, eti tou tou meizoa. alla emoi peithoun kai mi al-
lous poiiei.

SO. Kai tauta promethoudmai, o Kríton, kai al-
lai pola.

KP. Míte toínn tauta phosou; kai gar oude
polu tárgyriou estin o theloni labontes tines sò-
sta se kai aiegelain evthiend. epitea oux oras tou-
tou tois synkofántas, oux euyleesis kai oudein an deoi
et autous polloû argyriou; sou de upárchei men tis
emai chrématas, oux éggmai, ikanai epitea kai eti ti emoi
kidoemous oux oiei dein anallikes tama, xénoi outoi
enviade etoi moi anallikes. eis de kai kekomikei ep
autou tou argyriou ikanou, Sumiaas o Thebaios
etoiomos de kai Kébeta kai alloi polloi tapan. ooste,
ó per lénou, mihtete tauta phoiboemous apokármh sava-

nostarum. Stall. "Allo to tis pathein,
h. c. ne ipai in vinuula coniecturam, ex-
ilio nullatemur, necemur. Id.

"Easos autou xairein.] Bid adieu
6. ou take leave of it.

Dikaios ismen—kínvenenwm.] See
Matthiae Gr. s. 297.


"In carcer Socrates disputavit, et ex-
ire, cum essent, qui promitterent fugam,
notum, remansitque ut duarum rerum
gravissimarum hominibus metum deme-
ret, mortis et carceris."—Toutos tou
sekorofántas, expressive of contempt.

g. Apol. Soc. c. 1. a med. Oustos. n. infi-
c. 9. tootous toin polloin.

Demosth. Philipp. 1. p. 41. paraideigmasi chró-
menoi tis te tote bhmia toin Lákeia-
monihou —kai tis vnu b'drei tootous.

Oes euyleesis.] Criminaliores, acce-
salores, ad quos placandos non opus est
magna pecunia vis. Fisch.—Ces déla-
teurs sont à bon marché, et ne nous coûte-
ron pas grand' chose. V. Cousin.—'Epi'
autoyc, h. c. ad eos corrumpendos.—
Stall.

'Yparchei mén tis emai chrématas.

Tibi mee opes parata sunt, sc. suppre-
tunt. Stall.

"Einoi outax evthh. 4. Peregrini ecce
his aduant: are at hand here; by the
demonstrative oux, Crito does not
mean to say that they were then present,
but that they resided in the city, and
were in the habit of constant intercourse
with him. Buttm.

Sumiaas—Kébeta.] Both Thebans,
and on terms of close intimacy with So-
crates; v. in Phaedon. c. 2. sub. fin. c. 6.
a med. Diag. Laertius mentions the
titles of thirty-three dialogues which
were ascribed to the former, and of
three by Cebes, of which the Hivad, or
Picture of Human Life, only remains,
and to which his claim is disputed. It
is a very able allegory, truly Socratic in
its moral spirit and character, but con-
taining some sentiments which appear
to have been borrowed from the Pyth-
gorean school.

Míte—apokármh.] Do not despond.

—apokivménh, ne censes. Jacob; who
thought that the reading as supr. would
make Socrates appear to have despaired
of his escape as impracticable, instead of, as was actually the case, declining it as unjust, and proposed the emendation ἄπόκειται. But Crito may have easily used the term in the text, for he was as yet but little acquainted with the views of Socrates on the subject, and might have readily imagined that the objections which he endeavoured to meet were rather the results of some doubts which were only proposed with the hope of being dissolved, than of a steady determination, on the part of the philosopher, to abide by the decision of his country's laws.

"Ὁ ἠλεγε ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερὲς σοι γενέσθω, ότι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὁ τι χρῶ τε σεαντὸ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη, ἀγαπήσουσί σε. ἐκὼ δὲ βούλη ἐς Θετταλίαιν ἱέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεί ἔξονοι, οἱ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσουται καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σοι παρέξονται, ὡς τέ σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

§. 5. Ἔτε δὲ, ὦ Σωκράτες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι ἔξιν σωθῆναι καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεῦδεις περὶ σεαντῶν γενέσθαι, ἀ περ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαυεν τε καὶ ἔσπευσάν σε διαφθείρα βουλὸμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς νιέις τοὺς σαυτὸν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖς προδοῦναι, οὐσ σοι ἔξιν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπῶν, καὶ τὸ σοῦ μέρος, ὁ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι τεῦξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων διὰ περ εἰσοδε γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοῦ ὀρφανοῦς. ἦ γὰρ ὦ χρῆν ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἣ ἐνυδιάταλαπτωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα. οὖ δὲ ἐμοὶ

Matthiae Gr. s. 409. 6. Cf. Lucian. Necyom. s. 3. οὐκ εἰδῶς ὃ τι χρησιμοποιήσαται. ἀλλὰ. The corresponding form to ὅποια, otherwise the verb ἀγαπήσουσι would have required ἄλλαχος after πολλαχοῦ; upon this species of attraction see Buttmann, Larg. Gr. Gr. s. 138. i. 4.

Κατὰ Θετταλίαν. According to Laertius, and Libanius, in Apol. Socer., the acquaintance of Socrates was sought by some of the most noble in Thessaly. §. 5. Τὸ σοῦ μέρος. Quantum in te est, quod ad te attinet, Stal. as cc. 11. 16.

"Ὁ τι ἂν—πρᾶξον. h. e. eam sortem habeant quani iiis fortunae arbitrium tribuerit; quidvis iiis accidere poterit. They shall endure whatever they may meet with. Stal.—πρᾶξειν, especially with οὐ or κακῶς, is used to express good or evil fortune. Euphr. Iphig. Aur. 345. πρᾶσσειν μεγάλα ἑ. ὁ. μᾶλ εὐτυχεῖν.
IIATQNO2 but ravra such the Libanius, adv. omit may institute by nesses, to the third, which crown all, to teluvatov d'7 touT, the

Τά ραθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι. [Τα αυτομα μήλον νείρα, ουτε μακρά προτέρα αὐτῇ παραίτησαν συνέχεια conlecta sunt elegisse. Serran.

Ὑ εἰσόδος τῆς θείης.] Forster and others suspect τῆς θείης, which has been omitted by Ficinus, to be a mere gloss. But as a suit, ἡ θείη is said εἰσόναι or εἰσόραξθαι, to be brought into court, ἡ εἰσόν τῆς θείης appears to be obviously admissible. Schleiermacher would omit εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, but there is a precedent for this also; Cf. Demosth. adv. Phorrh. ii. p. 912. 27. μελλονισμος τῆς θείης εἰσόναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.—Ὡς εἰσήλθες, added in explanation of the preceding: Wolf and others read ὡς εἰσῆλθεν, sc. θείη, but εἰσῆλθεν may be affirmed indifferently of the litigants and the suit.—Εἴδον μὴ εἰσῆλθεν.

It is not clear how Socrates could have avoided his trial; Libanius, in Apol. i. p. 644, mentions that Anytus, after the accusation had been preferred, had offered to be reconciled to Socrates upon certain conditions; but the παραγραφή, or παραμαρτορία, the defendant's plea, when he alleged by competent witnesses, that the action brought against him was not θεία εἰσαγώγημα, a cause which could then be lawfully tried, and by which he could defer the trial, or institute a cross cause and so protract the threatened judgment, should be put in before the cause had been submitted to the magistrate who proposed it for the decision of the judges. It is more likely that Crito alludes to a law of which Socrates might have availed himself, commended by Lysias, p. 354. ed. Reisk, and by which it was allowed θεία εἰσαγώγημα, εἰκόνες δρασκάζειν, cause sue diligentia fuga se substituere. This seems accordant with the tenor of Crito's present arguments; he is now recommending Socrates to fly and ensures him a kind and honourable reception among his friends in Thessaly; such a course was at the option of Socrates in the first instance, and could have been scarcely less obvious than at the present, aware, as he must have been from the beginning, of the number and influence of his enemies, and the nature and extent of their design.

Ο ἄγων τῆς θείης.] The conduct of the trial; referring particularly to the defence of Socrates. V. Cousin: la manière dont le processuit-même a été conçu.

Ὡς περ κατάγελος. Cornaro compares the case of Socrates to a dramatic representation, of which the imprisonment formed the πρώτα, the trial the ἐπίτα, and his death in the gaol the καταστροφή. Crito, as yet unconvinced by the arguments of Socrates, and unable to understand why he would not take advantage of the proffered means of flight, endeavours to influence him by a sense of the utter absurdity and ridicule which should be imputed in consequence to himself and his friends. He sets out with a general proposition, that it was possible to suspect a mismanagement about the whole affair, which made him feel ashamed for both Socrates and his friends. Their supineness betraying itself in three special instances; the first in permitting the indictment at all, which it is to be supposed might have been counteracted by due precaution; the second in not avoiding its being put to issue, which appears to have been considered practicable; and the third, which crowned all, to teluvatov d'7 touT, the
ridiculous dénouement of the piece was, his appearing to have slipped through their fingers, as it were, from their fear and hesitation which prevented their making more efforts for him, than he did for himself, when they could have preserved him had they been of the smallest worth, or, the least assistance. There is some difficulty about the dependence of ὅσειν supra. Buttmann and others understand an anacoluthon in the sentence, and so refer it to μὴ εἶδος preced. Stallbaum considers it to be redundant, as c. 3. καὶ τοῖς ἄναι ἀισχῶν εἰς ταυτής δόξα ὅσειν, κ. τ. λ. Buttmann compares it with Aleib. Second, c. 17, extr. μεταβαλλόμενος γί τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὖν ὤτιν παῦει, ἀλλ’ ὁ περ ἀν μᾶλτα σου δέσῃ, τούτω καὶ εἰκεδεκάνα αὖ καὶ οὐκέτι σαφέστως δοκεῖν: which he professes only to be able to explain by an anacoluthon as above; as also the following passage from Plat. Menon. c. 22. init. ὅ περ ἱρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκελαίμην καὶ ἀκόσμαμι, πότιον ὡς ξεικατρ ὅτι αὐτῷ δει ἐπιτεχειρίν, ἢ ὡς φίλει ἢ ὡς τινὶ ποτὲ τρόπῳ πα- ραγιγουρέως τοις ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀ- ρετῆς: where the genitive is in anaco- luthon after the dative; αὕτῳ and ἀρε- τῆς appearing to be distinct, and yet being the same, and an anacoluthia in the sense also, for if φίλει προσγίγε- ται ἡ ἀρετή, how can it be said ἄνειν ἐπιτεχειρίν αὐτῷ. V. Cousin takes ὅ- σειν absolutely for δόξει, ὡς δοκεῖν, de sorte que l'on croira . . . et l'on croira . . . Oui, on va croire que, &c.—Δια- περεγίγεναι, Scap. Lex. Dicitur et ἐπι- τεχειρίν ἦμις ἵλα res, qua excidimus, quaeve e manibus quasi nobis elabitur: apud LScelin. in Ctesiph. Item quod nobis εμεμορία elabatur et excidit, quo modo usus est Isocrates. et Plutarch.— Οἵτινες ἐὰν οἴνη, qui te non conservaveri- mus, quemadmodum nec tu teipsum, quam tamen fieri illud potuisse. STALL.

"Ἀλλὰ βεβολεύσθεῖα.] The time had arrived when deliberation should have ceased, and at which Socrates should have adopted, if so inclined, the suggestions of his friend, and the plan for his escape, to be put in execution on the coming night, or the opportunity was lost. 

Εἴ δὲ τι. ] Ficinus appears to have read ei δὲ eti: Lat. Interpr.

Περιμενούμεν.] See in Phaed. c. 3. περιμενοῦμεν.

§. 6. Ἡ προθυμία σου, κ. τ. λ.] h. c. studio tunam mei servandi valide pro- bandum est et landandum, si eum recta ratione conjuncta sit. STALL. Ei μετ. τιν. orb. εἰ. V. Matthiae Gr. s. 524. Obs. 3.
Oious τῶν ἐμων.] h. c. ὥστε—πείθεσθαι—V. Mathiae Gr. s. 179. Obs. 2. a. s. 617. 5.—Τὰ ἔρωτα, quæ ad me pertinere, tum animi affectiones et cupiditates, tum externæ rerum conditiones. StALL.

"Οὐδὲν ἀν πλεῖον τῶν, κ. τ. λ."

Buttmann arranges the passage: οὕδ' ἀν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνόμας μορομαλύτητα ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ παιδὸς, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλεῖον, ἐξ ἐσορίας, κ. τ. λ. StALLbaum joins πλεῖον, as an accusative absolute, taken adverbially, with μορομαλύτητα, which appears to agree better with the position of the words in the text. Cf. c. 14. infr. sub fin. άλλῳ ἱάτῳ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπειθηματικός, etc.

Μορομαλύτητα.] Ruhnken, in Tim. Plat. Lex. μορομαλύτεσθαι, gesta quadam et pronuncianda voce Moroμω πιεμον τερετ. V. Gesner, ad Claudian. CARM. XXXI. 111. Cf. Schol. Basil. in Gregor. Nazian. Or. XXXV. p. 563. C. Moroμαλύτεσθαι ἵστιν, τὸ ἐκφραζεῖν, καὶ Μορομαλυκόν, προσωπικόν τε ἐφόσον παιδίων ἀνοίγων, καὶ τῦτος τῆς ἀλλόκοτος ὀδός, εἰρήνη ἀπὸ τῆς Μορομῶ, τῆς ἐκτοίς ἀρμάζειν. In order to hush and soothe their crying infants the nurses at Athens used to sing a lullaby called λαλίτ, Ovid. Fasti. II. 599, or βασικάμα: but when they were peevish and fretful they endeavored to quiet them with threats of a bugbear or spectre called μορομαλύκειον, μορομαλύκη, and more briefly morōμω, whence the verb as supr., which is always used by the Attic writers in the middle voice.

Έπιπέμπουσα.] Ἐπιπέμπειν frequently signifies emphatically to visit with good or evil fortune.—Καὶ θανάτους—καὶ ἀφαφρίσεις. The plural is used to increase the force of the expression. Cf. Plat. Lachet. p. 191. D. ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἀνέρειοι εἰσί. The punishments of infancy, banishment, slavery, or death, were always attended with the confiscation of property. V. Boeckh, Pub. Econ. ii. c. 14.

Μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα.] Ντρίως σκοπείσθαι, quævere ita ut par est, ut rei consevât, ut res postulat; h. c. recte, bene. StALL.

Πρῶτον μὲν.] V. infr. c. 8. a med. ὅστε πρῶτον μὲν, κ. τ. λ. where this first part of the discussion concludes, and the second is immediately subjoined, ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑπ' ἤτοι—Τῶν λόγων ἀναλαβόμενων—ἀναλαμβάνειν, disputat!onem restructuram, iterum diligentissimia tractatur, Wytenbach; correctly, for Socrates alludes to what had been already said upon this subject, c. 5. supr., which he now proposes to resume.

Πάτερον καλῶς ἐλέγ. ικάσ. ή οὖ.] h. c. Ultram quisquecumque superioria lmpoore de hac re disputabamus, recte a nobis dictum sit, neque, alius hominum opiniones respicierendas esse, alias non. StALL.
taīs mēn deī tōn doξōn προσέχειν tōn νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὖ. ἦν πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποδηνήσειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδιφλος ἔρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδία καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς. ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἐγώγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετά σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιώτεροι φανεῖται, ἐπειδή ὁδὲ ἔχω, ἦ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ εάσομεν χαῖρειν ἥ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πῶς, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἕκαστοτε ὁδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥς περ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ὃς οἱ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζομεν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοὺ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τούτῳ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὥσα γε τάνθρωπεια, ἐκτὸς οἱ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποδηνήσειν αὐριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακροῦν ἡ παροῦσα ἔμφορά. σκόπει δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἄλλα τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὖ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἄλλα τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὖ; τί φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

KP. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρᾶς μή;

KP. Ναί.

Wieland, Mus. Attic. iii. 2. p. 159. sqq. would omit ἦ οὖ, and understand καλῶς ἐλέγετο after ἀποδηνήσειν ironically. In the text ἦ οὖ refers to καλῶς preceded.

Νῦν δὲ—ἐγένετο.] Νῦν, signifying time either actually present, or bordering on the present, is often placed in contraposition to πρὶν, τότε, or other particles expressive of time past. With a past tense, as supr. it means lately, just now, as in Phaedon. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ νῦν προβήμεθα αἰτεῖσθαι—σκεπτόμεν. Cf. Horat. Od. i. 37. 2. "Nunc talliaribus Orna- nare pulvinar deorum Tempus erat dapibus." See Matthiae Gr. s. 506. V.—Κατάξιον, sc. ὃ λόγος.

"Ἀλλάτος.] Idly, vainly. Matthiae Gr. s. 597.—'Ἐνείκα λόγον, for argument's sake.—Ἐπειδὴ ὅτε ἔχω, postquam mor-

tis periculum mihi iniminet, postquam veni in periculum vitae. Stmall.

Τι λέγειν.] Opp. to παιδία καὶ φλυαρία preceded.

"Οσα γε τάνθρωπωμ.] h. c. ut quidem sunt res humane, i. e. quantum quidem ex iis, quae hominibus solent fieri contingere, conjicere licet. Stmall.

Παρακροῦν.] Παρακροῦν, Hesych. interpr. ἐξεντάτον, πλανάν: Fisch. facere, ut quis male statuat, et existimet, ut erret, ut non ponderet satis et examinat aliquid; properly, to trip in wrestling, or to cheat by touching the beam in weighing. Stallbaum explains the passage: Te enim presens calamitas non ita conturbaverit ut a recta judicandi ratione abducit te patiari.

Τιμᾶν.] To respect.
§Ω. Χρησταί δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, ποιηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;
ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;
§. 7. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τουαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττον πάντοτε σκέπως ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνοι καὶ ψόγοι καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἕκεινον ὥς ἄν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὦν;
ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπαζῆσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕκεινον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.
ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.
ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἄν τῷ ἑωὶ δοκῆ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ἐξυμπασά τοῖς ἄλλοις.
ΚΡ. 'Εστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Εἰδὲν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἑωὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίοντων ἢρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποί τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν ἀπειδοῦντος;

§, 7. Γυμναζόμενος ἄνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττον.] i. e. Practising athletic exercises, and wholly set upon them: —τοῦτο πράττε, a proverbial term, the age of the Latins. v. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 152.
"Ος ἄν τυγχάνη—ὅως.] i. e. whoever he may be that is, &c. See Viger, de Id. Gr. viii. 2. 1. sq.—Ιατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης. The former gave the necessary directions for the diet, &c. of the future athletes, whence ἐκείστοιν γε καὶ ποτῖον ἔμψα. The office of the latter consisted chiefly in exercising the bodies of their scholars in the palestra, whence πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον. Both professions were practised together first by Hierocles, of Selybria, of whom Plato, in Repub. iii. p. 406. A.—παιδοτρίβης ὄν καὶ νοσοδόχης γεγομένος, μίας γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς ἀπέκ νασε πρώτον μὲν καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκτός ἐπιστάτηις τῶν μαθητῶν καὶ τῶν ἱπποτῶν. V. Intpp. ad Aristoph. Nub. 969.
Τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι.] V. Cousin: celui qui préside à la gymnastique et qui s'y connaît; referring to ἰατρὸς and παιδοτρίβης, preced.
KRITON.

KR. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο γὰρ διόλουσιν.

ΣΩ Καλὸς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰλλα, ὃ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὅν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἣ βουλή, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἣ τῇ τοῦ ἔνως, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, ὅν δεὶ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἣ ἐξώματας τοὺς ἄλλους; ὅ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλυτο. ἡ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτο;

KR. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

§. 8. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγειονό μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσόδου δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσομεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων δόξῃ, ἀρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένον αὐτοῖ; ἐστὶ δὲ ποι τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἤ οὐχί;

KR. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

KR. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἀρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ-

"Επεσθαί. i. q. προσίχειν τῶν νοῶν supr. τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο.]

i. e. βέλτι. γιγνέσθαι ἠλέγομεν. See Matthiae Gr. s. 505. 2. whence it will appear that the proposed emendation of Buttmann, who reads, after Theodoret, (On. H. p. 27.) ἐγίγνετο-ἀπώλετο, is wholly unnecessary. Tr. was being improved, was in progress towards improvement, by justice, &c. The imperfects, according to Lange, bear a distinct and definite relation to the period at which this subject came first under discussion, whence he explains the passage; quod justo quidem melius ficebat (sc. ex sententia, priusquam in mortis periculum incideram a nobis proposita,) in justo autem depravatur.

§. 8. Πειθόμενοι μή τῦ.] Fischer supposes here a synchysis, or hyperbaton, and understands the passage, τῷ τῶν μή ἐπ. as also Ficinus, Lat. Interp. But Lange, more correctly, explains μή as opposed by ἀλλὰ in a corresponding sentence not expressed. sc. πειθόμενοι, μή τῷ τῶν ἐπ. δοξ. ἀλλὰ τῷ τῶν μή ἐπαίωντων: approved by Buttmann.

βιωτῶν.] i. q. βιωτῶς ὁ βίος. See Apol. Socr. c. 28. a med. Μοχθηροῦ.] Miserable.
HAATONO

arguing

auctorem?

ZKelvo, criv 1)

Kia coz/ Ti^iv Tio-Teov T&V construction, T69.

eialv X(jia(rO(u an ainaTLKyo 1.

Eusebius, Reisk. Antiq.

that concerned.

about

body,

cess be to with its living,

equally enjoyment its.

KP. Oδδαμώς.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλά τιμιώτερον;

KP. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Ούκ ἄρα, ὃ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστεόν ὃ τι ἔρουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπαῖων περὶ τῶν δικαιῶν καὶ ἀδίκων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτή ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτου μὲν ταύτη ὧν ὁρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίνῃ γ' ἃν τις, οἷοὶ τ' εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι;

KP. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα: φαίνῃ γὰρ ἃν, ὃ Σώκρατες.


'H φαυλότερον.] Or do we imagine that to be of less importance than the body, whatever it is belonging to us, about which justice and injustice are concerned. If, in order to enjoy the many and important blessings connected with bodily health, we should conform to that regimen by which they might be best secured; arguing from its success the capabilities and skill of the adviser; that life should then be worth living, whose termination should be equally desirable, were the means of its enjoyment neglected, or the voice of the adviser to be mistrusted and confined. So with the soul, the truth alone, the test of justice and injustice, should decide upon their effects in relation to this their primary object. Is it then possible to make light of a bodily infirmity which poisons life, and give no heed to its obvious cause? or is the soul more trivial still, and is the voice of the many to drown the solemn and sober dictates of this omniscient truth, which dispels the cloud of mental error, and so removes the possibility of moral taint?


Ὁύκ ὁρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ.] Εἰσηγείσθαι, legem vel conditionem aliqua parre et suadere; auctorem esse alie grant rei.—Sturz. Lex. Xenoph. s. h. v.

Δῆλα ἐδ' καὶ ταῦτα, ε. τ. λ.] Several editions ascribe ἐδ' καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, which is approved by Buttmann. But it would seem strange for Socrates so to affirm his position in the first instance, that it should be confirmed by Critios, and then confirmed anew.—ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ε. τ. λ. Bekker's reading, as supra, obviates the difficulty. For when Socrates had as-
Σ. Ἀλήθη λέγεις. ἄλλα, ὃ θαυμάστε, οὔτός τε ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁμοιὸς εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον καὶ τόνδε ἀν ἱκόπει, εἰ ἐτί μένει ἡμῖν ἂν οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ καὶ περὶ πλείστου ποιητέου ἄλλα τὸ εὖ ζην.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

Σ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταὐτῶν ἔστιν, μένει ἂν οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

§. 9. Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκέπτεσθαι, προτέρον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθεντε πειρασθαι εὐεξόμαι μὴ ἀφίεντον Ἀθηναίοι ἡ οὐ δίκαιον καὶ εάν μεν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειράμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐσχήμεν. ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε χρημάτων ἀνα-

serted that the objection might possibly be made, that the opinion of the many ought to be rejected, because its influence prevailed even to the deprivation of life, Crito caught up the idea, as favourable to his own views, and at once pronounces the argument to be valid. Socrates accepts his admission, but proceeds to show that the impression was false, and its result unfounded. Stephens and Cornarius read ἑλάσαγο, but γὰρ, which is emphatically affirmative in the text, is to be found in all the editions, which would render the former superfluous.

Οὔτος τε ὁ λόγος.] i.e. The discussion which Socrates had just concluded, concerning the opinion of the multitude, one which he set no value on, nor thought the many a more competent judge because they exercised control over life and death. Especially as they had no power over the conduct of life, which was not to be desired for itself alone, but should rather be reckoned as consisting in the amiable development of chastened and virtuous feelings, which are always independent of external sway, and must reconcile all who are so actuated to the anticipation of that unwellcome reception in most instances, and that unmitigated persecution in many, to which excellence is ever liable from powerful and petulant vice. By τῷ καὶ πρότερον, the philosopher must allude either to his previous argument on the subject, c. 3. which he subsequently discussed in detail, or to some debate which he had held with his disciples previous to his accusation. Stallbaum adopts the latter conjecture, which appears to be more in consonance with what follows; καὶ τὸν δὲ καὶ σκόπητι εἰ ἐτί μένει, κ. τ. λ. For Socrates being about to speak of the love of life, and a due moderation of the passion to preserve it, desires Crito to consider further, whether what they had formerly agreed to on the subject ought still to be abided by as true.

§. 9. "Εκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.] i.e. ex iis, de quibus consentimus. STALL.

Μὴ ἀφίεντον Ἀθηναίοι.] Without leave of the Athenians: ἀφίεναι, sine, permittere, FISCH. Cf. Eurip. Med. 374. τῇν ἀφίκειν ὑμῖναν μεναὶ μὲ, allowed me to remain this day. Cod. Tubing. ἀφίκντον as in c. 13. extr. 'Εσθήμιν.] Let us give it over.

Περί τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως.] See c. 4. a med.—Καὶ Κόρες; Ficinus appears either to have read καὶ τῶν τολμῶν Κόρες, or to have given the sense of the text as supr. in full. Socrates aludes here to the argument of Crito, c. 3. init.
Λώσεως καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἦ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτηνοῦντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκόμενων γ’ ἂν, εἰ οἶοι τε ἃσαν, οὐδὲν ἔχων νοῦ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ’, ἔπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὁ περ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτως τοὺς ἐμὲ ἐνθέντες ἐξάζουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἡ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φανόμεθα ἀδίκα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὴ ὑπολογίζοθαυ οὔτ’ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἵσυχιαν ἔγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁπλιών πᾶσχεν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖσ λέγειν, ὥς Σωκράτες, ὃρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

Μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς.] The imperative ὁρα is understood in μὴ here and infr. μὴ οὖν ἄλλο: Vide ne aliud nihit considerandum sit—μὴ οὐ δὲγ: Vide, ne nulla ne mortis quidem habenda sit ratio. STEPH.

Σκέμματα;] i. q. σσέης supr.

Καὶ ἀναβιωσκόμενων.] Ἀναβιωσκόμενων ταῦτα οὖν ἀναβιωσκόμενοι. Wytenbach, Ep. Crit. 232. ed. Lips., proposes ἀναβιωσκόμενων γ’ αὖ, incorrectly, for ἄν, subjoined to participles and infinitives, gives to these moods (not the sense of the future, although in Latin it can only be expressed by this sense, but) the same signification as the optative, conjunctive, or indicative, with ἄν, would have in the resolution, by means of the finite verb. Whence the passage above is to be explained; καὶ τοῦτων, οἳ ἀναβιωσκοῦντο γ’ ἂν, εἰ οἶοι τε ἃσαν, and who would restore to life again, were they capable. Matthæi Gr. s. 598. 1.—Τούτων τῶν πολλῶν; contemptuously, cf. c. 4. supr. τούτων τοῖς συκοφάντος.


Χρήματα τελούντες;] It is to be observed that τελεύων is applied with propriety to χρήματα only; χάριν ἐ-χειν, and χάριν εἰςεῖναι or προσει-ναι, also χάριν ἀποδιώκον, and ἐκεί-ναι are usual forms, but not χάριν τελεύων. It should have been written χρήματα τελούντες—καὶ χάρισας προσεινεῖτε; Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 4. init. The Greek writers, however, not unfrequently accommodated the same verb to several nouns, to one only of which it should have been joined, but at the same time, in a sense so extended, that it contained the force of the verbs which belonged properly to the other nouns. This practice originated with the Hebrews, by whom it was transmitted to the Greeks, and so to the Latins. Cf. Cie. pro. Arch. 3. “Quorum alter res ad scribendas maximas, alter, cum res gestas, tum etiam studium, atque aures adhibere possent.”

Κἂν φανόμεθα ἀδίκα, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. And if we should so appear to act unjustly, observe that we are not to take into account the death that must result from our remaining and keeping quiet here, nor any other suffering whatever, in preference to the injustice of the act; i. e. should we accomplish our ex-


KRITON.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃ γαθεί, κουή, καὶ εἶ τῇ ἔχεις ἄντιλέγειν ἑμοῦ λέγοντος, ἄντιλεγε καὶ σου πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦται ἢ, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὅς χρῆ ἐνθέδε ἀκόντων ὁδηγαίον ἐμὲ ἀπέναι, ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσαι σε ταύτα πράττεις, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντως. ὅρα δὲ ὅτι τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐὰν σου ἰκανός λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτόμενον, ὃ ἀν μάλιστα οἴη.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

§. 10. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμὸς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλὸν, ὅς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογήθη; ὃ περ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. Ἡ πάσα ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταύτῃ ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί, καὶ πάλαι, ὃ Κρίτων, ὧρα τηλικοὶ·

care.] Pararénēnes, moviere in vinculis neque inde anfigere. Stail. It is properly applied to faithful slaves, pararéνων, opp. to ἀποθεώσκοντες.

'Ως ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ.] Commentators have varied considerably in their explanations of this passage, of which they severally propose such emendations as may best accord with their own views. The text as it stands is interpreted accurately by Stallbaum: Magni estimo te mihi iterum iterumque persuadere contari, ut id ogam, h. c. ut fugam capessam, modo ne me invito hoc facias, i. c. more fully, generosam tuam amicitiam, qua sit, ut mihi hoc consilium identidem suaeles (the aorist being expressive of an action repeated) uitique plurimi facio, sed noli hoc committere, ut mea ipsius voluntari ac sententia nihil tribunas, quam ego sollem non veream externarum momentis commoveri, sed solius veritatis virtutisque talimibns. Socrates attached a due importance to the benevolent efforts of his faithful friend, but he could not allow himself to be persuaded against his own conviction, ἀλλὰ μή [μοῦ] ἀκόντως, which being not at all likely to be overcome by the arguments of Crito, he begs of him to resign the vain attempt. So V. Cousin: Cesse enim, je te prit de me presser de sortir d'ici malgré les Athéniens; car je serai ravi que tu me persuades de te faire, mais je n'entends pas y être forcé. Ficinus has strayed altogether from the sense and spirit of the passage. V. Lat. Int. For μὴ ἀκόντως several editions read μὴ ἀκόντα, which is probably more correct, but the genitive absolute is often found, though the subject is another case, in the principal proposition, especially if it is to be distinguished by the emphasis. Cf. Thucyd. vii. 48. χρημάτων μὲν ἀπορία αὐτοῦ ἐκυριαρχήσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἢ ἡ ταῖς ὑπαρχόνται μαζι θαλασσοκρατωντών.

Ἀποκρινεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτόμενον. See Matthiae Gr. s. 409. 6.

§. 10. 'Εκόντας ἀδικητίον εἶναι.] Cf. Plat. Repub. 7. p. 529. D. καταβασίων ἐν μέρει ἐκατόν εἰς την τῶν ἀλλων ἵψωροιμασι. For this construction, see Matthiae Gr. s. 417. 4.

Ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσί.] Professo, i. e. ἀβεβηκές sunt. Stallach. Jacobs elegantly compares the forms ἐκείνῃ πλέοντι, ἐκείνῃ χρήματα.—Ὑποτες ἄνδρες is
δε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγό-μενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέρον- τες; ἦ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὃς περ τότε ἐλέ-γετο ἡμῖν; εἶτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τόνυδε χαλεπότερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὑν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἡ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, όσ οἱ πολ-λοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δαὶ δή; κακουργεῖν δεὶ, ὁ Κρίτων, ἡ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεὶ δή που, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δή; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, όσ οἱ πολλοί φασί, δίκαιον ἢ οὖ δίκαιον;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδι-κεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεὶ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὦτιον πάσχῃ ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

redundant, but contrasts more strongly with παίδων seq. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 23. τηλικάνει ὄντα. c. 27. τηλικάνει ἄνθρωπου.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον.] Unquestionably, beyond all doubt; a particularly emphatic affirmation. Cf. in Phaed. c. 17. c. 56.

'Ομος τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν.] So, in Gorg. p. 469. when Socrates is asked by Callicles; σι' ἄρα βούλωμαι ἃν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀκύρως, he makes answer: βούλομην μὲν ἃν ἔγορος οὐδέτερα εἴ δ' ἄπασχον εἰπ' ἀδικεῖν ἡ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοιμὴν ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἡ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

'Ως οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται.] Cf. Archil. apud Theophil. ad Antolyc. ii. 57. ἦν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸ κακὸς τι ἐρώτα

ἐμφυοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακῶς. Solon, in Brunck. Poet. Gnom. p. 73. ἐίρθε οὐ γλυκῶν ὦτί φίλος, ἵκροισα δὲ πικρῶν ταῖς μὲν αἴεσι, τοῖς δὲ δαίμονι νεκών. Fragm. Eurip. ap. Valcken. p. 157. ἱκροιον κακῶς ἔραν ἀνέρος ἡγούμαι μέρος. That such was the opinion of the vulgar can be proved by many an- cient authorities, forbearance having been commonly deemed inconsistent with fortitude.

Οὐθ' ἂν ὦτιον πάσχῃ.] Si vel maximi et gravissimis injurias officiarit. STALL. Euseb. Theodoret. πάσχει τις ὑπ'. Pician reads πάσχεσ, passus fueris, but it is more correctly taken in the person of κακῶς πάσχοντα preceded, besides that it refers to the indefinite subject of the infinitive ἀνταδικεῖν.
καὶ ὁρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαιν ὁμολογήσῃ. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὅλγοις τοῖς ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δἀξεὶ. οἳς οὖν οὐτω δὲδοκεῖαι καὶ οίς μὴ, τοῦτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρὸντας τά ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκότει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖ καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀργύρωμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὄρθως ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικείν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικείν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἡ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὖτω καὶ νῦν ἐτί δοκεῖ· σοι δ' εיך πὴ ἀλλη δὲδοκεῖαι, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρὸσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκοιν.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι' ἄλλα λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δή αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μάλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ. πότερον ἀ ἃν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ οὖντα ποιητέον ἡ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

§. 11. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τοῦτον δὴ ἀδρεῖ. ἀπίστους ἔνθενε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἥκιστα δεῖ, η' οὖ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ᾧ οὖ;

Matthias Gr. 205. 2. For an analysis of the principle deprecated by Socrates as supr. see Dr. Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, sect. 63. and Dugald Stewart, Philos. of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, c. 3. sec. 6.

Βουλευήματα.] i. q. σκέψεις καὶ σκιμ- ματα, c. 9. supr.

Ὅτε κακῶς πάσχοντα.] i. e. Nor that one who is ill-used should revenge himself, requiring evil for evil. Ficinus incorrectly refers αντιδρῶντα κακῶς to the aggressor.

Τῆς ἀρχῆς.] The principle: disputa-
tionis principium. STALL.

Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.] The conclusion de-
duced from the principle, as supr.— Ἀλλὰ λέγε, omitted by Ficinus, but in-
correctly, as appears from λέγω ὃν αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σεκ.

§. 11. Ἐκ τοῦτον ἡ' ἀδρεῖ.] h. e. jam si hec vera sunt, nefas esse hedere quenquam ullo modo, vide quid inde se-
quatur. STALL.

Μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν.] i. q. ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων, ὁ μὴ ἀφίστων Ἀθηναίων, c. 9. supr.

Οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν.] h. e. de quibus ut justis et aequis nobis cum ciuitate con-
venit. STALL.
KR. Oûκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὁ ἐρωτῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἔννοῳ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὅδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθέντες εἰτε ἀποδιδράσκειν εἰθ' ὡπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτοῦντο. Εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἦ τοῦτο τῷ ἔργῳ ὃ ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι, διανοοῦ τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἐξυμπασάν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἣ δοκεῖ σοι οἷον τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἂν ἂν αἱ γενομέναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύσων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἱδιωτῶν ἀκροῦ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαβήσεται; Τό ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἀλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολυμένου, ὅ τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτει κυρίως εἴναι. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ

'Ἀποδιδράσκειν.' This term was generally applied to fugitive slaves, but its harshness is qualified by εἰθ' ὡπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτον, h. e. vel quod adinominat istud nobis appellationem crit. StALL.

'Εἴς εὐνοικὸν ἡμῖν.] This beautiful passage has been imitated by Cicero, in Catil. i. 7. "Patriam—qua tecum, Catilina, sit agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur, &c." Cf. Œuvres de Frederic 11. iii. p. 54. "Pour qu'assurés répondent ces cœurs tièdes et lâches—si la patrie personifiée se présentoit subitement devant eux, est leur tenoit à peu près ce language, &c." BIELT. Quintilian, ix. 2. observes on the effects of this figure 


'Αλλ' τι ἦ τοῦτο τῷ ἔργῳ.] See Apol. Socr. c. 12. init. and Matthiae Gr. s. 457. 9.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] i. q. καθ' ὅσον εὐνα- 

Ei να 

ι. q. σῶν εἶναι, σταθῆναι, Mark, iii. 24. opp. τὸ ἀνατεταράφ. infr. To continue, to exist; Cf. Cic. de Off. i. 12. 33. "bellum gerebatrum, uter esset, non uter imperaret."—Μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, h. e. neque censum facerer. StALL.

"Αἰ γενομέναι εἴναι.] Sc. οἱ ἔκτις κισαθείσαι, infr. judicia e legibus facta, judicata. StALL. V. Cousin; les jugemens rendus.

Τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου.] See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. c. xxx. extr. Demosthenes commends this law, Orat. adv. Timocrates. p. 782. Τὰς ἔκας καὶ τὰς εἰςακας, ὅσα ἐγίνοντο ἐπὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἐν δημοκρα- 

Tοῖς Ἰδίεις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις.] The particle ὅτι is used when the very words of the speaker are quoted in oratione recta, whereas these in other languages can be only quoted in the way of narrative. Matthiae Gr. s. 621. b. Hein- 

The latter verb Buttmann correctly understands as the aorist. Stall- 

baun explains the passage: Enim vero injuste nobiscum civitas agebat, quan nos
KRITON.

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ήμας ἡ τόλις καὶ οὐκ ὑρθὼς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἦ τί ἔρομεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νὴ Δ', ὥ Σώκρατες.

§. 12. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν ἐκτοσίν οἱ νόμοι, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἦ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἦμῶν τε καὶ σοῦ, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαιαι αἰς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θανμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἦσως ἂν ἐπιτευχ ὅτι ὅ Σώκρατες, μὴ θανμάζε ὃ τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκρίνουν, ἐπειδή καὶ εἴρων Χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐφερι γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἦμῶν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖσιν ἠμᾶς ἀπολλυμεν; οὐ πρὸτον μὲν σὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὶ ἡμῶν ἐλαβὲν τὴν μητέρα σου ἀ πατήρ καὶ ἐρώτευσε σέ; φράσον οὖν, τούτως ἦμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους μέμψει τί ὁς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μὲμφομαι, φαίνω ἂν. Ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τὴν τὸν γενομένου προφήτει τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἦ καὶ σὺ ἐπαίδευσης; ἢ οὔ καλῶς προσεταττόν ἡμῶν οἱ
dammaret et in carere retineret.

"Η τί ἐρόμεν;"

§. 12. "Η καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο.

Various readings and interpretations have been proposed for this passage, which however has been fully and correctly explained by Fischer, as it stands in the text; ταῦτα being understood to refer to ὁ ἡκε γάρ ἠμᾶς ἡ πόλες, κ. τ. λ. supr. and so opp. to ἐμμένειν ταῖς ἐκάσιας seq. Whether, say the laws, was this the compact which was made between ns, that you should charge the state with injustice, and its proceedings as illegit; or was it, that you would abide by the decisions which the state, with our sanction, might pronounce? At Athens, before the ephebi were permitted to be enrolled among the citizens, they were bound by an oath, in which, among other things, they promised calling the gods to witness; Τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ιδρυμένοις πείσομαι, καὶ οὐς τινας ἂν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος ἐρήσησαι ὀμοφρόμονοι καὶ ἂν τις ἀνάμοι τοὺς θεοὺς, ή μὴ πείθησαι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω, ἢμνον ὡς καὶ μόνοι, καὶ μετὰ πάντων. Stob. Eclog. Eth. c. 41. p. 243. Gesner. It is

not clear how Ficinus read the passage in the text, but he has lost sight of the meaning.

Τῷ ἐρωτ. τ. κ. α. "Question and answer."

Οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν."

Πρῶτον μὲν should properly be followed by ἐπίτητα, but the sense of the latter is implied in Ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τὴν τὸν γενομένου, κ. τ. λ. seq. where it might have been written: ἐπίτητα οὐ καλῶς προστατοῦν εἰ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδεία τεταγμένα νόμοι, παραγ. — παιδείαν; ἢ καὶ τούτως μερφεῖ; — καὶ ἐλ' ἠμῶν—this explains σε ἐγεννήσαμεν preced. The Athenian law obliged all citizens, especially such as held any important office in the state, to be married, with a view to the procreation of children, which were considered as a kind of security for the good conduct of the parents, and their being well affected towards the interests of the republic. Dinarch. contr. Demosth. Meurs. Them. Att. i. 14. ii. 6.—Ἔλαβας. Cf. Mark, 12. 19. sqq.

ἡ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. λ.] The laws repeat here emphatically the subject of the preceding question, Ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ.—ἐπαίδευσης."
παρὰ θεοὶς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἕτεα τι προστάτη παθεῖν, Ἧσυκίαν ἄγοντα, ἕαν τε τύπτεσθαι ἕαν τε δεῖσθαι, ἕαν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἁγία τροφήσομεν ἡ ἀποθανούμενον ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ υπεικεῖν ὑπὲρ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἃ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δ’ οὐχ ὀσίον οὕτε μητέρα οὕτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἐτι ἂττων τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, οἱ Κρίτοι; ἄληθὶ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

§. 13. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίειν ἃν ἵσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἤμεις ταῦτα ἄληθὴ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δράν, ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἤμεις γὰρ σε γεννήσατες, ἐκθρέψατες, παιδεύσατε, μεταδότες ἀπάντων ὃν οἶοι τ’ ἤμειν καλὸν σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ

Οωπείευν. Blande palpari, verbis blandia precari, Fisch., to conciliate, to caress. Θψ, adulator, palpo, whence Theatret. p. 128. E. θύπας λόγους, wheeling or flattering discourses. V. Wesseling, ad Herodot. iii. 80. Both these terms have a common origin with θαυμάζω, Ion. τομάζω, the former through θάπω, Ion. θῆπω, from θηωμαί, to wonder, to admire; thus θψ, one who affects admiration; Th. θαμαί, act. θαύ, obsol.

Καὶ ἡ πείθειν, ἢ ποιείν. Aut persuasendo contendere te oportere. WOLF. πείθειν, placare oratione, ita ut docens quomodo res habeat; meliora docere. STALL.

Eic πόλ. ἀγνα τροφησομένον. Steph. in marg. ad bellum ubi vulnera sis accepturus.

"Η πείθειν αὐτὴν ἃ τὸ δίκ. πεθ."

Plane docere earum, quomodo justum sese naturam habeat, i. e. plane docere naturam justi. Fisch. The infin. πείθειν is used as if the verbal ποιητέον preceded. had been resolved into ποιείν εἰ. Matthiae Gr. s. 447. 2. Cf. Gorg. p. 492. D. τάς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φιλῶν κολαστίων, εἰ μέλει τῆς οἷον εἰ ἰναι, ἐνεπι δὲ αὐ- τὰς ὡς μεγίστας πληρόσθαι ἄλλοθι γε ποθὲν ἐπιμάζειν: where Heindorf, “Suppleendum δέν, quod latebat in illo κολαστίων.”

"Η Πτολ. τὴν πατρίδα." Cie. ad Fam. i. ep. ix. 44. “Id enim jubei idem ille Plato, quem ego vehementer autorem sequor: Tantum contendere in republica quantum probare tuis civibus possis: vim neque parenti neque patriae afferce oportere."
§ 13. Τι ἔκοσιαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδή ἂν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ὑπῆ τὰ ἐν τῇ πολεί πραγματα καὶ ὡς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἢμεῖς, ἐξείναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπείναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὕδεις ἢμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμπόδον ἐστὶν οὖν ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τις βούληται ἢμῶν εἰς ἀποκινάν ἰέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἢμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἀλλοστε τοι ἐλθὼν, ἱέναι ἐκείσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἐχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. οὐ άν ἢμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὅρων ὃν τρόπον ἢμεῖς τας τε δικας δικάξομεν καὶ τάλλα την πόλιν διοικόμεν, ἦδη φαμέν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἐργῷ ἢμῖν, ἀ ἂν ἢμεῖς κελεύσωμεν, πυκνεσεις τάντα, καὶ τον μὴ πειδόμενον τριχὴ φαμέν ἄδικείν, ὅτι τε γεννηταις οὐδεν ἢμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσω, καὶ

nathetika, when those who were twenty years old were introduced at a public meeting of the εὐρήται, and entered in the register called ληξιαρχικῶν γραμματείων, in which were inserted the names of all persons of that borough, who were of age to succeed to the λῆξις, or inheritance of their fathers. This was called εἰς ἀνέθρις ἐγγράφεσθαι, or ὑκίς, εἰς αὐθ. as supra. The persons so enrolled were thenceforward at their own disposal, and not subject to the control of guardians. Cf. Lysias, adv. Timarch. p. 26. ed. Bremi. ἤπειρον ἐν ἐγγραφῇ εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματείον, καὶ τοῦτον νόμους εἰς νόμος τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἦδη οὕνηνται οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖα τῇ καλῇ καὶ τῷ μῆ, οὐκ ἢτις ἐτίρω ἑδονεῖ τα (ὑ νομοθέτης) v. Demosth. in Midiam. c. 43. Ulp. Boccch. de Epeheb. Attic. in lib.—Τῷ Βουλομένῳ—Αρβόντι. Cf. Sophocl. Electa, 470. Bremck. ἀπεισί μει θράσοι, ἄνθρωποις ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων, Lysias Epitaph. p. 28. ἀξιών γὰρ παῖς ἀνθρώπως—μηνύοντες.

Eis ἀποκινάν ἰέναι.] i.e. To emigrate into a Grecian, and that an Athenian colony; metekoin,—into a foreign country, Grecian or barbarian; para-pnéveis, to continue to abide at Athens. Fiscn.

Ὡμολ. ἐργῷ.] Has virtually agreed.
ὅτι ὀμολογήσας ἡ μὴ πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμισ, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἠμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύομεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δεινῶν θάτερα, ἡ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

§. 14. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σὲ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ταῖς αὐτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰ περ ποιῆσεις ἡ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἡκίστα Ἀθηναῖων σὲ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι διὰ τῇ δῆ; ὡσ ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτουστο, λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὀμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτῃ τῆς ὀμολογίας. φαίει γὰρ ἃν ὅτι Ω Σῶκρατες, μεγάλα ἠμῶν τούτων τεκμήρια ἔστων, ὅτι σοὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκουμεν καὶ ἡ πόλει' οὐ γὰρ ἐν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμησις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτε ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς

'Ομολογήσας — πείθεσθαι.] Cf. c. 11. ἐν. ὀμολογοῖς — πολιτεύεσθαι.

Οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.] Intell. that we are acting unjustly, implied in εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, seq.—Προτιθέντων ἠμῶν, &c. h. c. Quam nos et postea tiam faciamus corum, qua publice iubeatur cognoscendorum atque indicandorum, necque immuni se divertite quemquam cogamus, ut faciat quae fieri velimus,نمو nero concedamus, ut aut doreat meliora, aut, si hoc non poteritis, nobis parent, tamen iste neutrum horum facti. STALL.

The laws are said here προτιθέναι, in allusion to the proposing of a law in public, written upon a white tablet, and suspended at the statues of the ἐπώνυμοι, for due consideration, and subsequent approval or rejection on the part of the people, upon the former of which it became either a νόμος, a general and perpetual law, or a ψήφισμα, which was limited to particular places and times, but the obligation of both was the same.

Τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.] Ficinus appears to have read ποιεῖς; but the text is correct. BUTFM.

§. 14. Ἐνέξεσθαι.] Would become liable: whence ἐνόχος, tenis; ὄβνοιεσ.—Ἐπινοεῖς,—ἐπινοεῖν and ἐπίνοα, are generally taken in a bad sense as expressive of evil or mischievous contrivance.

Ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. ] Intell. ἐνεχομον. See Matth. Gr. 290. 3.

Καθάπτουστο.] Kathaptoe, He—

sych. interpr. ὀλοκροτεούσα, ὄνυνιεαν, πραβεον. Homer uses it in this sense, as also in the opposite one, to soothe, to parify. Cf. Iliad. 6, 582. Odys. β', 39. 540. κ', 70. Plato uses it as supr. in conformity with the delicacy of the Attic writers, who generally adopted such equivocal terms as might temper their severity in rebuke with the mildness they should have otherwise implied.

Ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.] Ἐπὶ is often put after verbs of motion with substantives which do not denote a place, but an action which is the end of one's going, &c. as Herod. i. 37. ἤτα ἐπὶ οὖραν, and supr. Matth. Gr. 586. c. θεωρία means here the Olympic, Nemean, Isthmian, and Pythian games, for which see Robinson's Grec. Antiq. book iii. c. 21. 22. 23. 24.
πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, οτι μη ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, οὔτε ἀλ-λοστε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μη ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἀλ-λην ἐποίησο ἀποδημίαιν πῶπτοτε ὅς περ ὃι ἂλλοι ἀνθρώποι, οὔτε ἐπιθαμία ἀλλης πόλεως οὔτε ἂλ-λων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἵκανοι ἢμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις οὕτω σφόδρα ἦμας ἢρον, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς καθ’ ἠμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι τα τε ἄλλα καὶ παίδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησο, ὃς ἄρεσκοῦσθη σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἐτε τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξήν σοι φυγής τιμήσασθαί, εἰ ἠβούλου, καὶ ὃ περ νῦν ἁκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σοὶ δὲ τό-τε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὅς οὐκ ἂγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθ-νάναι σε, ἄλλ’ ἢρον, ὃς ἐφησα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θά-νατον’ νῦν δὲ οὐτ’ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει οὔτε ἠμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει ἐπιχειρήμα τι διαφθείραι, πρώτεις τε ὃ περ ἢν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ἐξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ’ ὃς ἠμῖν ἐξενθέον πολιτεύεσθαι. πρώτον μὲν οὖν ἠμῖν τοῦτ’ αὐτο ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἄληθὴ λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὁμολογήκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ’ ἠμᾶς ἔργο ἄλλ’ οὐ λόγο, ὃ οὐκ ἄληθῃ. Τί

"Ο τι μη ἀπαξ.\[ Excerpt once. See Matthiae Gr. 624. 3. b. Seag. Viger. c. viii. 10. 5. \]
"Εἰ μη ποι στρατευσόμενος.\[ See Apol. Socr. c. 17. init. \]
"Οδο ἄλλωμει να εἰδέναι.\[ h. e. οὔτε εἰδέναι αὐτούς. See Matthiae Gr. 630. h. \]
"Ὡμολογεῖς - πολιτεύεσθαι.\[ Stallbaum makes the corrections proposed by Stephens, here, πολιτεύεσθαι, infr. ἐξενθέον πολιτεύεσθαι, and ὁμολογη-κέαν πολιτεύεσθαι, as c. 13, extr. ὁμολογήσατο - πείσαθαι, the futures for the present, by supposing the case of a citizen who was binding himself, by an oath, to conform to the laws of his state, and contrasting the effect of the two constructions, in either of which he might acknowledge his submission: η μην ὁμολογω κατὰ τοῦς νόμους πολι-
tεύεσθαι; or η μην ὁμολ. κατὰ τοῦς νόμ. πολιτεύεσθαι; the latter of which he justly prefers as the more emphatic; the restraint of the law being felt simultaneously with the consent to abide by it. There remains no difficulty then in applying a rule which so holds good in the oratio recta to the oratio obli-
qua, as in the text supr. and similar pas-
sages. \]
"Ἐξήν σοι φυγής τιμήσῃ.\[ See Apol. Socr. c. 25. \]
"Ἐκαλλωπίζου.\[ Properly, to beauti-
fy or embellish; thence to assume airs of pride or affectation, to vaunt one’s self. For ἐκτάναι, which is present in sense, but past in form, see Apol. Socr. c. 17. extr. \]
"Ἀ πεξ.\[ Euseb. ὁ περ, adopted also by Ficinus; v. Lat. Interpr. \]
"Συνέθου.\[ You covenanted. \]
"Ας δὴ εκάστοτε φης εὐνοεῖ;" Cf. Aleib. Prim. c. 35, ΣΩΚ. Ἐξ ὧν ξυπνήσεις σοφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμοτητα ἀπολέσει καὶ εἰκοσάν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνεύριαν καὶ καρπείαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ πειθωρίας τὰς Δακειαμονίων, παύει ἂν ἡμῖνας σαυτὸν πάσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. In Minos. c. 17. a. med. ΣΩΚ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἑώρα καὶ ἐλεημοναὶ ἔκαθον καὶ παλαιοτάτος Κρίτης οἱ Μῦροι καὶ Ρα- 

dεμανθοῦσα πολιτεία νόμος χρῆσθαι; ΕΤ. Φαινονται. ΣΩΚ. Οὔτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιών ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγονότις, νομεῖς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὡς περὶ καὶ Ἐρμῆς ἐγη ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τῶν ἡγαθῶν στρατηγῶν.

Οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνατίμησαν. Pollux. ii. 61. Ἀνατίμησος οὖ ἐστὶν ὁ πάν τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένος. Schol. min. ad Ilid. β', 599. Πηρὸς καλεῖται ὁ κατὰ τι μέρος 


Οἱ νόμοι ἐγῆλον ὅτι. i. e. So particularly with you beyond the rest of Athenians, did both the state find favour, and ourselves, the laws to wit; for to whom could a state without laws recommend itself? Buttmann, in explan. ἐγῆλον ὅτι καὶ ήμεῖς οἱ νόμοι ἤρεσκομεν σοι; whence the effect of τίνι γὰρ ἂν, κ. τ. λ., is considerably increased.— Stephens would reject οἱ νομοὶ ἤρεσκομεν τοις, a gloss; it is plain in the case of either explanation as supr., which are both equally admissible, that much of the spirit and force of the passage depends on the phrase being retained.

Ἔναν ἠμᾶς γε πείθης.] The laws answer themselves: But you will remain (ἄλλοι ἐμμεῖνες underst.) if you obey us, Socrates, and will not become contemptible by departing from the state.
τηδείους τούς σαυτού. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσι γέ
σοι οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι
τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν αὐτίκαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δῆλον
αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πο-
λεων ἐλθῆς, ἡ Ὀῆβαζε ἡ Μέγαράδε,—ἐνυπομονηταί γὰρ
ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἡξεις, ὢ Σῶκρατες, τῇ τούτων
πολιτείᾳ, καὶ όσοι περί κηδούται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων,
ὑποβλέψανταί σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων,
καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικαιούχοις τὴν δόξαν, ὡστε δοκεῖν
ὁρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι: ὅς τις γὰρ νόμων διαφθο-
ρεύσ ἐστι, σφόδρα ποὺ δόξειν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοη-
των ἄνθρωπων διαφθορεύς εἰναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει
τάς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν τοὺς
κοσμωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἥξειν σοι ζην
ἐσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτως καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις
dialegόμενοις—τίνας λόγους, ὢ Σῶκρατες; ἡ οὐς
περ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ύπερτη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστων
ἀξίων τοῖς ἄνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι:
καὶ οὐκ οὐε ἀσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Ἵωκρά-
tους πράγμα; οὐδερθα γε χρῆ. Ἄλλα ἐκ μὲν τούτων
τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἡξεις ἃς εἰς Ἐθέταλλαι παρὰ
tους ἐξουσίας τοὺς Κρῖτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐν δικαιότη-
ταξία καὶ ἀκολογία, καὶ ὅσος ἂν ἠδέως σου ἀκού-
οιει, ὡς γελοῖος ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκε
σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενον ἡ διψαρέαν λαβὼν ἡ

§. 15. "Ἡ Ὀῆβαζε ἡ Μέγαράδε."
Cf. in Phaedon. c. 47. a med. πᾶλαι ἄν
tοιτά τα νεώρα καὶ τὰ ὡστὰ ἢ περὶ
Μέγαρα ἡ Βωιστῆς ἢν.

Τοῦτος ὑποβλέψοντας, ἦν ὑποβλέπονος,
Hesych. ὑποβλέπονος, ὑποβλέποντας:
to look upon one with anger or suspicion.
V. Cousin: tout bon
citoyen t'y regarderait en ceil de défiance.

Τοῦς κοσμωτάτους. Κόσμοι.—
Fisch. interp. qui vitam, mores, studia
diligenter dirigent et complanunt ad leg-
atum normam: modesti, probl.

"Ἄξιον γὰρ τοῖς ζησίματος;"
Cf. in P hardship. c. 9. extr. ὥς μὴ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιοῦ-
tων μηδὲ μετίχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζησίμον.

"Ἡ οὖς πέρ ἐνθάδε." See Matthæus
Gr. s. 619.

Τα νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι.] Usages
and laws.

"Ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολογία." Steph. in
marg. maxima licentia est et pelautania.
The luxury, licentiousness, and intem-
perance of the Thessalians have been
recorded by several of the ancient writ-
ers. Athenæus, pp. 137. 418. 527. 663.
Xen. Mem. i. c. 2. 24. &c.

Σκευήν τε τίνα.] Σκευή, Hesych.
Śuíil. interp. στόλη. Phavorin: Σκευή.
The image contains a page of text in Greek with some English annotations. The text appears to be a scholarly discussion, possibly on a passage from a classical text, such as Euripides or Schleiermacher, with references to other scholars like Fries, Leibniz, and others. The text is written in a formal, academic style, likely discussing philosophical or literary themes.

The text includes references to other works, such as "suggested readings" in Latin and Greek, and mentions of authors like Aristotle, Scholus, and Leibniz. The page seems to be part of a larger work, possibly a textbook or a collection of essays on classical literature and philosophy.

Given the nature of the text, it likely requires a detailed knowledge of Greek and Latin to fully understand its content. The annotations suggest that this is a page from a study or lecture, possibly from a university or a scholarly society.
ta i ka paideusontai, mi ἐξουντος σοι αυτωις; οι γαρ ἐπιτήδειοι οι σοι ἐπιμελησονται αυτωις; πότερον ἐαν μὲν εις Θεταλίαν ἀποδημήσης, ἐπιμελησονται ἐδε δε εις "Αιδου ἀποδημήσης, ουχι ἐπιμελησονται, ει περ γε τι ὀφελος αυτων ἐστι των σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων ειναι; ολεσθαι γε χρή.

§ 16. 'Αλλ', ο Σώκρατες, πειθόμενοι ἢμιν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσαντι μήτε παιᾶς περὶ πλείονος ποιδιω μήτε το ζην μήτε ἀλλο μιθεν πρό τοι δικαιῶν, ἵνα εἰς "Αιδον ἐλθὼν ἔχεις τάντα πάντα ἀπολογησασθαι τοῖς εκεὶ ἄρχονσον' οὔτε γαρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται τάντα πράττοντι ἁμεινόν εἰναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν σοῦ οὖν οὔδενι, οὔτε ἐκείστι ἀφικομένῳ ἁμεινὸν ἐσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένον ἀπει, ἐὰν ἀπίς, οὐχ ὑπ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων εάν δε ἔξελθος οὗτοι αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ἕυνθικας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτως οὔ ἡκιστὰ ἐδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανώμεν ἐσώτερον καὶ ἐκεὶ οἱ ἀξιότεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ εῦν "Αιδον νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἄ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

§ 17. Ταῦτα, ὅ φιλε ἐταΐρε Κρίτων, εὕ ἴσθι ὅτι

Med. c. 3. Matth. Gr. 496. 8. Steph. in marg. An hoc quidem non facies, sed, si hic (Athenis) dicentur, te superstite, nelius educabant et instituierant, te cum illis non versante? tui enim necessari illorum curam gerent.

Πότερον εἶναι.] Ficinus appears to have read πότερον ἐι τόν, approved by Fischer, rejected by Buttmann, as impairing the effect of the asyndeton, caused by omitting the adversative particle, as surp.

§ 16. Πρό τοῦ ἑκατόν.] Cf. c. 9. a med. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ.

ὁμίτε γαρ ἐνθάδε.] For neither in this life, σ. Ταύτα πράττοντι, sc. pursuing the course proposed by Crito. ἁμεινὸν οὖν; a common form for ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: See Matth. Gr. s. 457. p. 757. Cf. in Phaedon. 63. extr.; whence by a kind of attraction οὐδὲ ἀκαίρετον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, seq.

'Αλλὰ νῦν μὲν.] Sc; now that he had declined to adopt the counsel of Crito.

'Αδελφοί.] The Greek writers elegantly applied the terms ἀδελφοί and ἀδελφά to things which were the same or similar in character and kind.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] C. 11. surp. a med.
§ 17. Κορυβαντιώντες. The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, used to disturb, with the clash of cymbals, and especially with flutes, the reason of those who took part in their frantic orgies, and so rendered them insensible to every other impression except the sound of the instrumentis; whence κορυβασταίνων, Tim. Plat. Lex. παρεμ-μαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικός κινεῖ-θαι. The term was properly applied to those who were troubled with delirium, noises in the ears, and broken rest, for which the most efficient cure was in rocking the patient like a child, and soothing him with music to sleep: so Plat. de Legg. vii. p. 628. D. V. Lucret. ii. 617. "Τυμπάνα τεντα τονταν πάλμοι, et cymbala circum Concava, ranciosa-que minantur cornua canto, et Pitygio stimulat numero cava tibia menteis, Te- laque præportant violenti signa furoris, Ingratos animos, atque impia pectora vulgi Conterrere metu que possint nun- mine Diva:"


'Αλλὰ ἵσθι—μάτην ἐρεῖς.] Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 5. ἐν μενοι ἵσθε, πᾶσαν ἤμιν τῆν ἀληθείαν ἐρώ; ibid. c. 17. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ἐν ἱστε.

Καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη.] Under the direction of the Deity Socrates expresses his purpose of adhering to the principle of which Crito is finally induced to approve. The grand point in the dialogue, the moral obligation imposed upon every citizen to submit under all circumstances to the laws of the state, is argued by the philosopher with a zeal and distinctness, which show sufficiently how deeply his thoughts were engaged, and his feelings were interested, upon a subject of such moment to his country and himself.—To his country, because a government could not be supposed to be otherwise than indifferently administered, whose laws it would be possible for one with impunity to evade; and to himself, because there could be no more effective refutation of the falsehoods of his adversaries, than his persisting, on the forfeit of his life, to uphold by the sanction of example, the respect and reverence due to those laws, whose restraint he was said to contemn. Through a long and arduous life, their friend and instructor as the advocate of virtue at home, and their no less competent champion and model of valour in the field, Socrates made the civil and military glory of the Athenians the object of his indefatigable exertions. It was not then to be otherwise expected than that the voice of his country should have been obeyed at the last, and that the existence which had long been devoted to the improvement, and often exposed for the safety of Athens, should have been willingly and obediently resigned when its services had ceased to be felt, and when an implicit submission at the present could not fail to furnish a triumphant and irrefragable proof of the upright sincerity that had ever influenced the past.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ.
ARGUMENT.

This dialogue, like the former, was held in the prison in which Socrates was confined. The last hours of his life were devoted to the discussion of the momentous subject, the immortality of the soul; Phædo, with whose name the dialogue is inscribed, is introduced as the historian of the scene and the arguments of the respective actors.

The first part of the dialogue is occupied in establishing the incorruptibility of the intellectual principle, and its total independence of organic decay.

The second contains a review of the popular and mythological creeds, respecting the ultimate condition of the soul when removed from the sphere of its earthly existence, and concludes with a circumstantial account of the philosopher's death.
§. 1. Αὐτός, ὁ Παίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ὕμερᾳ ἤ τὸ φύρμακον ἐπειν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἱκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἂττα ἐπειν ὁ ἀνήρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἄν ἰκουσαμιν.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.] Entitled also, Φαίδων, ἡ περὶ Ψυχῆς, 'Ἠθικός, on the authority of Θρασύλλους, Diog. Laert. iii. 58. Αὐτὸς ὁ Φαίδων—Hermogenes, περὶ μιθ. Δειν. i. p. 518, remarks upon the singular force of αὐτός in the question and reply: καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι.—Ἀβ-τός, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένου; Αὐτὸς ὁ Ἐχέκρατες. 'Ο μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο περινομενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν. Wyttenbach.

Phædo, of Elis, was a disciple of Socrates; he was nobly descended, but having lost his property in early life, he was sold at Athens as a slave. Socrates, in passing the house where he lived, was struck with his intelligent and ingenuous look, and persuaded one of his friends, Aleibiades or Crito, to redeem him. Thenceforward Phædo applied himself diligently to the study of moral philology, under Socrates, and adhered to his master, with the most affectionate attachment, to the last. He instituted a school at Elis, after the Socratic model, which was continued by Platamneus, an Elean, and afterwards by Menedemus, of Eretria. —Echeocrates, of Phlius, a town of Achaia, in the territory of Sikyon, is supposed to have been the same alluded to by Diogenes Laertius, viii. 46. and Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. i. 35. Plat. Epist. ix. p. 726. A., as one of the last of the Pythagorean School.

καὶ γὰρ, οὕτω τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὖνεὶς πάντες τιε ἐπιχωρίαξι τὰ νῦν Ἀθηναῖς, οὐ τέ τις ἔνοις ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὡς της ἀν ἡμῖν σαφὲς τι ἀγγείλαι οἶος τ’ ἡν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν ἐπικραμακοῦ πιὸν ἀποθάνοι τοῖν δὲ ἅλλων οὐδέν εἶχε φράξειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρὰ ἐπιθέσεθε ὁ τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναὶ, τάστα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡγείλε τις, καὶ ἐθαναμάξομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶν ὑστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανῶν. τί οὖν ἡν τοῦτο, ὃ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, συνεβη ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεράθῃ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμενίη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναιοὶ περιποιοῦν

θέντα καὶ πραγμέντα. Τί ας προλεγόντα, with ἐπιτι προλεγόντα, is sometimes accompanied by the subject in the neuter plural. Matthew Gr. s. 488. 7.

Ἐπιγραμματεύεται — Ἀθηναῖοι. Phaedo is supposed to be the Echecrates, at Phlius, the circumstances connected with the death of Socrates, of which little was known beyond the event having actually occurred, owing to the infrequent intercourse between the Phaliotes and Athenians. See Mitford’s Greece, c. xxy. s. 4. p. 108.


"Οστίς τι ἡν νῦ — οὐδεὶς τ’ ἦν. Οἶος τ’ θ. Edd. Cod. Aug. But the imperfect is correctly used here, both in reference to ἀφίκτα, preceding, which is to be taken in a past sense, because of χρόνου συχνοῦ subjoined, and also to ἔπιχε seq. HEIND. Cf. Aristoph. Lysistr. 109. Ὡς εἰδον οὖδ' ὁλίσθον ὁκτοακτίλων, ὡς ἦν ἡμῖν κεκυρία τικομιαία. — Ἰπίμην ὅτι ἀπεθα
νοι, except that he was dead, &c.

Περὶ τες ἔκκες.] Not περὶ τῆν ἔκκεν, as insfr. c. 2. περὶ αὐτόν τὸν θανατον, but in the genitive, as Fischer


Τύχη τις — ἔτυχε γὰρ.] An agreeable paronomasia, referring to the event to its cause. Cf. Achil. Sat. i. p. 55. (speaking of the Phelix,) ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ τίνι συμβαλὶ τὸν ὅλιν ἀναπεριφρόστα τὸ κάλλος. Upon the force of συνεβη, which implies a combination of circumstances, Plutarch, having quoted the passage as supr. observes: Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τὸν ΣΥΝΕΒΗ οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ ΓΕΡΟΝΕΝ ἀκοστοῖο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συγγρημὸς τινος αὐτῶν ἀπείθη, ἀλλὸν πρὸς ἀλλο γεγονότος. Simpl. ad Aristot. Phys. ii. p. 79. B. καὶ Πλάτων ὁ ἄν ᾧ τῆς τῇ τύχης καλεῖ, λέγον ἐν Φαίδων, Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, συνεβη ἀντὶ τοῦ ἁπλῆς τῷ αὐτῷ συνεβη — ὙΩΤΤ. Τύχη προτεράθῃ.] Thom. Mag. and Phavor. Προτεράθῃ, ἐπὶ τάξεως προ-
EX. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τούτο έστι το πλοῖον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ὧν Ὁθεσέως ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὶς ἐπτα ἐκείνους ὕχετο ἄγων καὶ ἐσωστε το καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τοῦ οὖν Ἀπόλλων εὐξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖν, ἐκάστου έτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δήλου ἠν δὴ ἀεί καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐνιαύτον τῷ θεῷ πέμποντων. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρξώνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτῶς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτο καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναν, πρὶν ἀν εἰς Δήλου τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύρου τούτο δὲ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτῶς. ἠρχῇ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς
terma iē, ēti múνηs όμέραs. Plátwn iī τῷ Φαίδωνες ἐτυχε γάρ τῷ πρωτοραίῳ τῆς οἰκῆς.

Τούτῳ ἦστι τὸ πλοῖον.] Minos, king of Crete, to avenge the death of his son Androgeos, besieged Athens, and withdrew his forces only on condition that seven virgins, and so many boys [ἡδέως ἐπτα καὶ παρθένους τοπαίτας. Plutarch, Thes. p. 6. παρθένους ἐπτα καὶ παιδίως ἱσών. Pausan. i. 27. extr.] should be sent every ninth year to Crete, to be devoured by the Minotaur; δὲ επτὰ ic. supr. The second time of paying this tribute, Theseus was included in the number to be so sacrificed, but he succeeded in killing the Minotaur, and preserving himself and his companions. Cf. Virgil En. vi. 20. In commemoration of this event, and pursuant to their vow, as supr. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλων, &c., the Athenians sent every year a solemn deputation, θεωρία, to Delos. The individuals who composed it were called θεωροὶ καὶ ἔλλασται, their principal, ἀρχιθεωρος, and the vessel in which they sailed, θεωρίας καὶ ἐλλάς. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. iii. c. 9. and Mitford's Greece, i. c. 1. s. 3. p. 60. Θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν.] Schol. ad h. 1. ἀντὶ τοῦ θυσίαν ἄπνευκεῖν. Θεωροὶ δὲ εἰσίν οἱ περιπόμενοι θύσατε καὶ θεραπεύσαται τῶν θεῶν ὅθεν καὶ αἱ ὅδει ἐκ οὗ ἐπορεύοντο, θεωρίες κέλευθος ἐκαλοῦντα, καὶ τὰ εἰδήμενα θεωρεῖκα, καὶ ή ναίς ή εἰς Δήλου πεμπόμενη θεωρίς, καὶ ὁ ἑρείπω θεωρός. There was another Δήλα, a quinquennial festival, held to commemorate the purification of Delos by Pisistratus; for which see Thucyd. iii. 101. See also Potter, Grec. Antiq. i. p. 438.

'Αἰε καὶ νῦν ἔτε.'] Plutarch. Thes. p. 10. C. τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ὧν μετὰ τῶν ἤθεως ἐπέλευσαν καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τῇ τριακοστῷ, ἀνυ τῶν Δημητρίων τοῦ Φαληρῶς χρόνων ἐφεβελπιστόν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι. The materials of the vessel were hence called ἄειςώντα, Callim. Hym. in Bell., but, in reality, it had undergone so many repairs and alterations, that it might have been reasonably doubted whether it was the same ship, in consequence of which it afforded the sophists an opportunity for a zealous discussion on the subject of its identity. See a parallel case quoted by Brown, Philos. Lect. xii.

'Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀρξώνται.] The priest of Apollo decorated the poop of the vessel with garlands of laurel, as a signal for the commencement of the voyage, and the purification of the city.—Ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, during the celebration of the Δήλα.

'Ἀνεμοί ἀπολαβόντες αὐτῶς.] Ἄ-πολαβόντες is used sometimes of contrary winds which intercept and de-
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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

θεωρίασ ἐπειδὰν ὁ ιερεύς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου τοῦτο δ' ἑτυχεν, ὡς περ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πο-
λὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει εἰς τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

§. 2. EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ο Ἡθίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες
οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἄνδρί; ἢ οὐκ
εἰς οἱ ἄρχοντες παρείναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολ-

λοί γε.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα

ημῖν ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σου ἁσχολία τυγχάνει

ὁδὲ.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω τε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν
dιηγήσασθαι καὶ γαρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ

αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλον ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάν-

των ἠδίστον.

EX. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ο Ηθίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσμέ-
nους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἄν

δύνη ἀκριβέστατα διελθεῖν πάντα.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν έγγυε ταμάσιά ἐπαθῶν παραγενόμενον. οὔτε γάρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἄνδρός ἐπιτηδεῖον ἔλεος εἰσῆι' εὐδαιμόνιον γαρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὧ' Ἐχέκρατε, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεώς καὶ γενναίως ἑτελεύτα, ὦστ' ἐμοὶ ἐκείνων παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἀιδον ἴόντα ἀνεν θείας μοίρας ἵναι, ἀλλὰ κάκεισε ἀφικόμενον εἰ πράξειν, εἰ πέρ τις πώποτε καὶ άλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνω μοι

miliarly affected with yourself; so Hein- dorf; At vetro eliama qui le auditturi sint, simulier affectos habes; who compares de Republ. vi. p. 498. G. άνενα άρετῆ παραπομόνων καὶ δομωμένων μέχρι τοῦ ἑνιαυτοῦ ἀνίκου, ἐργά τε καὶ λόγῳ εὐσανεστῶτα εἰ πόλει ἐτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πώποτε ἐσφάλμαι. Lach. p. 200. Δ. αιτῶν ἀντί ἐφαμίλην ἀνθρώπων περὶ οὐδέν ἐκείνως αλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπέρα τοιούτου φανερώατα, &c. Plut. c. 15. γεγο- νὼς καὶ πέμπω τό ἄπο, ἐτέρων εἰ το- οότου ἓρως. Cf. infr. c. 29. a med. τοιούτων τόπων ἐπέραν.

Παράδοτα με — εἰσέχεις] Εἰσέναι καὶ εἰσφρέσθαι, like the Latin sabor, are used to express the affection of the mind by the passions of hope, joy, sorrow, compassion, &c. Eurip. Med. 931. εἰ- σηλθέ μ' οίκτος. Iphig. Aul. 491. μ' ἑλεος εἰσήλθη. v. Valckemar. ad Phae- niss. 1375. p. 464. sq. This construct- ion is varied infr. οὐδέν πάνω μοι έλεες- τών εἰσίει; verbs compounded with prepositions which never govern a da- tive, sometimes taking the dative, when they express such a direction to an ob- ject, as εἰσφρέσθαι τίνα. Matthwus Gr. s. 402. c.

Τῶν λόγων.] Aug. Int. τοῦ λόγου, adopted by Ficinus; but the former is the more correct. Cf infr. καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιούτων τίνες ἤσσαν, καὶ ἐξε- τίνες, φίλως, ἤσσαν οἱ λόγοι.

Ὡς αὖτως.] For ὅτι οὖτως άδεως. Cf. Criron. c. 1. Ὡς ήθελος, n.—Γεν- ναίος; Xen. Apol. 33. ἐπεδείκητο εἰ τῆς ψυχῆς την ρώμην—οὔτε πρός τὸν θάνατον ἐμαλακεῖσαν, άλλ' ἁλά- ρως, καὶ προσδείκητο αὐτόν, καὶ ἐπε- τέλεσατο.—Παρίστασθαι is frequently used by itself, in reference to the thoughts which arise from present cir- cumstances. Hemsterhuis. ad Lucian. Contempl. c. 13. Taylor. ad Lysian ed. Reiske, p. 85. It is found, too, with ἔδεικνυτο σοὶ τὸ σοῦ, as Lys. in Eratosth. p. 421. καὶ μικρίνει τούτο παραστή, ὡσ—Οὐ- ραμένους κατηγοροῦ; and without any such addition as in the text, and Thu- cyd. vi. 68, καὶ παραστήτων παντί, τὸ μὲν καταφροσύνην, &c.

Εἰς "Αίων.] See infr. c. 29. a med. εἰς "Αἰών ὡς ἄλθης, Socrates, in Cratyl. ec. 44. 45. p. 45. 46., argues against the common acceptance of "Αἰ- ονθ', and its attendant prejudices. ΣΩΚ. Καὶ τὸ γε οὖνομα ὁ "Αίων, ὡς Ἐρμό- γενεσ, πολλοῖς εἰπ' απὸ τοῦ αἰώνος ἐπωμοιάζεται ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τα καλά εἰσίναι, ἀπὸ τοῦ- τον ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου "Αἰώνος ἐκλή- θη—οὖντω καλῶς τίνας, ὡς εοίκειν, ἐκπιστατεῖ λόγων λέγειν ὁ "Αίων, καὶ ἐστὶν ὡς γε ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου ὁ θεός οὖντος τέλεος σοφιστής τε καὶ μέγας ευφεργείτως τῶν παρ αὐτῷ, ὡς γε καὶ τοὺς ἐνδέκεισα τοιαύτα ἀγάθα ἀνίσαν σου τοῦλα ἀνηρτά τὰ περι- ὑντα ἐκεῖ ἵστη, καὶ τῶν Πλούτωνα ἀπὸ τούτον ἐσχε τὸ ὅνουμα: whence he infers that the names of the just should be unwilling to return again to earth. Opposed to this ἄγενος φωτεινός, or habituation of the good, after death, was the ἄγενος σκοτεινός ov σωφρόνος, the abode of the impious. Orpheus is said to have introduced this fragment first, from Egypt into Greece. See infr. c. 13. sub. fin. εἰσί γάρ ἐφις ο. ι. π. τ. τ. "Ανεν θείας μοίρας.] Sine consilio et voluntate deorum qui ei consenserent. STALL., because of ἄλλα κάκεισα ἀφ. εἰ πράξειν seq. Cf. Plutarch. ι. p. 499. B. ἀπολύσκομα σοὶ ἀιτῶν
'Ελευθερίαν εἰσήγη, ὡς εἰκόνος ἂν δόξειν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἢδονή ὡς εὖ φιλοσοφία ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὡς περ εἰσώθηκεν καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἢσαν ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπότον τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀλήθεις κράσις ἀπό τε τῆς ἢδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὀμοῦ καὶ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἐμελλε τελευτάν, καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχέδον τι οὗτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶτες, ἐνίοτε δὲ διακρύουντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφέροντως, 'Απολλόδορος' οἴσθα γὰρ ποιὸν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΦΑΙΔ. 'Εκεῖνος τε τοῖνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἴχε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἠγγόγε ἐστεραφᾶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. 'Ετυχόν δε, ὁ Φαίδων τίνες, παραγενομένοι;

[Σωκράτης]' ἵμαρακίζων οἱ ζῶντες, ως οὖν ἐν ἀξίου θείας ἀνέν μοῦρα ἐπομένου.

Παράντε πένθει. To one present at a sorrowful scene: παρόντεs depending on εἰκός and governing πένθει, in the dat. Heindorf understands μοι to παρόντες, but this would require τὴν πένθει. The application of the passage is general; the composure of Socrates was such, that Phædo felt none of that commiseration which it was natural for any one to indulge who was witness to any similar affliction.

'Ὡς εὖ φιλοσοφία ἡμῶν ὄντων.] i. e. As when we were engaged in our philosophical studies.—ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εἶναι, in philosophia versari, cadem occupari, quattuor de locis philosophicis. KORNER. Cf. Sophocl. Εδ. Τυχ. 570. τότ' οὖν οὐ μάντις ἦν ἐν τῷ τέχνῃ; Xenoph. Συγγ. ιον. iv. 3. 23. οἱ μὲν οἳ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἦσαν. Maxim. Τυχ. p. 396. i. ed. Lips. τοῖς οἳ εὖ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ πανῦ ἂν τις μηρόφαι.—STALL.

Τοιοῦτοι τινες.] i. e. Partaking of the character of their previous and customary discussions.

'Ατοπον.] See in Crit. c. 2. extr. Κράσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἢδος.] See infr. c. 3. Ὡς ἀτοπον. Cf. Liban. Epist. 1xiii. κράσις ἕχε μὲ τῆς ἢδονῆς καὶ τούτων οὖν.

'Ωτε μὲν γελ. ἐνίοτε εἶ δακ.] These participles are added in explanation of οὕτως preceded. otherwise the construction should be οὐτῶς διακείμεθα: οὐτε μὲν ἠγγόγε, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐσκρυμένον. [as Lys. p. 779. ἔμεις ἐν ὀυτῳ διετήθητε τοὺς μὲν φείγοντας κατεδείσατε, &c.] Compare with the text as supr. Sophocl. Εδ. Τυχ. 10. τίνι τρόφῳ καθίστατε; Δείσαντες, ἡ στήριξάντες; Xenoph. Anab. iv. 1. 4. τὴν ἑι---ιμμοίνην ὦτε ποιοῦντα, ἀμα μὲν λαθείν παρείμουνον ἁμα ἐνθάδε, &c. LEHEID.

'Απολλοδόρος.] A zealous and attached friend of Socrates; ἐπιθυμητὴς ἡγουμένος αὐτοῦ. Xen. Αροπολ. c. 28. He was morose in temper, and gloomy in disposition, whence in Sympos. c. 2. ΕΤΑΙ. Αἰι ὡμοίοι εἰ, ὥ 'Απολλοδώρων οἱ γάρ σαντον τε κακουργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις, καὶ ὅσοι μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλούς ἥγεται πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαντον ἀρίστεως, καὶ ὁποῖοι ποτὲ ταύτην τιν ἐπανημιάν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικιὸν [καίην ἐν λυῳδάν. ΑΣΤ. Διδιεύθυνα, οὐκ οὔτε ἐγώγε ἐν μὲν γάρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰττο μοῦ τοὺς εἰ σαντῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις αγριαινίας πλὴν Σωκράτους and possessed of but little strength of mind: see infr. c. 66. a med. Ellan. V. H. i. 16. mentions, as an instance of his
simplicity, his having brought with him into the prison a tuanic and splendid cloak, in which Socrates was to be dressed before his death.

Kai Κρίτσοβουλος. Crito, who gave name to the preceding dialogue, had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus. Laert. ii. 121. But the Hermogenes mentioned supr. appears to have been the son of Hippocrates, and brother of Callias. Cratyl. c. 2. ΣΩ. 'Ω πατί Πναρικεύον, Ερμόγνεως, &c. and Epigenes to have been the same as in Apolog. Socr. c. 22. a med. the son of Antiphon. Of Eschines, Diog. Laertius writes, iii. 37. Αύτων δὲ (Δισ-χίνου) Πλάτων οὔσοριθί τῶν ἑαυτῷ συγγραμμάτων μνήμην πεποίησα, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ περὶ ψευχῆς, καὶ Απο- λογίας. c. 22. He had lived in great poverty for many years at Athens, as an attached disciple and friend of Socrates, when he resolved to visit the court of Dionysius, who was, or affected to be, a patron of philosophers. He was introduced by Aristippus, and liberally rewarded for his Socratic dialogues.—He remained in Sicily until the expulsion of the tyrant, and then returned to Athens, where he gave instructions in philosophy, for payment, in private, as he could not publicly compete with Plato or Aristippus. He then, to enlarge his means, took up oratory, and appeared as the rival of Demosthenes. Antisthenes was born at Athens, about the ninetieth Olympiad, and served, in his youth, with considerable distinction, particularly at the battle of Tanagra. He first directed his attention to rhetoric, in which he was instructed by the sophist Gorgias; but abandoned a pursuit so unsatisfactory, for the more important study of moral and intellectual philosophy. He became a disciple of Socrates, and, in imitation of his master, sacrificed everything to the attainment of virtue. After the death of Socrates, while Plato and the rest of his disciples were forming schools, Antisthenes selected for him a place of public exercise without the city, near the Lyceum, called Κυνόσαργος, the temple of the white or swift dog; which, when Diomus was sacrificing to Hercules, seized upon part of the victim, whence the name of the place. Some writers derive from hence the name of the sect Κυνωνικος, which Antisthenes founded here, others, and the more numerous, ascribe their title to the surname of their master, Κυνων, which he obtained in consequence of the harshness and severity of his censures upon the manners of the age.—Ctesippus; Euthydem. c. 5. νεανίσκος τις Παιανιές. μᾶλα καλός τε κάγαθος την φόσιν ώσιν μὲν, ψευδιτής δὲ εἰκά τὸ νόος εἰναι. Cf. Lysid. p. 206, 207. seq.—Menexenus, son of Demophon, was born of a noble family, and applied himself, early in life, to the study of philosophy. He was a follower of Ctesippus, whence they are mentioned together here, as in Lysid. locc. cit. One of the dialogues of Plato, on the subject of the Athenians who died for their country in battle, is inscribed with his name, Μενεξενος, ἡ ἐπιτάφιος, ἡθικός. Πλάτων — ἡθενεί. Forster conjectures that Plato would have it inferred from hence, that his illness was occasioned by his grief for the impending death of his valued master. Athenaeus, having recounted the several arguments in proof of the misunderstanding which was said to have existed between Plato and Xenophon, brings forward, in further confirmation, the passage in the text, where the name of the latter is omitted in the enumeration of those who had assembled to pay the last tribute of affection and respect to their venerable instructor and friend;
EX. Είνοι δέ των παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Συμμίας τέ γε ὁ ὘θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνθης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Ἑυκλείδης τέ καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δαί; Ἄριστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

l. xi. c. 15. p. 505. Καν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Πλάτων καταλεγόμενος ἵκαστὸν τῶν παρατυχόντων οὐσία κατὰ μικρόν τοῦ Ξενοφόρτος μίμηται. Neither indeed could Plato have made any mention of Xenophon, who had departed into Asia a year before the death of Socrates; εἰς προτέρῳ ἐτεί τῆς Σωκράτους τελευτής. Lact. ii. 55.—Whence it is not likely that it ever occurred to Plato to explain the cause of his absence, and with regard to any jealousy which was reported to have existed between them, Xenophon was too far beneath his contemporary to have ever been considered in the light of a rival. Heind. So V. Cousin: "Je ne crois pas inutile de répéter ce n'est aucunement par envie que Platon ne parle pas ici de Xénophon, ou qu'il ne remarque pas qu'il était absens pour une cause sérieuse. Il ne dit pas que Xénophon était alors à la guerre, parce que c'était une chose assez connue de son temps, et qu'il ne pouvait soupçonner qu'on lui ferait, cinq siècles plus tard (Athènèe, liv. xi. 15), l'accusation de jalouse contre Xénophon. Heindorf est le premier qui se soit élevé contre la prétendue inimitié de ces deux grands hommes. Ils différaient sans doute; mais supposer qu'ils aient écrit pour se décliner, ou pour se distinguer l'un de l'autre, comme on l'a dit souvent, c'est une pérfidité dont il n'existe aucune preuve.

Συμμίας τέ—καὶ Κέβης.] Disciples of Philolaus, inf. c. 5. a med. a native of Crotona, who lived subsequently in He- raclea. He was a disciple of Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher of Ta- rentum, and cotemporary with Plato, to whom he sold the written records of the Pythagorean system, contrary to the express oath of the society, that they would keep secret the mysteries of their sect. It is probable that among these books were the writings of Timæus, the Loerian, one of the Italic school, upon which Plato formed the dialogue which bears his name. Philolaus having interfered in civil affairs, felt a sacrifice subsequently to political jealousy. Enfield, Philosophy, B. ii. c. 12. s. 2. Phaedon- des, also a Theban v. Rhunk. ad Xe- noph. Mem. i. 2. 48.—Enéides of Meg- gara, founder of the Megarian sect, called the Eristic, from its contentsion charac- ter, devoted himself to the study of philo- sophy in early life, and removed from Megara to Athens, for the purpose of joining the disciples of Socrates. He dispensed Socrates by engaging in fo- rensic disputes, to which he was led by an immorrate passion for controversy, and returned to Megara, where he be- came the head of a school, in which his chief occupation was to teach the art of disputation. He is not to be confounded with the mathematician, who flourished at a later period under Ptolomy Lagus, and died in the 123rd Olympiad. Enf. Phil. ii. c. 6. Of Terpsion nothing is known, further than that he is one of the speakers in Plato's dialogue, entitled Theaetus. Aristippus was the well- known founder of the Cyrenian sect, which was so called from his native city, Cyrene, in Africa. It is not clear whe- ther Cleombrotus, mentioned supra., was the native of Ambracia, of the same name, who furnished the subject for the celebrated epigram of Callimachus, to the effect that Cleombrotus of Ambracia, having paid his last respects to the sun, threw himself headlong from the top of a tower, not that he had done anything worthy of death, but had only read Plato's treatise on the immortality of the soul, and courted, by self-destruc- tion, the death which he felt convinced to be the passage to a happier life. Cal- lim. Epigr. xxiv. Tuscul. i. 34. Some suppose that he was not the one alluded
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ου δήτα έν Αιγίνη γάρ έλεγοντο είναι.
EX. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;
ΦΑΙΔ. Σχηδον τι οίμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
EX. Τί οὖν δή; τίνες, φής, ήσαν οί λόγοι;
§. 3. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἕγω σοι εἴς ἀρχής πάντα πειράσμαι διηγήσασθαι. αεὶ γὰρ δή καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰσώθειμεν φοιτῶν καὶ ἐγώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἐώσθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ὧδε καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο πλησίον γαρ ἂν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. Περιεμένοι οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἐώς ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρίβομετε μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀνεφεύγουτο γὰρ οὐ πρώτ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε προώιάτερον ἔξεγεζαμεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἄφιγμένον εἰς παραγγειλαμεν ὁν ἀλλήλως ἥκειν ὡς προώιατα εἰς τὸ εἰσώθος. καὶ ἡκο-

to in the text, but there is nothing clearly known of any other friend of Socrates of this name.

Ἐν Αἰγίνῃ.] It is conjectured, with great probability, that Plato intends covertly to rebuke Aristippus and Clesbrotus for their neglect of Socrates, in remaining to indulge their luxurious and effeminate habits at Αἴγινα, from which they might have sailed with ease to Athens, a distance of but two or three and twenty miles: Diog. Laert. iii. 36. εἰάς ἐν ἐφθασίᾳ οἱ Πλάτων καὶ πρὸς 'Αριστεράποτον ἐν γούν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ειωδὸλλον αὐτὸν ψηφιν, οτί οὐ παρεγένετο Σωκράτης τελευτῶν, αλλ᾽ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὑν καὶ σκέψεις, Athenaeus, xii. p. 541. D. διέτριβε δὲ ἑκ 'Αριστεράποτος τοῖς πολλαῖς ἐν Αἰγίνῃ τρυφῶν. Aristippus Annoyed Socrates by his passion for dress and extravagant habits, and offended his friends by the freedom of his manners, so much so, that he withdrew from Athens to the island of Αἴγινα, and there met with the celebrated Lais, whom he brought on with him to Corinth. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 99. Ep. i. 17. 23.

Σ. 3. "Εσχήμων.] Said. and Phavor. i. q. Πρώθεν, h. e. diluculo, prima aurora, sub aurora, ante lucem. Fiscu.

"Εσχήμων ἀνοιχθεῖ.] If an action has been frequently repeated in times past, ἦν has the opt. without ἄν. Mathiace Gr. s. 522. 1.

Διατρίβομετε μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων.] i. e. διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; as e. 65. infr. init.—Ἀνεβαφνυντο; the Attic form of the common impf. ἤνοιγετο.—Mathiace Gr. s. 168. Obs. 1.

"Ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἀνοιχθεῖ.] The optative is put with the particles ἐπεί, ἐπειδή, ὅτε, ὥσπερ, when the discourse is concerning a past action, which, however, was not limited to a precise point of time, but was repeated by several persons, or in several places; so supr. περιεμένοι οὖν εκάστοτε, ἦς ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ ἐσμέν εἰς ἀνοιχθεῖ εἰς ἀνοιχθεῖ παρὰ τὸν Σ. Mathiace Gr. s. 521.

μεν, καὶ ἢμιν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὃς περ εἰσέθη ὑπα-κούειν, εἴπε περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἢν ἄν αὐτός κελεύσῃ. Λύουσι γὰρ, ἐφή, οἱ ἐνδεκα Σω-κράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇ δι τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνου ἐπισχων ἥκε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἢμᾶς εἰσίναι. Εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμ-βάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένου, τὴν δὲ Σαινθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἰδέν ἢμᾶς ἡ Σαιν-θίππη, ἀνευφήμησε τε καὶ τοιῶν ἄττα ἐπεν, οἶα δὴ

περὶ τι αναλίσκει. Ηεγυχ. Διμηρεύ-οντες πᾶσαν πιονιάντες τὴν ἡμέ-ραν.

'Ὑπαικοῖεν.] Respondere et aperire.

Ὡττ.: Cf. Crit. c. 1.

Περιμένειν.] So the best editions read, instead of ἐπιμένειν, which sig-
ifies, to be patient, to wait the conse-
quence of anything; but περιμένειν, generally, to await, in one place, the ar-
tival of some one, or to look for the ap-
pearance of something. Whence the more frequent use of the latter in an absolute sense, whereas the former is more commonly joined with ἢν ἃν, and has certain derivatives which περι-
μένειν could not form. Wolf ad. h. l. Beck. Lectt. Phil. p. 89. supr. περι-
μένομεν οὖν. Infr. c. 65. ἢμᾶς δὲ ἐκ-
λέντες περιμένειν. Sympos. init. οὖ περι-
μένειτι; κἀγὼ ἐπίσταν περιμένεια.—

ΣΤΑΛ. 

Λύουσι.] See Crit. c. 1.

"Οπος ἂν—τελευτῆσῃ. Ὁπος ἂν is used with the conjunctive of the pre-
sent, when referring to a continued ac-
tion. Protag. c. 43. σωφροσύνης τις ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπος ἂν οἱ γεώς μη-
δὲν κακοφυγῶσι: and with the conjunc-
tive of the aorist in reference to an ac-
tion which is concluded at once, Plat.

Gorg. 167. Τοῦτο ἢμιν οὖν καὶ ἐν ἐπι-
τα τῷ Πρωμήθει, ὅπος ἂν παίς ἄι-
το αὐτοῖς. ΗΕΙΝ. v. Matthiae Gr. s. 518.

Οὐ πολὺν—χρόνον ἐπισχων.] i. e. af-
fer no long delay. For ἐκέλευτον, many editions read ἐκέλευς, in conse-
quence of ἢκε imp. prec. but this con-
nection of the aorist with the imperfect is not infrequent; Parmenid. p. 127.

Δ. ανεγερόμει τῇ μὲ ἐκ τῆς προτί-
ρας ἐπιμεθείοις καὶ ἡπατότε, καὶ—τὸ τι καὶ πρώτον ὁκεν, — ἐπίστα μίντοι ἐγείρετο. Philod. p. 228. B. ἢνον μὲν ἤλθαμ ἕσθεν ὅτι ἔοι ἐν τούς συγκοινωνι-
πιῶντα, καὶ προαγάν ἐκέλευν. Dif-
ferent tenses may be connected, as supr.
when two or more actions are to be considered as distinct in their character and intent. ΣΤΑΛ. 

Εἰσελθόντες.] Vulg. εἰσιώντες.—

ΗΕΙΝ.

Τῇ δὲ Σαινθίππην.] It is highly probable that the failings of Xanthippe have been greatly exaggerated. Socra-
tes, in a dialogue with his son, Lam-
procles, Xen. Mem. i. ii., gives her credit for many domestic virtues; nor are these so completely inconsistent with the evidences which she, no doubt, occasionally afforded of an intractable temper. The child, παιδίον, alluded to in the text, must have been either Sophronicus or Menexenus: infr. c. 65. σμικροῖ. Apol. Socr. 23. παιδία, for Lamprocles, the eldest son of Socrates, was now grown up; infr. c. 65. με-
γας. Apol. Socr. 23. μειράκον.—

Xen. Memor. ii. 2. i. ναιανίσκος. Plato,

Xenophon, and Seneca appear to have
known of one only of the wives of Socra-
tes, Xanthippe, and nothing of the other,

Myrto,—αἱ ὀικίαι γυναικῶν, infr. c. 65. referring to his female relations and kinswomen. ΨΙΣ."
eiōðhastin aí γυναῖκες, ὅτι Ὡ Σώκρατες, ὅστατον δὴ σὲ προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τοῦτος. Καὶ ὁ Σώκρατης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, Ὡ Κρίτων, ἐφη, ἀπαγαγότως τις ταύτην οὐκαδε. Καὶ ἐκεῖνως μὲν ἀπῆγον τινας τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν τε καὶ κοπτομένην ὁ δὲ Σώκρατης ἀνακαθίζομενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην συνεκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐτρψε τῇ χείρι, καὶ τρίβων ἀμα Ὡς ἀτοπον, ἐφη, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἕοικε τι εἶναι τούτο δὲ καλουσίν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἤδι' ὡς βαμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἑαυτῶν εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἀμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγινεσθαι τὸ ἄνθρωπόν, εὖν δὲ τῆς διώκη τὸ ἐτέρον καὶ λαμβάνη, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζονται ἵνα λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἐτέρον, ὡς περ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δ' ὄντῃ. Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόσεν αὐτὰ Αἰσιωτῶς, μὴθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλαξεῖ πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὕκ ἦδινατο, ἐξυπηρεῖν εἰς ταύτων αὐτῶν τὰς κορυφᾶς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὃ ἄν τὸ ἐτέρον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἐτε-
§ 4. 'Ο οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νητὶ τοῦ Δία, οἵ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, εύ γ’ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοῦ τῶν ποιημάτων ὄν πεποίηκας, ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπον λόγους καὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς με ἦδη ἦροντο, ἀτάρ καὶ Εὐνύνος πρῶθην, ὁ τί ποτε διανοθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεδορ ἥλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδέν πόσποτε ποιῆσας. Εἰ


Εὔ γ’ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με.] If the participle denotes an action coinciding in time with that of the finite verb, and completed along with it, the participle is in the same tense, especially with λανθάνειν and φθάνειν. Matthiae Gr. s. 559. c.

Ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπον λόγους.] Ἐντείνας, sc. εἰς ἔπος, s. εἰς μέτρον. HENx. In carminis medium ligants, in versus redigens, Ἀσοπι fabulcs. WYTT. Augustin. de Consens. Evang. i. 12. Opp. t. iii. pt. ii. p. 5. D. “Socrates autem, quem rursus in activa (virtute) qua mores informantur omnes praetulit, uta ut testimonio quoque dei sui Apollinis omnium suplenissimum pronuntiatum esse non taceant, Ἀσοπι fabulas pauculis versibus perecutus est, verba et numeros suos adhibens rebus alterius. Usque adeo nihil scribere voluit; ut hoc se connecti imperio sui daemonis fecisse dixisset; sicut nobilissimis discipulorum ejus Plato commemorat: in quo tamen opere maluit alienas quam suas exornare sententias.”

Bentley. In his dissertation on the fables of Ἀσοπ, appears to deny that they were extant in the time of Socrates, which, however, is affirmed, with greater probability, by Tyrwhitt, Dissert. de Bahr. From which it is not to be concluded that Socrates had a copy in the prison, but merely that he retained some of the fables in his recollection. Diogenes Laertius, ii. 41. mentions the beginning of a fable by Socrates himself: ἐποίησε εὖ καὶ μῦθον Ἀισώπεων υἱὸν τῶν ἰπετε- 

τινέων, οὐ ἢ ἀρχή. Ἄισωπος τοῦ γ’ ἄλλης Ἐφεσίου ἡμίουνι σοῦ, ἴδε 

Τ. οἴνον ὑπολαβὼν καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀλληλοκαλοῦν τὸ ῥήμαν. 

Τὸ εἰς τῶν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον.] A Reen, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 41. καὶ ἐθεῖς—καὶ παιάνα κατὰ τινς ἐποίησαν, εὔ ἢ ἀρχή, Δήλη Ἀπόλλων χαίρε καὶ Ἀρσεμί, παιίς κλείσαν. Diog. Chrys. Or. xii. 507. C. Ὀκράτης—καὶ παιάνα ἐποίησεν τίς τῶν Ἀπόλλων καὶ τίνη Ἀρσεμί. Epictet. Dissert. iv. 4. 590. καὶ πῶς αν ἦν ἢ Ὀκράτης, ἅν ταύτη ὕδρατον; πῶς αν ἦν τί λυκαίη παιάνας ἐφαγεν—

Προοίμιον seems to be peculiar to hymns in honor of Apollo, whence Thucydides iii. 101. ὑμιλέει εἰ μᾶλλα ὁμήρου ὃτι ταύτα ἢν, καὶ τῖς ἐποίησε τοῖς, ᾧ ἐστιν εἰς προοίμιον Ἀπόλλωνος. Diog. Laert. vili. 57. mentions a προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα by Empedocles. Pausan. x. 8. 517. Ἀλκαίος ἐν προοιμίῳ την εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα. Plutarch, de Musica, p. 1132. D. 1133. i. commends the προοιμία, or preludes, of Terpander, where the term is used by itself, without reference to a d Eλλ. WYTT. Ἀτάρ καὶ.] Frequently answers to καὶ in a collateral proposition in the sense of καὶ-ἐκ. Matthiae Gr. s. 621. Εὐ- 

φόρος; See Apol. Socr. c. 4. ἀνάρ Ἡμᾶς—Ο τί ποτε ἐπανοθείς; see Apol. S. 26. ὧ τι μαθαύν. Ἐποίησας 

αὐτά: παιίν, to compose, is used simply in reference to poets. Apol. Socr. c. 7. Euthyphron, c. 13. λέγω τὸ ἐπαν 

τίνος ἢ ὁ ποιητής ἐποίησεν, ὁ ποιη 

σας, κ. τ. Λ.
οὐν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἕχειν ἐμὲ Εὐνήρῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρηται, εὐ ὀδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρώτεται, εἰπε τί χρή με λέγειν. Δέγε τοίνυν, ἐφή, αὐτῷ, ὁ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὕδε τοῖς ποιῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα: ήδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ μέδιον ἐφή ἀλλ᾽ ἐνυπνίων τισῶν ἀποτελεσμένοις τέ λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενοι εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μούσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιαῦτα πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνίων ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτε ἐν ἀλλῇ ὡς φαινόμενοι, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, Ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἐφή, μούσικῆς ποίει καὶ ἐργάζον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὃ περ ἐπιτράπτων, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡς περ

'Ἀντίτεχνος.] A rival or competitor. V. Cousin. Son vinal. The term is emphatic in the text, as ἀντίτεχνος is properly applied to poets who contend upon the stage, with their productions, for a prize. Casaub. ad Athen. vi. 7. p. 413. Ficinus gives two interpretations for the word, the former of which, besides being unnecessary, is incorrect.—Fisc.  

Καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος.] Acquitting my conscience; Socrates having feared to provoke the anger of the deity by neglecting his will as conveyed through the medium of dreams. 

Εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις.] If so perchance. Cf. Lach. p. 179. B. ei δ᾽ ἄρα πολλάκις μι προσεχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ. p. 191. B. ei δ᾽ ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτῇ ἢ κατέρρησιν ἵσταν ἀνεδαιμον. Ἀποτελεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡς περ

"Ἀττα τοιαῦτα." Τις is often put with adjectives of quality, quantity, magnitude, especially when these stand alone, without a substantive, or in the predicate. "Ἀττα and άττα, particularly, are thus used, which are rarely found by themselves without an adjective.—Matthiae Gr. s. 487. 4.  

"Ἀλλοτρὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὑπερ." i.e. At various times in a varied form, but its burden was the same, &c.  

Μουσικῆς ποίει καὶ ἐγώ ἄγων.] Musi-
HAATONOS

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οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὁ περ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μονσικῆς οὐκ ἠπείδη ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑστὶν διεκόλυνε με ἀποθνησκεῖν, ἐδοξεῖ χρῆμα, εἰ ἀρα πολλάκις μοι προστάται τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημόδη μονσικῆς ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθήσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν ἀσφα-

taraliquem, ut aliquid faciat; ἐπικελεύειν, incitare faciunt. Fisci. There is a peculiar force in the repetition of the same verb, differently compounded. Cf. Cic. Fin. v. 2. "Te autem hortamur omnes currentem quietem."

Τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μονσικῆς ποιεῖν.

1 q. τοῦτο λέγειν ἐπικελεύειν μονσικῆς ποιεῖν. HEIND. A conciseness of expression familiar to Plato.

Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕτως μεγ. μουσ.]

1 c. Since, indeed, philosophy is the highest exercise of the art. Learning or discipline, in general, piacelia, is frequently designated by the term μονσικῆς, of which the origin and use, in its present sense, are developed, with great beauty and clearness, in the following passage in Lachet. p. 118. C. ὅταν—ἀκούω ἀνδρός περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐιδαγμένων ἡ περὶ τίνος σοφίας, ὥς ἀλήθως ὅντος ἀνδρός καὶ ἄξιον τῶν λόγων ἐλέγει, χάριν ὑπερφώς, θεομένου ἢ μᾶς τὸ λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λέγομα ὅτι πρόσοντα ἀλήθεις καὶ ἀρμόδια ἢ ἡνίκα καὶ κομιδή μοι ὁκεύ μοι μακρὸς ὁ ποιότος εἶναι ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡμοσμίνος. οὐ λύραν οὔτε παῖεις ὦρανα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὄντι ζῆν ἡμοσμίνον [οὗ] αὐτὸς αὐτό τοῦ τῶν βίων σύμφωνον τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὰ ἴση τὰ ἴση διωρίστι ἀλλού οὐκ ἢ θαυμάζειν ἢ ἐλεύθερον,

1 Gorg. c. 83. καὶ τοῦ ἐγὼ ψίθημα, ὦ ὁ ἔβλεπτο, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν καὶ χορὸν ψυχρογοηίν, καὶ πλείστοις αὐθέντοις ἢ ἐποιεῖνοι μοι ἄλλοι ἐνεπείτο λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἴνα ὑπεντρέψοι ἢν ἰμάντα ἄφθονον ἢναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. The writings of Plato abound with similar allusions; virtue in general he compares ἀρμονία τινι καὶ συμφωνία de Rep. iv. p. 130. F. And wisdom he calls τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην τῶν συμφωνίῶν. Legg. iii. p. 689, D. whence Sextus Empir. adv. Mus. p. 333, οἱ τε μέγα ἐννημερεῖς ἐν φιλοσοφία, καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων, τὸν σοφὸν ὁμοίον σαίνει εἶναι τῷ μονσικῷ, τῷ ἴσῃ ἡμοσμίνῃ ἔρχοντα. For this, amongst other things, Plato was evidently indebted to the Italic school. The harmony which Pythagoras asserted to be the necessary result of the systematic movements of the celestial bodies, is in like manner affirmed, by Plato, to proceed from the attuning of the soul to wisdom and virtue, the due regulation and control of the feelings and affections, which are to be kept in unison with the voice of conscience; that no jarring passion may interfere to destroy that perfect concord in the character of the good, which depends upon the due adjustment and direction of their desires and hopes.

Η τοῦ θεοῦ ἴσην, Supr. c. 1. νὸμος ἀκίνητον—μὴ σπάνια ἀποκτείνων. Δημοκρίτη μονσική;] i.e. Popular poetry, as opp. to the monsikē of the philosophers, which had been always the study of Socrates, and towards which he now required no new impulse from the deity. V. Cousin explains the passage correctly; Mais depuis ma condamnation et pendant l'intervalle que me laissait la fête de Dieu, je pensais que si par hasard c'était
λέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπίεναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιῆσαντα ποιῆματα, πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνῷ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεόν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἃν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία: μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοοῦσα ὅτι τὸν ποιήτην δέοι, εἰ περ μέλλει ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἂν μυθολογίκος, διὰ ταῦτα δή, οὐς προχειρῶς ἤχοι καὶ ἡπιστάμνη μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τοῦτον ἐποίησα οἰς πρῶτοις ἐνέτυχον.

§. 5. Ταῦτα οὖν ὁ Κέβης, Ἐὐνυφις φράζε, καὶ ἐρώτῳς καὶ ἄν σωφρονῇ ἔμε διώκειν. ἀπεμι δὲ, ὡς

aux beaux-arts dans le sens ordinaire que les sages m’ordonnaient de m’appliquer, il ne fallait pas leur désobéir et qu’il était plus sûr pour moi de ne quitter la vie qu’après avoir satisfait aux dieux, en composant des vers suivant l’avertissement du songe.

Poïen μύθους ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγους.

The fables of Αἴσωπ, which were called λόγοι supr. are here, and infr. entitled μύθοι. They are both used indiscriminately, like other synonyms, by the best writers, and their authors designated either as λογοσοι or μυθοσοι. But when they are intended to be opposed, as in the text, μύθος is to be understood as the fabulous department of composition in general, λόγος. Theon. et Λαμθων. in Progymnasm. μύθος ἐστι λόγος πενελής, εἰκόνιζων ἀλήθειαν, or fiction in writing, as opposed to fact. The moral of the fable, contained in the ἐπιμεθόν, is also frequently called λόγος. Wytenbach explains the whole passage: "cogitans, poetam debere, si poetas futuras esset, [et huic muneri ac nominii satisfacere vellet] fabulas componere ac non orationes [id est non vera argumenta] et me fabularum peritum et artificem non esse: propteræa fabularum Αἴσωποι, que mihi in promptu [et memoria] erant, quoque seecham, harum eas, in quo primum inciderem, versibus conscripsi. V. Cousin: ensuite faisaient réflexion qu’un poète, pour être vraiment poète, ne doit pas composer des discours en vers, mais inventer des fictions, &c.—Λόγος οὐκ ἢ, τὴν, the indicative instead of the opt. which might seem to be required here, because Socrates passes from the obliqua to the oratio recta, by which the spirit and force of the passage are increased.

Μυθολογίας.] Plutarch, de Aud. Poet. autóς μὲν (Socrates) ἔτη ἐν γεγονός ἐλήματα ἅγιοντες τῶν ἑπιτάτα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἢν οὐδὲ ἐθνομένος εἰμπορός.

Τούτων ἐποίησα. | h. c. versibus significat, in carmine mundos reddit. Cf. Herodot. ii. c. 53. ὅτι οἱ [Homer and He- siod] ή εἰς οἱ ποιῆσαντες θεογονίαν "Ελληστα. i. e. hi vero sunt, qui deque generationes Graecia carmine praide- runt. V. Wesseling in loc. cit. Pauper. iii. 25. p. 275. ἐποίησαν ἐν Ἑλληνικιννινεις, ὡς Ἰορκλής ἀναγάγων ταύτη τοῦ "Αἰεών τοῦ κυρία.—Grecorum nominilli versibus pridderunt, &c.—Wytt.


Ἐμὲ ἑώκειν.] Some editions read ἢώκειν ὡς τάχιστα; rejected by Hein- dorf, as Socrates is not speaking of a voluntary death, but the θανάτον μείλιθη, which he subsequently explains as peculiar to philosophers. Stallbaurn admits ὡς τάχιστα, on the grounds that Socrates might recommend Evenus to follow him as soon as possible, without inciting him to self-destruction, which it is evident he did not intend, but merely to advise him against a too strong attachment to the world. This reading would K
appear to be further borne out by the Socratic epistle, as supr.—ίναι βάπτων, &c.

Οἱ οἴνον παρακελεύειν] h. e. οἴνον ἐστι τοῦτο, ὁ παρακ. By means of the demonstrative pronoun, propositions, the first of which contains the verb εἰμί, and the second the relative pronoun, are contracted into one. Matthiae Gr. s. 472.

4. From this passage, which is so constructed as to be expressed of surprise in the speaker, and the context, it may be concluded that Evenus was not notorious for the soundness of his philosophy in this particular.


Σχέδιον οὐν ἐξ ὧν. ] Sc. εκ τοῦτων ὡν; when the word to which the relative refers is a demonstrative pronoun, the pronoun is generally omitted, and the relative takes its case. Matthiae Gr. s. 473. b. and s. 574.

'Οπωσιτοιν σοι.] Ἀλ. ὀπωσιτοιν ἄν σοι, upon which see Apol. Socr. c. 17. ἦδεν ἄν ύμων—παρεθρόνησατι.—'Εκὼν εἶναι. The infinitive εἶναι, especially with ἐκών, is often redundant in Attic authors. See Apol. Socr. c. 27. init.

Τούτων τοῦ πράγματος.] Intell. φιλοσοφίας.


λοσοφεῖ ὁ Εὐνόμος, ἠθέλησε ἀποθνήσκειν, ἵνα μὴ δοξῇ διὰ τούτων παρεγγυών ἤμιν τῷ εὐκοπήν δανίατον, φυλήν, ὡς οὐ μέντοι ἱσως βιάσεται αὐτόν οὐ γὰρ φασι θεμετον εἶναι. Καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τῆν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἡδὴ τὰ λουπὰ διελέγετο.

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"Ἡρετο οὖν αὐτῶν ὁ Κέβης, Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὃς Ὁκρατεῖς, τὸ μὴ θεμιτῶν εἶναι εαυτὸν βιῶσει, ἐθέλειν δ᾽ ἄν τῷ ἀποθυμοῦντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπειθαι; Τί δαί, ὃ Κέβης; οὐκ ἦκηκόατε σὺ τε καὶ Συμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων Φιλολάω συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὃ Οκρατεῖς. Ἄλλα μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω: ὃ μὴν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοας, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἵππος καὶ μέλιστα πρέπει μέλλουτα ἐκείσε ἁποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν

Φιλολάω συγγεγονότες. [A. Boeckh, in lib. Philol. des Pythag. Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines werkes Berol. 1819. has settled the age of Philolaus to have been nearly from the seventeenth to the ninety-fifth Olympiad. Plutarch mentions that he was one of those who escaped from the house which was burned by Gylon, at Crotona, during the life of Pythagoras, but this cannot be correct, as the latter died, according to the chronicon of Eusebius, in the third year of the sixty-eighth Olympiad. It is probable that Philolaus was a hearer of Lyssis, who, with Archippus, escaped the conflagration of the Pythagorean school at Crotona, upon which the latter withdrew to his native city, Tarentum, and the former to Thebes, where it is to be supposed that Philolaus met Simmias and Cebes. Cf. Schol. in loc. ἦλθεν οὖν (Philolaus) καὶ ἐς Ὀμήξας πθένετι τῷ εἰσακόλω Ἀσίας χάνοις ποιήσασθαι ἐκείσε τεθαμμένου. This is the most likely account that can be collected from testimonies which are at variance, in some degree, with each other. V. Jamблич. Vit. Pythag. cc. 104. 199. 248. 250. Bentley, Dissert. de Ætate Pythag. p. 49. Plutarch. de Genio Socratis. p. 583. A. Porphyry. Vit. Pythag. s. 54. Οὐδὲν—σαφές.] Schol. ἐι αἰνιγμάτων εἰλείπονε, καθάπερ ἡν ἠθε τοῖς Πυθαγορίως. Philolaus treated the doctrine of nature with great sublety, but at the same time with great obscurity; referring all things existing to mathematical principles. He taught, that reason, improved by mathematical learning, is alone capable of judging concerning the nature of things; that the whole world consists of infinite and finite; that number subsists by itself, and is the chain by which its power sustains the eternal frame of things; that the Monad is not the sole principle of all things, but that the Binary, or Duad, is necessary to furnish materials from which all subsequent numbers may be produced, &c. Hence it appears probable that Philolaus, following Timaeus, whose writings he possessed, so far departed from the Pythagorean system as to conceive two independent principles in nature, God and Matter, the Monad and Duad, and that Plato derived from the same source his doctrine on the subject. Enfield, Philos. B. ii. c. 13. "Εξ ἀκοῆς.] l. q. Ierod. iv. 16. ἀκοῇ τί λέγειν, from hearsay. Upon this assertion of Socrates', that he knew nothing of the doctrines of Philolaus, further than by repute, Boeckh, l. c. p. 23. sq. remarks, in discussing the subject: "daer mir denn jene Wendung mit dem Hörensagen gross eine mit der Platonischen Itone nur sehr wohl zusammenhängende Manier scheint, durch welche die etwas geringschatige Behandlung des gottlichen Mannes etwas verhüllt werden soll." [It seems, therefore, to me, that that allusion to the hearsay hardly agrees in manner with the usual style of Platonic irony, through which the half-contemptuous expression of the god-like man should be somewhat concealed.] Stàll. Φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν.] There is no objection to tell. Viger. c. iii. s. 12 r. 2. Καὶ γὰρ ἵππος καὶ μέλιστα.] Et enim vel maxime [καὶ μέλιστα] deest illius prosectorum disquerrere et fabulati de ps.
te καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, ποιὰν τιν’ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῦ ἀλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμοῦ χρόνῳ;

§. 6. Κατὰ τὶ οὖν δὴ ποτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτῶν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινώναι, ὁ Σῶκρατες; ἢδη γὰρ ἔγογε, ὅ περ νῦν δὲ σὺ ἡρω, καὶ Φιλολάον ἡκουσά, ὅτε παρ’ ἡμῖν δημᾶτο, ἢδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τυχῶν, ὡς οὖ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ούδενὸς πώποτε οὖδὲν ἀκήκοα. 'Αλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρη, ἐφ’ τάχα γὰρ ἄν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι. ἵσως μέντοι θαυμαστὸν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτῳ μόνον τῶν ἄλλων

regrinatione, quo illie est.—WITT.—μελλόντα, is to be understood indefinitely, of any one. 'Εκείσε ἀποδημίας, i. e. ἵνα "Δίδου ἀπίναι.—Diakopaiν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν: the former of these verbs is used in reference to a philosophical inquiry, the latter, to a speculative consideration of the subject in question.

Μέχρι ἡλίου ἐνυμῶν. ἗ς, Schol. ὡς ζήσασθαι μέλλων μέχρι ἡλίου ἐνυμῶν ἐν γὰρ ἡμῖν φοινίσθαι ἀπίστως.—Olympiod. ad. h. l. νόμος εἰ ἢν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μηῦν οὐφοντεῖν εἰν ἡμῖν. A similar law prevailed in Sparta, where the punishment of death was not inflicted in public, during the day, but in the night, in a certain part of the prison called ἐκεῖς. Valer. M. iv. 6.

§. 6. Κατὰ τὶ, κ. τ. λ.] The principle laid down here for discussion is, that the period of death should be looked forward to, but not so as to be compassed by self-destruction. For men, in this life, stand in the same relation to the gods, as servants to their masters, nor have they any right to leave it, unless the gods themselves discharge them.——Death is, therefore, to be endured with equanimity, because it is the limit which the gods assign to their protection of men here. Socrates then indulges a hope, that after death he might associate with those who, of mankind, had also lived uprightly, but asserts it as his positive belief, that he should enjoy the fellowship of the gods, t. e. best of masters. This argument implies an unfitness in the body to assist the mind in the investigation of virtue and truth, and further, a divine providence exercised in behalf of those who have made this investigation the object of their lives, who are thus ensured its attendant blessings after their bodily decease.—Κατὰ τὶ,—Steph. in marg. Quam igitur ob consam nefas esse auctum, sibi mortem consciscere? Ego enim jam pridem illum non salum a Philodam, άτε.

Αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν.] So in Latin, se ipsum. Matth. Gr. s. 408. 6.

Νῦν ἢ.] Tim. Plat. Lep. Πρὸ ὀλίγου χρόνου: just now, a little while since.

'Ισως μεντοι θαυμαστον σοι, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. Perhaps it shall, however, appear strange to you, if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true, αὐτολι, [se. that death is better than life,] and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at particular times, ὅτε, and to particular persons, οἴκε, death is better than life. But [seeing that at all times and with all persons, this principle holds good, or, according to V. Cousin, granting that there are particular individuals who prefer death to life,] it appears strange to you, perhaps, if it is irreverent for those to whom death is preferable, to benefit themselves, [by self-destruction,] but that they must await another benefactor. Cf. Simplex. In Epictet. p. 63. Ο ἐκ τοῦ Πλάτων καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀκροτητος, καὶ ἀγαθῶν αὐτὸν τὸν διάτον τὸν σώματος ἔως αὐτοφαίνε-
toujours preferable à la vie, alors il est bien étrange qu'à ces personnes, dans ces circonstances, il ne soit pas permis de se procurer elles-mênes les avantages de la mort, et qu'il leur faille attendre un bienfaiteur étranger. Socrate avait avancé qu'il ne faut pas se tuer. Quoi ! jamais ! la vie est-elle donc toujours préférable à la mort ? ce serait bien absolu et fort extraordinaire : tu n'oseras l'affirmer. Or, si la mort est quelquefois préférable à la vie, comment avancer qu'il n'est jamais permis de se tuer ? L'observation devait se présenter à l'esprit de Cebes, et il est naturel que Socrate la lui prêta, et alla au devant."

"..."

"..."
The secret or esoteric doctrine of the Pythagoreans, of which the former portion of which is stated in the text, &c. in the text, belongs to the Orphic school, cf. Tim. Plat. p. 291. &c. "Orpheus &c. Apollo, the Orphic mysteries, παντα Πυθαγορας ξεμαθην οργανισθεις εν Λυσθροις τοις Θρακικωσ., Cratyl. c. 38. Doxaiσι μεντοι μοι μάλιστα θειανοι οι άριδ Ορθακ τοῦτο τό άνυμα [τό σάμα], &c. των δικαιων εις την κυκλο, ἐπιστηρομεν οϊκον ειναι ειναι ειναι την της ψυχης τοῦτο, οὕτω αυτῷ ἀναιρεται, ευς των ικτησι τα ὀρθελμενα, τα σάμα, Forster, approved by Hesiod, understands by ἀποφήτα, mysteriis anana, the Orphic mysteries; according to others, the Eleusinian or Bacchic. But Wytenbach, in h. l. and Bosch., l. c. p. 179. sqq. explains it correctly as such. Most of the philosophical sects had their ἀποφήτα, or secret doctrines, Clem. Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 575. Λ. ωυ μόνον ἄρα οἱ Πυθαγόραι και Πλάτων τα πολλα ἀπεκφήτωσαν, ἀλλα καὶ οἱ Ἐπικουρικοι φανται και παρ' αυτώς μεταφρασαν εις καλες ημερεται ἐντυπωσαν τον τοις της γραμμας ἀλλα καὶ οἱ Στοιχειοι λέγουσι, Ζηρωνι το τροπο γεγραφηται τωι, ο μη ρατως επιτρέσαν τοις μεμφθης αναγινωσκεν μη οικη πεινοι διεικεον προτερουν εις γεμης ψυλοφοσιν λέγουσι δε και οι Ἀμπροτδους τα μεν εις πηλη εις προστορειαν. &c. in the text, &c. &c. Cf. Cicer. Somn. Scip. 3. "Nisi Deus is, cuius hoc templum est omnne quod conspicíus, ita est corpus custodis libentur, hic tibi aditus patere non potest. Quare et tibi—et pis omnibus retinentibus est animus in custodia corporis, nec in suis ejus, a quo illis est vocis datum, ex hominum vita migrandum est, nec humanum assignatun a Deo devoutissima videcamini." Tusc. i. 30. "Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injus- sua suo, nos his incipit: cum vero justam causam Deus dixerit, ut tum Socrati, sune Catoni, saepe multis, nec ille, confusus, vir sapientissimus ex his tenebris in lucem illam exspectaret: nec tamen illa vindicat carceris rupus: leges enim vetant: sed tanquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitimam, sic a Deo evocatus atque emissus exercit.

Οὗ μένιος διειν.,] The infin. active for the infin. pass. Matthaei Gr. s. 535. l. Obs.—Οὗ μένου ἀλλὰ, it is no otherwise, but, and, however. Id. s. 610. 4.—Ἐπιμελομένους. Μερις.—Ἐπιμέλους, παρακλῆτονος, Ἀττίκως, Ιπποπτωμάς, Ἑλληνίκως. Thom. Mag. Ἐπιμελομένους κάλλον ἢ ἐπιμελοῦσα. Ημᾶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις — τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.] Cf. Legg. x. p. 902. B. θεῖοι γε μην εκτίματα φανείν εἶναι πάντα ζωοί θυγιτην, ὡς ὑστέρ, και τῶν ψυχῶν ὑλων. Ibid. p. 906. Α. ἡμῖν δ' αὐτοί κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. Critias. p. 109. B. κατοικισμό- τες οὖν νομίς κτήματα καὶ ποιεῖμα καὶ θέρματα κατοικίας ἤμας ἔτρεφαν. Upon the indifferent use of θεῶς and θεοῖς, Wytenbach observes, that the latter is affirmed of the whole race of deities, under whose care, individually, mankind is placed, each mortal having a deity for his guardian. But the former is affirmed of the one supreme, who has the charge of those deities themselves, no less than of their dependents, as may be collected from the Phaedrus, Timaeus.
ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἦ σοι οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως: Ἐμοιγε, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὡς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων ἐι τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι μὴ σημάνατός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνως ἂν αὐτῶ, καὶ εἰ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖ χαὶ; Πάνω γ’, ἐφη. "Ἰσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἀλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δειν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὦς περ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.

§. 7. Ἀλλ’ εἰκός, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, τούτο γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἐοικε τοῦτο, ὃ Σωκρατεῖας, ἀτόπω, εἴ περ ὑ ’νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγος ἔχει, τὸ θεὸν τε εἶναι τὸν ἑπιμελουμένον ἥμων καὶ ἡμᾶς ἑκείνου κτῆματι εἶμαι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίστως, ἐν ἡ ἐπιστατούσων αὐτῶν οἱ περ ἄριστοι εἰς τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοὶ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ που αὐτός γε ἐαυτοῦ οἴεται ἀμεινον ἑπιμελήσεσθαι ἑλεύθερος γενομένως ἀλλ’ ἀνόητος μὲν ἀνθρωπος

Leges. x, and other of Plato's writings.—"Εἰ τοὺς κτημάτων τ. 0. a dogma, as Heindorf conjectures, of the Pythagoreans.

Τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων.] Of your slaves. Cf. Eurip. Mod. 49. Παλαιῶν ὀίκων κτήμαν, O vetus ancilla.

Μὴ σημάναντός σου.] In like manner, Epictetus expresses it as a reasonable motive for departing from life; θεοὶ σημαίνοντο τὸ ἀναληπτικόν, ως the deity sounds a retreat.

"Ὅτι βούλει.] Heindorf, would prefer βοήλευ because of the opt. ἀποκτινύοντο, χαλεπαίνοντο, &c. but a similar construction occurs in Gorg. c. 45. ὡς οὗτοι δὲ ἔχουσιν ἀναγκαίας ἀϊστερούς παῖδες περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν—λυμῳ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν αἰτητόν.

Ταῦτα.] In this light, V. Cousin. Sous ce point de vue.


HEIND. Stallbaun would omit ἂν.

§. 7. Ῥαδίως ἂν ἢθελέναι ἀποθνῄσκειν.] h. e. Indenter mori velle. STALL. Ἐοικε τοῦτο—ἀτόφη. See Matthiae Gr. s. 555. Obs. 2. Οἱ περ ἐπιστάται, θεοὶ.] Θεὸς καὶ θεοὶ are frequently used for ὁ θεὸς, οἱ θεοὶ. Scheffer. in Meletem. Crit. p. 4. Οὐκ ἔχει λόγον.] i.e. Is quite unreasonable.

Oíthetai taúta, fínektóv, k. t. l.] Putearet hoc, faciendov esse a dominis: in hac opinione eserit. Utum.—taúta est emphaticum et demonstrativum. As, inquit, c. 11. σύνεσι γὰρ αὐτῶν ταύτα εἶδει, k. t. l.

'Αγανακτήν.] Etymol. 'Αγανακτήν. ἀντί του στίγμαν, πάρα Πλάτωνι.

Πραγματεύω.] The ingenuity. H. l. operosa et arguta dialogi, sc. disputatandi ratio, qua solit esse subtilior quam verior. Körner. Olympiod. ὑπ' πραγματείαν ἰδίαν, πραγματείαν εἰκάλεσον ὁ Πλάτων ἀνοσίᾳ ὑπὲρ ἡμὰς τὸν Σιμίας ἱστόριαν, ἰδίαν μόνην ἰκάλεσε τὴν ἰδίωτην αὐτοῦ.

Ἔι τοι.—ὁ Κέβης.] Toto is emphatic here, as in Iliad. ε. 873. 'Ἄι τοι ἰγίσατα θείω τελήσης εἰρέν.

'Ο τι ἀν τις εἰπεῖν. Quodcumque ille sit qual quis dixerit. Stall. Vulg. eiπει, incorrectly, for the verb is used in reference to what Socrates had said, not what he was going to say.

Τι γὰρ ἀν βούλεμενοι, k. t. l.] For what intent, would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and heedlessly, or, for a trivial cause, depart from them; i.e. what could induce them to fly, what would they have by flying &c. as in Latin; "quid spectantes hoc fece-runt,"—ός ἄλλως being joined to ἀν-όρος σοι, as c. 9. ὁ ἄντως φιλοσοφός, c. 11. ὁ γνησίως φιλόσοφος, c. 12. ὁ φιλοσοφὸς ἡρῴς. c. 29. a med. εἰς 'Αἰνιὼν ὡς ἄλλως. Cf. Cicer. pro Milon. 30. "Proposita invidia, morte, prava, qui nihil sequius rempublicam defendit, est vir vere putandas est."

Εἰς σε τείνειν.] h. e. Te petere hac oratione, his verbis. Stall. V. Cousin. Et c'est contre toi, je pense, qu'est dirigé le raisonnement de Cébes.—Ρέγεως φήμες—ἀπολείπων. See Matthiae Gr. s. 555. i.

'Ὅς αὐτ. ὁμολ.] As you yourself admit.
§. 8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὦς, πειρατῶ πρὸς ύμᾶς πιθανότερον ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστές. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἐφί, ὦ Σμιμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ φίμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρ' θεοὺς ἄλλους σφούς τε καὶ ἄγαθος, ἐπείτα καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωπον τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τὸν ἐνδάδε, ἥδικον ἃν οὐκ ἁγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ νῦν δὲ εὑ ἵστε οτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἄφιξεται ἄγαθος,—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνιν διαχυρισαίμην ὅτι μὲντοι παρ' θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνιν ἁγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὑ ἵστε οτι, εἰ πέρ τι ἀλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων, διαχυρισαίμην ἃν καὶ τοῦτο. ὡστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἁγανακτῶ, ἄλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἰναὶ τι τοις τετελευτηκόσι καὶ ὡς πέρ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἀμείνου τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς.

§. 8. Οὐκ ἁγανακτῶν. Jacobi Olympiad. μῆ ἁγανακτῶν. But all the MSS. and best editions read as in the text, which is decidedly correct. Tr. I should have erred in not being annoyed at death, which, with μῆ ἁγαν., should be, if I were not annoyed. See Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 12. r. 11. upon the distinction between μῆ and οὖ or οὐκ: the latter denying something directly, and as a matter of fact; the former, denying only in reference to a conception or view, which has either been before expressed, or which, according to the sense, is implied in what precedes. Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 608.


Εἴ πέρ τι ἄλλο. Ἐφί πέρ τι καὶ ἄλλο. Heind.

Ὅχι ὁμοίως ἁγανακτῶ. Socrates intends to say, that feeling such an assurance of his future communion with the gods, he was not, consequently, so annoyed as if death were unaccompanied by such a trust.
The executioner, in loc. cit., which continued for three thousand years, when the soul assumed its human form again, was most probably held by some of the Egyptians, while others, it is equally probable, held that the souls of the good, having wandered for a time among the stars, were allowed to return to the society of the gods. Following the Thracians and Egyptians, from whom he derived his philosophy, Orpheus affirmed the soul to be immortal; and was the first, according to Diodorus Siculus, i. p. 56., who taught, among the Greeks, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. v. Orph. Argon. 1105. 1136.


'Ἡ ἀπολογία. ] i.e. Ea quan dixisti defenso. Heind. in reference to οἱμαί γὰρ ὡμᾶς λεγεῖν τι χρῆ, κ. τ. l. supra. c. 7. ext.

Krîtovna τῶν σκεψώμαθα. ] h. e. σκεψώματα, τί ἦσαν ο Κρίτων ὃν βουλέσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πτ. e. Upon tòν τε, see Matt. 21. 47. 20. 2.

Tì ë.—άλλο γε. ] Fully, τί εἶ ἀλλο γε ἵστι τοῦτο, ὃτι πάλαι μοι λέγει, κ. c. ὁ μέλλων σοι εὐθυνιν τὸ φάρμακον.

The efficacy of hemlock, as a poison, lies in the extreme coldness it produces, which might be counteracted by increasing the bodily heat either by exercise or warm draughts, especially of wine, when taken in time to obviate the chill and consequent check of the vital action. V. Plin. H. N. xiv. 5. xxx. 13. Cresig. Dissert de Cicut.—Μάλλον, ἕως τοῦ δεινοτοῦ: Heind.
§ 9. Кинуневоуси гара ὠσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς

...
Κυριευεντοιο.] Olympiod. ὃ ἄ-
κειος ἦσε περὶ τῶν θάνατον ἐπὶ μελε-
τήσεις, τούτους ἔκτισε. οἷον γὰρ ὄντων
τοῦτον ἐκπιστεύειν ἄποθνησκόν τινὸς
ἐπὶ θελέων ἄποθνησκέος, τῶν μὲν προαιρέμενον θάνατον καὶ τῶν χροσ-
μῶν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἐπιστεύει καὶ
ἐκλέξει τῶν ἐσσφωκτικῶν ἐπὶ μεν,
"tota enim philosophorum ista, ut ait
idem (Socrates,) commentatio mortis
est."—31. "Secernere autem a corpore
animum nec quidquid est, quam emori
discere." Senec. Ep. xxv. "egregia res est
mortem confidisse—hoc est ipsum quare
meditari deeamus." Infr. c. 12. τὸ
μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τῶν φιλο-
σόφων; λόγις καὶ χρωσμίσως ψυχῆς
ἀπὸ σώματος.
'Αποθνησκέον τε καὶ πεθαναλ.] i. e.
Mori et mortum esse; the former being
the passage to the latter. WITT. Cf.
Cic. Tuscil. i. 8. "Emori nolo: sed me
esse mortuum nihil estumno.
'Αγανακτίων ο.] 'O may be taken
here as depending upon ἐπιστεύεσθαι οὐ
ἀγανακτεῖν; the latter construction
is preferable. Cf. Demosth. de Chersones.
p. 103. καὶ τοι ἐγγύς ἀγανακτῷ καὶ
αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅ ἀνέφεξ Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ
tά μὲν χρόμματα λυπή τινας ὑμῶν,
&c. Id. adv. Conon. p. 1261. ἐγὼ εἰ—
χαλεπώς, ἐδ' οἷς τί πανθα, ἐκμυχώς
οἷς ὤντον τούτων ἀγανακτεῖσαι ἀγ,
&c. Lyasias. p. 787. ὃ ἐδ' ἄγοναι καὶ
ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ ἐπιτείχει ἢν
ἱμαῖς ἔχεις πιστεύων. HEIND. Steph.
in Thes. Ling. Græc. v. ἀγανακτεῖν;
"rarior procedentibus constructio est
in eadem Phaedonis Plat. p. 32. ubi ac-
cusativo rei jungitur." Abresch. Lect.
Arist. p. 266. understands autē
before ὅ.
'Ερασιστοι.] Schol. γελαστοί
ἐχοντα, γέλαστα ἔχοντα.
Τοῖς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν.] i. e. The
Thebans and Boeotians, who were
naturally averse to philosophy and its
περικότων Ὀμηλίος γὰρ ἢν ὁ Ἀθή
ciaς παρ' οἷς καὶ ἔτοιμα ἔγω.
Dacier reads παρὶ ἡμῖν, Atheniens
vestri; approved by Schleiermacher,
who understands an evident allusion to
the Athenians. V. Cousin reads and
refers παρὶ ἡμῖν to the Thebans, and
notes the passage: "C'est comme si Simmias
disait: Il y a des gens qui consentiraient
trouveurs,...du moins nos Thébains;
car pour les Athéniens, ils n'en sont pas
capables assurément,...Ici la restric-
tion explicite aux Thébains est une ex-
tension indirecte aux Athéniens eux-
mêmes dont un étranger devait s'abstem-
ir de parler."
Καὶ πάνυ.] In particular.—Οὐα
tῶοι: Schol. ταυτόν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Cf.
Lobeck. ad Phryncih. p. 80. sqq. For
ὁ λείψας the ordinary form should
be οὐ λείψας, but the verb is suited to
γ' ἀν λέγοιειν, ὃ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεηθ-θέναι. Λέλθησε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατώσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοι ἐίσι θανάτου καὶ οἴνον θανάτου οἱ ὄσ ἄληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. ἐπιστομεν γάρ, ἐφή, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοι· ἤγομεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γ', ἐφη ὑπολαβών ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἣ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνᾶναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτὸ καθ’ ἔαυτό τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἢ δεικνὺς ἄλλο τι ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἐφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὃ γαθεῖ, ἐὰν ἅρα καὶ σοι ἐνυδοκῇ ἡ περ καὶ ἐμοὶ· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλ-λον οἵματε ἡμᾶς εἰσεσθαί περὶ δὲν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἄνδρος εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἰδιονᾶς καλομένας τὰς τοιασδέ, οἴον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν; Ἡκιστά γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δαί; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Ὀνδαμός. Τί δαί;
'Iamatiōn dīaφērōντων.] Distin-
guished robes: in opposition to those
ordinarily worn by philosophers, which
were called, in contempt, τριζώνες or
τριζώνα. Xenoph., Memor. i. 6. 2.
calls the apparel of Socrates, ιαμάτιον
φαύλον, and Apuleius, Metam., i. p. 104.
Elemt. Scissile palliastum.—Υποέν-
μοτων: for the various species of
shoes in use among the Greeks, see
Robinson’s Grec. Antiq. B. V. e. 25.
Socrates makes an express allusion to
this part of their appointments here,
because they were particularly fastidious,
of both men and women, about this article of
dress, while the philosopher himself
%fno mi eivn apaokei περφ tuc χοιρόν
ta τη λιτοστήρα, και ἵσθητι βέρος τε
και χιμόνος τη αυτή υποήμασι
103.—τοὺς αλαζόνας. Τοὺς ψυχρόν-
tas, τοὺς ἀνυπούς τους λέγεις, "Ον
o καποδιαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαίρε-
φοι.—Τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς.—
Catera, alla, corpusis lenociina. Fisch.
Cf. Isocr. ad Demonic. p. 12. εἶναι
βούλον τα περι την ιδήτηρα ψυχόκα-
λος, ἄλλα μη καλλωπίστης—καλλω-
pistov et to periērgon.—Kαλλωπισ-
μός is generally used to designate a
culpable affectation in superfluous orna-
ment and dress.
'Αρσ οὖν.] ’Apa, frequently by it-
self denotes nóme, like the Latin ne en-
clitic. Matthiae Gr. s. 614.

"Απολύων οτι μάλιστα την ψυχήν.] This ἀπόλυων of the soul is explained,
infr. c. 12. το χωρίζειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώ-
Tusc. i. 30. "Quid—tum agimus, nisi
animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum
esse cogimus, maximeque a corpore ab-
ducimus? Secernere anteun a corpore
animum, nec quidquid aliquid est mori
"Animum cogi sibi intentatum esse, nec
avocari ad externa, omnī licet foris res-
sonent, dum intus nil tumultus sit, dum
inter se non vixentur cupiditas et timor."
Ep. 63. "Corpus hoc animi pondus ac
prena est, premente illo urgetur, in vin-
culis est; nisi accessit philosophia." So
Virgil, in allusion to the body being, as
it were, the prison of the soul, and the
faculties of the latter bemumbered by its
earthly bondage, and blinded towards the
attainment of celestial truth, Æn. vi.
733. "Hinc metuant, cupiuntque; do-
lement gaudentque: neque auras Despic-
tuent clausae tenebris et carcere caco."
Horace is supposed to have alluded to
this Platonic doctrine, speaking of Dem-
cratus, Ep. i. 12. v. 13. "dum perce-
gre est animus sine corpore velox."—
The remedy for this adulteration of the
soul by its connexion with the body, is
philosophy. The philosopher would
withdraw the heart and affections from
the perishable and deceptive objects of
present and worldly hopes and fears; 
would struggle to break the chain which
binds the ethereal and immortal to the corporeal and decaying portion of his nature, and raising himself above the mists of prejudice and vice, would make the truth his study here, and contemplate its sure fulfilment in the time to come. Hence the vulgur and illiterate, engrossed by selfish and immediate sensual pleasures, are unable to appreciate the purpose of philosophy, and reject, as an unwise and unaccountable desire for death, the doctrine that it is a passage only to a future and a better life.


'Ω—μηδε μετέχει αὐτῶν.] i.e. καὶ ὦ μη μετέχει αὐτῶν. In the second member of a sentence there must sometimes be understood a case of ὦ different from that expressed in the first Cf. Odysse. β'. 114. ἄνω χθὶ εί μην γαρ μείσθαι Τή, ὅτε ψ τε πατηρ κηλεται, καὶ ἀνδάναι αὐτῷ : i.e. καὶ ὅστιν ἀνδάναι αὐτῷ—V. Matthae Gr. s. 428. 2. Upon μηδεν and μηδε, see Matthae Gr. s. 608. 5. e. Cf. Criton. c. 15. οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῦν.

'Ἐγγὺς τι τείνει του τεθνάνας.] Propre mortuus esse, similem esse mortuo. HEINZ. τι being referred to ἐγγὺς, as in ὦν τι, πάντων τι, μετάει τί, &c. Cf. Soph. Antig. 1179. τα γὰρ ἡθο νάς ὁταν προδοσίας ἀνήκει, οὖ τί θύμι ἐγὼ ζην τῶν, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἡγούμει νέκυον.

§ 10. Ti dαι δη πεπρι αὐτήν.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 630. Ἀυτήν τήν τῆς φανόμενου κτῆσιν, πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σώμα Ἰ οὐ, ἑάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνίαν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἴον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω ἄρα ἔχει ἀληθείαν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ
Parmenides was a disciple of Xenophanes, and an equally distinguished member of the Eleatic school, the doctrines of which he put into verse.—The remaining fragments of his composition are inadequate to explain his system of philosophy, which is not much more intelligible from the dialogue which Plato has written, entitled by his name, in which the tenets of Parmenides are mingled and confounded with his own. The dogma alluded to in the text was that, probably, by which he asserted that nothing in nature is produced or destroyed, but merely seems to be so to the senses. Empedocles, of Agrigentum, in Sicily, appears to have belonged to the Italic school. He possessed some poetical talent, and is supposed by Fabricius, Bib. Gr. i. p. 466, to have been the real author of the "Golden verses of Pythagoras." He asserted that it was impossible to judge of truth by the senses, without the assistance of reason, which is, however, led by their intervention to the contemplation of real nature, and the immutable essences of things. Epicharmus, of the island of Coos, whence he was removed by his father, at an early age, to Megara, and thence to Syracuse, was a disciple of the Pythagorean school. Having been prevented, by the tyranny of Hiero, from a public profession of philosophy, he devoted himself to dramatic poetry, and offended his sect by the introduction of the doctrines and precepts of Pythagoras on the stage. He is supposed by some to have been the inventor of comedy; an honor which is by others ascribed to Susarion. v. Horat.Ep. ii. 1. 58—"Plautus ad exemplar Siculi proprerare Epicharmi." Among the poets alluded to in the text, Xenophanes is also to be reckoned, the founder of the Eleatic sect, and a native of Colophon. He left his country early in life, and supported himself, in the court of Hiero, by reciting elegiac and Iambic verses, written in censure of the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. vii. 49. 110. Diog. Liert. iii. 12. ix. 27. Cic. Academ. ii. 5.

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"Entaótha.] Sc. while occupied in active thought.

Phiame tì eìnai diávoun.] See c. 50. initi. eìnai tì ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.—Olympiod. autò diávoun kai léi tìv Ítian, h. e. formam, speciem justi; which is attainable by the mind alone. Cf. Tertullian, de Anima. c. 18. p. 247. t. iv. Semol. "Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibles, incorporeas, supermundiales, divinas et aternas: quas appetel ideas: i. e. formas exemplares, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subcentum corporalibus sensibus, et illas quidem esse veritates, hae autem imagines carum." Phaimén mìnto nì Dìa. Olympiod.—"Ο Συμμίασ ἐκτοίμεις συγκατατίθεται τῷ περὶ τῶν Ítεīν τῆν λάβῃ, ως συνόης Πνευματиκοῦς.

'Apátàvnon tòv oússias.] Cf. Timaeus, p. 27. 28. "Estin oún eì katì ἵμην Ítouvan prátoon diaperein vàdè tiû nàn mìn ài, gínei eì oùn ἵχνην kai ti tòv γιγνόμενον mìn, ón Ít de oúvste. toû mìn Ít nòmìte meta lábou peri-

lêpton, Ía káta tauté Ív tòv ad Íbèi, met' aísthèsews Íhagon, Ídèa-

tòn, γιγνόμενον kai ἀπολλήμενον, Ínìs Ít de oúvste Ív. Hence oússia, or essence, is the term employed to designate the ìeì káta tyntax Ív, so called in contradistinction to the objects of sense, which are continually fluctuating, so that none of them can ever continue uniform, constant, and the same. The divine reason, according to Plato, contains eternally within itself, ideas or intelligible forms, which, flowing from the fountain of the divine essence, have in themselves a real existence, and which, in the foundation of the visible world, were, by the energy of the efficient cause, united to matter, to produce sensible bodies. These ideas Plato defines to be the peculiar nature of things or essences as such; and asserts that they can remain the same, without beginning or end. Phaedr. p. 278. de Rep. vii. p. 531. Timaeus, c. 6. En-

field, Philos. B. ii. c. 8. s. I.—Ο τυγ-

χάνει ἔκαστον Ív; subjoined in expla-

nation of oússia preceded. Hèiin. V. Cousin—en un mot de l'essence de toutes choses, c'est a dire de ce qu'elles sont en elles memes?
πλατώνος

σκότει, ούτως ἄν ἐγγύτατα ἢ τοῦ γνώναι ἔκαστον; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἐφ' οὖν ἔκεινος ἄν τούτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὡς τις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢτ' ἔκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μὴ τέ τιν ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφελκὼν μηδὲμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρόμως αὐτό καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἐκαστον ἐπιχειροῦ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὕφαλαμον τε καὶ ὁτῶν καὶ ὥς ἔτοι εἰπεῖν ἦμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς παράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔωντος τῆς ἐνυχιῆς κτήσασθαι ἐλήθειαι τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωῇ; ἄρ' οὐχ οὔτός ἐστιν, ὥς Συμμία, εἰ πέρ τις καὶ ἀλλος, ο τενχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἡπὶ ὁ Συμμίας, ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὥ Σόκρατες.

'Ακριβὶστατα παρασκευάστητα.] h. e. Quæ maxime ac diligentissime institu- erit; assessorerit, &c. STALL. Ἀπὸ ἑκαστον.] Τοιομονημοὶ τῶν εἰλῶν νοητῶν [intelligible forms] si per se ipsam spectetur. HEIND. Καθαρώτατα.] Most purely. i. e. most independently of the organs of sense. Παρατιθέμενος.] Apprensens sibi, ad- hibens ut comitum ac socium. WYTT. CE. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 580. A. Ὁ γὰρ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, μήτε τινά τῶν ἄλ- λων αἰσθήσεων ἐφελκώμενος, ἀλλ' αὐ- τῷ καθαρῶ τῷ νῷ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐν- τυχχάνων, τὴν ἀληθῆ διάγνωσιν μέτεισι. de Repub. vii. c. 12. sub. fin.,— ὁτι καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει, ὅνει παρατοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴ τ' τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἑκα- στον ὁμοι καὶ μή ἀποστὰ πρὶν ἀν αὐ- τὸ ὁ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ νοήσει λάβη, &c.

Εἰλικρινεὶ τῇ διανοϊᾳ.] Eilekrenv is in a degree redundant, being implied in αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν πρεθεῖ. It signifies unmasked, unalloyed, and is derived qu. τῇ εἰλῃ κρούμονος, " quoniam ad splendorum solis, qui εἰλῃ dicitur, τὰ μεριμνη καὶ τὰ ἀμύγη facile ἐκα- κρίνεται." Scap. Lex. V. Cousin.—dé-
is the knowledge of what a thing actually is. Whence Plato, Tim. c. 9, speaks of the Deity as τὸ ὄν ἄει, γενεσθαι ὡς ὁ πάγος, and of the body as τὸ γεγόμενον μὴν ἄει, ὡς οὐκ ἐπετειλαται, thus explained by Sextus Empir. : διὰ τὴν λεγομένην συνεχὴ μηδὲν αὐτὸν, (viz. τῶν σωμάτων) ὥς μηδὲ τὸν τότε ἐξεύχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰσὶν νοημίζεσθαι. πάρο τοι καὶ οἱ Πλατ. γεγομένα μὴν, ὡς ἐνδέχετο καὶ κατὰ τὰ σωματα. 

§ 11. Τοὺς γνησίους φιλοσόφους. ᾿Εν- τος, γενειοσφαίρεις προφορας, Γοττλ.— so called in opposition to the πολιτικοι, or those who aimed no higher than the practice of such virtues as affected the well-being of society, temperance, justice, &c. Olympiod. ᾿Ινησίους φιλοσόφους εἴπε εἰδὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς. Ὁμιλητεύοιτο τις περ ἄτραπος, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Schol. Φημὶ ὅτι ταυτήν τὸν ἄτραπον ἰδέαν, οὐ τοῦ ἱστοροῦν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστι, καθαρτικὸς ὑπετικόν ἄτραπος γὰρ οὐ ἔστι, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑπιμετραν ἀγνοο- σα οὐ τὴν ἱστοροῦν ὡς ἐπὶ λειτουργεῖν, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστι, τὴν τῶν πολλῶν. Καὶ Πνευματοφόροι γὰρ ἦν παράγγελμα, φθόνον τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθ�οντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρινοβό τοις τῆς καθηκοντος, θεώνειν τὰς λειωφόρους. Ηινδοφρονοβρι

is the medium of their judgment, appeared most likely to conduct the searchers after truth, who in their scrutini- took reason for their guide, and on this account, because while the soul is united to, and encumbered with the body, it is incapable of attaining the object of its otherwise unrestrained exertions. So V. Cousin. It n'y a qu'un seul détourné qui puisse guider la raison dans ses recherches; car tant que nous avions notre corps et que notre âme serait enchaînée dans cette corruption, jamais nous ne posséderons l'objet de nos désirs, c'est-à-dire la vérité; to which he subjoin in a note: "Ce sentier dévoué est évi- demment le dégagement de l'âme; i.e. l'âme et la chair vivaient l'une par l'autre. Heindorf further explains μετά τῶν λόγων, praevante et ducte re ratione; Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 587. 3. Demosth. Leptin. c. 90. παρά τῶν πολιτῶν λό- γω μετα τῶν νόμων [demonstratibus, pra- euntibus legibus, WOL.] τὰ δικαία, laeμβάνοντες; and in this sense pro- poses ´ν ἁπα τῶν λόγων σκέψει as an equivalent arrangement to that in the text. Stallbaum understands by ἂ ἁπα τῶν λόγων σκέψει—veri investiga- tio mente et ratione institia, segregata ac separata corporis communiæ. Schleierm. connects ἂ πρὸς μετά τῶν λόγων in the sense of ἂ πρὸς καὶ τῶν λόγων. But the spirit of the passage is best evinced and supported by the construction and ex- planation of Heindorf, as supr.

Μνομίας μὲν γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod Τοῦτο ὡς ἂν εἴδο διὰ παραπληγίας ἐκχειρωθῇν αὐτογονοῦν, [i.e. tru- pice exaggerant, sc. tragedias excitant in descriptione impedimentis, que sunt animo a corpore. GOTTL.] τὰ συμβαί-
ΦΙΛΩΝΟΣ

τῆν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν ἔρωτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπτησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὃς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ δὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὔδεποτε οὔδεν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὔδεν ἀλλο παρέχει ἡ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμία. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ημῖν γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσαθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦτον θεραπείαν καὶ ἕκ τοῦ τοῦτον ἀσχολίαν ἁγομένος φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ ταύτα. τὸ

νοῦντα ἐμποδίει τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος ἐν ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις τροφαῖς, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν ταῖς νόσοις.

Καὶ φλυαρίας.] Olympiod. φλυαρίαι καὶ οἱ Πλάτων πάντα πέρι τοῦτον, οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἔργοις.

'Ωστε τὸ λεγόμενον.] Ut, quod vero proverbia diciuntur, omnino ne superem quidem usu quidam propter corpus possimus, Wyt., unde it is to be observed that the adage is one to be confined altogether to the class of philosophers. Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 432. 5. Ης ἀλήθως τῷ ὑπότε. See Matthiae Gr. s. 636. Cf. de Reb. i. p. 347. D. Ὁ τῷ ὑπωτὶ ἀλήθευσον οἱ πέρικε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφόρον σκοπεῖσθάν. Lachet. p. 183. D. Τούτου—ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἠθεσάμην ἐν τῇ ἀλήθείᾳ ὡς ἀλήθως ἐπιεικήνυμεν.


Διὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Πώς εἶδα τὰ χρήματα πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται; πολλοί γὰρ καὶ εἰ ἀλλὰς αἰτίας ἐγένετο 'Ῥρητῶν οὖν ὡς μὲν 'Ἀποκρατιόν, ἡ ὡτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖοντο, ἡ ὡτι καὶ τῶν λαφύων ἔλπις ἐπίτεινεν τὸν πόλεμον ὡς ἐν Λογίνας, το ἐκτὸς πάντα χρημάτα καλεί. V. Ruhnken in Dissert. de Longin. c. 6. p. 8. Fabric. Bib. Græc. ii. p. 61. Cf. Virg. Æneid. iii. 54. "Quid non mortalia pectora cogis, Aurì sacra fames." Καὶ καὶ τούτου—εἰ διὰ ταύτα πάντα. i. e. Et ex hac corporis causa, proper has cupiditates, et negotia, etiam tractandæ philosophie nobis inter detriment. Wyt.—Εκ τούτου, in consequence of the body, as a means—εἰ διὰ ταύτα πάντα, on account of its affections, as a result, &c.

Φιλοσοφίας περ. ] Quod ad philosophiam attainet. Hlind.


Tō δ’ ἔσχατον πάντων, ὦτι ἐὰν τίς ἥμων καὶ σχολή γένη-
tai ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπόμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν
taῖς ζητῆσειν α傧 πανταχοῦ ἀπαραπτίπτον θόρυβον
παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ δύνα-
θαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθαρὰν τάληθες. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι ἥμων
dέδεικται ὃτι εἰ μέλλομέν ποτὲ καθαρὸς τι εὑσεθαί,
ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ὑψωθείν αὐτά τὰ
πράγματα’ καὶ τότε, ὃς ἐοικεν, ἥμων ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμο-
mέν τε καὶ φαμὲν ἑρασταί εἶναι, φρονίσεως, ἐπειδὰν
tελευτήσωμεν, ὃς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ἣ λέει δὲ οὐ.
Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶον τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρὸς
γνῶσαι, δυοῖν βάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἐστὶ κτήσασθαι τὸ
eἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσαι τότε γὰρ αὐτή καθ’ αὐτὴν
ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ χώρις τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ’ οὐ.
καὶ ἐν ὧν ἄν ἔως, οὕτως, ὃς ἐοικε, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσο-
μεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, εἰάν ὃ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν
τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὁ τι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη,
μηδε ἀναπτυμλῶμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ κα-
θαρεύμενων ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἄν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ
ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαρὸ ἀπαλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ
σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὃς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιοῦτων τε

'Ἀναπτυμλῶμεθα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. ἀναπλήσαις αὐτῶν.
'Ως τὸ εἰκός,] In all likelihood. Aristid. Orat. i. p. 253. fully, ὡς τὸ εἰκός ἔχει.—Μετὰ τοιοῦτων, i. e. the gods and
good men. c. 8. supr.—Ἅσως τὰ-
λυθέες, probably true; Ἅσως being used as
indicative of a high degree of proba-
bility, ὄντως, of certainty itself. Legg.
xii. p. 695. G. ΚΑ. Ἅσως. ΑΟΗΝ.
Ὅς Ἅσως, ἀλλ’ ὄντως, ὃ εὐαρμόνε,
tαῦτης οὖς ἐστὶ σοφωτέρα μέθοδος
ἀνθρώπων ὀδύνει. Heinrich observes
upon Ἅσως, supr., that it is peculiarly
expressive of the modesty of the Attic
style, to speak hesitatingly.of what was
positively known and believed. The
prudent reserve [ἤλαβα, Olympiod.] which
Plato generally used in treating of
such subjects as were manifestly
beyond the grasp of human comprehen-

To δ’ ἔσχατον πάντων, ὦτι, κ. τ. λ. Η
See Matthiae Gr. s. 432. 5.

IIAPAPiPTOY,] Quod easo et fortuito
adeoque tempore interveniat alieno.—
Fisch. Οὐρμὸς is used in reference
to what affects the ears, ταραχὴν, the
eyes, and ἐκπλήττει, of the senses
generally. KöRNER.

Οδ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν—φρονίσεως.] See
Matthiae Gr. 474. b.

'Ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει,] i. e. What
has been hitherto said of the body and
its passions, as infr. c. 12. ὅπερ πᾶλαι
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται.

Δύοις βατέροις.] These words form
an apposition, being introduced into a
proposition with ἢ—ἡ, without having
any other connexion with it. Matthiae
Gr. s. 433. Obs. 1.

'Ὁ τί μὴ,] See in Criton. c. 14. sub.
initt.
Plato thought as a well-known and commendable characteristic of the Socratic school.

Plutarch de s. n. v. p. 549. B.


Kάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἀρα ὁ τοῦτο ἐξυμβαίνει ὁ περὶ πά-

sion, was a well-known and commendable characteristic of the Socratic school.

Plutarch de s. n. v. p. 549. B.

§ 12. Oύκοιν, ἐφ' ὁ Σωκράτεσ, εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, ὡ ἐταίρε, πολλῆ ἔλπις ἀφικομένων ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἰ πέρ ποι ἄλλοθι, κτῆσασθαι τοῦτο ὁ ἐνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν ὁ παρελθόντι βίο ἐγγονέων, ὥστε ἡ γε ἀποδημίᾳ ἡ νῦν ἡ προσ-τεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγάθης ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἤγειται οἱ παρεσκευάσαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς περικαθαρμένην. Πάνω μὲν ὄν, ἐφ' ὁ Σιμίας.

Kάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἀρα ὁ τοῦτο ἐξυμβαίνει ὁ περὶ πά-

been followed by γίγνεται, not γέ-

γονέων.

Kαὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνέφ.] Socrates had already asserted of himself, ὡστ' εὐελ-

πις εἰ μὲν τε τετελευθήσοι, καὶ—πολὺ ἀμείνοι τοῖς ἀγάθοις ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς—but now that he had shown it to be the province of all true philosophers, to aim at a perfect freedom of the mind and its attributes from the body and its influences, he concludes that any other, who had so achieved his moral independence, should welcome like himself, with willingness and hope, the prospect of a pure and perfect life to come.

Kάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι—τοῦτο ἐξυμβαί-

néi.] For ἔμμ. κάθαραι εἶναι τοῦτο, as Infr. c. 19. init. Ἄρι οὖν ὃ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνο εἶναι μὲν ἄφ' ὀρμών, &c. See Matthiae Gr. s. 287. This doctrine of the purification of the soul was bor-

rowed from the Orphic and Pythagorean schools, which inculcated an austere and constant course of discipline, as tending to emancipate the soul from the con-

tagion of things terrestrial, and to restore it unspotted to its celestial source.—

Körner.
λαί εν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκείως κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑπείτα μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυμομένην ὡς πέρ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε θάνατος ὅνομαζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασι γ', ὃ ὡς. Αὐνήν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμέν, προσβιοῦνται αἱ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελετήμα αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. η οDeque; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν ὁ περ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλεγοι, γελοιοῖν ἂν εἰδρυόμενον τι οἰκείως παρασκευάζονθ᾽ εαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὅντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτως ἦν, κἂν ἤκουσαν αὐτῶν τούτου ἄγωνκετεν; οὗ γελοῖον; Πῶς δ' οὗ; Τῷ ὑποτε άρα, ἐφη, ὃ Ζιμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθυμακείν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἦκισυ αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶν δὲ οὐκοῦν εἰ γὰρ διαβεβληθηται μὲν πανταχὺ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν

Συναγείρομεθα τε καὶ ἀθροίζομαι.] Cf. Hom. ll. 240. ἢσαγείρατο θυμόν καὶ Schol. in loco. νοῦν ἢθροίζετο.

'Ὡς περ ἐκ ἐθρημῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.] In such appositions the Greek writers seldom repeat the preposition, except for the sake of emphasis, as, supra. and infra. c. 33. ὥσπερ εἰς ἐθρημῶν εἰς τοῦτον σκοπεῖσθαι, &c. c. 64. ὥσπερ κατ' ἔννοι κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε ἕρμην. — Phaedr. p. 250. D. ὥσπερ εἰς εν κατοπτρώ ἐν τῷ οἴκοις εαυτῶν ὀρὸν Λέβης. Whence the latter ἐκ has been in some editions incorrectly omitted.

Τοῦτο γε θάνατος.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 472. 2. c.

Τὸ μελετήμα.] The study, practice, or pursuit.

'Ωσ περ ἐγγυτάτων ὅντα τοῦ τεθνάναι.] b. c. qui se ita componit et hoc studet, ut vitam agat morti quam proximam.— Staul.—οὕτως ἦν, is elegantly redundant here; Cf. Herodot. i. 196. ἐγγυτάτως χρῖν καταστήσαμα, ἡ μίν συνοικίσαντι αὐτῇ, οὕτω ἀπάγομαι.— Wytt.

Τοῦτον.] Sc. τοῦ τεθνάναι. 'Αποθυμάκειν — καὶ το τεθνάναι] Supra. c. 9. init.

Διαβεβληθηται μὲν πανταχὺ γί τοῦ σώματι.] Schol. αὐτὶ τοῦ διαβεβλημένου ἐχοσίν πρὸς τὰ σώμα. Αε ἀμοί πασίν ἢμείς σουν corpori, inhumi; corporis ut inimicum suspicatun et omerunt. Wytt. Upon eu γάρ preced. see Mathiae Gr. s. 630. 2. f.—uppon αὐτὴν εἰ καθ' αὐτὴν, seq. s. 616. and upon the indicative, ἐκαθ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν following ei, s. 524. Obs. 1.
έχειν, τούτου δὲ γινομένου ει φοβοίντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖν, οὐ πολλή ἄν ἀλογία εἰ, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ίοιεν οἱ ἀφικομένοι ἐλπίς ἐστιν, οὖ διὰ βίου ἡρων, τυχεῖν' ἡρων δὲ φρονήσεως· οὐ τε διαβέβλητο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτῶς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νεών ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκοίμησεν ἥθελσαν εἰς Ἀιδοὺ ἐλθεῖν, ὡπο ταύτης ἁγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς τοῦ ὀφεσθαί τι ἐκεῖ ὡν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ ἐξυνέσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἁρὰ τοῖς τοῖς ὑπερ έρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτήν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, µηδαµοῦ ἀλλοθεὶ ἐνευξέσθαι αὐτῇ ἄξιος λόγον ἦ εἰν Ἀιδοὺ, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἰσιν αὐτῶς· οἰσεθαί γε χρή, εὰν τοῖς ὑπερ έρῶν ἡ, ὃ ἐταίρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόζει, µηδαµοῦ ἀλλοθεὶ καθαρῶς ἐνευξέσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὗτος ἐξει, ο περ ἅρτη ἐλεγον, οὐ πολλή ἄν ἀλογία εἰ, εἱ φοβοῖντο τοῖς θάνατον τοῖς τοιοῦτος;

§. 13. Πολιτης μέντοι νη Νία, ή δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῖν ἰκανὸν σοὶ τεκμήριον, ἐφή, τούτῳ ἄνδρος ὦν ἄν ἱδῆς ἀγανακτοῦντα μελλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρµικτοίναι ταύτην ἐλπίδα. This same hope. sc. which was entertained by those who had descended into the lower regions, of renewing their interrupted love.

Εἰ µὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ίοιεν.] Here the original proposition repeated, is turned into a question. Math. Gr. s. 636.

Η ἀνθρωπίνων µὲν παιδικῶν.] For the sake of human objects of affection, to which are opposed, ή φρονήσις καὶ ή ψυχία, which may be considered as θεία παιδικά, divine objects of regard; παιδικά, admitting of being applied to whatever is dearly cherished or beloved, may be affirmed of philosophy, as the favorite of its genuine professors. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 482. Α. ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχίαν, τὰ εἰµά παιδικά, παιδίων ταύτα λέγονταν. V. Markland ad Tyr. Max. Diss. xxxv. 1.—'Εκοίμησεν ἥθελσαν, i. e. having sought the accomplishment of their desires, by self-destruction.

Τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα.] This same hope. sc. which was entertained by


'Οτι οὐκ ἀρµικτοίναι ταύτην ἐλπίδα.] Thus explained by Heindorf; non erat philosophus tum
ὅν δισσόφος ἀλλά τις δισσόματος; ὁ αὐτῶς δὲ ποιον οὕτως τυγχάνει ὁν καὶ δισσόχρηματος καὶ δισσοτμός, ἦτοι τὰ ἑτερα τούτων ἢ καὶ ἀμφότερα. Πάντως γ’, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὁς λέγεις. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ Συμβεν, οὐ καὶ ἡ οὐνομαζομένη ἀνδρία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως οὐ ποιον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σοφροσύνη, ἢ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐνομάζουσι σοφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπιτοήσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀληφόροις ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἢ όν τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ἀληφωροῦσι τε καὶ ἐν δισσοσφικία ζώσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἑθέλεις, ἢ δ’ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀνδρίαν τοις καὶ σοφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι

quum esse videhatur; ἢ όν being a form in frequent use with the Greek writers, to indicate the deceitfulness and disappointment of a previous hope. Cf. Odys. π. 418. sqq. Ἄρτινο, ἑβριν ἤγιν, κακομίσχαν, καὶ σε σαβσ. ἐν ἑμίρ᾽ Ἰθάκης μεθ᾽ ὑμήλικας ἵρμεν᾽ ἀριστον Βούλῃ καὶ μήθοισι σι᾽ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄρα τοῖς ἐγχθα. Eurip. Hipp. 360. Κύπας οὐκ ἀρ᾽ ἢν θεός, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τι μείζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ, "Ἡ τῆς κάμη καὶ ἐμοὺς ἀπάλεισιν. Τις φιλοσοφόματος." See infr. c. 32. init.

"Ἡ καὶ ἀμφότερα." Ἀπολ. Σορ. c. 8. extr. Cf. Homer. Π. γ᾽. 178. Οὕτως γ’—Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ’ ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ’ αἰχμητής. Τοῖς οὕτω διακιμένως. Videl. ills, qui student animum sejungere a corpore atque sperant se sapiendi esse accuturos, ubi vencerint ad inferos. STALL.

Oī πολλοὶ.] Vulgus, [inf. τῶν ἄλλων.] i.e. i., qui non possunt in numero vitrum philosophorum haberi. STALL. v. infr. c. 31. sub. fin. Μὴ ἐπιτοίχευαι. Suid. θυμαίλεται. See Horat. Ep. i. 6. 1. "Nil admirari—" 9. sqq. "Quis timet his adversa, fere miratur eadem Quo cupiens, pacto; pavor est utrobiique molestus, Improviso simul species exterret utrumque:" and M’Caul, in locc. citt. The verb ποτείζεσθαι is used here like the Latin trepidare, or metere, as expressive of that tremulous apprehension attending the desires and affections of the body, which arises from the uncertainty of their future fulfilment. Cf. infr. c. 57. τολκέν χρώμαν ἐπτομήν. This temperance, or equanimity with regard to the affections, which even the vulgar, though they do not possess, are still competent to define, is limited in truth, as well as the preceding virtue, προσεκτικός, to philosophers alone. V. Cousin.—et la tempérance, cette vertu qui consiste à maîtriser ses passions, ne convient-elle pas particulièrement à ceux qui méprisent leur corps et qui se sont consacrés à l’étude de la sagesse?

Εἰ γὰρ ἱθέλεις—ἴδε ὅσι.] Heindorf compares with this construction, Protag. c. 39. ἐι γὰρ ἱθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὃ Σωκρ. τοὺς ἀκεικοντας, τί ποτὲ ἐννοεῖ, αὐτὸ σε ἐλάβει— Menon. p. 71. ἐ. ἐι γοῦν τινα ἱθέλεις οὕτως ἐρεσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ὄσις οἱ γελάσαται καὶ ἐράζα; whence he prefers the reading as supr. to Vulg. ἱθέλησεν.

Τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρίαν τε καὶ σωφρ.] i.e. The semblances and counterfeits of these virtues amongst the vulgar many, the reality of which could be only felt and appreciated by the wiser few. See Cicero, de Fin. i. 10. 14. 15. ii. 14. 15. Socrates now proceeds to prove how it is that the philosopher
alone is possessed of those virtues in all
their perfection and efficacy. The dread
of some greater evil emboldens the igno-
rant against the fear of death; but
there is an inconsistency in courage aris-
ing thus from cowardice: equally so in the
abstinence which is owing to intem-
perance, and yet amongst the vulgar,
these incongruities do actually exist.—
And for this reason; their's is not like
the philosopher's, an utter independ-
ence of the passions, but a reciprocation
of them, like the interchange of money.
They call it intemperance, to be subject to
their yoke, but still, if they forbear
from the pursuit of one pleasure, it is
but to secure the enjoyment of another
and a more probable. So with their
fortitude, which is the offsprings of de-
spair, and not like the philosopher's,
the calmly anticipated result of hope.
Hence it is evident that the latter is
imbued with the essence of those virtues
of which the former are but familiar with
the name, and of which, in their attempt
to practise, they only can succeed in the
abuse.

Τῷ ἔδειναι—καὶ ἐπεί.] i. e. By the

act and principle of fear.

Δειλία ἀνθρείον εἶναι.] Cf. Plu-
Romulus) ἐνυλείας φυγῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ
tμορφαῖς ἐπιφορομένῃ, εἶκεν τὸ
tοῦ Πλατώνος, ἀπεχθὼς ὑπὸ ἔσον ἀνθρείους
gενόμενος.

Οἱ κόσμοι. ] Homines moribus com-
positis, temperantiae et munditiae studiis.

Gottl. In the text it appears nearl
synonymous with σώφρονες. "What,"
says Socrates, "of the temperate amongst
them? Are they not so affected as to
owe their abstinence to intemperance?
Which, impossible as it may appear,
still to such an affection as this they are
assuredly liable, in consequence of their
foolish and inadequate notions upon the
subject of the virtue which they have
not the sense to comprehend."—'Αλλ' ὁ
μὲν αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.—h. e. ἀλλ' ὁμοῖος
τὸ πάθος τὸ περί ταύτην τὴν ἐυθύνης
σωφροσύνην, ὁ αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει, τούτω
ὁμοίος ἐστιν.—Ἐὐθύνη, i. q. ἀντο-
ποτον, supr. Cf. Alciabid. ii. e. 5. οἱ ἔν
ἐν ἐνυφιμοῦταις ὁνόμασι βουλόμενοι
κατοναίμειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοφύλοις, οἱ
ἔν ἐνυθήτες, ἑτέροι ἕν ἀκάκους καὶ ἀ-
πείρουσ καὶ ἐνεύοις. Terent. Phorm. lii. 2. 63. "homo suavis!" KÜRNER.

"Ωι νῦν ἐν ἔλεγετο." Fully, οἱ ὁμοιοὶ εἶναι ἔλεγετο. Matthiae Gr. s. 473. Obs. 1.

Μὴ γάρ οὐχ αὐτὴν.] Sc. ὁ ὁμοίως μὴ γάρ, &c. See Matthiae Gr. s. 608. 5. Stallbaum explains the passage; Noli hunc sentiendi aegendi rationem probare; vide enim, ne hac non sit recta ad virtutem adipiscendam permutatio, ut voluptates cum voluptatibus commutemus. V. Cousin: Songe que ce n'est pas un très-bon échange pour la vertu que de changer des voluptés pour des voluptés, des tristesses pour des tristesses, &c. In the older editions ἀλλαγή was not found, and οὖς was understood, by a common ellipse, to η ὁρθή, to which, however, Wyttenbach supplied ἀρετή, as virtue itself, and not the way to it, was the subject of discussion, and so read η ὁρθή ἀρετή, ἡδονάς πρὸς ἡδονάς, κ. τ. λ.—Καταλλάττεσθαι—Cf. Aristot. Ethic. Nicomach. iii. 9. ἐτοιμοὶ γὰρ ὦτου πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τῶν βίων πρὸς μικρὰ κέρες καταλλάττονται. ΑΕιαν. Nat. An. viii. 1. θάνατον ἐν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἠλλάξατο.

Καὶ μείζων πρὸς ἐλάττω.] Omnisneque majora permutare minoribus velut numismata. HEIND. i.e. balancing the passions and affections, with a view to being guided by their relative degrees, a mode which is evidently inadmissible in estimating the virtues. V. Cousin—Et de mettre, pour ainsi dire, ses passions en petite monnaie.

Μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὅρθων.] The only sterling coin. V. Cousin. la seule bonne monnaie. Cf. Philo Jud. de Somm. p. 1120. C. τὸ τῆς ἴσχυς νόμισμα, παιδείαν, ἐξιστάντες καὶ κατακερμα-

τίζοντες σικτρός ἀπαλίσκοντων.

'Ἄνθιν' o.β.] The preposition ἀνθί, with the genitive, sometimes accompanies the verbs signifying to exchange. Matthiae Gr. s. 365. Obs. 1.

Καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα, κ. τ. λ.] Vereroghe ne quae hoc numismata emuntur vendunturque, ea omnia sint re vera, tum fortitudo, tum temperantia, tum justitia, omninoque vera virtus sit cum saepientia conjuncta, &c. HEIND., who proposes, however, as ὁνείδθαι is seldom, if ever, used in a passive sense, to read the passage, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὑνοίμεια τα καὶ πιπρακούμεθα. Wyttenbach objects to the text, on the grounds that ὑνοίμεια cannot be referred to τοῦτον, i.e. φρονήσως. For if anything be purchased for prudence, it would appear that prudence should then be parted with as the price, which is contrary to the injunction of Socrates, that prudence should be the thing to be acquired. Accordingly he arranges and interprets the passage as follows; καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα τα πιπρακούμενα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὑνοίμενα. V. et si hac omnia vendantur, et cum hac (i.e. prudenter) omnia emantur, tum revera constat et fortitudo et temperantia et justitia, et summam in virtus, quae sine prudentia esse nequit. But the passage may be admitted as it stands, as a general explanation of καταλλάττεσθαι supr., and, as Socrates had asserted that a reciprocation of pleasures, pains, or fears, with similar affections, even though unequal in degree, was not η ὁρθή πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ, so he proceeds to affirm what this exchange, properly so called, consisted in, which was nothing else than the interchange of prudence for its equivalent virtues. Prudence was the τὸ νόμισμα ὅρθων, (the metaphor being
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὄνομενα τὰ καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τὰ ὄντι ἕν, καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ἐυλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγυμομένων καὶ ἀπογιγυμομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων' χοριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλητόμενα, ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μη σκιαγραφία τις ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ καὶ τὸ ὄντι ἄνδραποδόδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγίες οὐδὲ ἄληθες ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἄληθες τὸ ὄντι ἡ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ

continued from μειζὸν πρὸς ἐλάττ. ὁσπ. νομ. supr.) which none who possessed would part with for less than its value, nor could any so part with except in name, prudence being only the aggregate of the virtues, as mentioned supr. in detail.

Ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη.] Cf. Plat. de Repub. iv. cc. 6. 10. 16. where the four virtues, as supr., prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, are mentioned, as also in Legg. iii. p. 688. p. 963 B., a division which Wytenbach supposes to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. Cf. Cic. de Offic. i. 5. "Omne quod honestum est, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollicitique versatur, aut in hominum societate tuenda, tribunendoque suum cuique, et rerum contractarum: sed aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore: aut in omnium qua situm, quaque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia." The Stoics held these to be the primary virtues; prudence, as respected the choice and pursuit of good; temperance, the government of the appetites and desires; fortitude, the endurance of what is commonly esteemed evil, and justice, the offices of social life. Enf. Phil. ii. 11. 1. Ἐνολλήβδην] In ὡμ. Ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ μετὰ φρονήσεως.] Socrates decides upon wisdom or prudence as the sum and basis of all the virtues; Cf. Meno, c. 24. Upon which Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. vi. 15. Συμφάτης τῷ μὲν ὅρθῳ ἐξήτει, τῷ δ' ἠμάρτανεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεως φύτο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἠμάρτανεν. ὅτι ε'ὐκ ἀνευ φρονήσεως ἔλεγεν.


WYTE. Virtue, in truth and reality, consists in the purification of the passions, which is effected by temperance, justice, fortitude, and prudence itself; through the medium of these qualities, and as their origin and source.—Τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, Intell. ἥξιον, φίλον, κ. τ. λ. This doctrine of the purifying of the mind by the study of virtue, i. e. by philosophy, was inculcated by many of the ancient philosophical writers, but eminently by Plato, through the whole range of his compositions, whence the frequent mention of the virtues and courses of discipline, entitled καθαρτικαί. V. Aristot. Poet. 16. Politic. viii. 7.

Καθαρμός τις.] This was the first part of the μνήσις, or initiation, which took place by the river Iliissus, where the person to be purified stood, having under his feet the Δῶρος κατόν, or skin of a victim offered to Jove. The second grade of initiation was the τῆς τελετῆς παραώσια; the third, ἐπισπεία; the fourth, ἀνάσεις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπίθεσις; the fifth, τὸ θεοφόλει καὶ θεῖς συνήσιμος εὐδαιμονία. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. i. c. 19.—ΕΛΕΥΘΙΝΙΑ. Οὕτω.] Νοτὶ ιλλ., celebrati ills; Orphæus, Musæus, &c. Stal. Καταστήσαντες; Eupir. Bacch. 21. Κάκει χρείας καὶ καταστήσας ἡμᾶς Τελετώς—τοῖς τινές—ήλθον πάλιν. "Ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσται. This doctrine was taken, according to Olympiodorus, from one of the Orphic hymns. Fragm. Orph. p. 509. Herm. Hymn. in Cerer. 485. Ὄλιθος, ὡς τόδε ὁπως τε ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀνδρῶς ὡς δ' ἀτελεῖς, ἱεράς ὡς τ' ἁμορφος, οὕτως ὁμοιὸν Λίσαν ἔχει, φίλιμονος περ, ὑπὸ εὐφρενίαν τερ. Schol. Olymp. 

καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ. Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἤμιν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαίλοι τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι δὲ ἀμύντοις καὶ ἀτέλεστοι εἰς "Αι-

δοὺ ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσται, ὃ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικνέμενοι μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσί γὰρ ἡ, φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι οὐ—


'Αρνθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ βάκχ. δ. τ. π.] Taken also from an Orphic hymn. Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 400. Βάκχον οὗ τῶν Διόνυσον ἱεῖλον μὲ—
PLATONOS

toi δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πε- 
"φιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὃν δὴ καὶ ἑγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυ- 
nατὸν ὀυδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἄλλα παντὶ τρόπῳ 
προῳδυμήθην γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς προῳδυμήθην καὶ 
tι ἡνυσάμην, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσομέθα, εἲν 
θεὼς ἐθέλῃ, ὅλων ὑπετερόν, ὥς ἕμοι δοκεῖ.

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ, ἐφη, ὁ Σεμιμα τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπο- 
λογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς 
ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλέπτως φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, 
ἤγομένος κακεὶ ὀυδὲν ἤττον ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε 
ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταῖροις· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς 
ἀπιστίαν παρέχει. εἰ τι οὖν μῦν πιθανότερον εἰμί 
ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς εὖ ἄν 
ἐχοι.

§. 14. Εἰπόντως δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολα-

von, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τους τελευτά-
τας τὰ ὅργια βάκχους ἐκάλων. Ca-
βάκχους sunt orciastas et ministri. Clem. 
Alex. Δαύνυσοι Μαϊνόλην ὄργα-
ζουσι βάκχους. Orphæus in hymno 
Sileni Ναίς καὶ βάκχους ἤγομένε 
cuπτοφόρους. Sæc aciependium in pro-
verbiis, πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφοροὶ παῦ-
ρι τε βάκχοι. In Dionysiacis 
solennibus, puta in phallagogiis, sa-
cris trieretricis, Iacchi exagoge, simi-
libusve pompis multî arrepto thyrso 
aut ferula προσκαίρους se præbe-
bant Liberi patris orciastas: nec so-
lum viri, sed etiam honestæ matronæ 
æ virginæ. Lege Diodorum Sic. lib. iii. 
73. Sed hi θυρσοφόροι aut ναρθηκο-
φοροὶ σolum appellabantur: ut qui or-
gia jugiter et legtime curante neque 
a suscepto ministerio recedebant, hi non 
solum narthechophori dicabantur, sed 
ναρθηκοφόροι βάκχοι, &c." Olympiæ-
Schol.—τελείη γαρ ἐστὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρε-
tῶν βακχεία καὶ φής [Πλάτων] "Πολλοὶ 
μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι, παῦρι τε βάκχοι" 
ναρθηκοφόρους, οὐ μὴν 

βάκχους τοὺς πολιτικοὺς καλῶν ναρ-
θηκοφόρους τοῖς καθαρ-
τικοῖς. v. Barnes, ad Eurip. Bacch. 
115. sqq. Clem. Alexandr. compares 
with the above, Matthew, xx. 16. xxii.

14. Πολλοὶ εἰσὶ κλητοὶ, ὅλγοι δὲ ἐκ-
κλετοῖ: and Fischer correctly explains 
the adage: multi præ se ferunt anorem 
et studium philosophie, sed pauci sunt 
veri philosophi.

"Ὡν οὐ καὶ ἐγὼ," i.e. Quorum unus 
ut fierem, nihil, quantum in me fiat in-
tentatum reliqui, sed omnibus modis stu-
di. Hein.—οὖν εἰς ἀπολέιτην, nihil 
reliquias, omnia expertii. Id. 
"Ἀπολείπων — οὐ χαλέπτως φέροι." 
For this construction see Matthiae Gr. s. 
555. i. 

"Ἀπιστίαν παρέχει." Quod tamen 
vulgo incredibile est. Hein., who 
understands autó, sc. τὸ πράγμα, as 
the subject of παρέχει.

Εἰ τι—πιθαν., εἰμι—οὐ ἄν ἔχοι. ] See 
Apol. Soci. c. 12. sub. fin. εἰ εἰς—dia-
φθείρει. n.

§. 14. Εἰπόντως εὐ, κ. τ. λ. ] To 
obviate the objection that the soul cannot 
exist independently of the body, Socra-
tes proceeds to argue that it existed be-
fore its union with the body. The pre-
vailing law of nature, according to the 
philosopher, is, that all things are 
produced from their contraries; the greater 
from the less, swift from slow, strong 
from weak, heat from cold, and vice 
versa. Life and death are subject to 
the same necessity, and reproduce each
other; unless it is to be supposed that here the law of nature is infringed, and these two principles exempted from its sway. But this is not so, and to understand the former position more clearly it is to be observed, that of every change there are three stages: the first, when the change begins; the second, while it is in progress; and the third, when it is complete. For instance, waking and sleeping are the two extremes, the intermediate state, or progress from one to the other, is that of falling asleep. So between sleeping and waking there is the middle stage, becoming awake. In like manner, that one should be alive or dead, it is necessary to have passed through the intermediate states of coming to life and dying, which states, as in the case above, must be alternated again, for if sleeping were not reciprocated by waking, all things should at last be buried in unbroken slumber, and equally if dying and death were not reciprocated by becoming alive and life, all nature should eventually sink and be destroyed. Wherefore the soul does not perish by death, but passes to another state, a future life, embittered to the evil, and enjoyed by the good. This argument is founded upon a certainty and an uncertainty. It is certain that in nature nothing new is produced, nor is what does exist destroyed. The production or destruction of anything does not arise from creation or annihilation, but from the union or disunion of its parts. It is uncertain whether all souls existed before their junction with the body, whether they were created in the first instance by the Deity himself, or consisted of material particles. But that the soul, if created by the Deity, does not perish with the body, follows, as well from the rest of the Platonic doctrine, as from what has preceded upon the subject of a divine Providence.—To remove this uncertainty, then, it is to be proved that the thinking faculty of the mind does not arise from a combination of the parts of matter, which will be made appear in the course of the dialogue.

Ἐνθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένης.] Statim ut discedit a corpore. HēIND.


πίστεως, ὃς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
πον καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ,
ἐφι, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποι-
ώμεν; ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογόμενι,
εἶτε εἰκὸς ὦτως ἔχειν εἰτε μὴ; Ἂγωγὸν οὖν, ἐφῆ ὁ Κέ-
βης, ἦδεως ἀν ἄκοισαμι ἡν τινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ
αὐτῶν. Οὐκοῦν γ’ ἀν οἰμαί, ἡ δ’ ὁς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ-
πείν τινα νῦν ἄκοισαντα, οὐδ’ εἰ κωμῳδοποίος εἰς, ὡς
ἀδολεσχὸ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκότων τοὺς λόγους ποι-
οῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρῆ διασκοπεῖσθαι.
§. 15. Σκεφώμεθα δ' αυτὸ τρεῖς πη, εἰτε ἀρα ἐν "Αιδον εἰσίν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τις λόγος, οὗτος

whence ἄνωθεν κ. k. supr., had been originally applied to those who undertook to explain the difficulties and obscurities of natural phenomena, without an adequate knowledge of the subject of which they professed themselves competent to treat; it was subsequently used in a commendatory sense, but continued to be employed in the former by those who could only vituperate the virtues they did not care to possess.

§. 13. Σκεφώμεθα.] Olympiod. ὁ σκοπὸς τοῦ προκειμένου λόγου εἶπειαν, ὅτι ἄνωθεν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτελεῖναν τρόφον τινα μετὰ τῶν χωρισμῶν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Ἰαμβλίχος οὔστα ἐκαστὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνου τὸν ἁπάντας τῆς ψυ- χής—οὔτε γάρ ὁ ἱερωτὸς τούτο χρόνος τῆς ἐκείνης τοῦ προβλήματος, οὔτε ὁ ἀποκριθε- μένος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνωθεν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κέλες ἀρμότητον, εἰ δυνατὸν τῶν Ψυχής χωρισθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώ- ματος ἐπιτελεῖναν καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνον πνεύματος εἰςκοροφίζωσαν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκεῖνον ὅτι ἐπιτελεῖναι χρόνον τινα μετὰ τῶν χωρισμῶν τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν ὑπὲρα, εἰς τὴν ὁ δεῖναι. Πρώτ. Ἀντί τρεῖς πη.] Αὐτὸ is explained by εἰτε ἄρα ἐν ψυχήν κ. c. 123. where the historian evidently refers to the doctrines of the Pythagoreans. How closely the pre-existence of the soul was united with the idea of its immortality amongst the ancient philosophers, appears from the following passage in Cudworth. Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. s. 31. "It is also further, evident that this same principle which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanence after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προϊσ- παρέξεις, or preexistence, and consequently its μετανυσιςωσίς, or trans- migration. For that which did pre- exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But, as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of the ancients admitted it also, yet, Timaeus Locrus, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any other wise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice.—Aristotle tells us again, agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα σοβαρομένων ἐπιτελεῖσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἕκ μυσιον γενεσθαι τε προϊσπαρέξαν- τος. That the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that anything should be made out of nothing preexistent. And, therefore, they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals preexisted before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortal- ity, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there any of the ancients, before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its preexistence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corre- cted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thereunto, afterwards, to establish its permanency after death." Cf. Tertullian de Anim. xxiii. p. 275. "Illus (Platonis) est enim in Phaedone, quod animae bin eumtes sunt illute, et inde huc." Olympiod in Fragn. Orph. p. 510. ed Herm. Όρφικος τε γάρ καὶ Πυθαγόριος οὐ πάλιν ἅγων τὰς ψυ- χας εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀναγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλῳ πολλάκις. in Meton. p. 81. B. καὶ Πύναρος καὶ άλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν πυ- θαγόρων, ὅσοι θείου εἰσα — φασί — τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰκαί ἀθάνα-
ού μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσίν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. Καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποδιανότων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἀλλὸ τί εἶν ἄν ἦμων αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὕσα, καὶ τοῦτο ἵκανον τεκμήριον τοῦ ταύτ᾽ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὅντι φανερῶς γένοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλον ἄν του δεόν λόγου. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ο Κέβης. Μὴ τούνων κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾴδιν μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ἐξελλήμβην ὁσα περ ἐχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἓδωμεν, ἃρ᾽ οὕτωσι
ton καὶ τότε μὲν τελευτήν, ὡς ἐπὶ ἀποθνῄσκων καλοῦν, τοτε ἐπὶ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλυσθαι ἢ ἀνιδώτετε, κ. τ. λ. Ἡ Plat. Epist. vii. 716. B. περισσαὶ ἡ οὕτως ἠκριβῇ ἡ κρίνῃ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἱ ἐπὶ μηνύσσοντι ἦμων ἀθάνατον ψυχήν εἶναι. Compare the following passages from Empedocles: "Αλλο ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐρίων φόνῳ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνοι Ῥήματος, οὐδὲ τις ὑπολείρην θανάτου γενεθλίᾳ (al. lect. τελευτῆ) Ἀλλα μόνον μίξεις τε καὶ ἑκάστης ταύτων ἢστι, φύσες ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁνομαζότας ἀνθρώπωσιν:—and again, Νήμπου, οἱ γὰρ σοὶ ἱερόλαγον φρόνεις εἰπί μέρομμα. Οἱ δὴ γίνοντας πάροι ἐκὼ ἐπὶ τείχουσιν, "Ποιο καταθύμηκαν τε καὶ ἐξολοθρεύοντα ἀπάνητι—Οὐκ ἂν ἀνήρ τοιαύτα σοφὸς φρεσκινὲς μαντεύσατο, "Ὡς ὅφρα μὲν τε μισοῦσι, τοῦ ἔπειραν κακώσω. Τόφοι μὲν ὅτι εἰσί, καὶ σφὶ πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἔθελα Πρὶν εἰ παγηνὰ βροτοί, λυθέτες τ᾽ ὁδέν ἀν εἰς". So Empedocles likewise gives the sense of the ancient philosophers on this head. Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. p. 750: Ὀνήμακε οὐδείν τῶν γονιμῶν, Νεκραμνόμενως ἢ ἀλλο πρὸς ἄλλο Μόρφον ἔστων ἀπειρεῖν. "Agreeably whereunto," observes Cudworth, "Plato also tells us that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition, or doctrine, before his time, τοῖς ζῶσται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώστων γεγογνησία, οὐδεὶν ἔστω τοῖς τεθνεώστας ἐκ τῶν ζῶστων. That as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living; and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancient were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men, more properly, a nativity or birth into life, and what was called generation into life, was, comparatively, rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's proper, or well adverted to out of these gross terrestrial bodies, to a body more thin and subtle, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more gross and terrestrial: Τις οἴδειν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν εἰσὶν καταθυμήκαν, τὸ καταθύμηκεν εἰς ζῆν," Intell. Syst. B. i. c. l. 33.Εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, κ. τ. λ. Ἰ. And if this is indeed the case, namely, that the living are reproduced out of the dead, δε. STALL.—Ἀλλο τε; see Apol. Socr. c. 12, init. Μὴ οὕσαν. ] i. e. οἱ μὴ ἔσαν; see Matthiae Gr. s. 608. 5, d. Τοῦ τοῦτο ζῶων εἶναι, ] i. e. τοῦ τάς ψυ- χας ἢμῶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι. HEIND. Κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων.] With regard to mankind. Matthiae Gr. s. 591, a. Κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν.] Olym. Τις ἐκ τούτων ῥησίων ἀπαθείμηνες, ψηνοῖς τῶν Πλάτων πάσαις ψυχῆς δοξαστίζεν. …Ἀμε- νοῦν ὡς ἐν φιλόσοφος Ἀμφαυάνου ἐξηγή-
χίνηται ἀπαντά, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἑναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει δυνατόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Τοῦτο οὖν σκεφτόμεθα, ἀρα ἀναγκαίον ὅσοις ἐστὶ τι ἑναντίοι, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἑναντίον. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζον τι γίγνεται, ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἐξ ἑλάττους οὕτως πρότερον ἐπείτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναὶ. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἑλάττων γίγνεται, ἐκ μεῖζονος οὕτως πρότερον ὑστερον ἑλάττων γενήσεται; Ἡ ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἴσχυρότερον γε τὸ ἀσθενεστέρων καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρων τὸ ἡλιότητον; Πάνω γε. Τί δαί; ἂν τι χείρον γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείλλοπος, καὶ ἐὰν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἰκανὸς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτως γίγνεται, ἐξ ἑναντίων τὰ ἑναντία πράγματα; Πάνω γε. Τί δ’ αὖ; ἢττι τι καὶ τοιοῦτε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐν μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων

σατο τὸ χαρίον τοῦτο, λέγων ότι τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔθεξε ἐπεισείρημα, τὸ κατασκευάζων τὰ ἑναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἀλλήλα. "Ἅσωνεν.] Fedelemus. HEIND. Vulg. εἰκόνων, σειασι; incorrectly, WYTT. Ἐκ τῶν ἑναντίων τὰ ἑναντία.] Added in explanation of οὕτως preced. Tr. But—taking the whole in connection, let us see, whether all things do not mutually originate in the following manner, that is, in no otherwise than the contrary out of the contrary. StALL. Olympiod. Ὅτι γὰρ τὰ ἑναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἀλλήλα, δείκνυσιν ἡ λέξις τρικόκλεθ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐκ τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς, παρατίθεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἑναντία, καὶ δείκνυσι μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀλλήλα. δεύτερον, ἐκ τῶν γενεσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὄσων, εἰ γὰρ αἱ ὄσοι μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἀλλήλας, οὗν ἡ λειτανίας εἰς τὴν μέλανσιν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἀλλήλας, οὗν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν. τρίτον, ὅτι χωλεσθῇ ή φύσις, εἰ ἐν μὲν τῶν ἑναντίων μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἄλλο, ἐν δὲ οὐ μεταβάλλει. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπιλείποτα θάτερον τῶν ἑναντίων, καὶ οὕτως ἑναντίον ἔσται, τὸ λοιπὸν μεῖζόν ἔχον εἰς ὄ μεταβάλλει. Πλ. 2

This doctrine of the generation of contraries, according to Aristotle, in Phys. 1. c. 6. was held, in common, by nearly all the philosophers.

Τοῦτο οὖν σκέφτηκαν ἀρα ἀναγ. Let us consider this then, whether it be necessary, &c.

Ἀρντό γίγνεσθαι. More accurately, αὐτῶν ἐκατόν γίγν. HEIND. But for a similar change from a plural to a singular, see sup. c. 7. init. αὐτός ἐγε ἐκατόν. n.

Ἅσωνεν ὅν—ἔχομεν τοῦτο. Are we sufficiently assured of this?

Τί δ’ αὖ; ἢττι τ. κ. λ. Olympiod. Ἐνεκθέθην τὸ δευτέρον ἐπεισείρημα, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὄσων, ὅτι αἱ ὄσα ἑναντία εἰς ὄ μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ἀλλήλας, πολλῷ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη. Socrates now proceeds to describe the passage between the two extremes, that is the progress of the change, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐκείρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἑλάττων, and vice versa; whence the ἐν ὑπὲρ, or two generations by which the contraries are
θάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἰκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Δέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σὺ, ἔφη, οὗτοι περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φής τοῖς ζήν τὸ τεθναίναι εἶναι; Ἕγωγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ εὖ ἀλλήλων; Ναι. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γεγονόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τι δαί, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαίον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὁ Κέβης, τὰ ζωντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἰ ψυχ—χαι ἡμῶν ἐν Ἁιδοῦ. Ἅρικεν. Οὐκοίν καὶ τοῖς γενεσίοις τοῖς περὶ ταύτα ἢ γ' ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δὴ ποι. ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτή χωλῆ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως ποι. ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτῃ; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοίν, ἢ δ' ὦς, εἰ περ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἀν εἰς γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὐτῇ, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνω γε. Ὄμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονεναι οὗτοι ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζῶντων. τούτοις δὲ ὦντος ἰκανον που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαίον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχῶν εἰναι ποι. ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεὶ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογεμένων ἀναγκαίον οὔτως ἔχειν.

§. 17. Ἱδε τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὔδ' ἀδι-
lar, that is, if all living were to proceed straight on to death, nor return again, by a winding in the route, to life—all nature gradually should sink in death, and remain buried in an equally profound repose as that of the fabled Eurydyme. But there is in nature a restorative principle, whereby life is produced from death, the living from the dead. Hence is inferred a future state of existence, of which the character depends upon the conduct of those to whom, according as they are good or evil, it must either prove a blessing or a curse. Cf. V. Cousin: “Les contraires naissent des contraires: la mort, de la vie; et la vie de la mort. L'existence est un cercle actif et fécond dont les extrémités opposées reviennent sur elles-mêmes, rentrent sans cesse les unes dans les autres, par deux mouvements contraires qui les séparent à la fois et qui les rapprochent, composent pour décomposer, décomposent pour composer encore. . . . Il faut bien qu'il en soit ainsi, car si la vie engendrait la mort sans que la mort à son tour reproduisît la vie, la mort aurait bientôt aboli tout être vivant, et les propositions harmonieuses de l'éternelle seraient aliénées. Circulus aeterni motus. . . . La vie n'a donc rien à craindre de la mort, en l'âme de la dissolution de ses organes.” Olivier de Plat. tom. 1. 165.

"Οτι οὖν ἀδύνατος ἀμολογ. That we have not rashly or unwisely allowed, οὖν. "Ανταποδοιθή τα ἰτέρα τοις ἰτέ- ραις.] i. e. If matters did not mutually alternate with, or correspond to each other, as if revolving in a circle, οὖν.— Upon the intransitive use of the verb in this passage, see Viger de Idios. cap. v. s. 1. v. 4. Κύκλῳ περιόντα— Cf. in Tim. τούτῳ άμα πάν οίον τρο- χον περιμεθόμενον γίγνεται. Analogous to the above was the opinion of Heraclitus, and some other philosophers, that the rational principle which animated the eternal fire, or ethereal exhalation, καθαρμίας, from which all things in nature were produced, pervaded the universe, and formed, preserved, and destroyed, in perpetual succession, the visible world. Enfield. Philos. B. ii. c. 14.—Μή ανάκαμψαι πάλιν, κ. τ. λ. Α metaphor taken from the stadium, in which καμπύλιο καμπτήριος was applied not only to the goal itself, but to the act of turning round it to return to the place of starting. It is elegantly used, as supra, by Plato, in explaining this doctrine of contraries, for which the Stoics, also, and Epicureans, the sceptic, of Gnosus in Crete, were indebted to Heraclitus. —'Ανα- κάμβτεν signifies merely to round the goal, but καμπύλιον καμπτήριον to return again to the place of starting. This was called the ορόμος ἐν καμπύλῃ, and included the race to the καμπτήριον and back; but sometimes the race ended at the καμπτήριον, and was then called ορόμος ἐκκάμψαι, ἀπολύειν οὐκ ἐδοθ. Ὡντος οὕτων. Commonly inserted πα- ρεπιστώσις by the Greek writers. Cf. de Rep. iii. p. 393. D. Εἰ γὰρ "Ομορφος— μὴ ὡς Χρώμης γενόμενοι ξένες, ἀλλ' ἐτι οὐς "Ομορφος, οἰδ' οὐκ οἷον ἐν μί- μοις ἄν. —Τιλευτώντα, in fine, or at
length. Mathew Gr. s. 557. 4.

'Teleutonta pant' an lirion, k.t.l.] i.e. All things coming to an end would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance: because all nature would then be circumstanced like himself, and he would be no longer remarkable for the singularity of his situation. Heindorf correctly understands δ' Ἐνδυμίωνων as the subject of φαίνοστα, and compares the construction, as supr., with Euthyd. s. 10. φοβομάκει πρὶν αὐτῶν—μή τις φθώρίας ἐκάλυπτε κ. α. ἀλλὰ τι εἰπτήθη γεγονός αὐτόν τῷ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἐπιφθοραῖ (sc. αὐτός.) Wyttenbach explains the passage: ταυδην ονομα λαβοιλα Endymionis nugas esse ostendeat et misquiam apparentem; making παντα the subject of both verbs; but the former interpretation is the more effectual, and equally admissible. The beauty of Endymion, whose slumber was proverbial for their continuance and soundness, captivated Diana, and induced the enamoured deity to visit the object of her love upon Latmos, a mountain of Caria, the favorite place of his repose. Cf. Euthyd. 'Ελέγετο εἰς οὗτοι δέ καθεύθειν, εἴτε ἀστρομορφών ἐπτ ἐφημίας εὑτριβε τῷ ἡφισος τῷ Σελήνῃ δ' εὑς καὶ πρῖν ἤπειρον φαινεστον οὗτος γὰρ ἐπὶ μή ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις πτεροῖς τοῦ Κανώρου φικυ ἀστρομορφήνην σχολάζων εὐθεῖα καὶ ἀνεγράφατο τοῖς σύγχροις ἢκε τῶν ἐθνών ἀστρομορφῆνοι ἐξοιμάτων.

Το τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονός εἰν. ] See Apol. Socr. c. 14. Diog. Laert. ii. 6. records the opening dogma of the system of Anaxagoras; Πάντα χρήματα μη ὤσον, εἰτα νοῦς ἀλὰ ἂν αὐτά ἐκσκόσιμησε. Adhering to the principle, ex nihilo nihil fit, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united and identical, (τὰ ὁμοομορφία), are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which, and disarrangement, he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world; adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and ether, must have been put in movement and animated, at the first, by the Intelligent Principle. Νοὺς he defined to be the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. From this principle he deducts motion, at first circular; the result of which rotation (he maintained) was the separation of the discordant particles; the union and amalgamation of those which were homogeneous; and, in fine, the creation of symmetry and order. Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which he is blamed by Plato; see infr. c. 46.; and by Aristotle, Metaph. 1. 4., who accuses him of using the Deity only as a machine in his philosophy. Accordingly he explained, on physical principles, the formation of plants and animals, and even of the heavenly bodies, as in Apol. Socr. loc. cit. supr. which drew on him the reproach of atheism. He admitted, to a certain extent, the validity of the evidence of the senses; but reserved for reason (λόγος) the discrimination of objective truth. Tennemann's Hist. of Philos. sect. 106. By some, Anaxagoras is asserted to have been the disciple of Hermotimus of Clazomenae, who is said to have recognized a superior Intelligence as the author of nature, and to whose mystical revelations the former is supposed to have been considerably indebted.
Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνησκοῦ μὲν πάντα ὡσα τοῦ ξήν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μενοὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεότα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἀρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτώντα πάντα τεθναίναι καὶ μηδὲν ξῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζώντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζώντα θυσίκου, τὸς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλώθηναι εἰς τὸ τεθναίναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σόκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἄληθεν λέγειν. Ἔστι γὰρ, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης, ὅς ἐμοί δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ὤτω, καὶ ἤμεις αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατάμεθεν ὀμολογούμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεότων τοὺς ζώντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεότων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μὲν γ' ἁγαθαῖς ἁμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

§. 18. Καὶ μήν, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν, καὶ κατ'

βλέψῃ λέχως. Ὠτως εἰ χ' αὕτη—γλώσσαι εξήμορεῖν. Elecr. 23. Ὄσπερ γὰρ ἵππους εὐγενῆς—Ἐν τοῖσι δικαίοις θηρίων οὐκ ἀπολέσατε, ἈΛΛ' ἐρθόν οὐς ἱστήσατε ὑστατὸς τοῦ Ἡμᾶς τ' ὅ-τροφός, ἤκ. ΗΕΙΝΔ.

Ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων.] i. e. From any thing else; not from what once had lived for a time, and then died; but had what lived been once in any way produced, and subsequently died without renewal, it would be impossible but that all things should have come to an end, as the source of life should be wasted and destroyed. So Heindorf explains the phrase, to obviate the necessity of Davier's emendation, εἰ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζώντα μὴ γίγνοιτο.

Τὰς μηχανή.] i. q. Θεόμεια μηχα-νῆ; whence μὴ οὐ is correctly used as in ordinary after a negative. Cf. e. 37. sub. ἐνδ. ἐος ἕτ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα μηκέτι συγχωροῦ, μὴ οὐ ποιεῖν, ἤκ. And inf. εἰ ἐος τοῦτο ἐνδ. ἐος ἔοιεν προσέξατε δάμαστον θαρροῦντι μη οὐκ ἀνοίγοις θαρροῦντι, ἤκ.—Καταναλώθη-ναι εἰς τὸ τεθναίναι, ἐ.τ. what remedy is there against all things being destroyed by death? So Epicurus, in Epist. ad Herodot. Diog. Laert. x. 39. καὶ ε

εφθαρετῷ εἰς τὸ ἀφαιριζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, τάντα οὖν ἀπαλολεῖ τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς αἱ ἐκλειπ-το.—Οὔδε μία; more emphatic, as Stallbaum observes, than οὔδε μία, which signifies simply, none, but the former, none at all, none whatsoever.

Ἐστι τῷ ὄντι—το ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.] From what has preceded, Socrates draws his conclusion of a resurrection from the dead, which is to be followed by the judgment, and the distribution of rewards and punishments, according to the need of the immortal souls. Compare with the text, as supr. St. Paul, Corinth. i. 15. 35. sqq.

§. 18. Καὶ μήν, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates having established the point of the soul's surviving the body, proceeds now to argue in favour of its preexistence. Knowledge or science (μάθησις) he asserts to be, in reality, but reminiscence (ἀναμνήσεις); because, in the first place, if one is fairly questioned upon a subject with which he is unacquainted, his an-
things abstract or intelligible. Of the latter there exist in the mind exemplars or types, by which qualities and degrees are recognized and decided. — What is beautiful, for instance, is acknowledged from its conformity to the idea of beauty preconceived in the mind. So of an action which is perceived by the senses, the merits are weighed by a standard or test which is innate and incorporeal, that is, by a preexisting, abstract idea of the qualities of actions and their degrees of good and evil, not derived from the senses; besides it is from these universal ideas that we arrive at the perception and knowledge of singulars. Consequently their preexistence, and independence of the body, infer that of the mind, which was also living and active before the body came to light. This doctrine, as Wyttenbach justly observes, however ingenious, is not unexceptionable, for it is possible for those abstract ideas to be attained in many ways during life. There are two opposite opinions of philosophers respecting their origin, the one maintained by Aristotle and Locke, that they are acquired through the medium of the senses, and introduced, like the notions of all things external, into the as yet unoccupied mind; the other maintained by Plato, who inculcates their innate- ness and preexistence, upon the grounds that the mind could not understand and acknowledge the appearance of what is presented to the senses, unless there was something within to which the external object might be referred, and with which it might be compared. This latter doctrine has been adopted by Leibnitz; but Plato uses it to prove that the mind existed, while the former would merely infer that it contained those ideas before its union with the body. According to Leibnitz, necessary truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them. — Sensible perceptions are indistinct; all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding. The ideas which relate to objects without the soul, must have a correspondence with such objects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. Tennemann's Manual of Philos. s. 317.

Mâthiasis—ánâmûnas.] Cf. in Menon. c. 15. "L'âme est née de la physis éthânostos te óðsa kai pollákes phýseiv, kai àforakia kai tà évdhê kai tà èn "Aión n kai tânta khrâpata, ónê èstîn o tì ou melâthkei, òôste oúdèn òtheúmaìs kai peri árîtôs kai peri àllwv ouv te èmna ànthn èn ànagnôs-thînìa ðì gê kai peri órîtôn hîpíastato, &c. in Phadr. p. 249. C. òtopò èi ès-tîn ènàmûnas èkèiâou, ðì ònê ouv èmna ànthn ðì physis sýmperóthësa thêî.—ènàmûnêskeivâ ðì òk toutê èkína, ouv ðèfèn ouv, &c. Buthn. in Consol. "Quod si Platonis Musa personat verum, Quod quisque discit inmemor recordatur." This doctrine, which is imputed, as suppr. by Plato, to Socrates, appears to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. V. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 24. and Davis in loc. Augustin. de Immortalit. s. 6. t. i. p. 290. D. De Quantitate Anim. s. 34. p. 310. D. V. Cousin explains the argument, Oeuvres de Plat. i. 165. "Toute science n'est que réminiscence: s'il en est ainsi, il faut que nous ayons eu avant cette vie; il faut donc que l'âme ait existé avant de revêtir cette forme humaine; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"Par exemple, les sens nous découvrent des choses que nous jugions égales; savoir, des arbres, des pierres, &c. — Mais l'idée d'égalité renfermée dans le jugement que nous portons sur ces choses, d'où l'avons nous tirée? L'égalité ne doit pas être confondue avec les choses égales qui ne sont telles que par leur rapport à l'égalité. L'idée de l'égalité ne vient donc point des sens; il suit qu'il faut qu'elle naîsse avec nous, ou que nous l'ayons cue avant cette vie, et qu'à l'occasion des objets extérieurs elle nous revienne à la mémoire. Est-elle innée, et le seul fait de la naissance la développe-t-il en nous ? Loin de là: ce n'est pas en entrant dans ce séjour des ténèbres qu'on découvre la lumière; on la perdrait bien plutôt! Reste donc que nous ayons acquis l'idée de l'égalité avant notre naissance, et que nous ne
ti ἢ ἀνάμμησις τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποι ἦμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ των χρόνων μεμαθηκέ-ναι ἀ νύν ἀναμμηνευόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἄδυνατον, εἰ μὴ ἢν ποι ἦμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἰδεὶ γενέσθαι ὡστε καὶ ταῦτα ἄδανατον τι ἐοικεν ἢ ψυχὴ ἐηναι. Ἀλλ', ὁ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης ὑπολαβόν, ποιοὶ τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησιον με' οὐ γαρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνι μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτόμενοι ὁ ἄνθρωποι, ἐὰν τις καλῶς ἔροτα, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ἢ ἔχει' καὶ τού ἐν ηὗ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἑπιστημή ἐνυόσα καὶ ὀρθός λόγος, οὐκ ἀν οἶοι τ' ἄκαν τούτῳ ποιεῖν. ἐπείτα ἐὰν τις ἐπι τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγγ ἦ ἄλλο

fassions que nous en ressouvenir. Ce que nous disons de l'idée de l'égalité, il faut le être aussi de l'idée du beau, du bien, du juste. Encore une fois, nous ne pensions pas toutes ces idées dans les impressions extérieures, mais nous les trouvions d'abord dans notre âme qui les possédait avant cette vie; il faut alors que notre âme ait existé avant cette vie; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"On voit que nous avons gardé ici à dessein, et avec un respect scrupuleux, les formes et la phraséologie sans laquelle cette théorie célèbre a paru pour la première fois dans le monde philosophique. Mais il faut percer ces enveloppes, pour entrevoir les hautes vérités qui sont dessous. La théorie de la science considérée comme reminiscence, ne nous enseigne-t-elle pas que la puissance intellectuelle prise substantiellement, et avant de se manifester sous la forme de l'âme humaine, contient déjà en elle, ou plutôt est elle-même le type primitif et absolu du beau, du bien, de l'égalité de l'unité, et que lorsqu'elle passe de l'état de substance à celui de personne, et acquiert ainsi la conscience et la pensée distincte en sortant des profondeurs où elle se cachait à ses propres yeux, elle trouve dans le sentiment obscur et confus de la relation intime qui la rattache à son premier état comme à son centre et à son principe, les idées du beau, du bien, de l'égalité, de l'unité, de l'infini, qui alors ne lui paraissent pas tout-à-fait des découvertes, et ressemblent assez à des souvenirs? C'est ainsi du moins que j'entends Platon.

"Ἡρὶ ἐν τρεῖς—εἰδεί.] Explained by Cicero, Tusc. i. 24. "nisi animus autem quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione vigerisset."

"Ἐπεί τις ἐν δύο—καλλιστῷ.] i. e. To comprise all in one most admirable argument; ἐν δύο is in frequent use for ἐν δύο.

"Επείτα ἐὰν τις.] Heindorf and Stallbaum object to ἐπείτα supr., as it is a new argument which is introduced, not the preceding one illustrated by an example. The former would read ἐπι τοι, which is not sanctioned, however, by any of the copies.—Ἐπι τὰ δια-γράμματα; geometrical figures. Cic. Tusc. i. 17. Descriptions, (explained by Fischer,) form, figure, geometrical. Allusion seems to be made here to the passage already quoted from the Meno; where Socrates asks one of the attendant boys in Meno's train, a series of questions upon the properties of a square, to which he makes such answers as might be expected from his age, and at the same time is led, by the easy progress of the interrogatives, to evince such an acquaintance with the subject as might have been supposed consistent with a previous knowledge
of the principles of geometry; which is
adduced by Socrates as a proof of his
argument.

Katagorai.] Sc. ὃ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ
diaxúmbata, or it may be taken im-
personally in the sense of, it appears,
like ἐσῆλος, προσημαίνει, ἐαἰεῖ, &c. Heind.

'Απιστίας γὰρ.] For you hesitate to
admit, &c.

Διόμει παθεῖν.] i.e. But I require
to be made sensible of this very thing,
which is the subject of the argument,
that is, to be reminded. Simmias evi-
dently refers here to the preceding ἀ-
νάμνησις, with which Ficinus, who
reads ἰόμαι μαθεῖν, understood ἀνα-
μνησθῆναι, as synonymous, but incor-
correctly, as Serranus justly observes, as it
should have been in this case preceded
by the article τὸ, besides that the ob-
vious bearing of the whole passage is
against it. Simmias means to say, that
he did not disbelieve the doctrine, but
wished his memory to be refreshed up-
on it, whence he asks, as supr. ποῖα
tοιῶν αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπάρχουσιν μὲ,
&c. And he now addresses Socrates to
a similar effect, and desires to be made
recollect what had been previously ar-
gued upon the very subject of all our
knowledge being nothing but recollection.
All the copies read μαθεῖν, which
is adhered to by Wyttenbach, who
would insert ὑ before πείρι, and ex-
plains the passage: hoc_autum_irisam,
s.ii. τῶς ἀναλομμένη μαθὴς ἀνα-
mnησις ἵστων, desidero discere, aut re-
minisci, de quo nunc logismur. But
Serranus first altered it to παθεῖν, which
is in every respect suitable to the sense
of the text as supr., and has been adopted
by Heindorff, who supports the present
reading by comparing what follows
shortly after: ὦ ὁκινέω—τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνά-
mnησις τῖς ἑστι; μᾶλιστα μὲντοι
ὅταν τις τοιῶν πάθῳ περὶ ἑστὶν ἤ
ὕπτω χρόνῳ καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκεπτεῖν
ἡμὶ ἐπιλέγοισθε; c. 19. init. ἢδ' ἵνα
ἀναγεννήσῃ πόλει προπάσχων, ἤνοιξι,
&c. c. 25. Ἰδεύει τοιοῦτο τὶ—ἐξ ἑβ-
μᾶς ἀνερθάσαί λαϊτούς, τὸ ποιφ τιν
ἄρα προσῆη τούτῳ τὸ πάθεσι πᾶσ-
χειν, τὸ διασκεδάζωσαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ
tὸ τοῖν ποίν τινς ἐείπεσαι, &c.

Οὐδὲν μὲντ' ἄν ἤττου ἔκειν.] i.e.
Nevertheless, I would now hear how you
essay to argue the subject; an being
taken with ἀκοινομα, as Stallbaum, after
correctly observes, and not as Wytten-
bach proposes, with μὲντοι in the sense
of'tamea'. Heindorff, from Ficinus, v. Lat.
1st., would insert ἦττου after ἤττου.

'Ὅταν ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.] See infr.
c. 34. τὸ ἄκοψαστὸν.
Δέ τινα τρόπον τούτον' εάν τίς τι έτερον ἣ' ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσειν λαβών μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνῷ, ἄλλα καί έτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὗ μὴ ἡ αὕτη ἐπιστήμη ἄλλ' ἄλλη, ἀρ' οὐχὶ τούτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμυνήσθη οὗ τῆς ἐννοιαν ἐλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἶον τὰ τοιάδε' ἄλλη πον ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπον καί λύρας. Πῶς γάρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν οίσθα ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται, ὅταν ἐδώσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἥ τι ἄλλο οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτοῦ ἐώθεν χρήσθαι, πᾶσχουσι τούτῳ ἐγνωσάν τε τῆν λύραν καί ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλαβον τὸ εἴ- δος πον παιδὸς οὐ ἢν ἢ λύρα; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνά- μυνήσις· οἷς πέρ γε καὶ Συμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέ- βητος ἀνεμυνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα πον μυρία τοιαῦτ＇ ἀν εἰη. Μυρία μέντοι νη Δ᾿, ἐφή ὁ Συμμίας. Οὐκοῦν ἢ δ' οὐ, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμυνήσις τίς ἐστι; μᾶλλον

'Εάν τίς τι έτερον.] i. c. If one should, by sight or hearing, or any other perception, receive an idea of some one object distinct from any other, (as the idea of a lyre, which is distinct from that of its owner,) and along with this idea should receive another impression, (that of the owner of the lyre,) of which the knowledge is equally distinct as in the former instance, how is it not justly argued that he remembered that of which the latter impression was so received? V. Cousin renders the passage; Par exemple, lorsqu’un homme en voyant ou en entendant quelque chose, ou en l’apercuevant par quelque autre sens, n’acquiert pas seulement l’idée de la chose aperçue, mais en même temps pense à une autre chose dont la connaissance est pour lui d’un tout autre genre que la première, ne disons-nous pas avec raison que cet homme se ressouvient de la chose dont il a pensé occasionnellement.


Ἡσ. τοῦτο. | ι. c. Are thus affected. *Ἐγνωσάν την λύραν, κ. τ. λ.| Whenever any habitual occurrence, or any customary event is mentioned, without its being an express narrative, the Greeks frequently have, instead of the pres., by which it is stated in other languages, and even the Greek itself, the aor. (which then marks an indefinite time in the strictest sense.) Demosth. Olynth. 2. Μικρὸν σταίσαμεν ἀνέχασ- τας καί διέλυσα πάντα, a small mistake overthrows and destroys all again. Buttmann’s Λr. Gr. Gr. s. 137. Obs. 5. So infr. πολλάκις—ἀναμνήσθη, where the adverb explains the full force of the aorist.—Τοῦτο διέστιν ἀνάμυνήσει.—Matthæus Gr. s. 440. 7.

Μέντοι νη Δ᾿.] Μέντοι is of fre- quent occurrence in answers, in the sense of certainly, very true, indeed. Matthæus Gr. 622. 6.
μέντοι ὅταν τὶς τοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἄ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκόπεῖν ἡδὴ ἐπιλέξεστο; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί δαί; ἢ δ’ ὡς ἐστὶν ἢππον γεγραμμένου ἱδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθήναι, καὶ Σιμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμίαν ἀναμνησθήναι; Ἡστὶ μέντοι, ἐφη.

§. 19. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἔμβαινει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἀφ’ ὁμοιῶν, ἐκεῖνα δὲ καὶ ἀπ’ ἀνομοίων; Ἐμβαίνει. Ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνηστικὰ τίς τι, ἢρ’ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ—δε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἰ τε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκεῖνον ὑπὸ ἀνεμνησθῆν; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὡς, εἰ ταῦτα οὐτωσ ἐχει. φαμέν ποὺ τι εἰναι ἵσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ’ ἄλλο τούτων οὐδέν, ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτέρον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον, φωμέν τι εἰναι ἡ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νη Δι’, ἐφη ὁ Σιμίας, θαν-

'Υπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μη ἐπ.] i. e. Owing to length of time and want of observation.

Αὐτὸν Σιμίαν.] Simmias himself; as opposed to his picture, Σιμίας—γεγραμμένον, supr.

§. 19. Τοῦτο προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.

See Matthiae Gr. 472. 2. b.

Εἰ τι τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο—ἐκεῖνον.] i. c. Whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect, or not, of that which he remembered.

Φαμέν ποὺ τι εἰναι ἵσον. See supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἰναι ἐκαίαιν. n. c. 50. init. Socrates alludes here to the τὸ ἵσον παρεμερές, the equality supposed by the vulgar to exist between one thing and another, which were in reality unequal, and the τὸ ἀκριβὴς ἵσον, or αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον ἀκριβεῖς, which is the idea of equality contained within the mind, and from which it is made apparent, that there is no actual equality or similitude between the things in nature; "Τανταμ enim," says Quintillian, In. Or. x. 11., "difficultatem habet similitudo, ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc loco evaluaret, ut non res quae simillimae videantur discriminate aliiquod discernatur." Whence it appears that the ancients were not unacquainted with those views of the subject which have occupied the attention of more recent philosophers. GOTTI.

Οὐ ξύλον ξύλῳ λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] Olymp. Τὸ ἐνταῦθα ἵσον οὐκ ἄκριβες ἐστί. πως γὰρ ἄκριβες ἵσον τὸ καὶ ψαμμῖον μεγέθους ἀφανεθέν τος ἢ προστάτη- τος ἵσον μείναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡμοῖοι οὐ- δὲν ἄκριβες, οὐδὲ ἀκόμην κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. ἀπὸ οὖν τοῦ παρα- προῖ τὸ ἵσον ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκριβες ἵσον ἐρ- χεται.


Φῶμεν μέντοι νη Δι.] Olympiod.
O ἐὰν Σιμμώς ἐτοίμως (ἐχει) τῷ εἶναι τὰ εἰσὶν ὑπὸ καὶ ὅρκον ἐπάγει καὶ φη- σίν ὅτι ὑπαρξισίως πέτεισμαι, ὡς συ- νήθης τῶν Σωκρατικῶν ἑγώματι— ὁμοιάζων γε; h. c. σφάλμα.

Ποθὲν λαβόντες.] Sc. ἐπιστήμων. Ἄρα οὐ λάθει—τοῦτο ἓν ὀνόμαν. Socrates asks whether it does not sometimes occur, that stones which are equal, and logs which are so likewise, although they continue the same, yet at one time seem equal, and again seem not? That is, of the objects submitted to the senses, of which an equality, τὸ ἴσον παρχόμενον, may be in the first instance affirmed, this property, though the objects remain unaltered, is not invariable, for it is liable to be affected by a change of the judgment, but the αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον remains unchangeably the same. Socrates evidently intends to draw this distinction between the objects of sense, and their intelligible forms, that the latter only admit of being certainly known, and are the only tests of truth. This is the view taken of the passage by Stallbaum; Heindorf explains it: eodem lapides cademque ligna aliud lapidis lignoceae equidem apparere aliī inquirentia: contra equale ipsum, αὐ- τὸ τὸ ἴσον, semper esse aequale, nonquam inaequale; and for φαινεται would read ὁκεῖ, but either is applicable to the objects of sense. He objects further to τοτῆς μὲν, and τοτε ἑκάτερος, and proposes τῷ μὲν—τῷ ἑκάτερον. This is unnecessary, however, from the position which ἵσος may be made to occupy in the interpretation of the sentence which is thus given by Stallbaum; enim interdum accidit ut lapides et ligna sibi equalia, quamquam cadem sunt tam modo equalia, modo inaequalia vi-deantur, h. c. sensibus apparent. This is decidedly preferable, the question being simply to decide upon the superriority of the ideal over the corporeal in the investigation and discernment of truth. Upon τοτὲ δ’ οὖ, see Matthiae Gr. s. 608. 5. c.

Ἄντι τὰ ἴσα.] i. q. αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, but used in the plural, as the affection, not of one, but several minds. So Olym- piod Cod. i. ex Plut. t. v. p. 741. Wytt, ο’τι τοτῆς μὲν ἴσον, τοτε ἑκάτερο ισα λέγει ἢ τις τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποβλέπων γώσα, ἵνα ἐκάστῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴσον’ ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ νῳ ἀποκύσιον, τὸ ἐς πε- πληθυσμένον τῷ ψυχήν ἐντάθη γὰρ τὸ ἐν πάλλα, ἔι τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ προς ἑαυτήν ὑποβάσθην. Cf. Parmenid. c. 7. Ἐν μέν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοία τις ἀπι- φαινεται ἄνωμοι γεγόνοντα ἡ τὰ ἄνω- μοια ὁμοία, τέρας ἀν’ οἴματι, ἦν, &c. Ac- cording to Heindorf, the plural may be used, because more than one object is involved in the notion of equality or si- militude.

Ταυτά—τὰ ἴσα.] Applied, demonstratively, to the individual objects submitted to the senses.
ēπιστήμην ἐννενόηκας τε καὶ εἰληφας; Ἅληθέστατα, ἐφή, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ὁμοίων ὄντος τούτως ἡ ἀνομοίων; Πάνω γε. Διαφέρει δὲ γ, ἢ δ' ὦς, οὖν. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἰτε ὁμοίων εἰτε ἀνομοίων, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐφή, αὐτὸ ἀνάμυνσιν γεγονέναι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δαὶ τὸδ; ἢ δ' ὦς. ἡ πάσχομεν τι τοιούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐνίλοις τε καὶ οὐς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοὺς ῥήσου; ἀρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἦσα εἶναι ὡς περ αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστὶν ἦσον, ἢ ἐνδεὶ τι ἐκείνου τῷ μὴ τοιούτων εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἦσον, ἢ οὖν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἐφή, ἐνδεὶ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τὶς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βουλεῖται μὲν τούτῳ, ὁ νῦν ἐγὼ ὑρῷ, εἶναι οἶον ἄλλῳ τὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιούτων εἶναι οἶον ἐκεῖνο, ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦ τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προείδότα ἐκείνο ὁ φησίν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεοεστέρως δὲ ἐχεῖν; Ἀνάγκη. Τὶ οὖν; τὸ τοιούτων πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὖ, περὶ τε τὰ ἦσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἦσον; Παντάπασι γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἀρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἦσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἦσα ἐννοήσα-μεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ· εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἦσον,

"Ὅταν οὖν.] "Εσος γάρ ἐν ἄλλο, κ. τ. Λ. Βρικ. Ἄλλο ὀδὼν—ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς.] The distinction must be observed here between the perception of the eye and of the mind, which are both caused by the same glance. Both together constitute the ἀνάμυνσις of Socrates, as he proceeds to prove.——Αὐτῷ ἀνάμυνσιν γε- γονέναι—αὐτῷ, i. e. τὸ ἄλλο ἰδόντα ἄλλῳ νοήσαι. Ἀρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν.] Added in explanation of ὁ πάσχομεν τί—τοῖς ἰσοῖς preced. Ἡ ἐνδεὶ τι ἐκείνου.] Sc. τοῦ ἦσον. Οτι βουλεῖται μὲν τοῦτο.] Βού- λομαι, and ἐθέλειν, signify to intend, to aim or endeavour, and are used in this sense of things as well as persons. Ἀναγκαῖον—τυχεῖν προείδότα ἐ- κείνο, κ. τ. Λ.] Οlymp. "Ὅτι γάρ ὑπε- τέρα ἐστὶ γνώσις, ἐνθοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ μετά- βασις. εἰ γάρ πρῶτῃ ἢν, οὐδὲν προσ- τίθεναι ἥνως ἡγενάμεθα, οὐδὲ μετά- βασις ἐγίγνετο. ὁ γὰρ τῶν εἰκόνα Σωκράτους θεασάμενος, μὴ πρότερον εἰ τῶν Σωκράτην θεασάμενος, ιστα- ται μέχρι τῶν εἰκόνων.—Ἀνάγκ. ποι, either εἶναι may be understood here, or the construction explained by an anaclouthon. Τὸ τοιούτων πεπόνθαμεν.] i. e. Are we similarly affected; as ὁ πάσχομεν τί τ. supr. Ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα τ. εἰν.] h. c. Ploc omnia, (τὰ ἦσα) appeteri ipsi equalitatis specieei fieri similia, nec ta- men fieri posse. STALL. According to
Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *iētaī*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. *ὅτι προθέρμηται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι οἷον ἕκεν*, κ.τ.λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι for πάντα ταύτα εἶναι as supr. Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *iētaī*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. *ὅτι προθέρμηται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι οἷον ἕκεν*, κ.τ.λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι for πάντα ταύτα εἶναι as supr. Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *iētaī*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. *ὅτι προθέρμηται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι οἷον ἕκεν*, κ.τ.λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι for πάντα ταύτα εἶναι as supr. Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *iētaī*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. *ὅτι προθέρμηται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι οἷον ἕκεν*, κ.τ.λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι for πάντα ταύτα εἶναι as supr. Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *iētaī*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. infr. *ὅτι προθέρμηται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι οἷον ἕκεν*, κ.τ.λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαύτα εἶναι for πάντα ταύτα εἶναι as supr.
meiζουν και τὸ ἑλαττὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοι-αὕτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὲσον νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλ-λόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου, καὶ ὁ περ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων οίς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὁ ἐσ-τι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἀπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσ-θαι εἰληφέναι. Ἡ ζωτὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόν-τες μὴ ἐκάστοτε ἐπιλεξήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀδὲ γίγνεσθαι

gεν] Τιν ἄντε ὀριτόν θυτοῦ, τιν στατίων οὐ καίρων. STALL.
Περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.] Beauty, Plato considered to be the sensible re-
presentation of moral and physical per-
fec tion; consequently it is one with
truth and goodness, and inspires love
(ἔρως) which leads to virtue. (Platonic
'Ὁ περ λέγω.] See Apol. Soc. c. 5.
sub. fin.
Οἶς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἐστι.] h. e. Quibus τῆς οὕσιας σιγμων ἰνπρι-
nίμων, quia noninve essentia insigni-
nis. STALL. Upon which we set the seal
of substance, οὕσια, or real existence, τὸ
ἄν, as opposed to the φαινόμενον or
apparent truth. The source of know-
ledge, Plato pronounces to be not the
evidence of our senses, which are oc-
cupied with contingent matter, nor yet
the μανδινοσ, but reason, whose
object is that which is invariable and
absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὄν.) He held the
domain of the existence, in the soul, of
certain innate ideas, (νοηματα), which
form the basis of our conceptions, and
the elements of our practical resolutions.
To these ἵδαι, as he termed them, (the
eternal παράδειγματα, types or models
of all things, and the ἀρχαι, or princi-
ples of our knowledge,;) we refer the
infinite variety of individual objects pre-
sented to us (τὸ ἀπέραντον, and τὰ πολ-
λαί), Hence it follows that all these de-
tails of knowledge are not the result of
experience, but only developed by it.
The soul recollects the ideas in propor-
tion as it becomes acquainted with their
copies (ὑμοιώματα), with which the
world is filled; the process being that
of recalling to mind the circumstances
of a state of pre-existence. Inasmuch,
as the objects thus presented to the
mind correspond in part with its ideas,
they must have some principle in com-
mon: that principle is the Divinity, who
has formed these external objects after
the model of the ideas. Tennemann's
Man. of Phil. s. 132.
'Ερωτῶντες καὶ — ἀποκρινόμενοι.] So infr. c. 25. a med. ἡ οὕσια, ἡς λό-
γον ἐκδόμεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες
καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, i.e. ἐκδηλώμενοι,
discussing or arguing in the form of ques-
tion and answer. Cf. Theet. p. 146. C.
ἐμι καὶ σὲ δὲ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ ἀπο-
κρινόμενους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαντας αὐ-
τοῖς περὶ τῶν λόγων.
Καὶ εἰ μὲν λα βόντες — εἰδέναι.] Socrates had already arrived at the
conclusion, that those ideas which constitut-
ed knowledge had been received by the
mind before birth. He now unfolds the
subject more fully and expressly, and
argues, that if this knowledge, having
been once received, was not in every
instance lost at the time of birth, we
should be born with it, and possess it
through life, for to know anything is to
retain the knowledge of it when once
acquired, as obli vious or forgetfulness is
to lose it afterwards. If, then, we were
possessed of this knowledge before being
born, and are unconscious of it at the
period of our birth, and that it is sub-
sequently so called into operation as to
convey a satisfactory proof of its pre-
existence in the mind, it should be
called remembrance. If we would designate it correctly. This view of the passage appears to be borne out by the succeeding portion of the chapter, which is devoted to a development of the same principle, and closes with a statement in sum of both sides of the question; either that we are born conscious of those ideas, and continue so through life, or, the knowledge is revised after a temporary loss; in other words, it is remembrance, which is the position to be proved.


Δυνατὸν γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο γ' ἔφάνη, αἰσθόμενον τι ἣ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τοῦτον ἐννοοῦσα ὁ ἐπελέληστο, ὁ τοῦτο ἐπιληψαζέν ἀνόμωσιν ὅν ἢ ὣ ὀμοίων. ὡστε ὁ περ λέγω, δυοῖν βάτερον, ήτοι ἐπιστάμενοι τε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίων πάντες, ἢ υστερον οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλῃ ἡ ἀναμνήσκομαι οὕτοι καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἄν εἶπ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ Σώκρατες.

§. 21. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ ὁ Συμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἁναμνήσκεσθαι υστερον ὑν
πρότερου ἐπιστήμην ἐλληφότες ἦμεν; Ὁυκ ἔχω, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δὲ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ηὐ προϊ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἀν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ; Πολλή ἀνάγκη, ἐφή, ὡς Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσιν σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν ὡς δῆ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλομένην μὲν ἑν, ἐφή ὁ Σύμμιας· ἄλλα πολὺ μάλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὐρίον τηνυκάδε οὐκ-έτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἄξιος οἷος τε τοῦτο ποιήσαι. Ὁυκ ἀρὰ δοκοῦσίν σοι ἐπιστασθαί γε, ἐφή, ὡς Σύμμια, πάντες αὐτά; Ὀυδαμῶς. Ἀναμμηνησκοῦνται ἄρα ὁ ποτε ἐμαθοῦ; Ἐνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἂθ' οὐ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἀρὰ. Ναί. Ἡσαν ἀρὰ, ὡς Σύμμια, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερου, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνη-σιν ἔχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἀμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ταῦτα τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὖνος γὰρ λεί-πεται ἐτὶ ὁ χρόνος. Εἴεν, ὡς ἐταίρην· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτῶς ὑπὸ ἄλλω χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντες γε αὐτῶς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν· ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ὁ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἡ ἔχεις ἄλλον

§. 21. Ὡν νῦν ἐρ̄ ἐλέγομεν.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 473. a.

Πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ [as in Latin vereor ne, cave ne] is only a softened expression of a categorical declaration, and then the other negations which follow μή, with the subjunctive, are expressed by οὐ. See Matthiae Gr. s. 608. 5. a. Obs. 2.—Ἀδύνατον τηνυκάδε, this time to-morrow.

Πάντες αὐτά.] Sc. περὶ ὧν νῦν ἐδὲ ἐλέγομεν, as appears from what proceeds, where, as here, reference is made to the ideas of the beautiful, the good, &c.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἀμα γιγνόμη] i.e. Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge at our birth.

Ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ.] At what other time, sc. than that of our being born: the argument then is, we cannot receive these ideas at our birth, for that is the time when they are admitted to be lost; nor can any other period be made out in which we may be said to lose them. Olympiod. Exerp. Cod. i. p. 62. Ὡτ' ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ γενέσθαι σφαδροτάτη μεταβολή ἐστιν αὕτη ἔτι ἐκπλήττεται τὴν μνήμην καὶ παράτισσα λήθην ποιεῖ· τότε ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἡ λα-βομέν ἐπιστήμην πρότερον ἄρα τού σώματος· ἦντο δὲ προσεχεῖς, ὡς εἰ τῶν νεοτέρων τῶν ἡκ πειρασάμεν, &c. καὶ ἐκ προγενετέρων ἐτὶ βιῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔχοντες γε αὐτῇ. In reference to Οὐκ ἄρα ἐδοκοῦσιν—ἐπι-στασθαὶ—πάντες αὐτά, supra.
Heindorf observes that the part of the aorist is always joined to the aorist λαθέων, as in the form λάθε βίωσας, and quotes Protag. s. 31. ἡλαθὼν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς ἐνυμαίες. Demosth. Leptin. c. 104. ἵνα μὴ λάθητε ἐξαπατηθεῖτες, &c. Stallbaum had expressed himself as nearly of the same opinion, ad Philib. p. 86, but found reason to change it from the following passages amongst others; in Criton. c. 10. ἡλάθομεν ἤμας αὐτῶν παῖδων ὄντων ἐναφέρομεν. Thuc. c. 169. C. μὴ πως παιδεύω τι λάθομεν εἴδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι. De Repub. vi. p. 486. Ὁ. μὴ σε λάθη μετίχυσα ἀνελεῳθια. Ibid. v. p. 457. Ὁ. ἀλλὰ ὅσα ἡλάθες — ἀποτελέσας, &c.

§. 22. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν.] Vulg. καλὸν τί τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν, which is neither sanctioned by the best copies, nor by the sense of the passage, the present question not being whether any thing deserved to be called beautiful and good, but whether there was the αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν and αὐτὸ τὸ ἁγαθὸν, which alone had a real existence; whence οὖσία, i. e. αὐτὸ ἱκαστὸν, ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν.— Cf. Parmenid. p. 152. καὶ μὴ οὖσία ἄρα εἰπέρ μη ἐστί.

Καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήματος.] h. c. Et ad harum essentiarum notiones ea, quae sensibus percepitur, omnia referimus. Heind. "Ἀλλ' ὠς.] In vain.

Εἰς καλὸν γε.] i. e. The argument has an excellent or apposite tendency, in establishing that our soul exists, in like manner, previous to our birth, as also the substance of which you are speaking now. "Ως οὖν τε μαλίστα.] With all pos-
Tί δὲ δὴ Κέβητὶ; ἐφὴ ὦ Σωκράτης· δεὶ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανὸς, ἐφὴ ὦ Συμμίας, ὃς ἔγωγε ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοι τον καρποτότατον ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' ὃιμα οὐκ ἐνδεώς τούτῳ πεπείθθαι αὐτὸν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ήμᾶς ἢν ἥμων ἡ ψυχή.

§. 23. Εἰ μὲντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐτί ἐσταὶ, οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφὴ, ὦ Σωκρατεῖ, ἀποδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτί ἐνέστηκεν, ὦ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἐλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀμα ἀποθνῄσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάζεται ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτή τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἥ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ἔμπνευσθαι ἀλλὸθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειν σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τοῦτον, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾷν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Ἐδ λέγεις, ἐφὴ, ὦ Συμμία, ὦ Κέβης· φαίνεται γὰρ ὅτι περ ἡμίου ἀποδεῖχθαι οὐ δει, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ήμᾶς ἢν ἥμων ἡ ψυχή· δεὶ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὦτί καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, οὐδὲν ἤτοι ἐσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐξειν. Ἀποδεικται μὲν, ἐφὴ, ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὦ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθέειναι

sible certainty.

Καρποτότατος ἀληθείᾳ.] Καρποτοί καὶ μαλάκοι are terms in frequent use with Plato, by whom they are applied, respectively, to those who are persevering and obstinate, or those who are easily convinced, and yielding in debate.

Οὖν εὐδεῖσι.] Sufficiently, satisfactorily.

§. 23. Εἰ μὲντοι.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 617. 5.

"Εἰς ἐνέστηκεν.] Is still in the way, i.e. obstructs conviction. —"Ὅποις μὴ, lest; see Viger, c. vii. s. 10. r. 4. Matthiae Gr. 565. Obs. 2.—Διασκεδάζεται; a form of the subjunctive for διασκεδάζεται, as c. 24. init. μὴ —διαφωνά καὶ διασκεδάζεσθαι για διασκεδάζεσθαι. V. Buttmann. Gram. Ampl. t. p. 510.

Ἀλλὰδὲν ποθὲν.] From some place or other, ἀμβδὲν ποθ. Bekk.—"Επειδὰν ἢν ἐνέστηκεν, Intell. εἰς ἀνθρώπων σῶμα.

Προσαποδέ ταί ὅτι καὶ ἰτ.] The second part of the argument Cebes asserts to be still wanting, the proof that the soul survives the body, and is not lost when it leaves it. This, Socrates answers, is sufficiently apparent to himself, for it is a natural consequence of what had been demonstrated already; since, if it be true that nothing in nature is destroyed, but merely undergoes a change, and if it be equally true that the mind is possessed of a certain knowledge without the aid of the body, it is necessary that the soul should survive the death of the body. But to remove all
doubt on the subject the philosopher proceeds from c. 24. to advance new arguments upon this branch of the subject.

Τεθνάναι.] Status hominis mortali; θανάτος, transitus ex vita in illum statum. Wyt.

§ 21. Διαπραγματεύσασθαι.] To discus, or examine into diligently, as c. 45. supr. περί γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.

Τὸ τῶν παϊδῶν.] Id quod prii faciam, οἷον τὰ τῶν παιδῶν. Staii. Id quod prii disserat, as τῶν λόγων, τὸ τῶν ὘μήρων. Heind.

Διαφρασάκαι διασκεδάνωσιν.] Should disperse and destroy. The doctrine of the destruction of the soul by the dispersion and dissolution of its component atoms, upon the death of the body, was inculcated by Epicurus, and adopted by his followers. He compared the soul to the eye, which is incapable of sight when detached from the organization to which it properly belongs.

Μὴ ἐν νηρείᾳ.] h. e. Non tum, quum fuerit venturus pae, sed tum, quum venter vehementer scuerat. Fisch. — Suidas, in v. Ταύτων, ex Alex. Aphrodis. — Νηρείαι καὶ γαλήνη, ὡς αὐτῆς ὁ γὰρ γαλήνη ἐν θαλάσσῃ, τὸν οὐρανόν διασκεδάσηαι ἐν ᾧ ὁ πνεῦμα. Νηρείαι γαλήνης ἀνίμων. Ως εἴδωλαν. — As genitives absolute are sometimes found where the participle should conform to the case of the preceding noun, so the genitive or accusative absolute are used as supr. instead of the case of the preceding noun. Matthiae Gr. s. 568. 3.

Ἀναπείθειν.] Some copies read μεταπείθειν: ἀνίμα and μετὰ, both, in composition, convey the idea of some change or alteration, whence either reading would answer as implying the persuasion to adopt a new opinion: ἀναπείθειν, adiutum est sententiam persuaderi. V. Abresch. Dilucid. Thucyd. Auct. p. 258. Wyt.

Ἐν ὑπὲρ παῖς.] It might be supposed, as Wyttenbach observes, at first, that allusion was made here to Apollodo-
merely parodied, and was therefore neglected and unenlightened, attempts to be puerile and irrational. So the ancients interpreted the passage: 'tou en vμν μπαίναν, μεριμνάν ἦν ἀκόμην ναύτα τά παθή.—Themist. Or. i. p. 13. Д. ἐστι γάρ τις en ἡμῖν, ἀν πάις, ὃς φησίν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' ὄνος τις ἐκεῖνης οἰκίας, φιλόνεικος γένεσις ἔραστής, &c. V. Cousin renders it, Prevails that we the craig ions, ou plutôt que ce n'est pas nous qui le craignions, mais qu'il pourrait bien y avoir en nous un enfant qui le craignit; tâches donc de lui apprendre à ne pas avoir peur de la mort, comme d'un masque difforme; and adds upon the passage, "J'entends παιδίς τις ἐν ἡμῖν comme les Alexandrins. La preuve de ce sens philosophique est l'opposition de ἡμῖν and en ἡμῖν. Ce n'est pas nous, dans notre essence propre, ce n'est pas moi qui craint la mort; mais c'est quelque chose en nous, un élément étranger au moi, quoi qu'accidentellement en rapport avec lui la partie puérile de l'âme. en ἡμῖν opposé à ἡμίων ne peut vouloir dire que dans nous, et non parmi nous, ce qui serait nécessaire au sens ordinaire: il y a peut-être parmi nous un enfant."

Τὰ μορφολογεῖα.] See in Crion. c. 6. μορφολόγισμα.

'Επίθετα. To charm or enchant; hence to soothe or tranquillize. This word appears to have been used on account of μορφολογεῖα preceded. The mind is diseased when it dreads the approach of death as it would the supernatural, and it must be relieved of its complaint by those remedies which are most likely to operate towards its eventual cure. Whence Plato has adopted the term, which seems to have been familiar with the medical practitioners in Greece, who not unfrequently had recourse to the ἐπιθέσει in the treatment of such disorders as arose from a morbid imagination. Cf. Charmid. p. 213. — ἐπιθέμεν δέ τινι τῷ φαρμακῷ εὐμ. ἦν εἰ μὲν τις ἐπίθεμεν ἄμα καὶ χρόνο, πανταπασιν ἄμα τοι τῷ φαρμακῷ ἄ- νευ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθέσει, ἀδέν φύλεσεν εἰς τοῦ φίλλου.—A little further on (p. 211.) condemning the system of those who in relieving the body did not extend their care to the mind, Plato explains the ἐπιθέσει.—Οὐκ απειράθεται τῷ φυ- χνῷ ἐπίθετος τινι τάς δὲ ἐπίθεσις ταύ- τας, τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλλίερ- κε δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς φυ- χαίς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεται, ἢ γη- γνωμονίας—μῦτον ἡ ἦν εἰναι τινών ἀγίαις, &c. Cf. Horat. Epist. i. 1. 31. "Sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenirelo dolorum Possis, et magnam morbi deponere partem," Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 191. εἰσίν εἲ ἐπιθεταὶ καὶ λόγοι θελη- κτόριοι φανερεῖται τι τῆς φαρ- μακοῦ νόσου. 'Εξεπιθέσετε.] Ἐξεπιθέσει, properly, to disenchante, signifies here, to alleviate or cure. Some copies read ἐξιάσηται, others ἔξεπιθεται, extravagabatur. Cf. Sophocl. Oed. Colon. 1193. εἰσί χαράς χοναι κακα καὶ καλας δεδεῖ, ἀλλὰ νοοθετούμενοι Φίλων ἐπιθεταῖς ἐξε- παθέντων φύσις. Πάθεν οὖν ὅλα ἐπιθετεῖται. ὡς ἐπιθετεῖται ἡ ἐπιθετεῖται. "Examples are frequent of a similar repetition of ἐπιθετεῖται. Xenoph. (Econ. viii. 15. 'Ο δ' εἶπεν, ἐπιθετοποιῶν, ἐπιθετεῖται ἡ ἐπιθετεῖται, τι συμβαίνει συμβαίνει, τῷ καίται, ἐπιθετεῖται, ἡ ἐπιθετεῖται τῷ ἐπιθετεῖται, &c. Sueton. Cæsar. 32. " Tunc Cæsar, Eatur, inquit, quo deorum ostenta et inimicōrum iniuitas vocat. Jacta alia esto in- quit."

Πολλ' ἐνι 'Ελλάς.] Cf. Theo-
andres, polla de kai ta tou barbararow genh, ouvs pantas xri diepenaosthi zetountas toioouton epwdoyn, mitha xrematow feidomeinous mitha pinovn, ovs ouk estin eis o ti an evkairoteron anvaliskoite xrimata. Zeteyin de xri kai autous met alloiloiv uswos gar an oudede radios euroite mallon umon dunamemonov touto poiein.

'Allla tauita men dh, ephi, uparxei, o Kebhs othein de apelipomene, epanellomene, ei sou idomenei estin. 'Allla mou idomenoi gei pous gar ou mellei; Kalwos, ephi, legeis.

§ 25. Oukoivn toiounde ti, oph de o Sokrathe, dei

'Allla tauita men — uparxei. h.c. Sed hoc quidem supputent, non decernat. i.e. but this shall be done, indeed, and shall certainly appear. Hen.


The verbs etnav and γίγνεσθαι are of ten accompanied by a participle of the verb "to wish," &c. in the dative; in which case the participle only, as the leading idea, is translated by the finite verb. Matthiae Gr. s. 388. e. Cf. Cratyl. 1. ei sou boulomeno istin, h.c. ei bolele. Hom. IIiad. 3. 108. 3moi de kev asmevoi eiv, h.c. asmeivos iko, interp. Eustath. This form was adopted by the Latins from the Greeks. Macrobr. Saturn. vi. 1. vi. vii. 13. "Si volentibus vobis erit, &c. Sallust. Jugurth. 100. "Uti militibus exequatus cum imperatore labos volentibus esset." Tacit. Agr. 18. "Quibus bellum volentibus erat."—Pios gav ou mellee. The infinitive is often wanting to melleei, when it can be easily supplied from the context or otherwise. Matthiae Gr. s. 498. d.

§ 25. Oukoivn toiounde ti, k. t. l. Socrates now proceeds to meet the objection against the immortality of the soul, that it perishes upon the decease of the body, in consequence of the disunion of the particles of which it is composed, by considering what the nature of the soul is, and proving from hence that as it does not consist of parts, but is in itself simple and uniform, it cannot be affected like what is compound, and consequently changeable, from the different affections of its component parts. Into these two classes all things are divided, simple and compound, between which there is this further distinction, that the latter are concerned with, and discerned by the senses, while the former is rendered intelligible by the mind alone. That the mind is itself simple, there is no reason to doubt; it is independent of the senses, and by the ex-
erecise of its own faculties comes to know that it exists. It is also independent of the changes of the body, and retains its power of thought, whatever injury the body may sustain by the loss of any of its customary media of sensation. The mind receives impressions of what is simple and immutable, while the body is incapable of any knowledge further than of what is transient and liable to change. Socrates presses, again, the perception of truth, to which the mind can best attain when collected within itself, apart from the body; when it is conversant with, and merges into a nature similar to its own, and abides in the contemplation of unmixed and unerring truth. The mind commands and the body obeys, the one fulfills the office of a master, and the other of a slave; hence it will appear which part of man is the more noble and divine. But as the attributes of contraries are also contrary, it follows that as the body, consisting of parts, is destroyed by their disunion in death, so the mind, which is one and simple, continues to exist, and departs into some sacred and unseen spot, to hold communion with its God; the destiny, sooner or later, of those who never lived in subjection to the body and its appetites. Those who have done so and are polluted in consequence, seek, after death, for other bodies which they are again obliged to animate.

Τῷ ποιῷ τοῖς ἀρὰ προσήκει τότῳ τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάζονταί, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιῶν τινὸς δεδείναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦ ποιῶ τινὶ οὐ; καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέπασθαι πότερον ψυχὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδείναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁμετέρας ψυχῆς; Αὐτῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἀρ’ οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐννυθέντι τε καὶ ἐννυθέτο ὄντι φύσει προσήκει

of it, (καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τοῖς οὐ); then to consider which of the two the soul is, and to found our hopes or fears on the result. Hence will appear the correctness of Heindorf’s emendation, τῷ ποιῷ τοῖς οὐ for τῷ ποιῷ τοῖς, which without the negative is but a useless repetition. Wytenbach and Cornarius would reject this member of the sentence, but without sufficient reason, as is evident from the sense of the passage as expr.

Τῷ μὲν ἐννυθεὶ.—καὶ ἐννυθέτο. Ἰ. ε. Εἰ quod compomendo factum est, et quod natura sua composition est. Wyt.—

ἐννυθείν, signifying a compound which was not always so, but the result of art, and ἐννυθέτον ὄν φύσει, a compound which was always, and naturally so; a distinction to which Plotinus seems to refer, Ennead. v. ix. 3. p. 557. Α. ὡμοίωμεν οὐ τὰ λειψάνημα εἶναι πάντα σύνθετα, καὶ ἀπόλοιοι οὐδὲ ἐν, ὑπὲρ τέχνη ἐγράφαται ἵκαστα ὑπὲρ φύσει. By some this tóvthóton is taken in the sense of the verbs ὑπατοῦ, id quod potest videri, visible; ἴκαστον, quod addiri potest; ἵκαστον, sensibile, &c. whence they interpret the passage of that which is actually compounded (ἐννυθείν, compositum) and that which is liable to be so, (ἐννυθέτον quod componi potest.) But the former interpretation is in every way preferable.—Τάντα ὑ περ ἐννυθεῖν, that is, that the whole should be divided into its component parts, preserving these parts distinct, as in the case of the division of body into the four elements of which it consists, from a separation of the links by which they are combined. Plotinus refers to this; Ennead. iv. 7. 12. p. 406. B. πάν τε τὸ λοιπόνον συνθέσιον ἐκλαμάτω ἀναλήξεται περιφερεί κ. ἐννυθεῖν, ψυχῇ ἓ μίᾳ καὶ ἥπερ ἐννυθείαν ὄνσιν ἐν τῷ ζῇ φύσει (ἢ φύσει ἐστίν) οὐ τοῖνυν ταύτῃ φθα-
πόσχειν διαφεδηναι ταυτή ἡ περ ἐννετέθη· εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξύνηθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσηκεί μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἰ πέρ τοι ἀλλω; Δοκεὶ μοι, ἐφί, οὐ-τως ἐχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Ὡκοῦν ἂ περ ᾧ ἀει κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὅσαύτως ἐχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνηθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ἐξύνθετα; Ἕμοιογο δοκεὶ οὕτως. Ἰομεν δή, ἐφί, ἐπὶ ταυτὰ ἐδ’ ἂ περ ἐν τὸ ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ, αὐτὴ ἢ οὐσία ἢς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτών-τες καὶ ἀποκρίνομενοι, πότερον ὅσαύτως ἂεὶ ἐχει κατὰ ταυτά ἢ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσουν, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστὶ, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτέ μετα-βολὴν καὶ ἡμινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἡ ἂεὶ αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστὶ μονοειδές ὅν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ὅσαύτως καὶ κατὰ

ρήσεται. To the body, according to Plotinus, belongs multiplicity, divisible with reference to space. The soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial and simple in its nature; without body, or with a body which has two natures, the superior one indivisible; the inferior one divisible. The metaphysical arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul, have been already stated by Plotinus, (born L. d. 205, at Lyceopolis, in Egypt,) in his Six Enneades, a collection of his various scattered treatises by Porphyry. Porphyry. Vit. Plot. c. 6. 24. Tenem. Man. Phil. s. 203. sqq.

"Α περ ἂεὶ κατὰ ταυτά—ἐχει.] So in Parmenid. p. 152. Οἴον τε, τὸ ἔχον πως, μη ἐχειν οὕτω, μη μεταβάλλουν ἐκ ταυτῆς τῆς ἑξέως; οὐκ ὄντες πάν ἀρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, μεταβάλλην σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μη οὕτως ἔχω. Cf. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. p. 232. "Τὰς οὐ-σιας, quas essentias dicimus, duas esse ait: per quas cuncta gigantur. Sed illa, quae mentis coelestis comprehendiur, semper et cedem modo et sui par, et sui similia inveniunt, ut que vere sit." (ὁ ἴστι τὸ ὄν.) It is to be observed, that the tenor of this passage is consistent rather with the Pythagorean than the Socratic school. Bruck. Hist. Phil. i. p. 696. Gott. For κατὰ ταυτὰ Wyts-tenbuch propo-κε τὰ αὐτὰ, and ad-ducis numerous passages in support of its constant application to ideas which are constant and uniform, as also to im-mutable natures and essences. de Legg. vii. p. 631. Α.—ταχθεν μὲν γὰρ αὑτὸ καὶ μετασχον τὸ τα αὐτὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅσαύτως ἂεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς παῖςειν, etc.

Τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως.] Sc. ἔχοντα.

Heinendorf proposes ἢ δ’ ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως.— —Ταύτη τε,——When a proposition be-ginning with the relative precedes, and another with the demonstrative follows, ἢ is sometimes repeated; (Matthiae Gr. s. 622. 5.) in order, as Buttmann observes, to increase the force of the op-position between the two members of the sentence when divided into the pro-tasis and apodosis. Excurs. xii. ad De-mostheu. Or. Midian. p. 147. sqq.

Ἡ οὐσία, ἢς λόγον. ἐκεῖν τοῦ εἶναι.] The essence, with respect to which we give the definition that it is.—See Matthiae Gr. s. 510. Obs. 2.—Λόγον, i. e. ὄρθων, as frequently elsewhere. Cf. c. 20. supr. ὧς ἐπισφαλεῖζομεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἐστι.

Τὸ ὄν] Added merely in explanation of ὃ ἐστι preceed.

Μονοειδές.] Simple, uniform; i. e. that which contains nothing foreign to or un-like itself. V. c. 28. infr. a med. Cic. Acad. i. 8. “Earam qualitatum sunt


tauta eixe kai oúdeîpote oúdampi oúdamos ἀλλοιωσιν oúdeimai ñndêxetai; 'Osaútwos, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, kai katà tauta êxein, ò Σάκρατες. 

Τί δὲ τῶν πολ- λῶν καλῶν, οίνον ἀνδρῶπων ἡ ἄπτων ἡ ἰματίων ἡ ἀλ- λων ὀντυνωνοῦ τοιοῦτων, ἡ ἴσον ἡ καλῶν ἡ πάντων τῶν ἀκείνοις ὠμονύμων; ἀρα κατὰ ταύτα êxei, ἡ πάν τοιναντίων ἀκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις oúdeîpote ós ëtopos eîteîn oúdamos katal tauta èstîn; 

Oútops aú, ἐφη, ταύτα, ὁ Κέβης' oúdeîpote óswaútwos êxei. Oukôn tòutôn méν καί ἄσαιο καί ιδοις κάν tais ἀλλας αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντων οὐκ ἐστῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἂν ἄλλο ἐπιλάβοιο ἡ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμὸ, ἀλλ ἐστὶν αἰεί ἡ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὀράτα.

§. 26. Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, ἀλήθη λέγεις. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἐφη, δύο εἰδὴ τῶν οὕτων, τὸ μὲν ὀρατὸν,

cis ignem." h. e. αἰδώτενω, having been cleansed of its pollution. The term is different to inferential subjects: in Tim. p. 39. B. gold is called μονοειδές γένος: to a rock or stone. Porphyry. Ant. Nymph. p. 310. τὰ ἀντρα ἐπάνω πέτρα περι-
χώμανα μονοειδέος, etc.—Αὐτὸ καὶ θ' αὐτῶ,—this is to be understood of ident-
ity, as ὡςαφτος καὶ κατὰ ταύτα of permanence.

Oúdeîpote oúdampi oúdamos.] Plato not unfrequently uses this strengthening of the negative by a repetition of its compounds. Cf. de Legg. xii. p. 931. C. oú πρότου εἰς ἑνόμων πολέι γένθεθα 


κενέρι μέιν μετέριδαι νάιμαι ἔχειν κοινούς εἰς μείν. It was not un-
usual also with the tragic and other writers among the Greeks. Eurip. Cyci. 

120. Νομάδες' ἀκούετε ἐν οὐδεὶς οὐδεὶς oúdeîn. It is remarked that in such

cases the letter δ is constantly repeated, and the letter π in affirmatives. 
Pæni. 

Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν.] The genitive absolute, serving to point out the object of the following proposition. Matthiae Gr. s. 342. 

Πᾶν τοιναντίων ἀκείνως.] Completely an opposite case to the former; toinantaing being put absolutely. 

Oûtops aú, ἐφη, ταύτα.] Sic contra, inquit, hie. Wytt.—ab in opposition having usually the sense of contra. "Oûtwp — ἐπιλάβοιο. See Matthiae Gr. s. 330.

Τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῶ.] i.e. re-

fraction; according to Plato, διάνοια is a mean between νοῦς, which is engaged in what is abstract and intelligible, and ὀφθαλμος which regards the sensible and concrete, whence it is concerned with both, as the progressive state from the sensible to the intelligible by which the latter becomes certainly known. 

§. 26. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει κ. τ. λ.] 

Olymp. Diæri ei καὶ τίν ἡμετέραι σύν-
tacon in ψυχὴ καὶ σώμα, καὶ ἔτει 

ti μᾶλλον ἦκε τοὺς ἀειλαύνους, πῶ-

terai ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τῷ σώμα, καὶ κατα-

σκενάζει ὑπ' ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον όυκε τοὺς
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

τὸ δὲ ἀείδες; Ὁδεῖν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀείδες ἂεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχων, τὸ δὲ ὀρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά; Καὶ τούτο, ἔφη, θώμεν. Πέρε ὡς, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἄλλῳ τι ημῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχῆ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὀμοίοτερον τῷ εἴδει φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ἐξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παυτὶ, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε δῆλον ὦτι τῷ ὀρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὀρατῶν ἡ ἀείδες; Οὔχ νῦν ἀνθρώπων γε, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἄλλα μὴν ἠμείς γε τὰ ὀρατά καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν. ἡ ἀλλή λυπεῖ οἵτινες; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὀρατῶν εἶναι ἡ οὐχ ὀρατῶν; Οὔχ ὀρατῶν. Ἄείδες ἄρα; Ναί. Ὀμοίοτερον ἄρα ψυχή σώματος ἐστὶ τῷ ἀείδει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρατῷ; Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὥ Σώκρατες.

§. 27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυ- χῆ ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τῇ διᾴ τοῦ ὀράματι ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἀκόουσιν ἡ δὲ ἀλλής τυνώς ἀισθήσεως—τῶντο γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ διᾳ τοῦ σώματος, τῷ δὲ ἀισθήσεως σκοπεῖν τῷ—, τότε μὲν ἐλκεταί ὑπὸ αἰτικότοις εἰς τρόμῳ ἰππεµέρατῶν, ἢ τοῦ ὀράτου αὐτῆς, καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἐλεγοντικοῦ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἔσταξείν τοῦ σώματος. See Matthie Gr. s. 516. 3. "Αλλὰ τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κ. τ. λ.] i.e. Is any other the case than that one part of ourselves consists of body and the other of soul? V. Viger. de Idiost. c. iii. s. q. r. 8. Matthie Gr. s. 487. 9.—ἡμῶν αὐτῶν depending upon τον seq. Οὔχ νῦν ἀνθρώπων γε.] Not by mankind at least. Intell. ὀρᾶται (ὄρατον ἐστὶν.) Ἄλλα μὴν ἠμείς κ. τ. λ.] But we indeed were speaking of what was visible and what incisible according to the nature (i.e. the capabilities) of man—ὄρατα—ἐλέγομεν, i. q. περὶ τῶν ὀράτων ἐλεγ. Cf. Apol. Soc. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ ὁδεῖν λέγειν.—τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, an elegant periphrasis for τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Οὔχ ὀρατῶν.] Quod certi negat—ἀείδες ἄρα, quod speciem formantem non habet. Hein., §. 27. Καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν.] Cf. c. 10. supr. et seq. Ηπάλαι, according to Fischer, is used here, as occasionally elsewhere, like the duodecim of the Latins, to signify just now, a short time since. Phot. Lex. ν. Ηπάλαι τῷ ἠδύν λέγειν εἰσώθατι Ηπάλαι: Eustath. ad II. θ'. p. 702. Phavor. in voc.—"Ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται; Cf. Laert. iii. 12. φησιν ὁ Ἀλκιμος καὶ ταύτα φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῷ ψυχήν, τὰ μὲν εἰς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον ἄκεφας, βλέπονν τὰ δ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνθημέρωσθαι, μετὰ τῷ σώματι χρω- μένην. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ, κ. τ. λ.] In this passage τοῖς τοῦ σ. σκοπεῖν is the subject, and τὸ δ' αἰσθ. σκ. the predi-
to his σώματος eis tā ouδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ 
αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἐλεγχαῖ οὐσιπρ ἐμ-
θόνωσα, ἄτε τοιούτων ἐφασπομένη; Πάνω γε. "Ὅταν 
δὲ γε αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν σκοπή, ἐκείσε οὐχεῖται εἰς τὸ 
καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ σὺν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως 
ἔχου, καὶ ὡς συγγενής οὕσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε 
γίγνεται, περὶ αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτὴν γένοιται καὶ ἐξῆ 
αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπανται τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα εἰς 
κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἄτε τοιούτων ἐφασπομένη; 
καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; 
Παντάπασιν, ἐφ’ ἐμον, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς λέγεις, ὦ 
Σῶκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐ τοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδε καὶ ἐκ 
tῶν ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῆ 
ὁμοίωτερον εἶναι καὶ ἐγγενέστερον; Πάς ἂν ἐμοιγε 
dοκεῖν, ἡ δ’ ὡς, ἐγγικρησθαι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης 
tῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παν-
tι ὁμοίωτερον ἐστὶ ψυχῆ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μάλ-
λον ἡ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ το σῶμα; Τό ἐτέρῳ. 
§. 28. "Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τήδε, ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
ὡσι ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύει καὶ ἀρχεῖσαι 

cate introduced by τοῦτο. Matthiæ Gr. 
s. 540. 
Τότε μὲν ἔλεγεται.] "Ελεγθήσαι is 
used here of the soul, to signify the un-
willingness with which it is forced into 
the consideration of the corporeal and 
sensible. 
"Ταλγyi.] Is affected with dizziness. 
becomes dizzy or perplexed. Verligine 
correctus rotatur et circumagitur. Stell. 
Scip. i. 12. "hoc est quod Plato notavit 
in Phaedone: animam in corpus trahi 
nova ebricate trepidamentum: volens no-
vum potum materialis illuviosus intel-
llegi, quo delibuta et gravata deducti-
er." 
Τοιούτων.] Sc. Planoemienon καὶ 
ἐν ταραχῇ υἱῶν. 
Τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.] 
Olympiadorus objects to the application 
of πάθημα to φρόνησις. (As in Χε-
noph. Cycrop. iii. 1. 10. πάθημα ἀρα 
σὺ λέγεις τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι τὴν σωφρ-
σινήν, ὡσπερ λύτην ὑμάθματο) upon 
which Wytenbach observes: "Ratio 
aut eculos in modo dictis: πέπανται 
toυ πλάνου, κ. τ. λ. indeque et sensu 
quietis et perceptione veritatis suaviter 
afficitur et bene patitur, εὑραθεία frui-
tur, εὕπαθει." So in Phaedr. p. 315. B. 
ἰνοῦσα ἐνα χρόνον τὸ ὅν, ἀγαπὶ τε 
καὶ θεωροῦσα τάληθι τρέφεται καὶ εὑ-
paθεῖ. 
Καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῇ.] Cf. Terent. 
Adelph. iv. 3. 18. "Ετ recte et verum 
dicis." 
"Εκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου.] From this 
investigation.—"Ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ, a pro-
verbal form; in all and every, i. e. com-
pletely, altogether. Upon the addition 
of μᾶλλον to the comparative, see 
Matthiæ Gr. s. 458. So with the Latins, 
magis certius, magis dulcius, magis 
mollior, &c. Stell.


Ξημβαινει.] h. c. Αὐ ex iis, quae disputata sunt, hoc consequatur.—STALL. The verb συμβαίνειν is frequently used in a logical sense, to express a deduction from established premises. Cf. c. 41. a mod. Aἰσθητέν οὖν—οὕτω τούτῳ σου ξημβαινει λέγειν, &c. Aristot. Topic. viii. 22. θέντες γὰρ τὰ πλείστα, ἢ τὰ τέλος τεραπευονται, ὡς συμβαίνοντο ἐκ τῶν κεριῶν: 1. c. quam plurima praeorbit, in fine argumentum, quasi non consequatur ex positis.—WYTT.

§ 29. Tί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἃρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῆ δὲ αὖ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτω ἐστὶν ἡ ἐγγύς τι τούτων; Πῶς

Topic. viii. 22. θέντες γὰρ τὰ πλείστα, ἢ τὰ τέλος τεραπευονται, ὡς συμβαίνοντο ἐκ τῶν κεριῶν: 1. c. quam plurima praeorbit, in fine argumentum, quasi non consequatur ex positis.—WYTT.

Πολεμικά.] Multiform. § 29. 'Αδιαλύτω.] Olympiod. 'Αδιαλύτως ἔστιν, ως μὴ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενον, τὸ γὰρ ἐκνιφόμενον εἰσὶ οἰκεῖα μὴ διαλύται. Cic. de Senect. c. 21. "Cum simplex—animi natura eset, neque habebat in se quidquam admisitam dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse cum dividi: quod si non possit, non posse interire."
"Eπιπλεκτος συχνων.—χρονων.] h. e. Suits die; a moderately long time.—STALL. Cf in Criton. c. 1. init. "Eπιπλεκτος πτυχαι.

"Εκα μεν τις και χαριντως, κ. τ. λ.] The point of the present argument is to evince that if the body, whose inferiority, in all respects, to the soul is already conceded, does not disappear, is not dissolved and dispersed, at once, when death takes place, but continues to last, according as circumstances may admit or effect, it is then only reasonable to allow that the soul does not perish instantaneously at the moment of decease.—Stallbaum explains the passage as supr. (referring καβοιαί ζωη ζωη ζωη τα προρεύοντως, as if the reading were εν χωρίας ωρας.) Si quidem quae et corpore floreunt mortuas fuerit et florentes atate; and understands καβοιαί μελα as a confirmatory assertion of its truth. Χαριντως και ζωη, he further observes justly, are not applied merely to what is graceful and beautiful, but to the strong and healthy disposition of the frame, by which, in the prime of life, the qualities of grace and beauty are best developed.

Dacier and Wyтtenbach, both incorrectly, refer ωρα to the time of the year.


Και εαν σατηρ.] Intell. το άλλα σώμα.

"Η εις ψυχή—το άειδής.] Compare with this, Paul, Corinth. ii. 4. 18. "for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."

Είς τοιούτων τόπων ήτοι.] Even into such another place as itself. Cf. e. 2. supr. Τοιούτων ήτοι ήτει.

Εις "Αειόν ως άληθος.] In enim, qui ere est æterna; ως αληθος being used in reference to the fictions of the poets and the vulgar on the subject; for doubtless the place where the τα άειόν, and τα άντων άντα were, properly deserved a name synonymous with that of its occupant.
τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλολεν, ὡς 
φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὡς 
Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ μάλλον ὡδὲ ἔχει 
ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος 
ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἀτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη 
ἀυτῇ εἰς αὐτήν, ἀτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο,—τοῦτο δὲ 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ οἰρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι 
τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδιώς. ἢ οὔ τοῦτ ἂν εἴη μελέτη 
θανάτου; Παντάπασι γε. Ὥνκοιν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα 
eis τὸ ὁμοιὸν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀείδες ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θείον τε 
καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει 
αὐτῇ εὑραίμοι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων 
καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρῶτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρω-
πείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὡς περ ὅλεγεται κατὰ τῶν με-
μυριέων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν 
dιάγονοι; οὕτω φομεν, ὡς Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως.
§ 30. Οὕτω νη Δι', ἕφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εἰᾶν δὲ γε, 
οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλ-
λάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι ἀεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θε-

Διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλολεν.] i. e. 
Is want to be dissipated and destroyed; 
the perfect being used in this sense, with 
reference to the complete fulfilment, suc-
cceeded by a state analogous to it.— 
Matthiae Gr. s. 502. 2.
Oi κολλοί ἀνθρωποί. Elsewhere 
oi πολλοί, simply; ἀνθρωποί is pro-
bably added in contempt.
'Εκοῦσα εἶναι.] Quantum quidem ab 
ipseis voluntate penderet. STALL. Cf. 
c. 5. supr. a med. έκων εἶναι. Apol. 
Socr. c. 27. init. See Matthiae Gr. s. 
515.
Μελέτη θανάτου.] Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 
30. " Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut 
ait idem (Plato) commentatio moris 
est." Hermias Comment, MS. n. Phaedr. 
p. 45. καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ ἡ μελέτη θανάτου.
'Υπάρχει αὐτῷ εὐδαιμόνει.] h. e. 
Ei contingit esse beate. "STALL. Cf. 
Xenoph. Cyrop. ii. 1. 23. ὑπῆρχε ὅ 
πᾶς τούτων τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον 
mὲν θεραπεύσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχο-
μένων.
'Αγρίων ἐρώτων.] Wild or unbridled 
desires, which, together with the fears, 
produce those disturbances of the mind 
which are comprehended in αὔοια pre-
ceding.
Διάγονα.] Heindorf would read 
διαγώνα, because of ἀπηλλαγμένη 
preced, but there is no sanction in any 
of the copies for the change, which cer-
tainly seems requisite. Stallbaum at-
tributes the reading, as supr., to the not 
unusual negligence of prose writers, who 
attend, in many instances, to the sense 
rather than the grammatical construc-
tion. He compares Thucyd. vii. 42, καὶ 
τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ἑμμάχως 
cατάπληξες εἰν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὄλγη 
ἐνεύρετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι
ratpevoussa kai erwòsa kai gegevthmenva up' autou upo te toun etpidymwv kai h'donwv, oiste midhen allo dokkeiv einai elhthes all' h to sswmatoeides ou tis aw an' swwto kai idou kai fagou kai poi kai prdos ta aforo'dia xri'sato, to de tois ommasi skotowdes kai xeides, voynten de kai filosofhia aieroton, touto de eidi'smenvi masein te kai tremein kai feugyv, ou'tov dh' e'xousan oiei'v xwch'wv autin kai' autin' eilikrhn a'pal- la'xesthai; Oud' oponsiowen, efh. 'Alla diei'llh- mevyn ge oimai upo tov sswmatoeidous, o auti' h omi- lia te kai 'xwunsoia tov swmatos dia to aei' xwneinai kai dia' auth ton 'pollh' mel'thn eneopoijse xw'mfuton. Pavn ge. 'Embridhes de ge, o phile, touto oies' thai xrho' einai kai 'barv kai geowdes kai' oratov. o dh' kai' e'xousa h toiaut' xwch' barunetai te kai 'exketai 'paliw eis tov oratov topo', fob'v tov xwidois te kai

tov apallagymena' tov' kixevon, o- rontes o'ute eia' thn 'dexei'xan te- xhismen disa' xen' xwson stratovv x- son — ipeilunhthta, k. t. l., where orontes does not appear to have re- quired emendation. V. Ducker, in loc. Poppo Prolegomen. ad Thucyd. i. P. 1. p. 111. Whence he conjectures the nom. diagoussa to have been used as if the preceding construction had been of aphi'men disaiainen evstai, k. t. l.

§ 30. 'Ew'osa. Sc. autov. — 'Ypo te toun etpidymon kai h'donon,—added in explanation of up' autov preceded.

'Alh' h'.] See Apol. Socr. c. 22. 6n. 'Alh' h' ton drahv. This form, which is frequently adopted by the Greek writers, arises from the union of two constructions, of which the one denotes opposition, and the other comparison, whence the passage, as supra. combines the effect of the separate propositions wasse midhen allo dekevin einais alhthes, allo to sswmatoeides — and woste p. de. einais alhthes, h to sswmat. So with plh' h. STALL. Cf. Schaefer, Appar. ad Demosten. i. p. 752.

O`d tis an' swwto kai idou.] If there are two verbs of different regimen in the proposition which begins with the rela-
tive, with each of which, therefore, the relative should be in a different case, it is commonly found only once, and in the case required by the nearest verb.— Matthiae Gr. s. 47 l. d. Upon the sense "to be able," implied in the optatives as supra. See Matthiae Gr. s. 514. b.

"Noomon de kai' filosofhia aieroton."] i. q. In Tim. p. 29. A. lghwv kai' fio- vnesi perileptov.

Dieyllhmevyn.] Involved, engrossed, or enmeshed. According to Heindorf; ita occupatum a corpore, ut id per eam dispersum quasi et dissipation sit. Wyttenbach gives it the force of ligatum, interiectam, interigitam, in which he is followed by V. Cousin; tente chargée des liens de l'enveloppe materielle.

Aidou, ός περ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τῶν τάφους κυλινδομένης, περὶ ἀ δη καὶ ὁφθη ἁττα ψυ-
χῶν σκοτοειδή φάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἰ τιοιντᾶι
ψυχαί εἰδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ

Περὶ τὰ μνήματα — καὶ τοῖς τά-
φους.] Αυτὴ ἡ δοσις ἦν ἑκατέρας ἐν τῆς οἰκουμένης, καὶ περὶ ἑ τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ
τελευταίᾳ ἐποχῇ, παρεῖσθαι μεν ἡν τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ
τελευταίᾳ ἐποχῇ, παρεῖσθαι μεν ἡν τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ
τελευταίᾳ ἐποχῇ, παρεῖσθαι μεν ἡν τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ
τελευταίᾳ ἐποχῇ, παρεῖσθαι μεν ἡν τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ
τελευταίᾳ ἐποχῇ, παρεῖσθαι μεν ἡν τῶν τάφων ἐν τῇ

to 

Eiswola.] Mosheim on Cudworth, cap. 5. sec. 3. note 23. "Constat est
veternum et concors sententia, animos
corporis terreni vinculis solutos et inferos
seu eis quoque abire: sapientum quidem
et heroum mentes ipsum una cum corpo-
mortali simulacrum (εἰδωλον) am-
mittere, statimque cum Dies post excess-
sum conjungi, tumetis simulacrum seu
animus sentientis ad civitatem Plutonis
descendunt: vulgares autem animos una
cum simulacro in subterraneo locum
locum commigraverunt: in eo animos su-
iales variis generis cruciatibus, qui puri
flant et liquidis, subjici: minus vero sec-
leratos et inveterata malitia infectos a-
ternis supllicis torqueri." Ibid. note 19.—"Modo—
non eis non iudicati a

ποιμὲνοι non omnes
nomina simulacrum hoc
animae corpus appellari. Pluriae
corora eιδωλων illud nominantium—alio vero,
in quibus Porphyrius et Hiero
canes, φόσιν illud dicant, aliis πενεμια
nominat alii Φωκιμι πενεμιακι, ut

Sy
tesius Libro de Insomniis, p. 137. Ex his
nominiis variis nascuntur qui familiaris
sunt Platonice, loquenti modi, in quibus
exprimendis facile aliquis erraverit, nisi
nomina quae diximus calent. "The subject
of the eιδωλα is discussed at consi-
derable length by Mosheim in locc.
cit, and with a distinctness which
throws all possible light upon this por-
tion of the Platonic philosophy. Cf.
H. I. 1. 103. Ὡ τῶν, ηρά τις

στι και εἰν 'Αιδων τώμων Ψυχη και
ειδωλων ἄτωρ φρόνις οἶκ οὶ ἐν τῆς

πάθειας, and Kennedy in loc. Odys. Π.
600. Τῶν ο μετ ἐτεννήτης βίων 'Η-

ρακλήρει, Εἰδωλων,—which is men-
tioned as distinct from Hercules him-
self, who was dwelling amongst the
 gods. Lucret. i. 121.—"Esse Acherni

s h e

t e m p l a E mi li us a t e r n i s exponit versibus
eddens; quo neque permanent anima,
neque corpora nostra; sed quaedam si-
mulacra modi palentia miris." Aeneid.
iv. 654. "Et nun magnae mei sub terras
ub ibat imagos," vi. 292. "Et ni docta

καις τε νυκτος τάφους, kai
μάλιστα των κακως ἡταντὸν ὅρατα.
et frustra ferro duceret utreras," and Heyne in loc.

Της προτέρας τροφῆς.] Etymol. M. and Sidd. Τροφῆς—λαρβάζεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας, where τροφῆ, a mode or plan of life, implies the instruction or discipline by which it was originally framed.

§ 31. 'Ἐνδούνται δὲ, ὥς περ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἡθή ὁποί' ἄττ'. ἀν καὶ μεμελητικιεῖα τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ μῖσῳ. Τὰ ποία δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἶον τὸν

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works, censures Plato for neglecting the sober philosophy of Socrates, and through a vain affectation of extraordinary refinement, and a fond partiality for the mysteries of Egypt, and for the prolixities of Pythagoras, devoting himself to subtle speculations, and becoming a haughty professor of wisdom. Hist. of Philos. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

Omnes tamen an huic dediti fuerint sensentiae sectae hujus philosophi, haud e quidem dixerim. Consentient etiam inter se de causis et initiis hujus formae. Animam enim ipsam universi statuunt; formam istam corpori, quod adjunctum habet, imaginandi qua pollet, facultate imprimer. Accendit nihilum animum amove corpore: humum amore efficere, ut humidum est spiritum copiosae attraheat: per spiritum hunc egressorem aspectabiliem fieri animum: accedere denique imaginationem animae et forma corpus, quod gerit, donare tam, qualum interior ejus poscat affectio. Quot hic recito sententiae, tot seio, me portenta narrare videri illis, qui nihil probant praetor id, quod rationibus et argumentis vident munitionem esse: verum nihil me secta huic tribuere, quod ab ejus alienum disciplina sit, innumeros confirmare mihi locis corum licet.” Cf. in Tim. p. 42. 91. de Repub. x. sub. fin. in Phaedr. p. 249. Tim. Socr. de Anim. Mundi in fin. "Uβρεις.] Supra, flagitia; whence ὑβ. μιμελετηκότες, lasciae, libidinosi, flagitiosi. Fisch. Philoposias, inebrity. Edd. αὐλοτησιας, which does not accord with the tenor of the passage. Ἔνυλαβημιν.] h. e. Qui sibi non prorsus ab illis vitiis eaverat, qui illa non omni modo fugerat. StalL.—Ficinus appears to have read καὶ μηνὶν ἔνυλαβημι, which is approved by Hein- dorf. V. Cousin; qui n’ont en aucun retenu. 

Ω ὃ ν ἐκάστη ίοι, κ. τ. λ.] Quocumque queque iverit, iverit secundum similitudinem consuetudinis. Wytt. Some copies read ὃ ἐν ἐκάστῃ upon which see Matthiae Gr. s. 486. 2. a. 

Καὶ τούτων.] Even of these; i. e. who have not studied to withdraw their attention altogether from things teres trial. The happiest amongst them were those who forbore the excesses which a merely moral discipline enabled them to withstand.

Τὴν εἰμιτοκεν τε καὶ πολιτικ. ὁ- 

ρητ.] Cf. c. 13. supr. The virtues unconnected with philosophy, and which were attainable by study and practice, without any exercise of those higher intellectual faculties which were necessary to, and frequently made synonymous with philosophy itself, were called πολιτεκαι. They were social or moral virtues only, and received their name from the sense in which Plato understood polities, which he defined to be the application, on a great scale, of the laws of morality; a society being composed of individuals, and therefore restricted by similar obligations. According to Plotinus, the human soul cannot attain perfection or felicity but by the contemplation of the Supreme Unity, by means of an absolute abstraction (ὑπλασις, simplification), from all compounded
things, and by ascending to the heights of pure existence. In this consists virtue, which is two-fold; inferior virtue, (or political) belonging to such souls as are in the progress of purification; and superior virtue, which consists in an intimate union, through contemplation, with the Divine Being (γένος). Tennemann, Philos. s. 211. Cf. Macrobius. In Somn. Scip. i. 8. “Plotinus inter philosophiae professores cum Platone praeceps, libro de Virtutibus, gradus carum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primae politiae vocantur, secundae purgatoriae, tertiae animi jam purgati, quartae exemplares.” &c.


§. 32. Εἰς ἐν γένος φιλόσοφοι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρὸς ἀπίοντι οὐθέν εἰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ φιλομαθεί. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἔνεκα, ὁ ἐταίρη Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὁρθοὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπεχνοντα τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμῶν ἄπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὗ παραδιδόσαι αὐτάς αὐτοὺς, οὐ τι

which the commentator observes to be at variance with the reasoning and sense of Plato, whence he proposes to read; Εἰς ἐν γε θεῶν γένος μὴ οὐθέν ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ φιλομαθεί φιλοσοφῆσαν καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶς ἀπίοντι, ἣ ἐν δεινον κύριον γένος ἐν σοι περενείραν τινα διδάσκειν. Heindorff conjectures; ἀλλὰ μόνῳ τῷ φιλομαθεί τοῦτον ἔνεκα, κ. τ. λ. Φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ φιλομαθῆς are nearly synonymous, so much so as to prevent any distinction that could be drawn between them affecting the passage to such a degree as might obviate the difficulty. It is suggested as a probable explanation, that ἀλλὰ τῷ φιλομαθεί is added to increase the force and emphasis of the sentence, as if he said, that it was unlawful for one who was not a philosopher, and who had not departed from life sustained by moral guilt, to rank among the gods; unlawful that this should occur in any case, except to the genuine philosopher.

Some suppose the words ὠδ' ἄλλῳ ἦ τῷ φιλομαθεί, to have been inserted by a copyist in explanation of μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαν, preceded, and ἄλλῳ changed afterwards to ἄλλῳ as supr. According to Wytenbach, φιλομαθῆς is the genus of which φιλόσοφος is the species, whence every φιλόσοφος was also φιλομαθῆς but not v. v. Hence Cicero
νοικοθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι ὡς περ ὀι πολιοι καὶ φιλοχρήματοι οὔδε ἀδ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὡς περ ὀι φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἐπειτὰ ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μά Δί', ἢ δ' ὅσ. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἀπασιν, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι οἰς τι μέλει τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες ζῴσι, χαίρειν εἰσπόντες ὡς κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδοῦσιν ὅτι ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦμενοι ὃυ δεῖ ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνῃ λύουσι τε καὶ καθαρμὸς ταῦτῃ τρέπονται, ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι ἢ ἐκείνη ψυγείται.

§. 23. Πῶς, ὁ Σῶκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἔρω, ἐφη. γνωσκοῦν διόρηγαρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχήν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεμένη ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκλημένην, ἀναγκάζομενες ὃς περ δὲ εἰργοῦσι διὰ τούτοις σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτῶν δὲ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργοῦ τῆς δεινότητα

use: *docti and doctissimi* for philoso-

φιλ.

Οἰκοθορίαν.] Rei familiaris jacta-

τοι. WITT. The rain or dilapidation of a family property. Donn. Gr. Lex.

"Επειτὰ.] So, therefore, things being

なのですαταπλαίττοντες.] Qui quia-

dem animam suam curant, neque corpus

unice colunt et fiunt. STALL.—Ζώσι,

sc. autī, Matthie Gr. s. 472. 3,

Τῇ ἐκείνῃ λύσει τε καὶ καθαρ.

ταὐτ.] Explained c. 33 sq.

§. 33. Παραλβοῦσα—τὴν ψυχήν ἡ φιλοσοφία.] Παραλβοῦσαιν is af-

firmed of those who take up, or take

charge of any for the purposes of ed-

ucation and discipline. Hence it is justly

applied to philosophy as above, under

whose tutelage the soul is delivered from

the thraldom of the body and its organs,

and restored to the purity and freedom
to which it is entitled as an immortal

and independent essence.

"Ὡς πίστει εἶ εἰργοῦ.] As if through

a dungeon. Cod. Ang. δ' εἰργοῦ, after

Hesych. Εἰργοῦς κόλασις, εἰτομός,

συνίχισις, but εἰργοῦ is correct, as

appears from Eustathius, ad Odysse. ἁ,


cολεῖον ἐψάλυσιν οἱ 'Αντικοι, καὶ ὄρθον

ἐκ τοῦ ἀπεραῦζαν ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γελείων

ἐδανον, ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ καθάριζαν, ὅτεν

καὶ ἐστίνηκα τῇ ἑργῆς. The soul, in-

prisoned within the body, is oblig-

ed to receive impressions through the

senses, which are usually as false as the

medium is fallacious. It cannot, while

thus confined, become properly the ob-

ject of its own contemplation, nor can it

devote itself,' while trammelled by the

body and its appetites, to those purely

intellectual exertions and researches, by

which alone it is enabled to arrive at

truth. But it is assisted, and in fine

successfully, in attaining to a knowledge

of the intelligible and invisible, by phi-

losophy, which is at once its ransomer

and guide.

Κυλινδουμένη.] Groveling.
"Quidquid etiam esse in sensu est, quod modo ita percutitur. Heindorf objects to the affirming ei eti in an active sense of tov eirugmeon as supr., but as it has already received the attribute, tiu deinoteta, it may be easily said eti inami, όν αν μᾶλ. к. τ. λ. Upon the construction ei inami, see Matthiai Gr. s. 550. 2. c. For το είκειθαν infra. Heindorf proposes το είκειθαν and compares Phaedr. c. 29. ζιμ. μοι λαβίβετ μου μισον. Aristoph. Vesp. 733. γινω δ' αν παρών τις—των θεων ξελλαμβάνει τον πράγματος. Xenoph. Mem. ii. 2. 12. ἢνα—ἀγαθόν συν γεγονητα συλλήπτωρ. ii. 2. 32. ἀγαθόν συλλήπτρια των εν εἰρήν πάνω, &c.


"Τι δ' αν δι' άλλων—εν άλλως ον.

"Δι' άλλων is opposed to αυτη καθ' αυτην proced. in the sense of ei aiovos τον καθ' αυτο των άνων του δια των ομματων σκέψις, ώπτης δ' η δια των ουτων και των άλλων αισθησεων, πείθουσα δ' εκ τουτων μεν αναχωρειν οσον μη ανάγκη αυτοις χρήσθαι, αυτην δ' εις αυτην ειλεγεσθαι και αθροιζεσθαι παρακελευμένη, πιστευειν δε μηδει άλλω άλλη αυτην αυτη, ο τι αν νοηση αυτη καθ' αυτην αυτο καθ' αυτο των ουνων του δια των περιτων αισθητον τε και όρατον, δ δε αυτη όρα, νοητον τε και αειδες.

"Ταύτη ουν τη λύσει ουκ οιομενη δειν εναιτιονται αυτης του ως αληθως φιλοσοφου ψυχη ουτως απεξεται των ήδονων τε και επιθυμιων και λυπων και
φόβων καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι ἐπειδή τις σφόδρα ἡσθῆ ἡ φοβηθῇ ἡ λυπηθῇ ἡ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὅσον ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἶον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντων μέγιστον τε κακὸν καὶ ἐσχατὸν ἐστὶ, τούτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τὰ τοῦτο, οἶ Σώκρατες; ἐφ’ οἶ Κέβης. Ὁτι ψυχῇ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἁμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἡ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τού καὶ ἤγεισθαι, περὶ ὧ ἄν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τούτο ἀναγραφατάτον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά. ἡ οὐ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκεται ψυχῇ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; Ὁτι ἐκαστῇ ἡ ἱδωνὴ καὶ λύπη ὡς περ ἥλων ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτήν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνᾶ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματειδή, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἃ περ ἄν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἴμαι, ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οία μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Αἴδον ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναι, ὡστε ταχὺ πάλιν πάπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σώ-
μα καὶ ὡς περ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἁμοιροσ εἰναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκρατες.

§. 31. Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κοσμοὶ τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασιν. ἥ σὺ οἰεὶ; Οὐ δήτα ἐγώγε. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσται ἂν ψυχῇ ἄνδρος φιλοσοφοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἄν οἰηθεὶ τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυοῦσας δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἠδοναῖς καὶ λυπαῖς ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδείκνυ καὶ ἀνήρυντον ἔργον πράττειν. Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζόμενην ἄλλα γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἂεὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὤστα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θείον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον μεμολυσάμεν. See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. Ἀναπλήσαι αἵτων.

§. 34. Οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς.] i. q. Οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ φιλόσοφοι. c. 33. init. Verc philosophantes, doctrine recte students. Wytt.


Ἀνήρυντον ἔργον.] Ignitum opus facere, quod navium ad exitum perducit quael. Heind. The soul, when disenthralled by the aid of philosophy it has shaken off its corporeal chains, should continue to abide in the purity and freedom secured by its deliverer. It should never again be subjected to the bondage of those passions by which it had been once degraded and debased: if it were so, the offices of philosophy were then rendered nugatory and vain. And as Penelope unwove by night what she had wove by day, so incomplete and unavailing was the task of philosophy in the purification of a soul, which reversed, however, the plan of Penelope, insomuch as when loosed at first it submitted to be bound again;—hence ἐναντίως. Some copies read μεταχειριζόμενης, and take ἐναντίως in the sense of ἀντικριν, i.e. instar Penelope tractantis telam; but the text as supr. is preferable.

Γαλήνην τούτων.] Heindorf refers τούτων, as put for τούτων, to ἀνήρυντον ἔργον πράττειν, κ. τ. λ. preced. —Fischer, more correctly, to τῶν ἴδιων καὶ λυπῶν underst.

'Αεὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὄστα.] Always engaged in this, sc. the contemplation of truth, &c.; τούτῳ referring to τὸ ἀληθινον, κ. τ. λ. seq.—Τὸ ἀδόξαστον, certain: V. Cousin; hors du domaine de l'opinion. Truth is discerned not by the senses, but by the understanding. The human intellect is employed, either upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which are in their nature simple and invariable, or upon things which are subject to the senses, and are perpetually liable to fluctuation and change. (De Repub. vii. p. 531. 4. Philoeb. t. ii. p. 63.) The contemplation of the former creates science, ἐπιστήμη; attention to the latter produces opinion, ἑδωκ. (Cic. Acad. Quest. i. c. 5. Plat. Theat. i. p. 186.) Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body. When the forms of things are, by means of the corporeal organs, so deeply
impressed upon the mind, as not to be easily effaced by time, this permanent impression is called memory. From the union of sense and memory, or from the comparison of a present with a recollected perception, arises opinion. Where these agree, the opinion is true; where they differ, it is false. Enf. Phil. ii. c. 8. s. 1. Opinion, then, as being uncertain, from the nature of its origin, and variable in its result, cannot enter into the contemplation of the truth, which can only be regarded in conjunction with what is unerring and divine. It is to be observed, that memory and reminiscence differ in time and in degree: the latter is conversant with the ideas which the soul contemplated before its union with the body, the former with the perceptions to which it became subject after; consequently memory is employed upon sensible things, reminiscence upon the purely intelligible.

'Eke de tis touvntias trophos.] Sc. 'Allovntias trophi, to which is opposed the 'elavntia trophi, of those souls which were incapable of attaining to philosophy and its results. Cf. in Phaedr. p. 345. E. Pásai de polen exousia pónon, atelies tis touto dýtos thias áperikontai kai ápelthousai trophi 'davasth hronnta. Wytenbach arranges and explains the passage as supr. Eke de tis 'elavntias trophi, tvntia g' eptiphneiasa, oudein euvin ou phosi-thei — ouwso ouk diastraptheisa, k. t. l. i. e. Ex tali profecto nutricio, et quom hac traheretur, non est verendum ne timent—ne distrac-ta in discens a quibusdam ventis dispers-sa ac disflatu erudat, nec quidquam amplius usquam sit.—Oudénc euvin ou pho-bi-thei. Cf. Apol. Soc. c. 16. init. ouvic de euvinn ouk evnivos sth.

Diaphoretheisa.] See supr. c. 24. init.

§. 35. Aútò te proò tou éphimi. Log. ëm. Socrates, himself, was eng-aged in meditation upon, or, was occupied in thought with the subject that had been argued. Cf. Philostr. de Vit. Apollon. v. 31. proò tourov òlog émii. I am wholly occupied in this—such being an ordinary signification of proò with a dative.


Τl — ðmìn tâ lexeánta.] Intell. Òdòkai. Cf. Soph. Elect. 706. 'Ω ëv, tî taûta, pòtèron, eùtvuhesth hron; i. e. 

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theoiménh kai ùp' èkeínon triphoménh, òcìn te ou'tos oie-tai deív, ëwos ën ëkì, kai èpeidhain tefleutísh, eis to ëvuggevês kai eis to toun touton afikoménh atoplalakhai toûv 'andropíonon kakówv. ëk de tis touvntias trophi ouv' deîvous ouk fobhthi, tvntia g' épitpedevasasa, òv Sümnia te kai Kèbìs, òpws ouk diástraptheisa en tî ápallagì toû sýmatos ùpo toûn anýmou diáfusítheisa kai diátopoménh óíxhatai kai ouv'dén ëti ou'dav-mou ì. Ð. 35. Sýnh ou'n ëgëneto tânta eîpontos toû Sw-krátous épi polòn xhrónon, kai au'tòs te pro's tìk eir-ménoi logoi ën ou Sókrátis, òs i'dèvon efaiíneto, kai ëmìwv oui plêistov. Kèbìs de kai Sümniásýmkròn pròs allhêlos dieleugésthv. kai ou Sókrátis idòn au-tò ëreto, Tl, ëfhi, ùmîn tà lexeánta; múv ëmì dôkavi
and certainly, Theophrastus.

**Theophrastus.**

Kaí miν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τάληθη σοι ἐρῶ.

πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερον τοῦ ἑτερον προσθέτα τί καὶ κελεύει ἑρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ἢκαὶ πἐρὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτων, μηδὲν ἀποκνήήσθη καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διεξέλθειν, εἰ τῇ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐμὲ ἔμπιπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μᾶλλον ὀίσθε μετ' ἔμοι ἐυπορήσειν. Καὶ ὁ Συμμίας ἔφη, Βαβαί, ὁ Συμμίας ὁ που λατεπῶς ἀν τοὺς ἄλλους πείσαμι ἀνθρώπων ὡς οὐ ἐξιμφοράν ἠγούμαι τὴν παρούσαν εὐμφοράν. Καὶ ὁ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασε τε ἥρεμα καὶ φησί, Ὁπίς, ὁ Συμμίας ὁ που λατεπῶς ἀν τοὺς ἄλλους πείσαμι ἀνθρώπων ὡς οὐ ἐξιμφοράν ἠγούμαι τὴν παρούσαν εὐμφοράν, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πεῖθεν, ἀλλὰ φοβείσθε μὴ δυσκολότερον τι νῦν δίκαιον ἦ ἐν τῷ πρόσεθε βίο. καὶ ὡς ἐοίκε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μακτικὴν, οἱ

tί παῦτά λίγῳ, πότερον εὑρ.-Μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ,—μὴ, an Attic particle of interrogation, in Latin an forte, is occasionally joined with each of its component parts, with μη pleonastically, and commonly the question asked with it as well as with μη, involves a negation. Seag. Vig. de Id. c. vii. s. b. 1. 2.

Ἐπὶ πέρι ἐμίν παῖνεται βελτ. λεξ. ἢ

it appears to you in any degree that it could be better expressed; where ἄν would seem to be required before λεχθῆναι, but it is not unusually omitted in the case of other moods to which it gives the force of the optative or conjunctive.


"Ἡ ποιῇ—Serves, sometimes, the purpose of assuring, but so that τοῦ somewhat moderates the assurance contained in ἢ; certainly, if I mistake not. — Matthiae Gr. s. 604.


Trogovai, ἀφοθανεῖν, ἀδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τότε ἡ πλείστα καὶ μᾶλλα ψεύδονται, γεγονότες ὅτι µελλοντι παρὰ τῶν θεων ἀπίειν, οὗ πέρ εἰσὶν θεραποντες. οἱ δὲ ἀνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασιν αὐτοὺς θηρνουντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδεν ὄρμου ἄδει οἷαν πεινῷ ἢ ρίγου ἢ τινα ἀλλη λύπην λυπηται, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἦ τε ἀγδον καὶ ἡ χελιδών καὶ ὁ ἑποψ, ἄ δὴ φασι διὰ λύπην θηριουντα ἄδειν ἀλλ' οὕτε ταῦτα οἰκεῖναι λυποῦµένα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἄτε, οἷµα, τοῦ 'Απόλλωνος ὄντες µαντικοὶ τ' εἰσὶ καὶ προειδότες τά ἐν τῷ ἀγαθα ἀδουσί τε καὶ τέρπονται ἐκεῖνην τὴν ἡµέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐµπροσθεν χρόνῳ. Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦµαί ὀµόδουλος τε ἐναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρον ἐκείνον τὴν µαντικὴν ἐχειν παρά τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυµότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ

Οὐ πέρ εἰσιν θεραποτες. [Infr. τοῦ 'Απόλλωνος ὄντες.
'Εξήλειν.] Explained by Stephens, to sing for the last time, to take leave of their art of song; by Heindorf, to sing out life, i.e. to die by singing, or die singing. Serranus attributes to the ἐξ an intensive force, as in ἐκείσακες, ἐξ- ευρεῖν, ἐκσεῖεναι, ἐκπίνειν; and like that of the Latin de, in dacto, desecūo, detono, and renders the term vehementius cure, comparing ὄνοσι—diaphero- ντως, infr. "Α ἐφι φασι." In reference to the fabled metamorphoses of Terence, Procu, and Philomela.
Μαντικοί.] Oppian Cynege. ii. 547. s. Ὀικ ἄρα τοι µοῦνουσιν ἐν ὀρί- θεσιν οἰς Κύκνων µαντιτόλοι γόνων ὧσπερ τὸν θεϊον. Ἀσχyl. Agam. 1453. ἢ ἐκ τοῦ κύκνου ὀκνηρ, Τόν ὄν- τατον µιµάσα τινος γόνων.—whence the language of one at the near approach of death was called κύκνων ὄσµα. Cic. Orat. iii. 2. Cyneca. 
Διαφερόντας ἢ. ] Rather than. See Matthiae Gr. s. 366. Obs. 2.
"Οµόδουλος—τῶν κύκνων." See Matthiae Gr. s. 405. Obs. 1.—Ἱπρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. Matthiae Gr. s. 315. 1.
Οὐ χείρον—τὴν µαντικήν.] See Ἀπολ. Σocr. e. 30. ἐν ὧ µᾶλιστα ἀν-
βίον ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἄλλα τούτων γε ἐνεκα λέγειν τε χρή καὶ ἔρωταν ο̱ τι ἀν βούλησθε, ἐὼς ἄν οἱ Ἀθη- ναίων ἐδώσιν ἄνδρες ἐνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Συμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἔρω ὁ ἀπορώ, καὶ ἂδ ὤδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὥθεκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑσως ὡς περ καὶ σοὶ, τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεσθὸν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐ- τῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ πρότῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίσ- τασθαι πρὶν ἀν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἄνδρός· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπερ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν, ἢ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γούν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρω- πίνων λόγων λαβῶντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ἄχουμενον, ὡς περ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα, διαπλεύσαι τοῦ βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον

θρωποὶ χρησμοὶ.—Παρά τοῦ ἐπεστά- του, sc. Apollo.

"Ὁ ἀπορῶ.] h. e. Περὶ οὖν ἀπορῶ.
Καὶ μὴ προαφιστάσθαι.] Added in explanation of παντὶ πρότῳ ἐλέγχειν preced. whence the passage might have been arranged so—παντὶ πρότῳ ἐλέγ- χειν μὴ προαφιστάσκονς πρὶν ἀν τ. &c. Stephens and Forster would omit μὴ, which, however, is more correctly re- tained and explained by Fischer and Heindorf, as supr.—Ἀπειπέν, ἀπαν- ἔαν, and ἀπαγορεύειν, as Stallbaum observes, are used in reference to those who are wearied and exhausted in purs- uit of an object, which it is either diffi- cult or impossible to attain.

"Ἡ μαθείν ὅπερ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν.] i. e. Either to learn from others, or to find out, upon investigation, by one's self. Μαθα- νείν occurs frequently also in the sense attributed to εὑρέω here, but it is pro- perly used with reference to διεύκασιν, to teach. Hence the three methods of acquiring knowledge, by learning, in- vention, and inspiration, as Soph. apud. Plutarch. de Fortuna. p. 98. Λ. τὰ μὲν ἔκειστα μανθάνω, τὰ ἐνερετὰ ζητώ· Τὰ δ' εὐκτά παρὰ θεῶν ἐγώμαιν. Τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων.] h. e. Inter rationes et argumenta, que huma- no ingenio exogitata et inventa sunt.—Stall.—to which is opposed λόγον θείου τύπου infr.

"Ὡς περ ἐπὶ σχεδίας.] Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Itaque dubitanis, circumspec- tantes, hasitans multa adversa reverser, tanquam ratis in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio." This metaphor is taken from the Greek adage, ἵπτε ἑλπίς ὀ- χισθαι. v. Plat. Legg. iii. p. 59. C. ἐπὶ ἐς τῆς ἡλπίδος ὀχυμενον ταῦτας εὐφρασκόν καταφυγήν αὐτοῖς εἰς αὐτοῖς μόνονε εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεοῖς. Some idea of risk or hazard is implied in κυ- δυνοῦντα, as if the very best of human reasonings were still an uncertain vessel to embark in and traverse the sea of life. Hence ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκι- νδυνότερον, &c. as applied to the more steady and unerring vehicle, the rea- son inspired from above. On the phrase διαπλεύσαι τῶν βιῶν, see Wesseling ad. Herodot. v. 6. p. 422. Toup. ταὶ Suid. i. p. 20.
καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερον ὁχήματος ἡ λόγος θείου τινὸς διαπορευθήναι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἀ ἔμοι δοκεῖ. ἔμοι γὰρ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸνοι σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνω φαίνεται ικανὸς εἰρήσθαι.

§. 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἰσως γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ ἐταῖρε, ἀλήθη σοι φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δή οὐχ ἰκανάς.

"Ἡ λόγος θείου τινὸς."] Heindorf would omit ἣ; but it may be retained in a similar sense to that in which it is used in Crito, c. 3. inf. ταῦτας ὑποκά, ἢ δοκεῖν. Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 7. r. 2.—Θείον is to be understood here in the sense of ὑστέρας, or θεῖος ποιήσας γενόμενον. It is scarcely necessary to say that there is no foundation for the conjectures of those who have understood the above passage as containing an implied reference to Holy Writ.—The idea, to say no more, involves, in the first instance, a misapprehension of the sense in which λόγος is used in the text.

"Επειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις."] i, e. Especially since you yourself advise me to it.

Πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸνοι σκοπῶν.] h. c. Quandt et mecum hoc animum repul, et cum hoc una considero.—Stall.

§. 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates now proceeds to meet the objections which he had encouraged Simmias and Cebes to advance against the conclusion at which he had arrived from the preceding part of the discussion. Simmias asserts that the faculty of thought might be a quality of body, arising from the due disposition of its several affections, heat, cold, moisture, and dryness, in the same way that a discord results from a well-tuned lyre; in other words, that the mind is a harmony, which ceases to exist upon the decease of the body and the dispersion of its particles, as the music of the lyre is destroyed when the chords are broken and the instrument past use, a doctrine held by Parmenides Zeno, and others.—Cebes, using a different image, argues to a similar effect against the soul's surviving the body. V. Cousin sums up the argument and its answer, Chuv. Plat. i. p. 160. "Mais si l'âme n'était qu'un être collectif, un résultat, une relation, l'harmonie d'une lyre! l'harmonie aussi ne semble-t-elle pas quelque chose de simple, d'invisible, de fixe, et pourtant elle se dissipe quand la lyre et les cordes sont brisées? Non, l'âme qui prē-existe substantiellement à son apparition sous cette forme corporelle, l'âme ne peut être la collection, le résultat, la relation, l'harmonie de parties qu'elle précéde. D'ailleurs une collection, un résultat, un rapport n'ont pas d'essence propre, et n'existent recellement que dans les éléments qui les constituent, tandis que l'âme sait et sent qu'elle a une existence à soi. Enfin la force de toute composition est dans l'accord le plus intime de ses composans; la force de l'âme au contraire est de se séparer violamment de plusieurs de ses pretendues éléments, et de leur faire la guerre. L'âme n'est donc ni une collection, ni un résultat, ni une relation; c'est une unité individuelle, subsistante par elle-même." Hence the conclusion to which those who subsequently adopted this doctrine of Plato have justly arrived, that the faculty of thought cannot be inherent in the body, as being that whose every action and passion depend upon the change and motion of its component parts.

Ὀδ ἰκανῶς. Inadequately.
The sense of this passage and the context is somewhat involved, and it may be well to develop it more largely and clearly. Simmias objects to the proofs deduced by Socrates, from the nature and connexion of the soul and body, of the immortality of the former, by shewing that in the supposed analogous case of a lyre, and the harmony which results from its being sound and in tune, a similar train of reasoning cannot hold good. The harmony, which is analogous to the soul is invisible, incorporeal, perfectly beautiful and divine, when the instrument is in order; the lyre itself, and its chords, are typical of the body, being actual bodies, consequently partaking of their nature, compound, terrestrial, and allied to mortality. Should one break the lyre, cut or rend its strings, according to the mode of argument adopted by Socrates, one would say that the harmony still existed and had not been destroyed. For it could not be possible that the lyre in its broken and imperfect state should continue to exist, and that the strings, after they had been cut or rent, should still obviously though uselessly exist, while the harmony, of the same nature with, and congenial to the immortal and divine, should disappear, having perished previous to that which was mortal, and naturally subject to decay. But one should assert that the harmony, of necessity, existed somewhere, and that the frame and chords of the instrument ought to be utterly decayed before any such affection could befal the harmony itself. Here, then, was the difficulty arising from the argument of Socrates. If the soul was a harmony, resulting from the due adjustment of the bodily affections, it is plain that like the harmonics of music, or of the other works of art, it could not exist when the body had been too much relaxed or overstrained; but the bodily relics still continued to exist for a long
τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυντοειδεῖς οὐσας, τὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν ἀπολολέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὀμοφυὰ τε καὶ ἑυγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην ἀλλὰ φαίη ὡς ἀνάγκη ἐτί πως ἐναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ἄξια καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασατησεθαι πρὶν τὶ ἐκείνην παθεῖν, καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὡς Σάκρατες, οἴμαι ἐγώνει καὶ αὐτὸν σε τοῦτο ὑπεθυμήσαθαι, ὅτι τοιούτοι τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνουμεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡς περ ἐντεταμένον τοῦ σώματος ἴμμον καὶ ἑυνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἐξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τυόντων κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἴμμον, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραβῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυνχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἄρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἴμμων ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπισταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὕθες ὑπάρχῃ ἀπολολέναι, καὶ περ ὡςανθειοτάτην, ὡς περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλαι ἄρμονίαι οἱ τε ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολῶν χρόνου παραμένειν,


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'étos àn ē κατακαυθή ē καταστή. ὁρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦ
tου τον λόγου τι φήσωμεν, εάν τις ἀξίοι κράσιν οὐ-
sαν τήν ψυχήν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλομένῳ
θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

§. 37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς περ τὰ
πολλὰ εἰόθει, καὶ μειδίασα Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέ-
γει ὁ Σμιμίας. εἰ οὖν τις υἱόν εὐπορότερος ἐμοῦ, τί
οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως έκουεν ἀπτομένῳ
tοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρί-
σεως ἐτί πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγ-
cαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἕνα χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμε-
θά τι ἐροῦμεν, ἡπείτα ἀκούσαντας ἡ ἐγγχορεῖν αὐ-
tοῖς, εάν τι δοκώσει προσάδειν εάν δὲ μή, οὗτος ἦδη
ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ’ ἀγε, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ὁ Κέβης,
λέγει τί ἢν ὁ σε αὖ θράττων ἀπιστίων παρέχει. Λέγω
δή, ἢ δ’ ὅσ ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοί γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτί ἐν τῷ αὐ-
tῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ ὁ περ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέ-
gομεν, ταύτων ἐγκλημα ἐχειν. ὃτι μὲν γὰρ ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ
ψυχή καὶ πρῖν εἰς τὸδε τὸ εἶδος ἑλθείν, οὐκ ἀνατίθε-

'Επείτα ἀκούσαντας.] Vulg. ἐπεί-
tα δε—but both εἶσα and ἐπείτα occur
in numerous instances without the par-
ticule, the latter almost always, even
when πρώτων μὲν precedes. HEIND.

Προσάδειν.] i. e. If they seem to
speak reasonably; προσάδειν being used
here in the sense of λέγειν τι, aliquid
veri firmique dicere. WYTT.—the term
being applied as supr. in reference to the
nature of the subject in dispute. Cf. infr.
c. 41. Ὁὗτος οὖν σοὶ ὁ λόγος ἐκείνω
πῶς συνάσται καὶ μὴ—πρῶτες γε,
eἰπέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ, ἐξωμείω τίνος
καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμονίας.

Ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.] To defend
or support the argument.

Οράττων.] Att. for θράςσων i. q.
παράσσων: th. παράσσω.

'Ετεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ—εἶναι.] i. q. Οὐ
προκεχωρηκέναι, i. e. to have made no
advances towards being established as a
truth; to remain in the same place, or be
liable to the same objections as before.

Εἰς τὸδε τὸ εἰςοῦ.] Sc. αὐθώπτινον.
 Cf. c. 21. supr. in anibrpov oidei.
Ouin anatibemai.] I do not retract, or, change my opinion. The term is frequently used by Plato in this sense, in Menon. p. 89. D. Protagor. p. 211. E. Charmid. p. 240. It is properly applied to players at draughts; Suid. 'Anaiethsai: & η̆ μεταθεσαι & απ' των πιττεωντων και τας κειμημενας ἡμας ψηφους 'ενορθωμεντων — σημαινει η λειτυρ — & τη μεταβουλεσθαι και μεταγυναι, ποιο εστι παρα Πλατωνοι φιλοσοφοι.

Ει μη ηπαχθες ἵστην εἰπεῖν.] If it is not too false, &c.—ηπαχθης being affirmed of any praise or commendation which is so intemperately and injudiciously bestowed as to disgust not only the auditors, but the object of it. Cf. Plutarch. de Sui. Laude. p. 54. F.—τως ἑαυτῶν ἑπανως—τως ἐλλειψε—η ἀποτελεσεις—η ἀμαρταιας ἐλλαπραις κεβδαλλουτες, αφαιρουσι τη ηπαχθεις αυτων και γεμεσιτων.

Ου μοι εικει τηδε.] Intell. ικανως αποδοειξηθα.

Ος μεν ουκ ἵσχυροτερον, κ. τ. λ.] Ceches does not agree with Simmias as to the relative strength and durability of the soul and body, but upholds, in either respect, the superiority of the former.

Ἀν φαιη ο λογος.] Sc. the argument personified.

'Εμοι γαρ ἐκεί, κ. τ. λ.] The objection of Ceches to the argument of So-
confidence arising from a secure belief in the immortality of the soul, for he could not tell but that the body, which was then itself on the eve of dissolution, was also that which was to be accompanied by the death of the soul.

ПриАвтων.] Se.Psихινκαισωματος—μιτρί·ανμου,ί.ε.ριθώθως,κατάτημακατάτημα,κατατηρεῖταικατηγορείταικαταβάταικατακλύστεροικατακλύστεροι.

'Αλλαγαρναναι."

Intell. Ο λέγων ταύτα πρέπει αυτων.

Ει γαρ μειον το σώμα, κ. τ. λ.] i.e. If, while a man is still living, the body is liable to change and waste, and the soul weaves, as it were, anew what had completely decayed, or, in other words, if it uses one body after another, it should follow of course that when the soul perished, it should do so prior to its lastmentenement only, which would still evince its inferiority, for on the destruction of the soul, it would give evidence of its weakness by a speedy dissolution. — Hence, according to Cebes, it would appear that the greater strength and durability of the soul, and its being necessary to the continued existence of the body, cannot be trusted to as an argument against its own final dissolution, which may take place previous to the
corruption of one, and that the last body it may dwell in.

\[\text{Tōn φύσιν τῆς Ἀσθενείας.}\] i.e. Tēn Ἀσθενείας. — φύσις being in frequent use in similar periphrases. Cf. Plat. in Phainon. p. 702. C. Theop. γὰρ ἐν ὀστα-τοῖς — τῶν ἄστρων φύσις λεκ-τίων, i. q. τὰ ἀστήρ. Legg. xii. 697. ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν φυλακῆς φώ-σιν, i. e. πρὸς τὴν φυλακὴν. — Plotin. Enn. ii. 1. 3. p. 93. Δ. — καὶ ἄρη μῆποι ἐπιλίπει, οὐδέ ἡ ἐ-στος φύσις. Cic. de Fin. v. 11. — "hoc intelligat, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me: nil enim hoc differt."

Ei γὰρ τις καὶ πλίον ἐτε.] This, as well as what immediately preceded, Cebes addressed to Simmias, who, while he admitted the pre-existence of the soul, yet by contrasting it with a harmony, denied its superior strength and durability, as compared with that of the body. Cebes now asserts, that if one were to concede to another, who insisted upon still more than Simmias did, namely, not merely the soul’s pre-existence, but that the souls of some existed after their decease, and were subject to the successive changes of birth and death, the nature of the soul being such that it could survive these repeated births; if one were to concede this, he could not still by any means allow that the soul suffered no injury from these many changes, and that it did not eventually sink in some of them, but which, it would be impossible to say. Hence, according to Cebes, one should entertain but a foolish and unfounded confidence who would fearlessly encounter death without the ability to prove that the soul was, in every respect, immortal and imperishable, in which case it would be impossible but that the person about to die should fear with regard to his soul, that its doom was involved in the approaching dissolution of the body.

Οὗτο γὰρ αὐτῷ.] Δάυτο ἥ. Ἴ. referring to ψυχήν, is used for αὐτῆν. Demonstrative pronouns are often not in the gender of the substantive to which they refer, but in the neuter, provided the idea of the substantive in the abstract be considered generally as a thing or matter. Matthis Gr. s. 439. — Ἀν-τίχειν, i. q. ἐμπήγειν, σώζειν, to endure, to continue.

Μὴ ὦ ποιεῖν αὐτῆν.] Μὴ ὦ is used after negative propositions or verbs,


with infinitives which are themselves negativus, where it is equivalent to the Latin quin, or quoniam. Matthiae Gr. s. 699. e. Cf. supr. c. 17. sub. fin. τίς μυχανή μη οὖν, κ. τ. λ.—Ποιεῖν, i. e. frangit viribus, con fugit, fulsitere. Stalh. εν χαίς πολλάς γενέσθη, quum migravit sapientius et professcitur in alia atque alia corpora. 10. Οδειν προσήκει βάθανον. Explained by Heindorf; In nominem fiden-

ter obfirmatque antiqv mortem expectan-
tem cadit, ut non stultile hane habeat fiduciam, qui non possit, &c. Upon θά-

νατον θαρροεντι see Matthiae Gr. s. 414. 12. Αδιεναι ὑπ᾽ ἐρ τῇς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς. To fear concerning his soul: the more usual form being, according to Heindorf, εἰδοεῖν περί τινος, or περί των. § 33. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες, κ. τ. λ.] This interruption of the dia-

togue, and the transition from the sub-

ject to the narrator himself, is admirably adapted, as Wyttenbach observes, to in-

terest and affect the reader. Εἰς ἀπιστίαν—τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις. See Matthiae Gr. s. 390. Τοιούτων τι λέγειν, κ. τ. λ. i. e. A like reflection strikes myself. Upon αὐ-

τον μὲ νῦν ἄκ.—ἐπιστρέφει, See Mat-

thiae Gr. s. 402. a. Obs. 1.
πλατωνος

towke. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινά ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὦς περ ὑπέμνησέ με ῥήθεις ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προνάδεκτο. καὶ πάνω δέομαι πα- λιν, ὦς περ ἔξ ἀρχής, ἄλλον τινὸς λόγου, ὦς με πεί- σει ὑς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχή. λέγε ὦν πρὸς Δίος, πῦ ὁ Σωκράτης μετήλθε τὸν λό- γον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὦς περ ὑμᾶς φής, ἐνδη- λὸς τι ἐγένετο ἄχθομενος ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶα ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ικανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἡ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἦμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἄκριβεστατα.

ϜΑΙΔ. Καὶ μήν, ο Ἐσεκρατεῖς, πολλάκις θαυμά- σας Σωκράτη οὐ πάποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν ὦν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἵσως οὐδὲν ἀτοπον· ἀλλ ἐγώ χαί μᾶλιστα θαυμάσα αὐτοῦ πρὸτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἦδεως καὶ εὑμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἐπει- τα ἦμῖν ὡς ὀξέως ὑσθετο ὑπὲροῦθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λό- γων, ἐπειτα ὡς ἐλ ἦμᾶς ἱάσατο καὶ ὄσ κερ περευ- γότας καὶ ἤττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὐτρῆσε πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ ἴσυσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

Θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου—ἀντιλαμβά- νεται.] i. e. Makes a wonderful impres- sion upon, takes a wonderful hold of me: see Matthiae Gr. s. 330. Stallbaum ex- plains it; mirifice me capit, ita ut ab altera illa sententia quasi abstrahor et auidar.—Και ὦν καὶ ἄι, μνε, ut jam semper antea. STALL. Cf. Schefer, ad Sophoc. Antig. v. 181.

Και ὦν περ ὑπέμνησε με.] And has reminded me, as it were, that I have my- self held the same opinion. Matthiae Gr. s. 629. v. ὑπὲρ.

Μετήλθε τὸν λόγον.] Followed up the argument; for the purpose of ex- planing away the objected difficulties. Πρῶα ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ.] Tempe- rately bore out, supported, the argument; i. e. defended and sustained it against the doubts and censures of his oppo- nents, with good temper and discretion.

Τὸ μὲν ὦν ἔχειν.] This construc- tion arises from the attraction of the sub- ject; otherwise the passage would run, τὸ μὲν ὦν ἔχειν ἐκείνον ὁ λόγοι. Τρ. That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so much to be wondered at.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο—ἐπειτα—ἐπι- τα.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 603.—'Ως ἡ- ἱέρως καὶ εὑμενώς. Cf. in Crilon. c. i. ὄς ἡμῶς καθεῦνες.—'Αγαμένως—ἀ- πεδέκατο. i. e. With what respect and admiration he attended to the argument of the young men. Ruhnken, ad Tim. Gloss. p. 9. explains it; orationem mi- rifice probavit, and Hesychius under- stands ἀγαμένως in the sense of θαυ- μασίως, but it is obvious that the spirit and sense of the passage are best evince- ed by the interpretation of Stallbaum as supr.

Ἱμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἵστηκα.] See Mat-
EX. Πῶς δή;

ΦΑΙΔ. 'Εγὼ ἐρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξίᾳ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαίζηλου τινὸς, ὃ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ύψηλοτέρου ἡ ἐγὼ. καταψήφασα οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ ἐνυπτιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰσῆλθε γὰρ, ὅποτε τῦχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὔριον δὴ, ἡφι, ἵσως, ὁ φαίδων, τὰς κάλας ταῦτα κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. 'Εοικεν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢ Σῶκρατες. Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἔμοι πείθη. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Τῇμερον, ἡφι, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταῦτα, εὰν πέρ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνόμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγων ἂν εἰ σὺ εἶη καὶ με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἐνορκὸν ἀν ποιησάμην ὡς περ Ἀργείοι, μὴ

thie Gr. s. 317.


Τὰς κάλας ταῦτα κόμας ἀποκερεῖ.] One of the modes by which the Grecians expressed their regret for the decease of their friends was, by cutting off or shaving the hair, of which they did not think it sufficient to deprive themselves of a small part only; Eurip. Orest. v. 128. They disposed of their hair in several ways. Sometimes it was thrown upon the corpse. Hom. II. ψ' v. 135. Θρεῖ δὲ πάντα νίκην καταίνων, δὲ ἵππακλον Κειρόμενοι—sometimes it was thrown upon the funeral pile, or placed in the hands of the deceased, to be consumed with the body, II. ψ' 152—κινρεῖ κόμην ἐτάροι φιλοί Θήκεν.—and at other times it was laid upon the grave. Ἀεσχύλ. Choeph. ὤρῳ τομαῖον τόντι δοὐρεύων τάφῳ. It has been objectd, v. Meurs. ad Lycophr. 976. de Funer. c. xlvii. that shaving the hair was rather, as appears from several ancient authorities, a sign of rejoicing; see the discussion of this subject in Potter's Grec. Antiq. ii. c. 5.


'Εὰν περ—ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ.] The forms ὁ λόγος οἴχεται, ἑκφύγει, σώζεται, are familiar with Plato, instead of which he now uses one less frequent, but more suitable to the immediate nature of the subject.—Ἀναβιώσασθαι, to recall to life. Cf. in Criotn. c. 9. init. Καὶ ἀναβιώσασθαιν. Εἰ—με εἰσφυγοι ὁ λόγος.] i. e. If he should lose hold of his argument, and be consequently unable to prove his point, the immortality of the soul.—Ἐνορκὸν ἂν ποιησάμην, I would bind myself by oath.

'Ὡς περ Ἀργείοι.] The Argives having lost Thyrea to the Spartans, bound themselves, by a decree and impression, to cut their hair and never permit it to grow again to its accustomed length until the place had been recovered. The Spartans, on the contrary, who used to wear their hair short, decreed that from henceforward they would nourish their hair, as a reproach to their enemies. Herodot. i. 82. 'Ἀργείοι μὲν νῦν ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ χαλῶν (the time of the loss of Thyrea) καταπειράμενοι τὰς κεφαλάς, πρόστις ὑπάναγκες κομέντες, ἐποίησαντο νόμον τε καὶ κατάρηι, μὴ πρότερον θρίψαν κόμην ὁ Ἀργείων ἠμίεν ρηθεὶ τὰς γυναικας
πρότερον κομήσεως πρὶν ἀν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενοι τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται οἷος τε εἶναι. Ἀλλ’ καὶ ἐμέ, ἐφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐως ἐτὶ ψως ἐστὶν. Παρακαλῶ τοῖνυν, ἐφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ’ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδέν διοίσει, ἐφη.

§. 39. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποίον; ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ. Μὴ γενόμεθα, ἦ δ’ ὡς, μισολόγοι, ὡς περ ὁι μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι,

σφεχρυσφορήσειν, πρὶν ἀν θυρίας ἀναστώσωμαι. Διεκαίμονοι εἰ τὰ ἑναστὶ τοῖνυν ἔθνει νόμον, ὁ γὰρ κομήσεως πρὸ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τοῦτο κοιμάσθη.

Πρὸς εἶν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς.] The application of this proverb is plain, but its origin is uncertain. It arose, according to some, from Hercules having called fohus, son of Iphicles, king of Thesaly, to assist him in destroying the hydra, which he did by applying a burning iron to the wound, as soon as one head cast off, to prevent the growth of another; the attention of Hercules having been drawn away for a time by a sea-crab, which Juno, jealous of his glory, had sent during the combat to bite his foot. Cf. Schlol. in loc. Tάττης τὴν αὐτὸν ὁ Δοῦλος ὀντὸς ἐφηγέτα. Ἡρακλῆς φρεσὶν μυών εἰμίμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀλευρίῳ, πυγμῆς ἀγώνια καταθήναι, καὶ πιεσάναι τὴν εἰς ὅλιμπαίαν, πᾶλιν ἀγνωνίμων, ἢ τὸ Ἑλάτου καὶ Φεράνθρον πάλη ληφθῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἐκείνον τῷ Πρός εἶν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, παρουσιασθῆναι . . . . Ἡρακλῆς ὑπὸ τὸν Ἐλλάνικος φάσιν, ώς ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἔρημον Ἡρακλῆς ἀφήνει, τὴν Ἡρας αὐτῷ καρκίνων ἐφορμήσει πρὸς εἰῶν ἐπὶ ἐκκόμενον μάχεσθαι, σῶμα μαχον εἰκαστεάδον των Ἰδέων καὶ ἐνεδέθη ρηθήται τῷ παροιμιᾶ. V. Geel. in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. ii. p. 15. sqq.

"Εἰς εὔτι φῶς ἐστιν.] i.e. Before sunset, after which time, those who had been condemned to die were obliged to drink the poison. Cf. Infr. c. 66.

§. 39. Πρῶτον.] First of all,—Τὸ ποίον, H. c. ποίον ἢτι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὁ λέγεις. The article is prefixed to interrogative pronouns, when it always refers to something previously said by the person interrogated; the article appearing to be the commencement of an anticipation of what the person questioned is expected to say, and the interrogative pronoun to be resorted to after a short apophasis, from inability to proceed. Tr. εὑρίσκομεν τὰ πάντα ἐπὶ θεαμαστῶν, Merc., τῶ—τί. Aristoph. Pae. 696.—Merc. ὥδε ὑπείκεσαν ἐνναυαθέσθαι σοι; Tr. τά—τί; Aristoph. Pae. 693.—Π. πράγμα ποροσφόντων μέγα. κ. τὸ—ποίον, ὧν ξέιν; Soph. τὸ ποίον ἐλήμενε; when there is nothing in the preceding words to which the article thus employed can be grammatically referred, some noun with which it may agree is expressed in the interrogation itself: Prom. θημος τὸ πανσα μὴ προδείκησα μόνον. Chor. τὸ ποίον εὐφών τῆς φάρακος νόσον. Aschyl. Prom. 248. the remedy which you discovered for this malady was what? Seag. Viger, i. l. r. 19.

Μὴ γενόμεθα—μισολόγοι ὡς περί ὁι μισάνθρωποι.] Cf. Minucius Felix in Octavio xiv. 4. "Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui, dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intensionibus avocantur, sine deiecta adventuuntur dicitis omnibus, nec a rectis falsa securunt, nescientes inesse et in incredibili verum, et in verismili mendacium. Itaque quo sepsibus adseverationibus credunt, eo frequentius a peritoribus arguuntur: si assidue tentericate decepti, culpan judicii (sic leg. pro judicibus) transferunt ad
incerti querelam; ut, damnatis omnibus, nullatibus universa suspenderé, quam de fallacia juris judicare. Igitur nobis providendum est, ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremos; uta ut in excercationem et odium hominum plerique simpliciores efferrantur. Nam incaute creduli circunveniantur ab his, quos bonos putarunt: mox errore consimili jam suspicis omnibus, ut improbos metuunt etiam quos optimos sentire potuerunt."


"Evdi'eta.] Arise in the mind. Cf. Æschin. Soc. iii. 8. ἰσθίως ὑπένθυσαν—where the verb is also used absolutely and in a similar sense.

"Oúthi έτερον.] i.e. Upon a different occasion from that in which the favorable opinion was formed of him in the first instance, he will be found quite a different character. V. Cousin; et tout autre encore dans une autre occasion.

"Etiam Jovin." Comparatives and superlatives of substantives, which are taken in an adjective sense, and which, for the most part, are adjectives, are not unusual. Cf. Herodot. vii. 1. ἐνόλεστος. Aristoph. Equ. 45. εἰκαβολώσατος.


"Oukouν—αἰσχρόν.] Suppl. τοῦτο ἐστι.—"Ανευ τέχνης; Cf. Lucian, in Timon. where Jupiter inquiring from Mercury the cause of the misery and complaints of Timon, is answered; χρυσότητος ἐπιτίμησε αὐτὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπία—ὡς ἐφ ἀληθεία λόγον, αὖνα καὶ εὐθυῆθα καὶ ἀκριβία περὶ τοῦ φίλου, δὲ οὐ συνίει, κόραξε καὶ λύκως χαρίζομενος.

"Os per ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] Such as it really is he would have judged the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few on either side, but that the middle class is the more numerous.—σφό-
δρα ὅλιγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους. τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἢν δ' ἐγώ. "Ὡς περ, ἢ δ' ὦς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων" οἴει τι σπανιότερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἐξευρεῖν ἀνθρώπων ἡ κύνα ἡ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν; ἡ αὖ ταχύν ἡ βραδύν, ἡ καλῶν ἡ αἰσχρῶν, ἡ λευκῶν ἡ μέλανα; ἡ οὐκ ἑσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων στάντως καὶ ὅλιγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνω γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἐφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγῶν προτεθείη, πάνω ἄν ὅλιγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανηναι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἐφη ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ σοῦ ὑmination ἐστὶ προάγνοις ἐγὼ ἐφεστῶμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἡ, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστευσῆ λόγῳ τινὶ ἄληθει εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κατείσαι ὅλιγον ὡστερον αὐτῷ δόξη ψευδῆ εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὄν, καὶ αὕτης ἔτερος καὶ ἕτερος καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρήσαντες οὐσθ' ὅτι τελευτώντες ἦρα being taken with χρηστοίς καὶ πονηροῖς. Cf. Apul. de Doctr. Plat. ii. p. 22. ed. Elm. "Sed apprime bonus et sine mediocritate δεκτερίως paulum admodum rarioresque, et, ut ipse ait, innumerables esse: eos autem, qui nec plane optimi nec omnino determini sint, sed quasi medie morati, plures esse."

Τα μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων. The extremes.

"Ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι.[1] Socrates does not assert his analogy to hold good so far as that reasonings may be considered liable to the extremes of good and evil which he had just declared to be few as in the case of mankind, nor to the more widely extended mediocrity which prevailed amongst them. These observations applied to men alone, and he was led out of his way to express them, in explanation of a foregoing remark, by the question of Phaedon, Πῶς λέγεις; supr. whence ἀλλὰ σοῦ ὑmination ἐγὼ ἐφεστῶμην. After which Socrates proceeds to show where the points of similitude, to which he had in the first instance alluded, lay, and which appeared to arise from a hasty and inconsiderate mode of judgment, by which, inferring as it did a constant and perplexing change of opinion with regard to truth and falsehood in philosophy, as with regard to good and evil in man, the former was also condemned as deficient in those qualities of certainty and stability which alone enhanced its pursuit.

"Ἀλλ' ἐκείνη." Sc. ὅμοιοι εἰσί. Upon ἐκείνη ἡ, see Matthiae Gr. s. 480. c. and 474. d. Schleircher observes upon this, that the consequence loses itself here, but in such a manner that it is possible to be drawn out in the parenthesis.

Οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικ. λόγον ἐπιμεθρ. Those who are conversant in sophistical reasonings. Wytenbach explains ἀντιλογικοῖς λόγους, sophismata, argumenta in tranquillo partem composita, ratio contra omnia disputandi. Cf. infr.
"We piro in Eurip."

A narrow strait dividing Euboea from the mainland of Greece. The currents were so strong that, according to some of the ancient writers, the sea was said to ebb and flow seven times a day, and as often during the night, whence it became proverbial for inconstancy and unsteadiness. Livy, xxviii. 6. whose account appears the more rational, denies that it ebbs and flows as stated supr. but says that it is subject to the influence of furious winds from the high mountains on either side, and that the current itself, changing irregularly, like the wind, from one point to another, is hurried along like a torrent from a mountain, so that ships cannot lie quiet in it day or night.

"Ando kai kata stoiphefetai.] In allusion to the uncertainty which such reasoners attach to every thing, and the insecurity of the knowledge which results from such fluctuating principles. Upon ando kai kata stoiphe, vid Wesseling, ad Herodot. p. 195. iii. 195.

"Epeita eia to paragyin sensei, k. t. v.] Would it not, says Socrates, be a deplorable grievance, if, while there is a mode of reasoning which is true, solid, and intelligible, yet from having encountered such a description of reasons as at one time appeared to be true, and at another false, one should in fine, through discontent and vexation, be glad to transfer the blame from himself and his inertness in not endeavouring to dispel his doubts, and arrive by investigation at certainty, to the reasons, and should dislike and condemn them through life, while he remained a stranger to the truth and knowledge of the realities which those reasons evinced?—"Epeita, yet, nevertheless.

Oikrnon dheta.] Grievious indeed.

§. 40. Mh pariwmen eis toin psikhin osw toin logon.
PLATONOS

κινδυνεύει ουδὲν ύπόσ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ήμεῖς οὕτω ύπόσ ἔχομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ύπόσ ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὐ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα βίου παντὸς ἐνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὅς κινδυνεύω ἐγώγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτον οὐ φιλοσόφως ἐχειν, ἀλλ' ὄς περ οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσοντι, ὅπι μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὅν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἡ ὦ φροντιζονς, ὄπως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐδεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦντι, τούτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκεῖνον διοίσει. οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἅληθῆ εἶναι προθυμησομαῖ, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὄπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἐχειν. λογιζομαι γὰρ, ὃ φίλε ἑταῖρε καὶ θέασαι ὅς πλεονεκτικῶς εἰ μὲν τυγχάνανε ἅληθῆ ύπτα ἂ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τῷ πεισθήναι εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι.

"Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον."
Intell. ἐν
νοόμεν.

"Ἀνερίστεον."
I. e. We must exert ourselves with manly resolution and energy.

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον.] Sc. the immortality of the soul.

Ὄδ γάρ ὅπως."
Γάρ, like the Latin nceper, serves for the explanation of a preceding proposition, in which was contained a demonstrative pronoun, preparing the way for that which follows. Matthae Gr. s. 615.

Εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον."
Unless it should occur incidentally, should occur as a matter of but secondary importance; V. Cousin; Au moins n'est-ce pas là mon but principal; for Socrates was anxious in the first instance, from the nature of his situation at the time, to be himself convinced of the soul's immortality, that his arguments might not fail either of their due effect upon those to whom they appeared not to be primarily addressed.

Λογιζομαι γὰρ—] I. e. For I am considering, and observe how favorably to myself, if what I say happens to be true, it is well to be persuaded of it, εἰ.

Ficinus appears to have read λογιζομαι γὰρ ὅδε.—Εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει. The most learned among the ancients generally hesitated to admit the immortality of the soul as an absolute and incontrovertible truth, and accordingly they often appeared, at one time, to yield to that, as an established certainty, which they nullified at another by their many and perplexing doubts. So Cyr. Socrat. ap. Xenoph. viii. 7. on this subject; εἰ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα—εἰ ἐϊ μή. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 22. Epist. ad Div. v. 16. Senec Epist. 102. "Juvabat de aternitatem animorum quaerere, inmo hercle quaerere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnumor virorum, rem grttissimam promittentium, quam probantium." The ancients mostly were inclined to receive this opinion upon the grounds of what was asserted respecting the immortality of the soul, rather than upon a conviction resulting from close and suitable arguments, by which they seldom laboured to prove its truth. GOTTL.

Εἰ ἐι μηδέν ἐστι τελευτ.] I. e. If all sensation is destroyed by death, and the soul itself ceases to exist.
'All' ovνν τούτων γε—[Yet (άλλα) I will for this reason (οὖν) now ad least (γε), &c. Matthiae Gr. s. 615.]

'Άμα ἐμαύτου τε.] Vidg. ἄμα ἐμαύτων τε; the reflective pronoun ἐμαύτου being frequently used by the Attic writers for the other personal pronouns compounded with αὑτός.


Ovik ἀποδέχεσθε.] Do you not admit, or allow.

Θαυμαστῶς ὦ.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 628. 3.

'Αποδέξει γε σαυτῷ λέγοντος.] You will not assent to, or approve of yourself assenting, &c. Matthiae Gr. s. 373. Obs. Ταῦτα σοι ἐγνώσαι λέγ.] It follows that you assert this, &c. Simmias admitted the pre-existence of the soul, but by comparing it to a harmony, which he could not assert to exist prior to the instrument by which it was produced, he was obliged to deny what he had al-

ready, and, as he allows, satisfactorily conceded. For if the soul bore the same relation to the body as the harmony to the lyre, the body should not only exist before it, but its qualities and affections should be so duly disposed and regulated as that they should combine to produce faculty of thought, in like manner as the harmony could only result from the proper tension of the strings. After ἥμασιν ἐγνώσει, intell. ὦ ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἀρμονία ἐγνώσει, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, εἴ δὲν ἔδει αὐτὴν ἐννεντῆναι.

Εἰς ἄνθρωπ. ἐκδ.] The human form.
δ' αυτὴν έξυγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ
dὴ ἀρμονία γέ σοι τοιούτων ἔστιν, ζ' ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ
πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι
ἐτί ἀνὰρμοστοὶ ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων
ξυνίσταται ἡ ἀρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
οὕτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνο πῶς ἔσνασται; Οὐδα-
μῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σίμμιας. Καὶ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὦς, πρέπει γε, εἶ
πέρ τι ἄλλον λόγον, ἔξυνοιδὸ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμο-
νίας. Πρέπει γὰρ, ἐφη ὁ Σίμμιας. Οὕτος τοιοῦν,
ἐφη, σοι οὖν ἔξυνοιδός, ἀλλ' ὃρα πότερον αἱρεὶ τῶν
λόγων, τὴν μᾶθησιν ἀνάμμυνην εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν ἀρμο-
νίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὥ Σόκρατες. οὔδε
μὲν γὰρ μοι γέγονεν ἀνεὶ ἀποδείξεως μετά εἰκότος
τινὸς καὶ ἐ NSUIntegerías, θ'εν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεὶ
ἀνθρώπους' ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀπο-
δείξεις ποιομένους λόγους ἔξυνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζοῦσι, καὶ
ἀν τὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἔξαπατῶσι,
καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ
τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγους δὲ ὑποθέσεως
ἀξίας ἀποδείξασθαι εὑρηται. ἐρήμηθα γάρ ποιν ὄντως

'Εκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων.] ι. ε. 'Εκ
tῶν τοῦ σάματος, ἢ οὖσι ἡν.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἁρμονία.] For neither is
harmony any such thing as that to which
you compare it.—τοιούτων ἔστιν, ζ' ἀπ.
i. ε. τοιούτων ἔστιν οὖν φ' ἀπ.
Οὕτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος.] Sc. the
argument of Simmias, that the soul was a
harmony; how, Socrates asks, will he
reconcile this with his former admission,
that science was nothing but reminiscence,
and that the soul existed before its
union with the body?—'Εκεῖνα, sc.
tῷ τῇν μᾶθησιν ἀνάμμυνην εἶναι.—
ΗΕΙΝΔ.
'Οδὲ μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν, κ. τ. λ.]
i. ε. For this argument (that the soul was
a harmony,) occurred to me, independent
of any demonstration, but in consequence
of a certain verisimilitude and specious-
ness, whence many men entertain this
same opinion. But I am convinced that
the arguments which derive their proofs
from verisimilitudes, both in geometry
and all other instances, are futile, and if
one be not on his guard against them, es-
pecially deceptive. Upon the eikōta of
the rhetoricians, see in Phaedr. p. 353.
Alexandr. i.—Εὐπρεπείας, and ἐνπρε-
πῆς are frequently used in reference to
the plausibility of a speaker and his ar-
guments. Cf. Thucyd. iii. 11. ἐνπρε-
πεια λόγου. 38. τὸ εὐπρεπίς τῶν
λόγων ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσε-
ται.
Ξύνοιδα.] See Matthaeus Gr. s. 548.
'Αλαζόσι, Tim. Plat. Lex. 'Αλαζῶν
ψευδῆς. — ἔξαπατῶσι, decipientibus.—
WYTT.
Δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδείξασθαι.]
Upon a principle deserving of admission
or assent.
'Ερήμηθα γάρ ποιν ὄντως, κ. τ. λ.]
i. ε. For thus, indeed, our soul was said
to exist before the body, since it be-
§. 42. Τὴ δαί, ἡ δ' ὁς, ὁ Σύμμια, τηδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἡ ἀλλη τινι συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἡ ὁς ἂν ἐκεῖναι ἐχὴ εἶ ὁν ἂν ἐγγεγένται: Οὐδάμος. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγώμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἄν ἐκεῖναι ἡ ποιή ἡ πάσχῃ. Ξυνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἦγείσθαι ἵ προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων εἶ ὁν ἂν ἐγγεγέντη, ἄλλο ἐπέσταθαι. Ξυνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἑμαντία γε ἀρμονίαν κυνηθήναι ἡ φθεγξασθαί ἢ τι ἄλλο ἑναντιωθήναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἐβῆ. Τὴ δαί; οὐχ οὔτως ἀρμονία πέρυκεν εἶναι ἑκάστῃ ἀρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἁρμοσθῆ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐβη. 'Ἡ οὐχι, ἡ δ' ὁς, ἐὰν μὲν

longa (ὡς περ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν) the essence (ἡ οὐσία), which bears the name of "that which is," (τὴν τοῦ ὁ ἐστίν, ἴ. q. τοῦ ὁστος). In other words, the soul as certainly existed before it was united to the body as did those essences, or intelligible forms, inseparable from and innate in the soul itself, and of whose pre-existence, it was likewise allowed, there was no doubt. Cf. cc. 22. 25. supr. in the former of which ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν, as applied by Socrates to οὐσία, is equivalent to what is expressed as supr. by Simmias, ὡς περ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἐστίν ἡ οὐσία. V. Cousin, in h. i. "Ce passage se rapporte directement à celui qui précède, c. 24. ou Socrates dit: si le beau, le bon, καὶ τὰ ἡ τοιαύτης οὐσία, et cet ordre d'idées auxquelles nous rapportons, comme à des principes supérieurs toutes les impressions des sens et que nous trouvons d'abord en nous-mêmes, oui, si toutes ces idées existent réellement avant de se développer en cette vie, il faut, nécessairement que l'une qui les possède en propre, lui préexiste également. Platon appelle les idées des essences, οὐσίαι, ou même collectivement η οὐσία, parce qu'elles constituent la vraie existence, toutes les choses visibles n'en étant que des formes passagères. Il les appelle souvent τὰ οὖντα ὄντως; et c'est dans ce sens qu'il dit ici: έχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὁ ἐστίν."

§. 42. Οὔδε μιρ. Nor yet. Matthie Gr. s. 605.—'Ἀλλο παρ' ἂν ἐκέινα, anything else except, or otherwise than, that which it does and suffers itself. Matthie Gr. s. 588. c. Socrates proceeds to show, by a further argument, that the soul is not a harmony; for harmonies vary in their degrees, and one may be more a harmony than another, but one soul cannot be more a soul than another, whence it easily appears that the similitude fails here also.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα ἐδί ιναντία. It is then far from being the case that harmony is contrariwise (ἰναντία) produced, or utters sounds, or in any other respect is opposed to its component parts.

Ὁχι οὔτως ἀρμονία. The harmony naturally depends upon the arrangement which is best adapted to produce
μᾶλλον ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεόν, εicontains περ ἐνδεχέται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἃν ἀρμονίᾳ εὑρὶ καὶ πλειον, εἰ δὲ ἢττον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττον, ἢττον τε καὶ ἐλάπτον; Πάνω γε. Ὡν οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμκρότατον [μᾶλλον] ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλεόν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἢττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Οὐδ' ὀπωσδιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Δίος' λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄρετῆν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθῆ, ἡ δὲ ἀνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν τιθεμένων ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φύσει ταῦτα ὀντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἄρετὴν καὶ τήν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐτὶ τιν ἀλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τήν μὲν ἡρμώσθαι, τήν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονίᾳ οὐσία ἀλλην ἀρμονίαν, τήν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἕχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλην; Οὐκ

it; consequently, according to the degree of perfection in the arrangement of the instrument, strings, &c. the harmony itself, if it can admit of degrees at all (εἰ περ ἐνδεχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι infr.) will be more or less complete.

'Ἡ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ.'] Is this then the case, Socrates asks, with regard to the soul, that even in the least degree possible, one soul should be more or less a soul than another? Assuredly not; therefore in this respect the soul is not a harmony.—Heusde would reject μᾶλλον, justly, as having no connexion with the sense of the passage; so, likewise, Stallbaum and Heindorf, but as it is found in all the editions it is preserved, and enclosed in brackets.—Ἀντί τοῦτο, Matthiae Gr. s. 439. Obs. 1. b.

Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Δίος.] Socrates advances another argument against the position of Simmias. If souls are variously imbued with virtues and vices, so that some appear to be better attempered, and, as it were, attuned than others, it follows that one who insists on the soul being a harmony, should also admit that in this harmony, that is, in the soul, the forms and degrees of harmony should be manifold, which is obviously against the nature of the thing itself. Besides, if what was lately conceded be true, that one soul is not more or less so than another, one may be easily compelled to allow that no soul can excel or come short of another, which is the same as to assert that different minds are not capable of being endowed with different degrees of justice, temperance, and wisdom. But the experience of every one is against such an assertion as this. Further, if the nature and notion of harmony be more deeply and accurately investigated, it will be easily allowed that true harmony can, as such, at no time, and on no principle, admit of or participate in discord. Hence, whoever argues the soul to be a harmony, must also contend for its perfect freedom from all impurity and vice, and for the souls of all animals as partaking of the perfections of the soul of man; a conclusion which is obviously unwarrantable and absurd.

Τήν τε ἄρετήν καὶ τήν κακίαν—ἀρμονίαν—καὶ ἀναρμόζει. Cf. c. 4. supp. Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσίας μεγ. μονής.
Virtue, according to Pythagoras also, is the harmony and unison of the soul, (Aristot. Eth. Nicom. ii. 5. cf. i. 4. Diog. Laert. viii. 33. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. c. 23); or in other words, similium similia occur; and the objects of the soul, 5i ομοιοίς ἄκαθαι ἐστονται, εἰ περ' ομοίως ψυχαί πεφύκασιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ ψυχαί, εἶναι; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὧν Ὀόκρατες. Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἡ δ' ὅσ, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πασχεῖν ἄν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος,

Εἰ περ' ομοίως ψυχαί. i. e. Si quidem anime pariter a natura hoc fuit, ut sint animae. WYTT. 

Καὶ πάσχειν ἄν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, κ. τ. λ. i. e. Whether do you suppose that such an assertion could be made with any shew of justice, or that our reasoning should be subjected to the censure.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

εἰ ὁρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἢν, τὸ ψυχήν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; Ὁυδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφ'.

§. 43. Τί δαί; ἡ δ' ὅσ' τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὁ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἀρχεῖν ἡ ψυχήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμοι; Οὐκ ἐγγογε. Πότερον ἐγγχαρούσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σώμα παθείν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιομείνην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόν deceived, οἶνον καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἐλκεῖν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθείνειν καὶ ἄλλα ποιν τούτων ὀρμέων ἐναντιομείνην τὴν ψυχήν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ὁυκοῦν αὐ ὀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μὴ ποτ' ἀν αὐτήν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔταν, ἐναντία ἂδειν οἳ ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλάτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πάθος πάσχου ἔκεινα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὔτα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαὶ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ οὐ ποτ' ἀν ἡγεμονεύειν; ἦμολογήσαμεν, ἐφ' τῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὖν πάν τοūναντίον ἦμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἠγεμονεύουσα τε ἔκεινον πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησεί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιομείνη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ

of such senseless inferences if the position be correct, that the soul is a harmony?—

Ovidei ὀπωστιοῦν, is to be referred to ἡ καὶ καλῶς ὅσκει—ὑπ' ἥγε, preced, making the sense of the passage; ὅν' ὀπωστιοῦν καλῶς ὅσκει ὑπ' ὦτω λέγεσθαι.

§. 43. Τί δαί, ἡ δ' ὅσ' οὖ]—The last argument against the soul's being a harmony. The soul of the wise and prudent is always opposed to the passions and affections of the body, which, by various expedients it endeavours to curb and control. But if the soul were a harmony arising from and depending on the tension, relaxation, or vibration of the corporeal qualities, it could no more be independent of or opposed to them than the harmony of the lyre could be, which is evidently under the influence of the instrument itself. Whence the soul cannot be a harmony in this sense, or it would agree with the body, from which it is manifestly distinct in the case of all who choose to keep the body in

subjection to the higher and more noble principle.

Ὅκαὶν αὐ ὡμ. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.] Cf. supr. c. 42. init. Τί δ'—τρέξ; ὁκεῖν αὐτον ἡ λλὴ τιν συνθήκῃ προσθήκην ἄλλως πως ἔσχεν ἢ ὡς ἢν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσχεν, ἢ ἦν ἢν ἡγεμονεύει.] Heindorf gives Spalding's explication of the passage as supr. — ἐναντία ἢς ἀντίθεσαι αὐτῷ (καθ' αὐ) ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλάτο — ἢ θεῖα ἢν ἢν τυγχ. οὔτα, ἢ ἐναντία ἢς ἀντίθεσαι καὶ χαλάσεις καὶ παλμὸς καὶ ἀλλ' ἄφθονν πάθει ἐκεῖνον ἢ ἢν τυγχ. οὔτα. Stallbaum compares a similarly remarkable species of attraction, Demosth. adv. Mid. p. 515. καὶ ἐκχυμ ἡμα βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν ἢν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτελεστὸν θρασύν ὑντα καὶ βέλουσιν, where ὥν is put for αὐ, depending on ἦρασθ' εἰναι. Buttm. in loc.


Ω 2
Να με προκύψει για τους άλλους, τά μὲν χαλε-
πότερον κολάξουσα καὶ μετ’ άλγηδόνων, τά τε κατά
την γυμναστικήν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τά δὲ πραώτερον,
καὶ τά μὲν ἀπελουότα, τά δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυ-
μίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις, ὡς ἄλλῃ οὕτα ἄλλω
πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἶνον τοὺς καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐν
Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὄδυσσεα,
στήβος δὲ πλήξας κραδίνη ἦνπάπτε μύθῳ
τέτλαθι δή, κραδίνη καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἐτλης.
ἄρ’ οὗι αὐτῶν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοοῦμενὸν ὡς ἄρμονίας
αὐτής οὕτας καὶ οἴας ἀγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος
παθῶν, ἄλ’ οὐχ οἷς ἀγεῖνε ταῦτα καὶ δεσποζεῖν,
καὶ οὕτας αὐτῆς πολὺ θειστέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ

ἐπιθυμίαι, λειτουργοῦτα τε αὐτάν καὶ
θυμοῖμονον τῷ βιαζόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ,
καὶ ως περ ὅνυν στασαζοῦντον ἔξη-
μαχον τῷ λόγῳ γενόμενον τῶν θυ-
μών του τοιοῦτον.
Τά ἐν νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.]
Νουθετεῖν properly governs an accusa-
tive, but the case is sometimes deter-
mined by the remoter verb, as by ἀπε-
λουότα supra. Cf. Odys. κ'. 531. ἐτά-
ροισι ἐπιτρίβαται καὶ ἀνάξει. Soph.
Antig. 537. καὶ ἐμπιστόχως καὶ φίλῶ
τῆς αἰτίας. Lobeck. ad. Soph. Αj. 475.
p. 295.
Ο Λέξει τῶν Ὄδυσσεα.] Odys. υ.
17.—Στήθος ἐπὶ πλήξας. Plato makes
a similar use of this argument, Rep. iii.
Allegor. Hom. p. 63. ed. Schow.—
Ταῦτα τοινῦν ὡσπέρ ἐκ πηγῆς τῶν
"Ομηρικών ἐπῶν εἰς τοὺς ἱδίους εἰλακ-
γοὺς ὁ Πλάτων μετέχεσαι καὶ πρω-
τὸν γε περὶ τῶν ἁλόγων μερῶν τῆς
ψυχῆς σχέσεως ότι μὲν γὰρ ο θύμος
ἐλήχη τῶν υπόκρεσών χώρων, ὁ Ὄ-
δυσσείς ποίησε τοῦτο σαφῆς ἐν τῇ
κατα μνηστήριον ὀργῇ, καθάπερ οἰκον
τυν τῆς μισοποιόμελες θυρροκρηστῶν
τήν καρδίαν. 'Στήθος ἐπὶ πλήξας,
κραδίνη ἦνπάπτε μύθῳ. Τίτλαθι δὴ ἐκ
κραδίνη, καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἐτ-
λης. 'Αφ’ ἃς γὰρ αἱ θυμικαὶ μένουσι
πηγαί, πρὸς ταῦτην ὁ λόγος ἀποκλί-
νει. Proclus, in Rep. p. 392. ἐν Φαί-

ομεν μὲν γὰρ ὅπου ἐναφορῶντος ὁ
Σωκράτης τῆς ἐκουσὶν ζωῆς ἀναπλοῦ,
καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πλῆθος ἄ-
νοιγε τοῖς ἐκουσὶς ἐκδοταῖς, πλοῦσι
ἡ τις καὶ παντοτοκεῖος ἀνάξεις κα-
ταγαύηκατος ὡς ἀρα ἄλλη μὲν ἔστον
η ἄρμονία τῶν σωμάτων, ἄλλη ἐκ
ψυχῆς φύσει, καὶ μεμοιχεῖται ταῦτα
κατ’ οὕτινα ἀπ’ ἄλλων, τελευτῶν
ἐπὶ τόνω ὁ ποιητής καταβάλει, καὶ
toῖς ἐκείνω δὴιμένοι ἐνεργοῦσα-
τοι τεκμερίους χρωμοὺς ἐξορμημένην
ἐπιδίκησε τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς περὶ τοῦ
σώματος καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίας τῆς ἐι
διακαύηκατος φιλο πρὸς τῷ
στήθει τατηγιμένην ζωῆς κινομένην,
καὶ λέγον τίτλαθι ἐκ κραδίνη πάν-
τως τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἠξῆλλακτα τοῦ-
πός ὁ διαμαχεῖται καὶ τὸ κατε-
ξαναστάτεμον τοῦ σώματος οἷς ἐν τῷ
σώματι τῆς ἐυποτάσιν ἔχου καὶ
οὕτω δὴ προῖς ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ ἀμο-
περανάμονος ὅτι τῶν οὕτας τῆν
ψυ-
χῆς ἔραοι (I. ἐναντιάις) ἥχο φάναι τῆς
tου σωμάτος ἀρμονίας, ύστερο εἰς τὴν
καρδίαν ἀνάγκης κατακλισις (sic. leg.
ρυο ακαλέθελις) τοῦ σύμπαντο λόγον
οὕτε γὰρ ἠφένον Ὁμήρου διὸ ποιη-
τῇ ταυτῇ λύγοις ὑμολογείμεν, σουτε
ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ.

Διανοοῦμενὸν ὡς ἄρμονίας—οὐ-
σερ.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 569. 5.—
Καὶ οἷς ἀγεσθαι, ἰ. ε. καὶ τουαῦτης
ὡς ἀγεσθαι. Matthiae Gr. s. 476. a.
"H kath' ármovíaν.] i.e. Than that it could be compared to a harmony.—When it is not a substantive, that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it (where in Latin quam pro is used), then ἡ κατὰ or ὅ τρις is put after the comparative. Matthew Gr. s. 449. c.

Νῇ Δίᾳ—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.] Sc. ταῦτα ποιήσα διανοούμενος ὡς αὐτῆς οὕτως δῖας ἄγεν τε ταῦτα καὶ θεσποζων, &c. Simmias allows that, according to his view, the intention of Homer, in the passage as cited above, was to evince the superiority and sway of the mind over the body.

Οὐδαμῷ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν.] It is to be observed that the harmony which against Socrates has argued as being in any respect analogous to the soul, is totally distinct from the harmony alluded to c. 4. supr. a med. n. ὡς φιλοσόφιας μὲν οὕσης μεγίστης μονικής. The one being a physical harmony, arising from without, and necessarily dependent upon what is external and perishable in its origin and result; the other a moral, intellectual, or as Jamblichus calls it, a mathematical harmony, apud Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 864., arising from the accordant affections of the soul, inseparable from and co-existent with the soul itself.

§. 44. Εἶεν δ', ἡ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης.] From this to c. 56. infr. Socrates argues against the position of Cebes, that although the soul was more excellent than the body, and lived before it, still by changing into one body after another it impaired and wasted its influence and strength, and at last was utterly destroyed. The answer is, that the nature of the soul is the same as that of things intelligible, that is, ideas and essences. For that anything should be beautiful, the immediate presence of beauty is required in the object, as that of heat, that anything should be warm, or life, that anything should exist. Now what is warm may be made cold, but heat itself cannot become cold; what is beautiful may be unsightly, but not so with beauty itself. For on the appearance of cold, heat is not changed into cold, but disappears, so beauty is not changed into, but gives place to deformity. Thus on the approach of death, the soul departs, and is not changed into death. For by the presence of the soul the body is animated and alive, and the nature of the soul is the same as that of those imperishable and undecaying ideas and essences which are innate in the mind; therefore the soul is immortal. Wytenbach sums up the argument thus; the essences of things are constant and immutable, the essence of the soul consists in thought, therefore the soul can never lose the faculty of thought, consequently it is immortal.—This argument is objectionable upon other grounds, but principally owing to a defect in Plato's system of ideas, in not sufficiently distinguishing between those which originate in the mind itself and those which are acquired by experience, or by confounding, as Wytenbach observes, things actual with things possible. For as anything set in motion cannot be otherwise understood than as changing its place, yet there is no necessity that it should be always in motion, or always exist. So with the soul, although it cannot be otherwise understood than as living, yet it cannot for this reason be conceded that it always lives or is eternal. But Plato arrived at this conclusion as one conformable to his design. For by deciding on the immutability of those ideas, and classing souls with them as identical in their nature, it followed that he should decide upon the soul's being no more possible to be deprived of life than a triangle could continue to be
The nature of this argument, and its application, is clearly and ably developed by V. Cousin. Œuvres de Plat. l. p. 171.

"Ici se rencontre épisodiquement la théorie des Idées."

"Toute philosophie qui se renferme dans les phénomènes apparents du monde extérieur, se condamne à n'atteindre jamais ni les causes ni les principes. La physique croit faire merveille par exemple d'expliquer la situation dans laquelle je suis assis, par la disposition des os, la tension des muscles, n'oubliant rien dans le détail minutieux de ses laborieuses et superficielles explications, si ce n'est le principe réel, la cause première du phénomène, la détermination de ma volonté. L'erreur commune, celle du peuple et du physicien qui n'est pas philosophe, est de confondre l'apparence avec la réalité, ce sans quoi la cause ne pourra pas se développer, avec la cause elle-même. "La physique se perd dans une multitude de petites causes qui ne sont pas des causes, et prend pour une chimère la grande cause qui fait, le bien et vivifie tout. En parlant de la cause et du principe, il ne faut pas s'arrêter aux effets, si l'on veut pénétrer dans la réalité des choses."

"La cause, le principe suprême, c'est l'intelligence."

"Les vrais principes, les vraies causes, ce sont donc les idées."

"L'idée est, dans chaque chose, l'élément interieur et essentiel qui, s'ajoutant à la matière, l'organise et lui donne sa forme. L'idée est le type interne de toute chose, "

"L'idée, ne venant pas du dehors, ne peut être saisie par les sens. "

"Elle ne tombe pas davantage sous le raisonnement; le caractère de la perception que nous en pouvons avoir, est d'être immédiate, simple et indécomposable. Par exemple, c'est l'idée seule du beau qui fait que toute chose belle, est belle. Qu'on y pense: ce n'est pas tel ou tel arrangement de parties, tel ou tel accord de formes, qui rend beau ce qui l'est; car indépendamment de tout arrangement, de toute composition, chaque partie, chaque forme pouvait être déjà belle, et serait belle encore, la disposition générale étant changée. La beauté se déclare par l'impossibilité immédiate ou nous sommes de ne pas la trouver belle, c'est-à-dire, de ne pas être frappé par l'idée du beau, qui se rencontre généralement dans les figures qui sont belle, mais belle encore, la disposition générale étant changée. La beauté se déclare par l'impossibilité immédiate où nous sommes de ne pas la trouver belle, c'est-à-dire, de ne pas être frappé par l'idée du beau qui s'y rencontre. On ne peut donner d'autre explication de la perception de l'idée du beau. Il en est de même du bien, du juste, de l'étendue et de la grandeur, de la quantité et du nombre, et des forces élémentaires de la nature."

"Sans doute ce n'est point ici le lieu de rechercher si la critique moderne, tout en reconnaissant la solidité et la profondeur des bases de cette théorie famuse, pourrait en admettre toutes les applications, surtout celles qui se rapportent au détail des nombres; mais on ne peut s'empêcher de remarquer, en passant, que la théorie de Platon a cela de propre et d'excellente parmi les théories idéalistes, qu'elle ne s'arrête pas à la qualité logique des idées et que, elle va jusqu'à leur essence réelle. Les idées de Platon ne sont pas seulement des directions pour la pensée, comme les catégories d'Aristote et de Kant, ce sont des éléments intégrants de la réalité. Principes et causes tout ensemble, elles plaident à la fois sur l'humanité et la nature, et réunissent en elles le princípio essendi et le principio cognoscendi, si mal à propos divisés par la scholastique, comme si l'essence de l'être pouvait être destinée d'intelligence, ou que l'intelligence ne fut pas aussi de l'existence, et l'existence à la fois la plus puissante et la plus pure!"

"Les idées, les principes et les causes, bien que, par leur rapport aux choses qu'elles animent et qu'elles constituent, elles tombent accidentellement dans le temps et dans l'espace, sont essentiellement étrangères aux révolutions de l'espace et du temps; elles ne connaissent ni commencement ni fin pour elles mêmes: elles sont éternelles, incorruptibles."

"Le caractère propre d'un vrai prin-
transition he designates as τὰ Κάδρου
A more recondite sense has been at-
tributed to the above passage by different
commentators, less felicitous than in-
genious: the explanation given by Da-
cier affords a satisfactory specimen of the
rest: i. e. that as Amphion by the har-
mony of his lyre built the walls of The-
bes, so Simmias formed, by his harmony,
the human soul: and as Cadmus, hav-
ing sowed the dragon's teeth, produced
the men who almost immediately per-
ished, so Cebes by his argument would
destroy the soul!

Εἴ τι ἐξε τις χρήσασθαι.] If one
could be able to do anything with his ar-
gument, i. e. if one could extirpate him-
self by any means from the difficulty
which, as Cebes had supposed, lay in
the way of any attempt to answer Sim-
ἐχει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τι καὶ
ἄλλο έρωτήμα.

Ταύτα ἢν οἷς ἀν θανάμασαι.] I
should not be surprised if the same thing
should befal the argument of Cadmus,
(Cebes' own,) i. e. that it should at once
prove unable to withstand the first en-
counter of Socrates' reply.

Μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία.] Socrates
asks of Cebes not to commend or eulog-
gise him too highly, lest the efficacy of
his future reasoning should be defeated
by that fascination, βασκανία, by which
those who had been too much commended
by others, were in danger of losing the
advantages in which they were said to
excel. Upon the βασκανία, or evil
eye, so called, παρὰ τῷ φάσασι καῖνιν,
from destroying with the eyes, see Pot-
ter, Grec. Antiq. i. c. 18. sub. fin. This
power of fascination was called by the
Latinus fascinus; and the usual remedy
for its injurious effects was the herb bacchar. Cf. Virgil, Eclog. vii. 27. "Aut si ultra plactium laudarit baccare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futura," and Serv. in loc. "quicquid ultra meritum laudatur, dicitur fascinari." Hence the Greeks, when expressing their approval of any person or thing, used the terms μετὰ προβασκανίου, or αὔσασκαντως, and the Latins used to add to their praises praefacine, or praefacine diversin, to avert the mischief of the evil eye. The goddess Nemesis was supposed to have been the cause of this infilction, which was intended as a judgment on the arrogant and proud; whence de Legg. iv. p. 601. D. καθόσι παντοῖο καὶ πεντεχοί λόγων ματροφατή ζησία πάση γαίος ἐπίσκοπος τοίς περὶ τα τουαντα τοι δήμος Νεμίσεως ἀγγέλος. For περιτρέψy Ruhnken proposes περιστρέψy. It was observed that in this word the metaphor is kept up from ἐφώδον ἐξεσθ- θαι supr.

'Ομηρικως.] Explained by Stephens, ut Homeris verbis utar, το τον Ὄμήρου; in which sense, however, it should rather have been written Ὅμ. εἴσειν. The term is better explained by Heindorf, to mean after the manner of Homer’s heroes, i. e. boldly, undauntedly. Cf. Iliad. vi. 496. ἐ. 611.

'Αξιοίς ἐπιδειχθήναι.] i. e. You require that the soul should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he will be far happier than if he had died, having passed through a different life (i. e. from that of a philosopher), is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds. Socrates adds ἢ έι ἐν ἄλλῳ βιω βιοίς ἐτελεύτα, as if summing up anew the former part of the argument, in which he had shown that philosophers, only, were admitted after death to the society of the gods, and consequently to a happier life. Heindorf observes that there is no occasion to supply δειν to the verbs ἠγίσθατο, λογιζομαι, οἰςθασα δικην νομίζειν, when used in the same signification as αξίους, ακουν, &c. orms judicare. Whence it need not be understood either to αξίους supr. For έι ἐν ἄλλῳ βιω βιοίς έτ. Wyttenbach proposes έι ἐν ἄλλῳ βιω ἐν φιλοσοφήν έτ.

Το εÎ' αποφαινεθαι, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves—you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal (an immortality,) but only that it is of a long duration, and pre-existed for an inmeasureable time, and was both conversant with and engaged in the execution of many things. The difficulty of this passage, which all the editions read as supr., arises from the construction ἀθανασίαν μεν μή, ὃτι εÎ' πολυχρόνιον, κ. τ. λ. which Heindorf proposes to obviate by reading; οὖν έν κόλονει φις πάντα πάντα μηνιείν ού την ἀθανασίαν, ἄλλα μούνον ὃτι πολυχρόνιον τι ἐστι, κ. τ. λ.; the meaning of the passage being certainly this, that all the arguments advanced by So-crates had only gone the length of establishing satisfactorily the soul’s pre-existence and durability, but assuredly not its immortality. But, as Stallbaum observes, there is no change requisite in the text to elucidate its sense, for what
might have been expressed simply thus; 
πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν μόνον, ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τε ἔστι ὑψικά καὶ ἑνεκείμενον ὑμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κολύσειν φης πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀβανασίαν μὲν μη, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τε ἔστι ὑψικά καὶ ἑνεκείμενον ὑμᾶς ἀπολύσθαι, διαφέρει δὲ δῆ, φής, οὐδὲν εἴτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γέ τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβείσθαι προσήκει γὰρ φοβείσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τὸ μὴ εἰδοτι μὴ ἔχοντι λόγον διδοναι ὅσ αὐθάνατον ἐστὶν τοιαῦτ' ἀπαξ εἰς τὸν παρόντι, ἐφ' ὥστε, οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθέειν δέομαι ἐστιν δὲ ταῦτα ὅ λεγον.

The legitimate use of the optatives ἦ, φης and ἀπολύσθαι without the conjunction which as well as ἐν is sometimes omitted, see Matthiae Gr. s. 629. 1. 3.

Πρὶν ἡμῶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι,] i. e. Πρὶν ἡμᾶς (τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν) εἰς ἀνθρώπων σῶμα ἐλθεῖν.

Ὁδέκιν τι μᾶλλον ἡν ἄθανατον. Sc.

Previews to its junction with the body,— ἄθανατον, h. l. signifies endued with an immortal nature.

Διάφεροι εἰ ἐν, φης, οὐδέν, κ.τ.λ.] i. e. But you assert that it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once, or often times, as far as regards our several apprehensions; for it is right that he should feel afraid, unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware, and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favour of the immortality of the soul; that is, he must feel afraid, and justly, lest the soul being eventually exhausted, should perish in the same death as the last body which it had ceased to animate.
§. 45. 'О οὖν Σωκράτης συχνῶν χρόνων ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαύλον πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἦτεις' ὅλος γὰρ δεὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς τῆς αἰτίας διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δείμω περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη ἐπειτα, ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὃν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθω περὶ ὃν λέγεις χρῆσει. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ο Κέβης, βούλομαι γε. Ἀκονε τοίνυν ὅσο ἐρούντος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ὃν θαμαστῶς ὃς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἃν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἰδιορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐδοκεῖ ἐναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἐκαστὸν καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἐστι καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυ-

Εἰ τί τι βούλει, προσθῆκε ἡ ἀφήλης.] h. e. Καὶ ἵνα, τί τι βούλει, προσθῆκε ἡ ἀφήλης. Cf. Matthiae Gr. s. 516. 3.

Προσθέτων έλεομαι.] i. e. βούλομαι. Ι desire to add nothing more.

§. 45. Οὐ φαύλον πράγμα.] No trivial matter.—Peri γενέσεως, see Matthiae Gr. s. 380. 4.

Τὰ γε ἤδη πάθη.] h. e. 'Α ἐγὼ ἐπαθοῦν.—Socrates proceeds to show how he was, himself, affected in the course of this investigation.

'Εγὼ γὰρ ἐφη—νέος ὃν ἔρα.] By some, what is stated by Socrates here is supposed to be applicable to himself, by others, it is understood to refer more distinctly to Plato, upon other grounds besides the doctrine of ideas infr. c. 49.—

Τῆς σοφίας ἃν ἔδι καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἰδιορίαν, of the wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature, i. e. natural philosophy. The starting point of philosophy was the question concerning the origin and the elementary principles of the world; the resolution of which was attempted, after the experimental method, by the Ionic school, and the formal by the Pythagoreans. The Eleatic school opposed to each other the experimental and intellectual systems, which were combined by the Atomistic philosophers. Last of all came a sophistical school, which threatened to destroy all belief, religious and moral. But this progress of investigation was a sort of prelude to a more scientific philosophy, which by-and-by turned from the external object to the internal subject; from the world without to the mind within. Tennemann, Hist. Phil. 83. 84. The study of human nature, self-knowledge, observes V. Cousin, was, according to Socrates, the true beginning of philosophy; who, while the Pythagoreans, before him, placed all philosophy in theology, and the Ionians in physics, was the first to show that the relation in which man stands to the world and to God, is by virtue of his own nature, and that nature's laws. Wherefore this nature ought to be primarily and preferably examined into and investigated, to the end, that when once the nature of human beings is known, we may understand their true relations to what is not known—to the world and to God. In a word, Socrates added psychology to theology and cosmology, or substituted it for them. Introduction generale à L' Histoire de la Philos. 3me. Leçon. The name ἰδιορία φύσεως was anciently applied generally to that knowledge of nature and acquaintance with its principles, which resulted, in practice and theory, from observation and reason.

'Ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐκκείν ἐκαν.] Sc. αὐτὴ ἡ σοφία. For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be ac-
quainted with the causes of every thing, &c.—είτεναι τός αιτίας being added in explanation of ὑπερήφ. γὰρ μοι πρεέχει. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 462. C. οὖσαν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ρητορική εἶναι, χαριτέσθαι οἷον τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις.

"Ἀνω κάτω μετέβαλλον.] There is no doubt but that this expression frequently has the meaning assigned to it by Heindorf, who understands it of the variability and continual changing of the different opinions which Socrates had successively embraced. But it should rather be interpreted here of the perplexity in which Socrates was involved, not from the variety of opinions or systems which he had recourse to himself, but from the doubts and difficulties which he met with in the pursuit of his physical researches and the many different opinions which he found severally advocated there. So V. Cousin; "—L' expression Grecque ne marque proprement que l'agituation en sens contraires, et cette signification suffit ici. Si Socrate eût embrassé tour à tour des opinions diverses, la chose était assez grave pour la développer davantage, et Platon n'eût pas manqué cette occasion de donner plus de mouvement et d'intérêt à son drame. Mais il n'est question de ces changements de Socrate, ni dans toute l'antiquité, ni dans ce dialogue. Cela d'ailleurs répugne au caractère de Socrate, qui ne faisait pas assez vite ses opinions pour être sujet à en changer." Notes on le Phedon p. 363.

"Σπηδάνων τινά λάβαρν."

properly patrehction, is used here to signify the digestion of food in the stomach; in which sense σῆπεν, σῆμις, and ἄσφατος are also used; whence Galen, in Hippocrat. Aphorism. vi. 1. Παλαιὰ τῆς ψυχῆς συνάντησις τούτων τοῖς ἀνδρῶσιν ἄσφατα καλεῖν ἄπειρον ἡμᾶς ἀπεισοῖτο λέγειν. Hence, too, κατὰ σῆμαν and ἡ πιέσις are synonymous, the food being corrupted in the process of digestion. V. Hippocrat. de Diata, i.

11.—"Ὡς τινὲς ἔλεγον, the Ionic philosophers, Diuaxagoras, who said, according to Laertius ii. 9.—τὰ ζωὰ γενέσθαι εἰς ὑγρὸν τε καὶ θερμὸν καὶ γεωδῶν, ύστερον εἰς ἄλληλας; and Archelaus, who maintained that all things were disengaged from the original chaos by the operation of two discordant principles of heat and cold, (or of fire and water); Diog. Laert. ii. 16. ἔλεγε εὖν αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσθαι, θερμον καὶ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὰ ζωὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ὑδάτων γεννηθήναι—γεννάθησαν ἐκ—τὰ ζωὰ ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἑκάστη παραπλησίας γάλακτι οἷον τροφήν ἀνέσθης, ύστερον εἰς καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους παίξει. —Ξυντρέψεται, i. e. συνίσταται, πήγνυται Suid. Synaglautar. HEIND. Are made of a due and proper consistency.

Το ἄιμα ἦστιν ψ ψφρονούμεν.] This was the opinion of Empedocles, who defined the soul as consisting in a combination of the four elements (to account for the knowledge it possesses of external objects, which he conceived to be owing to an analogy subsisting between the subject and the object); and pronounced the seat of the soul to be principally the blood. Tennemann's Hist. Phili. 108.—"Η ἰαίρε.—the opinion of Anaximenes, who was led by certain observations on the origin of things, and the nature of the soul, to regard the air (αἰρέ) as the primitive element.—Auct. de Pleit. Phil. i. 3. 'Αναξιμένης ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων αἴρε ἀπείσοντο ἐκ γαρ τοῦτον τὰ πάντα γεγονέθη καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πᾶλιν ἀναλεόσας, οἷον ἡ ψυχή, φίλον, ἡ ἡμεῖς τίρα ἰαίρε υόσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὁλοὶ τῶν κύσμων πνεύμα καὶ ἰαίρε περιέχει. Diogenes, of Apollonia, held this opinion also. Aristot. de Anim. i. 2.—"Η τὸ πῦρ.—Fire was the elemental principle, according to Heraclitus, the foundation of all things, and the universal agent. He maintained the excellence of the soul to consist in its aridity, or freedom from aqueous particles—αἰρ
τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκεφαλός ἔστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὅραν καὶ ὅσο-φραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβοῦσθι τὸ ἑρμεύειν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ αὐ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταῦ- την τὴν σκέψιν ἄφυξης εἶναι, ὡς οὐδέν χρῆμα. τεκμή-ριον δὲ σοι ἐρῶ ἵκανον· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἡπιστάμεν, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταῦτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἀ πρὸ τοῦ ὄμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὶ ἀνθρώπως αὐξάνεται. τούτο γὰρ ὄμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ

ψυχή ἀρίστης ο ὑ σφωτάτης; according to Stob. Serin. 17. and Ast, on the Phaed- drus of Plato, c. 111. ed. Lips. 1810. Αὐγή ἡλικά ψυχή ὑσφωτάτης. On this expression compare Pet. Wesseling, Obs. de Herac. αὐὴ ψυχὴ ὑσφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστης, in ej. Obs. Misc. Amst. v. c. 111. p. 42. Leucippus and Democritus also held the opinion that the soul consisted of globular atoms of fire, which imparted movement to the body.


'Ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνεσθαι.] The opta- tive is used here, not as if according to Heindorf, it had been preceded by a past tense, thus: ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ ὁ περὶ ἔλεγον τως, ὅτι ὁ ἐγκεφαλός εἰν— but because Socrates passes from the oratio recta to the oratio obliqua as if he had used ὅτι ὥς. Hence, too, the infin. γίγνεσθαι seq. StALL. 'Εκ ὡς μνήμης καὶ ἐξής. See supr. c. 34. Τὸ αὐξαστὸν.—Δαμαστήριος τὸ ἦ- ρεµεῖν, i. e. being steadied, settled, or at rest; for, according to Plato, ἐστα- τήμην or science alone, is durable, firm, and unchanging; while ἐδοξα or opin- iion, is variable, shifting, and insecure. Κατὰ ταῦτα, in the same manner as memory and opinion were said supr. to arise from the sense of hearing, seeing, &c.

'Ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.] i. e. I looked up- on myself at last as completely (that nothing could be more so) unsuited (from want of natural capacity) for this investigation. Ὡς ὡς χρῆμα, ut nihil quidquam, i. e. that I was more unsuited than any one else. HEIND. So in Latin; nihil videbatur me ineptius esse ad hoc investiganda.

"Α καὶ πρότερον σαφ. ἡπιστ.—οὐ- τω σφάδρ. ἐκ τόρ.] For the things which I formerly with certainty knew—in these (ταῦτα being supplied to ἐτυφλώθην
from a preceding.) I was so utterly blinded, &c.

Ταῖς μὲν σαρξι σάρκες προστέγωνονται, τοῖς δὲ όστοις ὅστα, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία εκάστοις προστείνεται τότε δὴ τὸν ὁλίγον ὄγκον ὅταν ύστερον τολυν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτω τότε ὄμην' οὐ δοκό σοι μετρίως; Ἕμοιγε, ἐφι ο Κέβης. Σκέψατε δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτι. ὄμην γὰρ ἔγγον ἰκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅπως τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστάς μέγας σμικρὸς μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ῥπτος ῥπτον' καὶ ἐτὶ γε τούτων ἐναργεστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἔδοκεν τῶν ὀκτὼ πλείονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσείναι, καὶ τὸ δίπτηχυ τοῦ πηχαίον μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἐφι ο Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρῳ ποῦν, ἐφι, νη Δί' ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴσθαι περὶ τούτων την αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅσ γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὅσ ἑπείδαιν εἰνὶ τις...
προσθή ἐν, ἢ τοῦ ἐν ὧν προστεθή δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τοῦ προστεθέν καὶ ὧν προστεθή διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἔτερου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὦτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἢ ἐρ ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἠστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπηλθίσασαν ἀλλήλως, αὕτη ἄρα αὐτῶς αὐτία ἐγένετο δυοὺς γενέσθαι ἡ ἐξυνόδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθηναι. Οὐδὲ γε [ὡς] ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἐπὶ πείθεσθαι ὅσ αὕτη ἂδ αὐτία γέγονεν ἡ σχίσις τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἡ τότε αὐτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ἐξυνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προστετίθετο ἔτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ᾽ ὠτὶ ἀπαγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτερων ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδὲ γε διότι ἐν γίγνεται, ὅς ἐπίσταμαι ἐπὶ πείθω ἄμαντων, οὐδ' ἀλλο οὐδὲν εὐν λόγῳ, διότι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλυται ἥ ἐστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τοῦ τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἀλλον τρόπον αὐτῶς ἐἰκῇ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσέλμαι.

when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, the conjunction by which they are approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any should divide one (from the other of two) can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely their division, of their becoming two. For this is quite an opposite case to the former, of their becoming two; for then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added, the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither, yet, according to this system of investigation, am I persuaded that I knew how one becomes two, nor in a word, anything else, how it is produced, or perish- es, or exists, but I proceed to compound without due consideration some other system, and by no means approve of this.

"Εν ἄρι ἐκάτερον." Theopompus. Com. ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 26. Ἔν γὰρ ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἐν, Τὰ ὥσ ἐν ἐνοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑστιν, ὡς φάσθαι Ἡλατίων. Αἰτία—δύον γενίσθαι.] See Matthia Gr. s. 542. b. β.—'Τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθηναι, inasmuch as they are near each other; added in explanation of ἣ ἐξυνόδος preced. Matthia Gr. s. 540. Obs. 2. Οὐδὲ γε [ὡς] ἐάν τις. Ὁς, as Fischer observes, is incorrectly placed before ἐάν τις. but such negligence, he adds, is not unpleasing in the easy style of familiar dialogue. It is omitted in Vat. et Flor. d., and justly. Stall. 'Εναντία γὰρ γίγνεται.] Olympiod. Εἰ τάναντια εἰδὴ αἰτία τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦν ἐν γένοιτο, τῶς ἢ τε σύνοικος καὶ ἡ σχίσις ἐναντία νωταί το αὐτό ποιοῖο- σι.—'Η τότε αἰτία,—Vett. editt. Bas. 2. ἡ τότε αἰτία, incorrectly, for τότε must then be referred to ἡ σχίσις, whereas it is plain from τότε μὲν γὰρ infr. that it refers to ἡ ἐξυνόδος. Tr. For this (sc. ἡ σχίσις) is an opposite cause to the former, Ἔν. Cf. Plat. Gorg. p. 481. C. καὶ πάντα τάναντια πρώτασμεν, ὡς ἐνε- κεν, ἢ ἀδίκια. Upon ἄ. after ἐναντία, see Matthia Gr. s. 619. Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. i. e. Physics; peri φύσεως ἱστορίαν supr. Αὐτῶς εἰκῇ φύρω.] Alian quandam
§. 46. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, 'Ἀναξαγόρων ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἁρα νοὺς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίων, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην τε καὶ ἐδοξεί μοι τρόπον τινά ἐν ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν ἐνιαί πάντων αἰτίων, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὔτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοὺν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἐκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅτι ἄν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ εἰ οὖν τις βουλόιτο τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνρέιν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἐστὶ, τούτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνρέιν, ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτῶ ἐστιν ἢ ἐνιαί ὁτίουν πάσχει ἢ ποιείν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τοῦτον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν τοῦτον τοῦτο καὶ τὸ Χείριον εἰδέναι τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταύτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἀσμενος εὑρήκειν ὁμιν διάσκευον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν οὐτων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαντό, τὸν 'Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδή δὲ φράσειν,

rationem quasi commisese temere et comminiscor, TAIL.—a metaphor taken, as Fischer correctly observes, from those who mix up clay or flour with water to make mud or dough. Aristoph. Av. 462. προσπεφύσατο λόγος εἰς μοι, ὃν διαμάτευκεν οὐ κωλυε. By τίν άλλον τρόπον, Socrates alludes to the system of Anaxagoras, c. 46, infr., to which he had recourse in the hope of being extricated from the difficulties which physics had left unexplained. He certainly does not intend by it any reference to the subsequent theory of ideas, which he adhered to with a firmness and constancy quite inconsistent with the form of expression as supra. autēς εἰκή φύσιν.

§. 46. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε.] 1. e. 'ΑΛΛ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἀναγιγνώσκοντος τινός ἐκ βιβλίου, ὡς ἔφη, (sc. ὁ ἀναγιγνώσκον) 'Ἀναξαγόρα. See supra. c. 17. Ἡ τοῦ 'Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονός ἑτη.

'Ὁ διακοσμῶν.] Διακοσμεῖν, and κοσμεῖν, which Cicero renders in ordine adducere are peculiar to the system of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cratyl. c. 37, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων φύσιν ὧν πιστεύει "Ἀναξαγόρα. τοῖς νοστιμίας, τοῖς θωρώσαν, τοῖς θυμάσιμος. The system of Anaxagoras, cf. Aristoph. Eqq. 499. 'Αλλ' άτι χαίρων καὶ πράξεις κατὰ νοῦν τῶν ἐμοίν. Πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη.] On this point Anaximander and Anaximenes, who preceded Anaxagoras in the Ionic school, disagreed;
the latter taught that the form of the sun and moon, both fiery bodies, was that of a circular plate, that the stars, also fiery bodies, were fixed in the heavens like nails in a crystalline plane, and that the earth itself was a plane tablet [πλατεία or τραπεζώνης] resting upon the air. The former taught that the stars, planets, &c. were globular, and that the earth was a globe, whence στρογγύλη supr. or, as some say, cylindrical, to which the same term will apply. By πλατεία, Heindorf, h. i. understands Plato as alluding to the Ionic, and by στρογγύλη, to the Pythagorean school. Voss. ad Virg. Georg. iv. 357. Laert. ii. 1. 2. iii. 4.

'Ως οὖν κτίται ποθόσμους.] So as no more to require any other species of cause. Vulg. ως ούκεφ υπόθεσμον, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus, but is neither sanctioned by the best editions, nor is it at all consistent with the obvious and necessary sense of the passage.

Τάχους τε πέρα πρὸς ἄλληλα.] i. e. Concerning their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections or accidents.

Καὶ τοιεῖν.] Sc. τοιεῖ.

'Εκάστῳ οὖν αὐτών ἀποιώντα, κ. τ. λ.] I thought therefore, that he ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would enlarge more clearly upon what was best for each, and the general good of all.—Οὐκ ἂν ἀπειλώμεν πολλοὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἵνα μὴ ἄνεγγυνωκιν, ἢ ὡς τάχιστα εἰδεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χείρον.

§. 47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμασθῆς, ὡς εὐταίρε, ἐλπίδος ὑπεκδηνήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμείων καὶ ἃτινη ἀμείων ἡν τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδηνήσεσθαι ὡς ἀμείων ἡν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενοι αἰτίας ἀλλο εἴδος. Καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὗτο παρεσκευάσμην ωσαύτως πενσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἅλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, τῇ ποτὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἀμείων ἑτέρων ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀ πάσχειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ αὐτὸν ὑμῖν, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκείς ἡ ὧτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἑστίν ὡς περ ἔχει ἕκαστον οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινὴ πάσι τὸ ἑκάστω βέλτιστον ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδηνησθὲν ἔγαθον. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἄλλα πάνυ σπουδῆς λαβῶν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα ὁδός τῇ ἄνεγγυνωκιν, ἢ μόνο τάχιστα εἰδεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.
χόμην φερόμενος, ἔπειδὴ προϊοῦ καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοιν ὀρῷ ἀνδρά τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τιναίς αἰτίαις ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξέων ὁμοίότατον πεπον-θέναι ὡς περ ἂν ἐι τις λέγοιν ὡτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὡσα πράττει νῦν πράττει, κἀπείτα ἐπειχείρησας λέγεν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὑν πράττων, λέγοι πρὸτον μὲν ὃτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὡτὶ ξύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμά εὖ ὡστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡστὰ ἐστὶ στερρὰ καὶ διαφυάς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεύρα οὐα ἐπίτεινηθαί καὶ ἀνίεσθαί, περιαμπέχουτα τὰ ὡστὰ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος, ὡ ἔννεχει αὐτά: αἰωρουμένον ὡν τῶν ὡστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐξυμβολαίς χαλῶτα καὶ ἐξυντεινουτα τὰ νεύρα κάμπ-πτεσθαί πον ποιεῖ οἶον τ' ἑναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξυγκαμφθείς εὐθάδε κάθημαι καὶ αὐ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὡμὴν ἐτέρας τινὰς τοιαύ-

§ 47. Ἄπο ἐν θανατησθὴς—ἐλπίδος ὡς σφε.] I was beggled then in this won-derful hope. Upon the form φόμην φερόμενος, see Matthiae Gr. s. 553. c. Stephens explains the passage: Μινθέλα illa spec debebas, or, Παινε in spem ece- tus eram, quum ecce ulterius in ilium lectione progressus, ὡς, incorrectly, for φώνασθαι ὡπὸ ἑλπίδος means, to be led, or induced, by a hope, as ὡπὸ εὐχής φερόμενα ἐπέρημα ἐν. But φώνασθαι ὡπὸ ἑλπίδος signifies, to be beggled, disappointed in, or be deprived of a hope. So Euthy-phr. p. 15. ἐκαταμάλλησθα ὡπὸ ἑλπίδος. Ficinus has adopted the sense of Stephens as supr. 
Τῷ μὲν νῷ οὖν χρώμενον.] i. e. Making no use of (that divine) intelli-gence, nor alleging any causes for the arrangement of all things, otherwise than assigning the air, atmosphere, and water, as causes, besides many other things equally absent. Cf. Aristot. Metaphys. i. 4. Ἀναβαγόρας μηχανὴ χοίραι τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κομψοποιῶν καὶ ὅτιν αἱ-πορηθεί διὰ τὶν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἠστι, τότε ὥκει αὐτῶν ἣν ἐν τοῖς ἁλ-λοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτίασι τῶν γε-νομένων ὑν νομ. Simple, in Aristot. Phys. i. p. 2. A. 'Ἀναβαγόρας ὡς ὁ Ἐλλαζομένος ἐπέτησε μὲν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων τῶν νομῶν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰτιολο-γίαις ὁλίγα αὐτῷ προσέχομεντα ὡς ο ἐν Φαίδων. Σωκράσις ἐπισκηψε. 
Διαφώτις.] And have their diaphyses (or bodies) separately, one from the other. Cloquet's System of Human Anat. c. i. 29. "The long bones (sea langua sive cylinders) occur in the limbs. Those nearest the trunk are longest and less numerous. Their extremities are en-larged, and their middle part, which is named their body or diaphysis, is con-tracted, and most commonly triangular and twisted."—Ἐπιστήμη signifles also the intervals between the knots on the stalk of a plant. 
Ὅτα ἐπιτεινισθαί.] i. e. Τοιαύτα ὡς ἐπιτείνησαί. 
Ἀλφομένου ὁν τῶν ὡστῶν, κ. τ. λ.] The bones being suspended from, swinging, or playing in their joints.—Συμβολαίας.
tas αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἄερας καὶ ἀκοας καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελής τις ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναῖος ἐδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθήσαται, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἄν κελέσωσιν, ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα τε καὶ τὰ ὀστὰ ἣ περὶ Μέγαρα ἦ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ἄμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἢντιν ἂν τάττη. ἄλλ' αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλείν λίαν ἄτοπον' εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστὰ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶος τ' ἢ ποιεῖν τὰ δοξαστά μοι, ἀλλήθι ἂν λέγοι' ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἄ ποιῶ, καὶ ταύτῃ νῦ πράττω, ἄλλ' ὡς τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῆ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία ἐη τοῦ λόγου. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶον

Cic. de Nat. D. ii. 55. "Quid dicam de ossibus! quae subjecta corpori, mirabiles commissuras habent, et ad stabilitatem aptas, et ad artus finiendos accommodatas, et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continetur, eorumque implicationem corpore (ito pertinentem)."

Φωνᾶς τε καὶ ἄερας.] Another instance of the absurdity of those who stopped at secondary causes, through incompetence or unwillingness to carry their inquiries beyond the unsatisfactory limit of physical science. V. Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. p. 902.

Νῦ τὸν κύνα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 7. init.

Περὶ Μέγαρα ἦ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν.] As the nearest cities to which Socrates could have fled for the purpose of escape. Cf. in Crit. c. 4. c. 15.

Καὶ ταύτα μὴ πράττοι.] And so far act under the influence of mind (as far as I have bones and nerves) and not from the choice of what is best; ταύτα being equivalent to ὣτι ἐκα ταύτα ποιώ ἄ ποιῶ, and so opposed to τῆ τοῦ βελτίσ-

του αἰφίσει. Hence there seems no necessity for the emendation of Heindorf, ταύτα, which is to be found in some editions, and would appear to have been adopted by Ficinus.

Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι. That one should not be capable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that without which the cause would not ever be a cause is another! suppl. εὐθὺς κ. ἡμῖν ἢντιν.—the infinitive being often used in exclamations and questions of indignation. Cf. Cic. Fin. 2. 10. init. "Hoc vero non videre maximo argumento esse," &c. Matthiae Gr. s. 544. Seag. Viger, c. 5. s. iii. r. 8. Socrates exclaims against the folly of those who cannot distinguish between the real or primary cause, and the concourse, without which the former could not exist. For instance, the real or primary cause of the change of posture in the human frame is the will, and the secondary cause, the muscles, nerves, &c., upon which it is obvious that the former of necessity depends, in order to be effectually fulfilled.
τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλῳ μὲν τὶ ἔστι τὸ αἰτίον τοῦ ὄντος, ἄλλῳ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀνευ οὐ τὸ αἰτίον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἰτίον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται θυλαφώτες οἱ πολλοὶ ὃς περ ἐν σκότῳ, ἄλλοτρίῳ ὑόματι προσχρόμενοι, ὃς αἰτίον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὃ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθὲι τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ ὡς περ καρδόπωρ πλατεία βάθρον τῶν ἀέρα

"Ὁ ἐὖ μοι φαίνονται." The accus. δὲ depends both on ψηλαφώτες and προσαγορεύειν. 

HEIND. — Ψηλαφώτες, — Πλατον. Ψηλαφώδης αὐτή μοναδική ἐστὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ γορδόν τὸ ψηλαφῶν λέγεται παρά τῷ ψαλτήριον ἀφάν. Hence it signifies, to seek anything by feeling for it, to search in the dark. Cf. Acts, xvii. 27. Ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ἄρα για ψηλαφώσην αὐτοῦ καὶ εὑρεῖν, καὶ τοι γε όι μακρὰν ἀπὸ νῦν ἵππων ἀπήχουν: That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us.— Aristoph. Resp. 690. Προστοῦ σὲ όνομ Εὐψηλαφώμεν ἐν σκοτὸ τὸ πρόγναστα· Νῦν ὅ ἀπαντά πρὸς λύχνον βουλεύσομεν. According to Vatke in, this verb is composed in a manner rare in Greek, of two verbs, ὑπὸ or ψάλλω and ἀφώ.

"Αλλοτρίῳ ὑόματι." i. e. Which the majority feeling for, as it were, in the dark, appear, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself. Vulg. ἀλλοτρίῳ ὑμματι; incorrectly, which, however, is curiously defended by Reisig, Enarrat. (Edip, Colon. 142. "Alieno oculo, inquit, significatur ea membra, quibus in tenebris rem obscuram tentant. Hac autem non sunt intellecta ab editoribus Platonis.

"Δίνῃ περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ." Whence one indeed encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, causes the earth to remain fixed; in the centre of the universe. Heindorf correctly joins Δίνῃ to ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, which he explains verilem quæ a seco fìt; and compares with this construction, Politic. p. 291. D. καὶ μετὰ μανορχίαν ἐποίη τις ἄν, οἴμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὅλων ἐναγαστεῖαν. de Rep. iii. p. 390. C. "Ἀρέως τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Χρήστου ἐσσ-
υπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὃς οἶδον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τε-θῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, τάυτην οὔτε ζήτουσιν οὐ τε τινα οἶονται δαιμονίαν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἠγούνται τούτον ἀν ποτε Ἄτλαντα ἵσχυρότερον καὶ ἰδανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπαντα ἐξουσίων εὔπορεῖν, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τάγαθον καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ἐξουσίων οὖν ὁμοσταλοι. ἔγο μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰ-τίας ὅτι ποτε ἔχει μαθητής ὅπουν ἢδιστ' ἂν γενοί-μην ἐπειδή δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθηκαν καὶ οὕτα αὐτὸς εὐ-πορεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἀλλοι μαθεῖν οἶος τε ἐγκόμημι, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ἐκήθησιν ἡ πε-πραγμάτευμα, βουλεί σοι, ἐφη, ἐπίθειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης: 'Ὑπερφυσός μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὠς βουλομαι.

§. 48. 'Εδοξε τοῖςν μοι, ἢ δ' ὃς, μετὰ ταύτα,
The text is not clearly visible due to the low quality of the image. It seems to be a page from a Greek text, possibly a philosophical work. The content appears to be a discussion on perception and reality, possibly a reference to Socrates. The text is not legible enough to provide a coherent transcription or translation.
them in images any more than he who considers them in their visible effects, for, in both cases, there is reality presenting itself, in the latter case, however, to the eye of the body, in the former, to that of the mind.

§ 49. 'Αεὶ καὶ ἄλλως, κ.τ.λ.] On every other occasion as well as in the preceding discussion.

"Ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπικειμένων.] i. q. Ἐπικειμένων; the present participle being equally admissible, as the verb ἐπικειμένω ὑποθέτουμεν. The present participle has of itself a future sense. Otherwise the future is constantly used in this form, v. e. ἔρχομαι λέγων. Cf. Portus, in Lex. Ionic. voc. Ἐρχομαι.—Heindorf gives as an equivalent to the phrase as supr. ἔρχομαι ἐπικειμένων.

Πολυθρόντα.] i. e. Διαβεβημένα. Heasch. interpr.

Τι καλὸν αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτό.] Cf. supr. c. 19, 20, 22. Infr. c. 50. Upon the ἐπίθηκον to which Socrates here alludes, see in Tim. p. 28. Steph. and Parmenid. p. 141. sqq. Bas. 2. He now proceeds to show that the immaterial and eternal qualities have a necessary relation to the immortality of the soul, such as a cause has to its effect.

Οὐκ ἂν φήμασι περαινων.] Come to your conclusion then at once; περαινων, in dialectics, having the sense of concluding or deducing from admitted premises. Upon the optative used imperatively see Matthiae Gr. s. 514. c. 515. γ.—Τὰ ἐξίς ἐκεῖνος, i. e. what follows the preceding, as in Cratyl. p. 399. A. p. 420. D. Legg. vii. p. 796. E.

Οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ.] On account of no one thing else; i. e. that which is beautiful is only so by its partaking of the ἀκτό τὸ καλὸν.—Ἡ διοίκησι ἐπικειμένη, Plato makes frequent mention throughout his writings of this μετοχή or μὴθεία, the true nature of which will be easily understood from the following passage in Parmenid. c. 13. sub. fin. ἄλλω—μάλιστα ἑμοίσι σας Σωκράτης καταφαίνειται ὑπὲρ ἑκείνην. ἡ γὰρ ἡ ἡπὶ ταῦτα
Ευγήωρω, ἐφεύ. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὁς, ἐτὶ μανθάνω οὐδε δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφᾶς ταύτας γυγνώσκειν' ἀλλ' εάν τις μοι λέγῃ διότι καλὸν ἐστίν ὑπ’ οὗ, ἢ ὅτι χρώμα εὐανθές ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὑπίπτουν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν εὖ, ταραττοῖς γὰρ εν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι, τούτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καλάτεχνοις, καὶ ἵσος εὐθῶς ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἠ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία, εἶτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη οὐ γὰρ ἐτί τοῦτο διασχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα ὑπ’ τὰ καλὰ γίνεται καλά. τούτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ ὡς πρὶν παραδείγματα εὐτάναι εν τῇ ὁποίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖσις οὐειναι καὶ εἶναι ὁραφόματε καὶ ἡ μῦθες αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γυγνώσκειν τὸν εὐθυν οὐκ ἄλλο τις τῆς ἐκείνοις αὐτῶις. Cf. supr. e. 20. a med. ὥς ἐπιφανεῖςκα, κ. τ. λ. and see infr. μετασχον τῆς ἑνής οἰσθα ἐκάστου.

Τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας. These subtle causes.

'Ἡ οτι χρώμα εὐανθές ἔχω.' Intell. εἰσίν; this form ἔχω εἴσιν for ἔχει, being not unusual. Cf. Sophist. e. 32. εἰ ἄφων ἥν ἐστὶ πάν ἢ ἀρα τιν' ἔχω εἰσέρθειν ἐξάναι εὐφωμίας.—ARIStoph. Ran. 1160. Οὔ ἐγίνα τούτῳ γάρ, ὃ κατεστωμολογεῖν ἄρθρωσε, ταῦτ' εἴσιν', ἀλλ' ἀροτρί', εἶτον ἔχων; and Bruenn, in loc.

Ταραττοῖς γὰρ εν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν; h. e. For I am troubled and perplexed at all the other arguments which any might adduce, so much so as to be incapable of discerning the truth. Ἀτέχνω, artlessly; so Wytenbach and Heindorf in preference to ἀτεχνόω. Harpocrat. Ἀτεχνώς, περισσοπομένοις μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ σαφὸς ἢ βεβαιοῦ ἢ σαφεῖλος ὢν ἀνεκτυποῦσος ἐν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμέλος καὶ ἀνεφινής.—Εὐθύθως, Hesych. interpr. ἀνοίγως.

Εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία. Either the presence or participation. For Plato was yet in doubt in what manner the ἐιδή, or eternal and immutable forms, were joined to and connected with things themselves; he had not certainly, as yet, ae appears from Parmenid. p. 130. E.—132., discovered a word by which he might designate their communion; hence εἶτε παρ. εἶτε κοιν. supr.—Εἶτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated, sc. as a presence or participation. Heindorf objects strongly to προσγενομένη being referred to παρουσία or κοινωνία, and throws out as a first-sight conjecture, that some word may have been lost after προσγενομένη, upon which also may have depended the gen. ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ supr. Ald. παρουσία—κοινωνία—προσγενομένη, which does not lessen the difficulty unless it might be further amended thus: ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐκείνο τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία, εἶτε κοινωνία εἶτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένων. Wytenbach, followed by Stallbaum, would read προσαγωγωμένη, of which he supports the admission and propriety by many quotations, and so explains the passage; while allad reddere illud palachyn, nisi ipsius paluchridinum sine præsentia sine commando sine quaescua ade proemine appel·latur. But nearly all the editions agree in προσγενομένη, which Flaccus refers to παρουσία καὶ κοινωνία supr.

Οὐ γὰρ ἐτί τοῦτο διασχυρίζομαι.] Socrates says that he does not yet insist upon establishing the manner or degree in which things are connected with their intelligible forms. Aristot. Met. i. 6. p. 272. τῶν μεντοι γε μεθεξιν,—ἡτικ δὲν
τούτον ἑχόμενος ἦγούμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσέω, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλές εἰναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄτρῳν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. ἦν καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζων μείζων, καὶ συμκρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναι. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρ; ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἰ τίς τινα φαίνῃ ἐτέρων ἑτέρων τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἰναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ ἀυτῷ τότε ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύρου ἃν ὀτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ λέγεις ἢ ὀτι τὸ μὲν μείζων πᾶν ἐτέρων ἐτέρων οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ μείζων ἐστίν μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τούτο μείζων, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ ἐλάττων οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ ἐλαττῶν ἢ συμκρότητι, καὶ διὰ τούτῳ ἐλαττῶν, διὰ τὴν συμκρότητα, φοβοῦμενος, οἶμαι, μὴ τίς σοι ἑναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζων τινα φῆς εἰναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζων μείζων εἰναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων ἐλαττῶν, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ συμκρᾶ ὦση τὸν μείζων μείζω εἰναι, καὶ τούτῳ ἰδὶ τέρας εἰναι, τὸ συμκρῶ τινι μέγων τινα εἰναι. ἦν οὐκ

ἐν, τῶν ἐνών, ἀφίσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. It may be deduced, as Stallbaum observes, from hence, that Plato had not as yet brought his Parmenides to light, in which this subject is argued at large.

Καὶ τούτων ἵμαρσαν—οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν.] And holding firmly by this, I think that I shall never fail.

Μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα.] Cf. in Parmenid. c. 10. a med. δοκεῖ σοι—εἰναι εἰςη ἄττα ὡν τὰς τὰ ἄλλα μεταλλάξαντα τὰς ἐπονομαζόντων ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἄρα ὄνομάν τις μὲν μεταλλάξαντα ὀρμαστε, μεγέθους ἢ καὶ μεγάλα, κάλλους ἢ καὶ ἐκκαυστόν μεῖκα τι καὶ καλά γίγνεσθαι.

Οὔτε σὺ ἄρα ἂν ἀποδέχω. Neither indeed would you approve, or admit of it.—Τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζων, a head taller; the dative expressing usually the relation of the measure, degree, &c. with the comparative. Matthiae Gr. s. 400. 8.

Ἀλλὰ ἐπαραμιστώματοι.] Socrates objects to the generally received expression as supr. taller or greater by the head, upon the grounds of its reducing to matter and figure that essence, by the presence or participation of which, that to which the quality was attributed might really be considered what it was. For instance, to say of one man that he was greater than one, and smaller than another, by the head, would seem as well to imply that the head was the cause at the same time of a thing being greater and smaller, as also that by reason of the head, which is but a small part of the body, that which is greater becomes what it is. But one should rather assert that everything which was greater than another was so by means and on account of nothing else than magnitude itself, and likewise that which was smaller was so by means and on account of parvitude itself. So with two numbers ten and eight, and the cubit and two cubits infra.

Μη τις σοι ἑναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ. Lest any arguments of a contrary tendency should oppose you, i.e. should be objected by any against you.

Τούτῳ ἰδὶ τέρας εἰναι.] Τέρας, in

Τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ ε. γ.־]


Μετασχῶν τῆς ἴδιας οὐσιας ἐκάστου.] b.c. Τῆς ἴδιας ἐκάστου; referring to the μίθεις or communion, by which individuals are made to participate in the one, indivisible and immutable εἴδος.

That such should be its characteristics, however numerous the individuals with which it is communicated, and that it is not separated from itself while it is observable in each individual of its peculiar class, at the same time that it is known to exist prior to and independently of any, appears obvious from a happy illustration with which Socrates is made to answer the doubts of Parmenides.
elementary principle of equals (ἀρχών), duality, whence things are made and said to be two, as in, καὶ μονάδως, &c. the participation in the elementary principle of unequals (περιπτών), unity, by which anything is made and said to be one.

Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἦν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἦν καὶ χαίρειν παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαντοῖς σοφωτέροις; οὐ δὲ δεδώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαντοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχῶμενος ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἁσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὔτως ἀποκρίνασθαι ἂν: εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐξοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφός ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκεῖνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαι, εἰ σοι ἀλλήλους ἔμφασε τῇ διαφωνεῖ; ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δεοί σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσματώς ἂν διδοῖς, ἄλλην αὐτῷ ὑποθέσεων ὑποθέσεος, ἡ τις τῶν ἀνώθεν βελτίστη φαίνειτο, ἐώς ἐπὶ τι ἰκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροι ὃς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς δια-

'Ομορφήσετα σκέψισι.] This whole passage, it is to be remarked, is in accordance with the usual system of dialectics. He who opposes the original thesis or principle (αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐχομενος) cannot do so in two ways. First, he may show that its deductions involve a contradiction, i.e. that τά ὑποθέσεάτα ἐκεῖνος ἐμφασίζει: in which case καὶ ἐμφάσεις ἂν, you would take leave of him, as it were, and make him no answer until you had considered whether the consequences attributed to your principle mutually coincided or disagreed: secondly, he might contend for the truth of a principle opposite to your own, upon which αὐτῆς ἐκείνης ἐκτὸς ἂν σύνθεται λόγον, i.e. it would be necessary to advance the reasons upon which your principle was founded, which you should do by so enlarging upon it, and sustaining it by one principle after another, whichever appears to be the best of the more universal, τῶν ἀνώθεν βελτίστης, until you shall have arrived at a result which may justify the original proposition. Thus in pursuing this method you will avoid the errors of those contentious disputants, who, by confounding the principle and its consequences, are unable to arrive at the distinct knowledge of the truth. V. Wytt. in Præcept. Log. iii. 10. 1. By ἀνωθεν
λεγόμενοι καὶ τῶν ἑξ ἐκείνης ὄρμημένων, εἰ περ ἄνυλοι τὶ τῶν οὐντων εὑρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἵσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτων λόγοι οὐδὲ φροντὶς ἱκανὸι γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκώντες ὁμοὶ δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν" στὶ δὲ εἰ περὶ τῶν φιλοσοφο-"φων, οἴμαι, ἀν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθεστάτα, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σμιμίας ἀμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EX. Νὴ Δία, ὡ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε' θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ὃς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχωντι εἰπέτεν ἐκείνως ταύτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡ 'Εσχέρατες, καὶ πάσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐδοξέεν.

EX. Καὶ γὰρ ᾗμιν τοῖς ἀποντι, νῦν δὲ ἀκού-ουσιν.

§. 50. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἢν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λε-θέντα;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταύτα ἐννε-χωρήθη, καὶ ὠμολογεῖτο εἰναί τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν

supr. is to be understood the more ab-"stract or universal principle; Cf. Aris-"tot. Topic i. 20. Λέγω δὲ ἐνω μὲν, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον (καταγρώσα) κἀκεῖν ἔρε, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος"—i. e. but I call the category which is higher up, that which rises to the more universal, and that which is lower down, that which descends to the more particular. Pintarch. Defect. Orac. p. 248. E. τῶν ἀνωτέρω ἄρχων, Λέγω δὲ τοῦ ἐνος καὶ τῆς ἀρ-"σιστον ὑπόσσος.—Εἰ σου—ἐνθάμεν ἡ ἐνθωται,—an, te judaeus, invicem consen-"sientiam an dissidentiant. WYTT. Cf. Thesae-"t. p. 119. E. τοτευν οἵμιν (in our judgment) αὐτὰ ἀλλήλους ξεψωμεῖ.

§. 50. Ἐλαια τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν.] i. e. That every idea (or intelligible form,) was something, self-existent, and that other things, τὰλα, (i. e. distinct from these ideas, submitted to the senses), participated in the former so as to receive their name; as, for instance, true in-"cludes the idea of truth, good of good-
ness, beautiful of beauty, greatness of great, from which they are severally so called. Cf. Parmenid. p. 140. C. ὅ-"ρκει σοι εἶδος εἶναι ἄττα, ὅν τὰ τὰ ἀλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπιφονο-"μίας αὐτῶν ἑσκείν, ὅν ὀμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὁμοῖα, &c.—

Parmenid. c. 13. τὰ εἶδος ταῦτα ὡστὶ"παραθεῖμα ἐστίναι ἐν τῇ φύσι ὑπτα τα τὰ ἄλλα τούτους ἔοικεναι, καὶ εἰ-"ναι ὀμοιόμορα—where as supr. τὰ ἄλλα, elsewhere called also τὰ ἔτερα is to be understood of the things submitted to the senses. Cf. supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἰναί ἐκαστον sqq. c. 20. init. οἷς ἐ-πισφυγείομεθα τούτω, δ' ἐσται. It is to be observed that εἶδος and οἶδα are used indifferently in this dialogue, as in the Parmenides which contains the whole substance of the system. Parme-"nid. p. 56. F. Οἴμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτο εἷ̣ν ἐκαστὸν εἰδος οἰςθαί εἰναι ὅτα "πολλ' ἄττα μεγάλα ἵνα σοι εἴναι, μια τις ἓνεκε οἴδα ἤτοι εἰναι ἄττα ἓνεκ ἐπί πάντα ἑσκείν, οἷον ἐν τὸ μέγα ηγη εἰ-"ναι; p. 57. D. F. Όν ἂρα ὑπὸ γὰ ἴμ-"μων γεγονόκεντα τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδὲν—

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καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τήν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἤρωτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ταῦτα ὦυτος λέγεις, ἄρ’ ὦχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζον εἶναι, Φαιδονος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγει τὸτ’ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἐγώγη. 'Αλλὰ γάρ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ὡμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους ὦχ ὅς τοις ῥήμασι λέγεται ὦυτο καὶ τὸ ἀλλῆς ἵσχειν; οὐ γάρ ποι πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἵσχων’ οὐδ’ αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι σμικρότητα ἐξει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων μέγεθος. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδὲ γε αὐτὸ ὑπὸ Φαιδόνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαιδὸν ὁ Φαιδὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέγεθος ἐξει ὁ Φαιδὸν πρὸς τὴν Σιμμία σμικρότητα; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Ὀστῶς ἁρὰ ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπω-

calὸν ὁ ἵστα, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν· καὶ πάντα ὁ ἐν ὑπὲρ ἰδιὰς αὐτῶν ὕστας ὑπολογισμὸν. II. τοιαύτα—καὶ ἐτὶ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτων πάντων πολλὰ ἀναγκαίων ἵσχει τὰ εἰς, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐτοὶ εἰδεὶς τῶν ὑποστῶν. p. 58. A.—δὲ εὐ τε γε τις ὁ Σωκράτης, αὐ τῇ ἐν ἑυς εἰς τῶν ὑποστῶν εἶναι, εἰ πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ ν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα ἀπόλυτοι, μηδὲ ἔρισει μέν ὁ ἐν ὑποκάτω ἵσχων ὕστας, εἰς ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλληλοῦν ἵσχας. Aristot. Metaph. xii. 4. περὶ ἐν τῶν ἵσχων πρῶτον αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἑν τὸ βοῦν ἤπεκτοπτὸν—ὡς ὑπάλληλοι εἰς ἂν γνῆς ὁ πρῶτος τῆς ἱδεις διαφοράς ἐναι συνήθη εἰ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἵσχων ἵσχας τῶν εἰσόδοι εἰ ἐν περὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐν ἑαυτῆς ἐν τῆς ἀλληλείας τῆς Ἱπποκλεσίως λόγοις, ὡς ἔπειτα τῶν ἀνάθεσεων ἄντιστοι. Photin. Enn. i. vi. 8. p. 58. A. ᾿ξεῖ γὰρ πρῶτον ἀναγκαίων ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦτον καθ’ ἑν πάντα ἐστέκει καλὰ τὰ ἱδεις, καὶ φύσε ο ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἵσχοι εἶναι τὰς ἱδεις. Enn. iii. ix. 1. p. 336. A. Νοῦς φησιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἐνόσχεσα ἱδεις εἰ τῷ ὁ ἐστὶ ζωῶν—ὄφεικ φησιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἐναὶ τὰ ἱδεις πρὸ τοῦ νοόν. They are sometimes, however, mentioned as distinct, and idēa is understood as the immaterial essence or exemplar, εἴδος the form of the external object which is modelled after the preceding. Cf. Senecc. Epist. 58. p. 150. Olympicod. in Phsed. Cod. iii. p. 35. 'ὁ ἔστι τὰ ἑνία' ὃτε φησιν ἢ εἴδει, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῇ τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι—where idēa has the same sense as supr., and eιδή is applied to mental perceptions. Ἐγώγη. Meris: Ἐγώγη, Ἀττικῶς ἑκχειρ., Ἀλληλοκο. Ὀστῶς καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἕχειν. i.e. That Simmias did not in reality exceed Socrates, as he was said to do, for Simmias was not so adapted by nature as because of his being Simmias to exceed Socrates, but by reason of the magnitude which he had as compared with the parvitude of Socrates. The object of this is to show, that it is only relatively speaking that the same thing can be said to be small and great. Simmias was small, compared to Phaedo, but his parvitude could not admit its contrary, the magnitude of the latter; neither could his magnitude admit of the relative parvitude of Socrates; therefore, in reality, the contraries, magnitude and parvitude, did not and could not meet together in Simmias.—The application of this will appear subsequently. Πρὸς.] In comparison with.
νυμίαν ἐχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρον, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθη ὑπερέχει τῆς σμικρότητας ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχειν ὑπερέχουν. Καὶ ἀμα μειδίασας, Ἠοικα, ἐφη, καὶ ἔγγυγγαφικός ἐρείν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐχει γε τὸν ὦς λέγω. Ἐνέβη. Λέγω δὲ τοὐδ' ἐνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὁ περ ἑμοί. ἑμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ πάνων

Ἐπωνυμίαν ἐχει.] i.e. 'Ονομάζεται εἶναι. Cf. Herodot. ii. 44. Ἰρών Ἰπακλεσ, Ἐπωνυμίαν ἐχοντος θοαίων εἶναι.
Τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθη ὑπερέχειν.] i.e. Surpassing the poritude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude; Υ. Cousin arranges and explains the passage correctly; ὑπερέχουν τοῦ μεν (κατα) τῆς σμικρότητας τῷ ὑπερέχει τῷ μεγέθη, surpassing one dans sa petite, par la superiorté de sa grandoeur, et par τηρεχων τω ετε, et laissant à l'autre, reconnaissant en lui, lui accordant pare qu'il ne pent pas ne pas lui accorder το τῳ μεγεθος υπερεχους της σμικροτητος, une grandeur qui surpasse sa petite,
Heindorff and Wyttenbach propose emendations of this passage as corrupt, which, however, from the interpretation as supr. appear unnecessary; the one would read τοῦ μεν της σμικροτητας τω μεγεθε τω υπερεχου του δε τω μεγεθε της σμικροτητας παρεχουν τηρεχου, αλλιώς parvitudem magnitudinis (sin) superas, alliis verum magnitudinis parvitudem (suum) superandum praebens: the other remolds the whole; τω μεν του μεγεθου υπερεχου της σμικροτητος παρεχου του ετω μεγεθος της σμικροτητος υπερεχου' i.e. illi quidem, quod magnitudine eum superat, parvitudem praebens haec autem magnitudinem, quam parvitudem superat.
Συγγραφακώς.] i.e. To speak with the accuracy of a written contract; owing to the minute attention with which he discussed the subject in its several details. Fischer interprets the term historicorum more, and Wyttenbach, scripturn ratione, both incorrectly.
Λέγω δε τουδ' ἐνεκα, βουλόμενος.] i.e. ὁτι βουλομαι. See Matthiae Gr. s. 303. 2.

'Ερωι γαρ φαινεται ου μανον κ.τ.λ.] For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself (the abstract idea) is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but that the magnitude also in ourselves (the concrete, in a sensible object) never admits the small nor is disposed to be surpassed, but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or cease to exist when it has actually come, but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be anything else than what it was before; Socrates means now to say that in reality neither absolute nor relative magnitude and parvitude could exist together at the same time, for magnitude either withdrew as parvitude advanced, or completely disappeared when it had arrived, but it never was disposed by awaiting and admitting parvitude to become different from what it was before, which in such a case it should be, as it might then be as well affirmed to be parvitude as magnitude, which never could occur, for the one being great, never endured (πεταλομεί) to be the other, small. - 'Ως πρε ἤνω δεξαμενος, κ.τ.λ.—Magnitude, Socrates had observed, is not disposed by the admission of an opposite quality to be different from what it was, but was actually and in truth determined to remain the same, in like manner as Socrates who had received and sustained parvitude, and still continuing the same, was the same small individual, and had not admitted magnitude with which its contrary could not evidently coexist. This passage, ὧς πρε ἤνω—ὁ αυτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι, is introduced parenthetically as an illustration of the truth and justice of what precedes. Stallbaum explains ὑπομένου ἐκα δεξαμενον την σμ. κ.τ.λ.; Quum autem το μεγεθος το εν ἦμιν sustinuit et in se recepit parvita-
autò τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐδέλευ ἁμα μέγα καὶ σμι-κρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυνεῖν τὸ ἔτερον, ἣ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν autò προσίτι τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἣ προσπέλυν-τος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι ὑπομένου δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἔτερον ἢ ὁ περ ἦν, ὥς πέρ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἐτὶ ὃν ὅσ περ εἰμί, ὡς ὅ autòς σμικρός εἰμι: ἐκείνο δὲ ὑπετόλμηκε μέγα ὃν σμικρὸν εἶναι. ὥς ὅ autòς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐτί ὅν ὁ περ ἦν ἁμα τούναντιον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνε-ταί μοι.

§ 51. Καὶ τις εἴπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὁς τις ὁ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις autò τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνι λέγομένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μεῖζονος τὸ ἐλάττων, καὶ ἀπεχ-νόσ αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παράβαλὼν τὴν κε-

tem, videtur tamen non aliquid esse velle, quam quod erat ante; which as well as the accompanying note is neither cor-
correct nor intelligible. Wytenbach’s in-
terpretation is equally infelicitous; alter-
num de dubius accidit; aut fugit et de-
redit veniente contrario, silicet paret-
tate; aut quum veniret contrario, perit
expectatur et suspiciens paravit, nec
nam tamen aliquid esse quam quod fuerat.
The conclusion to which Socrates in-
tended to come was simply this; one
might be said, when spoken of relatively,
to possess at the same time the opposite
qualities, i. e. the contraries, magni-
tude and parvitude, but they could not
in reality coexist or be reciprocated in
the concrete, any more than their ideas
themselves could coexist, or be reciproc-
cated in the abstract, so as to be indif-
ferently affirmed of each other, that
magnitude was parvitude or vice versa.
The application of this argument, which
is continued through the four preceding
chapters, will be found at the close of
c. 54. and in c. 55.

Οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μίγα— Is neither
disposed to become, nor to be great.

§ 51. Εν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λό-
γοις;] Cf. supr. c. 15. sqq.

Παραβαλὼν τῷ κεφαλῆν, Haring
moved his head forward; to hear more
distinctly, as the objection was probably made in a low voice and hesitatingly, as in the case of Simmias and Cebes supr. c. 35.—Οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς, φήσεις, δὲ ὅτι, however, observe the distinction between what is advanced now and at that time, ἃς.

Έκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος.] Socrates, supr. c. 15., spoke of things which are capable of producing, receiving, and reciprocating their contraries, as for instance, in the case of anything becoming greater, it must have been formerly less, and vice versa. Or when anything was stronger or swifter, it must have been generated from weaker and slower, &c. But Socrates is now speaking, not of the πράγματα ἐναντία, which are so produced, but the αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, the contrary itself, the contrary as an essence or intelligible form, which cannot become its own contrary, (e. gr. the ideas of the just, beautiful, and good, which, with their opposites, being severally immutable and eternal cannot be changed so as to reciprocate with each other, nor are they so dependent on each other as to be mutually produced,) neither in the concrete, οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, nor in the abstract, οὕτω τὸ ἐν τῷ φόσει. Socrates was then speaking of those things which contain the contraries, (τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία), and which are called by the name of their several inherent contrary essences; but now he is speaking of those essences, by reason of the presence of which, (i. e. which being inherent or contained, ὅν ἐνόντων,) those things which were so called received their name; and these he asserts to be such as are incapable of being mutually produced.—Οὕτω τὸ ἐν τῷ φόσει. It is to be observed that Plato did not consider these ideas as mere notions of things impressed upon the human mind; he held them, on the contrary, to be self-existent and perfectly distinct from those things which bore their name.

Οὐδ' αὐτοὶ.—οὕτως εἶχοι.] i. e. Οὐδ' αὖ τεταραγμένος εἰμὶ, in which allusion is made to c. 22. supr. sub. fin. καὶ τοις κατερώτατοι ἄνθρωποι πανίστι πρῶς τὸ ἀπίστευν τοὺς λόγους. Heindorf pro-
§ 52. 'Ετι δὴ μοι καὶ τὸδε σκέψαι, ἐφή, εἰ ἄρα ἐννομολογήσεις. θερμὸν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρὸν; 'Εγώγη. 'Αρ' ὁ περ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Μα Δί' οὐκ ἐγώγη. 'Αλλ' ἐτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἐτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρὸν; Ναί. 'Αλλὰ τὸδε γ' οἴμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὖνδὲποτε χιόνα γ' οὕσαν, δεξαμενὴν τὸ θερμὸν, ὅς περ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐτί ἐστεσθαι ὁ περ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμὸν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντως τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνω γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐτοπροσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτὸ ἡ ὑπεξείναι ἡ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξαμενὸν τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτί εἶναι ὁ περ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. 'Εστιν ἀρ', ἡ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ

poses οὐκ ἀδ.—Καὶ τοι ὅπ τι λέγω,—although I by no means deny that there are many things which perhaps we. Picious appears to have read καὶ τοιοῦτο τι λέγω, ὡς ὁ πολλὰ με παράτητοι. § 52. 'Ετι δὴ μοι καὶ τὸδε.] Socrates proceeds to show that not only the actual contraries themselves, οὐσία τὰ ἓναντια, could not be reciprocated but that even those things, which though not of themselves, nor strictly contraries, yet inferred some contrariety, did not admit of a form contrary to what they had, but rather on the approach of such, retired and disappeared. Thus the number three, which does not seem to have any contrary, or anything opposed to itself, yet because it always contains the idea of inequality, i.e. is always odd, it never admits of equality, i.e. never can become even. And so with fire and heat; for though the fire itself is one thing, and heat, the contrary of cold, another, yet both are so closely connected that fire cannot receive cold so as to coexist with it, but must disappear on the approach of the latter. In like manner snow, which is always connected with cold, disappears on the approach of heat, with which it obviously cannot mix. This argument with its conclusions, as applied to the soul, is made available thus: the soul, into whatever body it enters, brings with it the principle of life: but since death is contrary to life, it follows that the soul cannot receive and admit a form contrary to that with which it is of necessity joined, (as the idea of inequality is inseparably connected with the odd number three,) and which is called life. But whatever does not admit of death, is immortal, whence it follows that the soul is imperishable and immortal.

'Αλλ' ἐτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν.] The latter being the result or consequence of the former; fire being the essential principle of heat, as snow of cold.

'Αλλὰ τὸδε γ' οἴμαι ἐκεί σοι—] i. e. But this I think is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before, (supr. c. 50. a med.) continue to be what it was, snow; but, at the same time but, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or utterly disappear.

'Υπεξείναι.] Matthise Gr. s. 404. 1. 3. Εἴμι and its components have always a future signification in the Attic writers. Dawes, M. Crit. 82.

'Espin ἀρ'—ώστε. It happens, therefore, that, &c.—Αὕτω το εἴδος. Here Plato appears to make the inequality, τὸ περὶτόν, the genus or εἴδος, and the number three, which contains the
inequality, the species or \( \varphi \) from which he varies infra. \textit{c.} 53., calling three, \( \delta \epsilon \delta a \), and the inequality, \( \nu \beta \). 

The \( \alpha v^{\prime}t o t \) \( \varphi o m a t o s \) \textit{i. e.} That not only the genus itself at all times, but that something else which is not the genus, but retains its form (is its species) as long as it lasts, is always designated by the same name. For example, inequality must always be so called, but the numbers three, five, \&c. which are not the same with inequality, yet, (besides their own proper and peculiar names,) as participating in and admitting inequality, are called also by the same name, unequal. That is, not only the \( \tau o \) \( \pi e r i t o n \) has the name \( \tau o \) \( \pi e r i t o n \), but the \( \tau r a \), \( \pi e m p t a \), \&c. and the \( \nu j o s \) \( \tau o \) \( \alpha r i b m o i \) \( \alpha p a s \). 

\textit{Metà to v o u v o m a t o u k a v o i t o s.} \textit{Along with its own name (as \( \tau r a \), \( \pi e m p t a \), \&c.) to designate it by this, \&c. to \( \pi e r i t o n \) : because its nature is such as that it cannot become distinct from or independent of the idea of inequality.}
\[ \text{ὥρος, οὐχ ὡς ἐκείνου, ἐνό στίχους ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μᾶς ἐθείας ἐφεξῆς τούς τε ἐπιλογίων ἐκτάττων καὶ τοὺς} \]

\[ \text{τριῳσιομοὺς.} \]

\[ \text{Ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα—ἐκτὶ ἀεὶ τὰναντία.} \]

Socrates says that this was what he was concerned to show; not only that contraries themselves did not receive their contraries, but that also as many things, as without being mutually contrary, yet contain contraries, (three, for instance, not being the contrary of two, yet containing as an odd number the inequality τὸ περίττον, which is the contrary of the equality τὸ ἄρτιον, contained in the even number two,) neither did these appear to receive the idea which is the contrary of that which they already contain, but on its approaching, either disappear or recede.

\[ \text{Ἀπολλόμενα ἡ ὑπεκχωροῦντα.} \]

Se. φαίνεται. Cf. supr. c. 29. οἱ ἄφικομένῳ ὕπάρχει αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.

\[ \text{Οὐδὲ μὴν—ἐναντίον γ' ἐστὶ ὑπὰς τριάδα.} \]

Hence it appears that the τραίας is not to be reckoned amongst the εἰκόν τὰ ἐναντία, for if it were a contrary itself, the contrary to it should be the ἑνάς, which is not and could not be the case.—Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλ' ἀπτὰ τὰ ἐναντία,—but some other things also do not await the approach of those which are really contraries. Cf. supr. c. 52. Ἑστιν ἅρ'—περὶ ἑνάν τῶν τοιούτων, κ. τ. λ.

\[ \text{§ 53. Ἀρ' οὖν—ταύτες εἰς...—] Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain the idea (or form) of itself, but always of something which is itself a contrary: for example the τριὰς, whatever it may have occupied or become inherent in, it not only forces that to be three, but also to contain within it the notion of that which is of itself a contrary, the περίττον. That this is the sense of the passage is evident from its subsequent explanation by Socrates; οὗτος γὰρ ὅς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τριῶν τριών, κ. τ. λ. whence the reading of Heindorf has} \]
μόνον ἀναγκάζει τῇν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν αὐτὸ ἵσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αἰεὶ αὐτοῦ τινός; Πῶς λέγεις; "Ὡς πέρ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἷσθα γὰρ δὴ ποὺ ὅτι ἀ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς; Πάνυ γε. "Επὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμείν, ἡ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ’ ἂν ἐλθοί. Οὐ γὰρ. Εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἡ περιττή; Ναὶ. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναὶ. "Επὶ τὰ τρία ἀρά ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει; Οὐ δὴσα. "Αμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία; "Αμοιρα. "Ανάρτιος ἀρά ἡ τριάς; Ναὶ."Ὁ τοῖνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τειν ἔντα ὁμος οὐ δέχεται αὐτό [τὸ ἐναντίον], οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὗσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλ- λον αὐτό δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυνὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἀλλὰ πάμπολλα, ἀλλ’ ὁρὰ δὴ εἰ οὗτος ὀρίζει, μη μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ἐφ’ ὦ τὶ ἂν αὐτὸ ἦ,

been selected as supr. Bekker reads ἐ-

ναντίον ἂν τῶν τινός; so likewise

Stallbaum, who encloses αὐτὸ in

brackets as dubious. Ficinus appears to

have read ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον ἂν τῶν τι-

νός, but none of the proposed emend-

ations, which are not a few, afford the

easy and obvious interpretation sup-

plied by the text as it stands.

Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον.] To such, we say

now, the idea contrary to the form which
effecte<i><i> </i></i></i> <i>this</i></i></i>, can never at all arise: i. e.

as infra. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία—ἥ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει.—Τῇ μορφῇ; see

supr. c. 52. ἐκείνου μορφήν—Τοῦτο, sc.

τὸ περιττὸν εἶναι.

Ἡ περιττή;] Sc. μορφῆ, i. q. ἂ τοῦ

περιττοῦ ἰδέα s. μορφῆ. Heind.

"Ὁ τοῖνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι.] That

therefore which I proposed to determine—

see now if you determine thus; ἀλλὰ ὁρα,

ὅτι, εἰ οὗτος ὀρίζει, κ. ἡ. λ., the apo-

dosis commencing with ἀλλὰ ὁρα, which

takes up the sentence interrupted by the

parenthesis οἶον νῦν ἡ τριάς—ἀλλὰ

πάμπολλα.

Τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ.] Αὐτῶ sc.

τῷ ἀρτίῳ, i. e. the τρίας or ternary

always brings against the even, ἀρτίον,

its contrary, the odd, περιττόν. The

verb ἐπιφέρει supra, also φέγγει, ἐπεκ-

χωρεῖν, προσέλθειν, εὖ ἔσεσθαι

ὅτι καὶ ἐπιφέρειαι, which are in fre-

quent use through the course of this argu-

ment, are obviously peculiar to mili-

tary tactics.

"Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο.] i.e. But that also

which brings any contrary against what-

ever it approaches, can never at any time

receive the contrary of that which is so

brought; as the τρίας which brings to-

whatever it approaches, the περιττόν,

(which is of itself ἐναντίον τι) does not

receive the ἀρτίον which is the con-

trary τοῦ ἐπιφερόμενον sc. τοῦ περι-

tτοῦ. Olympiod.—τοῦ ἐπιφερόμενον,

totu ἐστι, τοῦ συμφέρομενος αὐτῷ

ἐδέσω. Gottleber calls τό ἐπιφερόμε-

μον the attribute of anything, τό συ-

μβαίνον τῷ πράγματι. V. Mor. ad
autò to épiféron tìn tòu épifereoménou énanantiotētta
μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. Πάλιν δε ἀναμμυησκον' ου γὰρ χειρὸν πολλακις ἀκούειν. τα πέντε τῆν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τῆν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αυτὸ ἄλλῳ ἑναντίον, ὁμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται' οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἕμιόλιον οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ τοιάυτα, τὸ ἡμίουν, τῆν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιάυτα, εἶ
περ ἐπει τε καὶ ἔξυνδοκεῖ σοι οὐτως. Πάνω σφόδρα καὶ ἔξυνδοκεῖ, ἐφις, καὶ ἔπομαι.

§ 54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἐφη, ἐξ ἄρχης λέγε. καὶ μὴ
μοι ὅ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνοιν, ἄλλ' ἄλλω, μμομομενὸς
ἐμὲ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐλεγον ἀπόκρισιν,
tὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην

Longin. p. 62.

Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρων.] This is merely a
repetition of the nominative ὃ ἂν ἐπι-
φέρῃ ti preceded.: a familiar usage with
Greek and Latin writers.

Οὐ γὰρ χείρον.] It would be pro-
fitable. Cf. in Crit. c. 16. ἀρμίρων
εἰναι. See Matthiae Gr. s. 457. p. 757.

Τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου.] Σε. ἐκατ.—Οὐκ
ἔτι ἔκκατο.—Οὐκ ἔτι ἐκκατόρθος, όν
τεν, the double of five, ὡς —Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ
αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἑναντίον; this double, which
is itself contrary to something else, (than
the περιττόν,) will not nevertheless re-
ceive, &c. i.e. the number ten not being
the contrary of the genus περιττόν, but
of its species, the number five, (the con-
trary of a double being its half, and
everything having but one direct con-
trary,) still does not receive the περιτ-
τόν, that is, never can become an odd
number, because it contains the idea of
equality, which is inseparable from the
doubling of numbers, as supr. So with
the sesquialter or three halves, the half,
and the third, which do not receive the
idea of the whole, which is still not the
contrary of any of them, (the contrary
of half being the double, of a third the
triple, &c., and the direct contrary of
whole being part,) but because they in-
clude the general idea of fraction, which
is contrary to the idea of integer.—Οὐδὲ
δὴ τὸ ἕμιόλιον [the passage being so
arranged by Stallbaum, with a view to
unfolding its sense.] οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ
tοιάυτα, τὸ ἡμίουν καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ
cαὶ πάντα τὰ τοιάυτα (ἐχθιτώ) τὴν
τῶν ὅλων.

§ 54. Μὴ μοι ὅ ἂν ἐρωτῶ — Socrates
says, do not answer me by a re-
petition of the word which I use in the
question, but with a different one, imi-
titating me, or following my practice. As
when I ask of you whence a body be-
comes hot? do not say from heat, but
from fire; or why a body is diseased?
do not say from sickness, but from fever,
&c.—Socrates wishes to be answered so
as that the species of the genus, to which
the subject of this inquiry belonged,
should be named, not the genus itself.—

STALL.

Λέγω δὲ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον.] The reason
why Socrates required to be so
answered was, because he saw and un-
derstood (oriously) from what was im-
mEDIATELY then under discussion (ἐκ τῶν
νῦν λεγομένων, c. 53.) that besides
that answer which, as he had formerly
shown, (παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐλεγον ἀ-
τόκριςιν, V. c. 49. supr. ἑσυχυρισθά-
μαι—ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ
γίγνεται καλά, κ. τ. λ.) could be justly
and safely given, (τὴν ἀσφαλίαν,) there
could be another given of equal
certainty and truth (ἀλλὰν ἀσφάλειαν). Fisch.

"Ои ἄν τι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται."  
Stephens proposes, ὦ ἄν τι σώματι, ὦ τι σώματι, ὥστε ὁ θερμότης.  
Wytenbach follows Stephens as supr. Tub. Ald. and Bass. ὦ ἄν τι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὧ τί σώματι, and seq. ὦ τι ἄν τηρημότης, and ὦ τι ἄν πῦρ. Almost all the editions are at variance on this passage, from which however Heindorf, approved by Stallbaum, has made the happiest effort at an intelligible reading and obvious sense: ὅταν τι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὃταν τηρημότης, and ὧταν ὧταν πῦρ. The re- 
main portion of the passage requires no emendation.

"Ο τι θνητος." What I mean.

"Οικον ἡ ψυχή τὸ ἐναντίον ὑποτε- 
ty]. h. c. Τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου ὁ αὐτή ἐπιφέρει.  
§. 55. Τὸ ἑκατον — μουσικὸν. 
The just—and the graceful. Cf. Αρο' 
de Doctrin. Plat. i. p. 10. Elmenh. 
"fieretque (homo) totus ipse modulatum 
ac musicum." Fischer explains μουσι- 
κόν, modulatum, concinnum, and con- 
sequently ἀμουσικον, immodulatum, in- 
concinnum.

"Ἀμουσικόν, ἐφή, τὸ ἑκατον." More 
fully, τὸ μὲν ἀμουσικον, τὸ ἑκατον: 
but μὲν is sometimes understood when 
ἑκατον appears to be omitted 
in "Libertas, quae seram tamen respetit 
inertem," Virg. Eclog. i. 28; and "ma-
tura res erat, tergiversantur tamen," 
Viger, p. 197.
μὴ δέχηται, τί καλούμεν; 'Αθάνατον, ἐφη. Ὄφκον ἡ ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. 'Αθάνατον ἀρα ἡ ψυχή; 'Αθάνατον. Ἐδειν, ἐφη. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδε- δείχθαι φῶμεν; ἡ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μᾶλα γε ἰκανῶς, δο Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἡ δ' ὦς, ὡ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἄναρ- τῳ ἀναγκαίῳ ἢν ἀνώλεθρο ἐιναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἀνώλεθρα ἀν ἦν; Πῶς γαρ οὖ; Ὅφκον εἰ καὶ τό ἄθρεμον ἀναγκαίον ἢν ἀνώλεθρον ἐιναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χίωνα θερμὸν ἑπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆη ἅν ἡ χῶνα οὐδα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπόλετο γε, οὔτ' ἀν ὑπομε- νουσα ἔδεξαι ἅν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέ- γεις. Ὡς δ' αὐτοίς, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄφυκτον ἀνώ- λεθρον ἢν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπίοι, οὐ ποτ' ἂν ὑπεσβέσκαιν οὐδ' ἀπόλυτον, ἄλλα σῶν ἄν ἀπελ- θον φῶς. Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Ὅφκον καὶ ὁδε, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἄθανατον εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄθαν- ατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστιν, ἄδυνατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνα-
φαίδων.

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tos ἐπ' ἀυτὴν ᾗ, ἀπόλλυσθαι: θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέχεται οὐδ' ἑσται τεθηκιστα, ὡς περ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἐσται, ἐφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττὸν, οὐδὲ ὅ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ γ' ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμῶτης. Ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίν ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπίνοιτο τοῦ ἄρτιον, οὐς περ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολλυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τὰ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλυσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὁμολογητο ἦμιν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία ἀδίκητα ἁπάντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἦ οὕ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἄθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἦμιν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἰ ἐνος τῷ ἄθανάτῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· ei de μημ, ἄλλου ἂν δεοι λόγου. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δει, ἐφη, τούτου γε ἐνεκα' σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι
equivalent to ἀνώλεθρον supr. Topic. vi. p. 694. edit. Fac. t. i. p. 376. ed. Syllb. The argument as supr., is thus summed up by Albinus, Doctr. Plat. c. xxv. p. 370. Τὸν ἐπ' ἐφεξῆς ἄθανατον ἀποφαίνει τούτον ἐπικριτεῖν τοὺς τῶν τρόπων' ἡ ψυχή ὅτι ἂν προσέγνωται ἐπίσημου τοῦτον τῷ ζῷ, ὡς σύμφωναν ἑπάργνιν ἀπαύγα· τὸν τέτοιον τικτον τῷ ζῷ, αὐτοὶ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ διαθέσαι τὸν ἄθανατον, ἄθανατον· εἰ ἐπ' ἄθανατον 'ἡ ψυχή· καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἂν εἰπ' ἀσώματος γάρ ἢτον οὔ, ἀμετάβλητος κατὰ τὰν ὑπόστασαν καὶ νοητῷ, καὶ αἰείς καὶ καὶ μονοειδῆς· οὐκοῦν ἀσέβητος· ἀςείατος, ἀςείατος, ἀςείατος.

Ἀλλ' τί κωλύει. But, says an object, what is there to prevent this,—granting that the odd cannot become the even on the accession of the even, as had been already conceded—that on the annihilation of the odd (ἀπολλυμένον εἰ τις) the even should succeed in its stead (ἀντ' ἐκείνου)? That is, that the soul, while it is a soul, cannot receive death, but on the approach of death it ceases to be what it is. To this Socrates says, that he cannot make any answer on the grounds of the odd being imperishable, since its not being so did not interfere with the main of the argument which regarded the ἄθανατος. If, however, it were conceded to be so, he might easily contend for the disappearance merely (that being one of the alternatives mentioned supr. c. 58. sub. fin., ἡ φειγεν — ἡ ἀπολωλεναι) of the odd and its species, three; and so with fire, heat, &c. Therefore with regard to the immortal, if it was agreed that it was also imperishable, the soul then, in addition to its being immortal, (πρὸς τῷ ἄθανατος εἶναι,) should be incorruptible likewise. But if this was not agreed to, some other argument would be required in proof, for which, however, there was no necessity, since nothing could be imperishable if that which was immortal and eternal in its nature should yet be subject to decay.

Διαμάχεσθαι.] To contend with, to argue against.

Τούτου γε ἐνεκα.] As far as regards this.
ἀλλο φθοράν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τὸ γε ἀθάνατον καὶ αἴδιον φθοράν δέχεται.

§ 56. Ὁ δὲ γε θεός, οἴμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἰ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀθάνατον ἀστι, παρὰ πάντων ἄν ὁμολογηθεὶν μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μὲντοι νή Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἐτί μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγὼμι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἔστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχῆ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὐδα, καὶ ἀνόλεθρος ἀν ἐη; Πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ. Ἐπιόντως ἁρα θανάτόν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν θυμὸν, ὡς ἐοικεῖ, αὐτοῦ ἀποδήνησε, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ὕψωτον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανατῷ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἁρὰ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχῆ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνόλεθρον, καὶ τῷ οὐτὶ ἑσυναὶ ἡμῶν οἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν "Αἴδων. Οὐκοιν ἐγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐχῳ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ τῇ ἀπίστευν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ὑδὲ ἦ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὐ ἔχει μὴ καταστήσασθαι, ὡς οὐκ οἴδα εἰς ὅν τίνι ἄν τις ἄλλων καϊρὸν ἀναβάλλοντο ὅ τῶν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἦ τι εἰπεῖν ἦ ἀκούσα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὡς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐχὼ ἐτὶ ὅπῃ ἀπίστωκ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ μεντοὶ τοῦ μεγεθοὺς περὶ ὅν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτμίαξον, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπίστιαν ἐτὶ ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη,
§ 57. 'Alla tòde γ', ἐφη, ὁ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον δια
νοθήναι, ὅτι εἰ περ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστιν, ἐπιμε-
λείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν
ὁ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζήν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίν-
δυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δοξεῖν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσῃ.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγή, ἐρμαίον ἂν ἢν
τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἁμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς ἀυτῶν κακίας
μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δὲ ἐπείδη ἀθάνατος φαίνεται
οὕσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἰ ἀντὶ ἀλλὰ ἀποφυγῇ κακῶν
οὑδε σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὦς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμω-
tάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς "Ἀδων ἡ
ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ᾗ δὴ

ἡ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις, καὶ
tὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστᾶ τίμῶν εἰςίν,
ὀμως ἐπισκεπτέας σαφέστερον καὶ ἕαν αὐτός ἰκανῶς
dιέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ'
ὅσον δυνατόν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι καὶ
τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφῆς γένηται, οὔδεν ἤγιστετε περαιτέρω.
Ἄλλη, ἐφη, λέγεις.

§ 57. 'Alla tòde γ', ἐφη, ὁ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον δια-
novothnai, óti ei per h' psuchē athanatos estin, epime-
leias dei deita oux upeter tou chrōnou tou'tou monon en
ō kaloumen to zein, all' upeter tou' pantos, kai o kīn-
dynos nun de kai doxein an deinōs einai, ei tis autheis
amelhesi. Ei mev gar hen o thanatos tou' pantos
apallaghe, ermaion an hen tois kakois aptabanousi tou
tou te somaatos ama apellallachai kai tis auton kakis
meta tis psuchēs' nun de epieidē athanatos faivetai
ousa, oude mia an eih autē allē apofugē kakon
oudē sotēria plēn tou' ows beltistēn te kai prōnimo-
tatēn genesthai. oudēn gar allo exousa eis "Adoun h'
psuchē erkhetai plēn tis paideias te kai trophiēs, a de'

exein peri ton eipomenvon. Cf. in
Menon. p. 71. B. taoute periou kai
oikeai apaggelomev. ΣΩΚΡ. Me
monon gen, iō etaipre, alla kai oti ou'd
allō πω ἐνίκησον εἰςτὲ. de Legg. vi.
p. 752. A. ΚΛ. 'Aριστη' εἵρμαις ou
einw. ΑΘ. Oi monon gen, allα kai
grasio kata dunamein ontw.
Kai ei paistai—dous episkpetiai.
See Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 3. b.

§ 57. όνη ψερ του χρονου του-
tou, κ. τ. λ.] i.e. Not for the sake of this
period only, during which that is
which we call life; en o kaloseim to
zein being equivalent to en ς to kalos-
ki alēsiv enba kalwne Kēληται.
Sop. Trach. 618. "Eph" 'Elalainon an-
γorai Hulastides kalontai. Matthiæ
Gr. s. 472. 4. Obs.

Εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσῃ.] Ei is not
unfrequently accompanied by the future
indic., when the opt. with an follows in
the apodosis. Matthiæ s. 524. Obs
2. 1.

O thanatos tou' pantos apallaghe.
If death were a deliverance from every
thing; the soul perishing along with the
body. The theme of apallaghe is a-
παλάτταται pass. or mild. not ἀπαλ-
láttaiw.—"Ermou, Tim. Plat. Lex.
ērēmer από τον ἐν θεὶ λεγομένον, Κοινὲς Ἐρμῆς. Schol. interpr. τά ἀ-
προσδόκημον κιρίσος από τών κατα τας
οὔτε τις τιμημένους ἀπαρχων, ὡς οι ὁδα-
πορίας κατέθυσαν. ταῦτα εἰ τῷ Ἐρ-
μῆ ἀμφιρρέσθην ὡς ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ ἐν
τῶν ἑνώνων θεῶν.

Τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς.] Tro-
phē and paideia are frequently so joined,
and indifferently used for each other;
but where there is any distinction in-
tended, the former is applied to the
soul, the latter to the body, and trophiē
is then used metaphorically of that
knowledge by which, as its proper nu-
kai λέγεται μέγιστα όφελείν ή βλάπτειν τόν τελευτήσαντα εὑθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ός ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἐκαστον ὁ ἐκάστον δια-

triment, the soul is sustained. To these two is added ἀγωγή, education or discipline.

Λέγεται ἐπὶ οὕτως.] Having fully established the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Socrates proceeds in the second part of the dialogue to the consideration of its future state, as an imperishable and incorruptible essence.—This subject is discussed also in the Gorgias, p. 512. sqq. de Republic. x. p. 614. ed. Steph. which may be advantageously compared with the above, as also in Thaïdr. c. 56. where the condition of the soul is described previous to its descent into the body. Upon this important portion of the heathen mythology it is to be observed, that Socrates is not made to express himself as convinced of the absolute truth and certainty of the things he describes. Plato, as Stallbaum justly remarks, in his frequent references to myths, does not appear to have introduced them for ornament merely, although the 'poet of philosophers' was by no means unmindful of this, but it would seem that he had some more useful and graver object in view. For in his discussion of such subjects he generally makes it to be understood, that there is more room for doubt and conjecture than valid argument and conclusive reasoning: to accomplish which, he so uses, for the most part, the popular fables and traditions of Greece, as that he not only alters or rejects what is unsuited to his purpose, but at the same time makes an effort to reform and remove the superstitions of his countrymen, which is his evident design throughout. It is equally evident that he was also desirous to emancipate the minds and judgments of his friends from the thraldom of a blind and absurd belief, and lead them, by a requisite preparation, to comprehend and partake of the benefits resulting from a purer and more exalted wisdom. The sum of the arguments advanced by Plato on the subject of a future state is simply this; that the good are happy and the evil miserable; that the happiness of the former consists in virtue and truth, and the misery of the latter, in the contrary of both; but for the probability of his own, or the speculations of others upon what this happiness or misery is to be in quality or degree, he does not by any means contend, nor dilate upon with any other view than that already ascribed. Cf. V. Cousin, Œuvr. de Plut. i. 177.—"Vient ensuite la seconde partie avec le cortège de croyances populaires et mythologiques sur la destinée et l'état ultérieur de ce principe immortel, transporté hors des conditions de son existence actuelle. La première partie était un discussion entre philosophes; la seconde est un hymme, un fragment d'épopée; c'est, en quelque sorte, un accompagnement doux et gracieux, destiné à relever l'effet des démonstrations précédentes, et à charmer le cœur et l'imagination, après que l'intelligence est satisfaite.

"La philosophie démontrer qu'il y a dans l'homme un principe qui ne peut perir. Mais que ce principe repartisse dans un autre monde avec le même ordre de facultés et les mêmes lois qu'il avait dans celui-ci; qu'il y porte les conséquences des bonnes et des mauvaises actions qu'il a pu commettre: que l'homme vertueux y converse avec l'homme vertueux, qui le méchant y souffre avec le méchant, c'est là une probabilité subtile qui échappe peut-être à la rigueur de la démonstration, mais qu'autorisent et consacrent et le voue secret du cœur, et l'assentiment universel des peuples. Elles ne sont pas d'hier, elles ne s'éteindront pas demain, ces naives et nobles croyances qu'un indestructible besoin produit, répand, perpétue parmi les hommes, comme un héritage sacré; et, en vérité, ce serait une philosophie bien hauteaine que celle qui défendrait au sage, à l'heure suprême, d'invoquer ces traditions vénérables, et d'essayer de s'enchanter lui-même de la foi de ses semblables et des esperances du genre humain. Ce n'est pas là du moins la philosophie de Socrate. Trop éclairé pour accepter sans réserve les allégories populaires qu'il raconte à ses
μον, ὃς περ ζωντα εἰλήξει, οὗτος ἁγεν ἐπιχειρεὶ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐννίενεντας διαδικασμε—

amis, il est trop indulgent aussi pour les repousser avec rigueur; et l'on voit tout au plus errer sur le lèvres du bon et spirituel vieillard ce demi-sourire qui trahit le scepticisme sans montrer le dédain."

To this part of the dialogue Olympiodorus gives the name Νεκυία, which is likewise applied to the similar passages in the Gorgias and de Repub., and by the ancients to the eleventh Odyssey, which being occupied with a like subject was called by the ancients Νεκυία or Νεκουμαντία. Socrates now proceeds to say that every soul has its own genius for its guide, which conducts it after death to the lower regions; a wise and well-informed soul pursuants to its own desire, but a vicious and foolish soul, and devoted to the body, against its will. Having been so conducted to a particular place, they are there tried, and those who lived moderately well suffer such punishment for their misdeeds as may tend to their being cleansed, and restored to virtue, at the same time that they receive the reward of their good actions. Those, however, who have committed greater, but yet excusable crimes, such as homicides, or those who ill-treat their parents, are afflicted with severer penalties, from which they are not discharged until they have made the requisite atonement to the objects of their injustice.—But those who have committed unpardonable and irremediable offences, by many and gross acts of oppression and violence, are plunged into Tartarus, to abide there for ever. Finally, those who have led a blameless and an upright life, and especially those who have studied philosophy intently and effectually, are exalted into the upper regions, whence they return no more. This abode of the blessed is on the earth itself, but in a lofty and celestial quarter; for what is water with us is air with them, and our air is their ether: all things are purer, brighter, and more subtle there; ended with more acute perceptions, they enjoy a more vigorous intelligence, and a nearer intimacy with the gods. While we, as fishes in the depths of the sea, so live in the lower air, whence few ascend into the

more ætherial space; all things with us are coarse and earthly, our perceptions dull, intelligence slow, nothing really and sincerely good.

Throughout this discussion, though the mind and the soul appear to have been used as synonyms, yet there is a distinction to be observed between them. The soul is that whole, whatever it is in us which thinks, feels, acts, desires, is conscious to itself of itself and all things else. It is called by the Greeks ψυχή, and is attributed to all animals (ζώα). But these are either rational (λογικά), or irrational (ἄλογα, i. e. brutes); of rational beings there are four classes, gods, daemon, heroes, and men. Platonists divide the soul into three parts or faculties; two irrational, ἐπιθυμίαν, and θυμὸν, the affections and passions, and the third rational, λόγον, reason, which, if it is regarded not as a faculty of the soul, but as a part, and that, too, the most excellent and influential, is called νοῦς, the mind. This part, then, which is mainly concerned in the question of immortality, is generally implied by the term mind, the whole is designated as the soul. Cf. Tennemann, Man. Philos. s. 134. Plato considered the soul to be a self-acting energy, (ἀυτὸ ἑαυτοῦ κυνοῦν, de Leg. x. p. 88. sqqu.) and viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the rational (λογιστικόν, νοῦς); and the irrational or animal (ἄλογος τετικόν ὀ ἐπιθυμικόν): mutually connected by a sort of middle term (θυμός ὃ τὸ θυμοτικός·, de Rep. iv. 349. ed. Steph.) The animal part has its origin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body; the intellectual still retains a consciousness of the ideas: whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of spirits. "Ο ἐκάστου βαίμων·" i.e. The daemon or genius which was appointed as the guide and associate of every human being during life. Whether every individual had his own peculiar daemon, or that one daemon took charge of a greater number of individuals, the learned are not agreed, nor does it appear that Plato himself thought proper to decide.
Some supposed the daemon to be a part of the soul itself, or the νοῦς, Plat. Tim. p. 551. A. or an ἂν. Cf. Porphyry. Epist. ad Aneb. p. d. b. Διαμισθείσητος εὖ μῆτω ὀαίμοιν ἵτώς μήρος τί τίς ψυχῆς εἴη καί οὕτως ἄρα εὐθαμίνος εἰς ὁπίσς νοῦν ἐχει σοφον. Olympiodorus, Cod. I. p. 288. is of opinion that one daemon has the charge of several souls, for it was not allotted to a soul but to a life; ἀλλὰ βίων τί εὖ κολλήσω τὸν ἀυτὸν βίων πλεῖον αἰρέσθαι φυ- χάς; therefore every species of life had its own presiding daemon which also took charge of the souls by which that species of life was adopted. With this he aims at reconciling the passage in Rep. x. p. 250. C. where the soul in its choice of a new life selects also a daemon for itself, the daemon does not select the soul, whence he concludes that each daemon presides over a particular kind of life; to this effect Platonius refers, Enn. iii. iv. 3. p. 281. B. ὥστε εὖν Λήγεται ἡμᾶς αἰρέσθαι τῶν γάρ ὑπερκείμενων κατὰ ζωὴν αἰρόμεθα. To which opinion Jamblius also so far accedes as to determine the daemon to be a part, but the predominant one, of the soul, ἤς. p. 160. Εἰς ἐς εὐ τῶν ἁλαθὴ περὶ τοῦ οὐκείων εαίμονος λόγον ἀποκλάνθη, οὐκ ἄρα ἐνός μέρους τῶν ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ, ἐν' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τὸς συμπεριφερόμενος ἀπορίσθη ἡμῖν ὁὕτως ἄρα ἄρα ἄν ἄρα τῶν πάντωσι ποσοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν ζωῆς, καὶ τῶν παντεοέρων σώματος, ἐν ῥαν ἡ ψυχή κάθειται ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀπομείζεται τοι ἐν ἡμίν μοῦρα ἢ ἀν ἐκάκοι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπορίσμε- νείς κατ' ἓκατ' ἐπιστάσαις ὁὕτως εὖ εἰς εὖν ἐκάκοι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μοῦροι ἀπορίσθη ἡμῖν. ἐν ἑν ἀκούει καὶ των ἐν τῇ παντοκρατικῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς, τοῦ παντοκράτορος σώματος, ἐν ῥαν ἡ ψυχή κάθειται ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀ- πομείζεται τοι ἐν ἡμίν μοῦρα ἢ ἀν ἐκάκοι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μοῦροι ἀπορίσθη ἡμῖν. ἐν ἑν ἀκούει καὶ των ἐν τῇ παντοκρατικῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς, τοῦ παντοκράτορος σώματος, ἐν ῥαν ἡ ψυχή κάθειται ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀ- πομείζεται τοι ἐν ἡμίν μοῦρα ἢ ἀν ἐκάκοι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μοῦροι ἀπορίσθη ἡμῖν. ἐν ἑν ἀκούει καὶ των ἐν τῇ παντοκρατικῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς, τοῦ παντοκράτορος σώματος, ἐν ῥαν ἡ ψυχή κάθειται ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀ- πομείζεται τοι ἐν ἡμίν μοῦρα ἢ ἀν ἐκάκοι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μοῦροι ἀπορίσθη ἡμῖν.
between the gods and man, partaking of the nature of mind and body, susceptible of passions like human beings, and consequently liable to diversity of character. Nearly similar is the doctrine of Ocelus, from whom, however, as he makes demons the inhabitants of the sublunar regions, Aristotle differs essentially, who supposed no such intelligences except in the celestial sphere. Enf. Phil. passim. Cf. Horat. Epist. ii. 2, 187. Theocrit. Id. iv. 40. λι, αι, το σκήρυδι μάλα δαιμονίας ἑαυτής με με λόγοι. Lys. Epitaph. p. 130. δεί τί ἐν φύσει καὶ φύσιν ἡμῖν ἡγομένους λύσεις καὶ γέρους, ο Theodore. τινι δαιμόνιν οί τινι ἡμῖν κρατοῦν ἐλημώνοις ἀπαραίτητος. Menand. apud. Clem. Alex. Strum. v. p. 727. "Ἄπαντα δαιμώνια ἀνέπραπαστατί Εὐθὺς γενομένυς μαμύτα-γογίς τοι βίου. Virg. Georg. i. 302. Tibull. ii. 2, 1, iv. 6, 1. Pers. Sat. i. 3. "Ος περί ζωήν εἰδήσεις." Kacher reads ὅσπιρπ ζωήν εἰδήσεις, after ed. Fran-the passage; Demonem summ quemque ducere, quemadmodum eum viventem deprehenderit, eo, quo defuncti se colligant, &c., which is obviously incorrect both in sense and arrangement. "Ος περί (so in vett. editt.) is the true reading, and consistent with the doctrine of Plato. For in Rep. x. l.e. supra, he makes Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, address the souls; Φυελχοῦ ἕρμηρεῖ—οΒις ἑμᾶς δαιμόνιν ἱέκσατα, ἀλλὰ ἑμῖς δαιμόνιν ἀπρήπεται: the genius which the soul selected being so allotted by Lachesis to that life upon which the soul chose to enter, and in which, according to its future destiny, it was called εὐκαιρόν, or κακοκαιρός. Whence Gottleber correctly renders the passage, ος περί ζωήν εἰδήσεις, qui ge-nius viventem cum sorte accessorat. V. Cousin; le même génie, qui a été chargé de lui pendant sa vie. Dacier; le démon (le génie) qu'il a eu en partage.

Eis οὗ τινα τόπουν.] Into a certain place; this τόπος is called by Socrates, Αἰσχιν. Socr. iiii. 19, πείνιαν ἀλήθείας.

Ori. ἐν τοῖς ἐνληγίγνασις ἀιώνασιμοῖς.] i.e. Where having been assembled, they must undergo their trials: ἀιώνασιμοῖς, as Reiske correctly ob-serves, in Ind. Demosth., signifying, to commit one's cause to a legal investiga-tion, whence ἀιώνασιμοῖς supr. is equivalent to ἀιωνάσιμοι ὑπίχον-tas elsewhere. Cf. infr. c. 62. init. πρώτον μὲν εἰκεκισκόντο, κ. τ. λ.

Προσθέσαι.] Interpr. Hesych. πρόσθεσαι, ἀγαθεῖν. Ὁν πολλῶν χρόνου καὶ μακρο. περ.] Plato does not accurately define the number of years in which the period of, or revolutions of years allotted to trans-migrating souls, were completed; but to some he assigns the space of one, to others of three, and again to others, of ten thousand years. He has not either laid down his doctrine of metempsychosis so simply and obviously as the Pythagoreans, but has studied to explain its principles from the nature of the soul itself. For the soul, from the habits of its former life, being tied down to the love of pleasure, naturally seeks for a body of such a description as may be best adapted to the gratification of its desires. Consequently, being deceived through ignorance of what is really good, in the choice of a new existence, it abandons the better for the worse.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἀπλήν οἰμόν φησιν εἰς Ἀιδον φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὐτε ἀπλή οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει εὐγάρ ποῦ τις ἀν διαμάρτων οὐδαμὸς μᾶς ὁδὸν οὐσίς. νῦν δὲ έσκε σχίσεις τε καὶ περίοδους πολλὰς ἔχειν απὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαίρομενοι λέγω. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρονίμος ψυχὴ ἐπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα. ἦ δὲ

quit: undeque enim ad inferos tantum-dum viv est.” Horat. Od. i. 28. 16.— “Et calcarum semel vialet.” Virg. Aen. vi. 126.— “facilis descensus Avern.” For Telephus, see Class. Dict. His story formed the subject of the last tragedy of Æschylus, inscribed with his name.

Νῦν ἐς.] Matthiae Gr. s. 607.

‘Απὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων.] Τὰ ὁσία is used of the last duties towards the dead, and so likewise τὰ νόμιμα, and νομιζόμενα, in Latin justa, of the customary and established titles of burial, &c., whence Wytteubach understands the phrase by the figure ἐν εἰδί ἐνοῦν, to signify relīgio mortuorum, scaera inferis et manibus exhibita. Upon the different parts of such ceremonies, which Socrates alleges as an argument for the diversity of routes conducting to the lower regions, Cf. Schol. in loc. ex Cod. Olymp. i. p. 233. "Ὅτι μία μέν κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν, ἡ εἰς ἁέουν παρίσια πολλαὶ ἐκ καὶ παντοποιαί αἰτι μετὰ τήν μίαν ὁδὸν, ἀλλὰ τοιούτων καὶ τοιαύτων ὁσίων τῶν ἱμησίων, ὡς τέλη ποιοῦνται αἱ δουλερόουσαν (ψυχαὶ)— η ἐντάς Δημήτρος πᾶνας ὡσ γὰρ εἰσαφόρων ὁσίων τῶν ὁσίων ἐπιληφθῆ οτι ἐπὶ τριῶν θόνου τριῶν ξῆκτη (leg. τριῳτίτε 'Εστάγη) καὶ παραδείκνυσί ταῖς τριώσεις ἐν ἄλλως νομίμοις. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀποικιμάτων τὰς ψυχὰς τριῶν θραπεύοντων ἄλλως μὲν τῶν παναγῶν ἱερῶν ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν βιοθανάτων καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλος τὰς τῶν πολλὰς. For ὁσίων, Vulg. Ang. Aed., &c. read θυσίων, adopted by Ficinus, and by Olympiodorus, who understands an allusion to the sacrifices offered to Hecate, where three ways met;—Ο Σωκράτης εἰς ψυχὲς πλησίον, ψυχῶν μίαν ἄπο τὸν ἐξίσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων μᾶς γὰρ οὔσης ὁδὸς, μὲν ἂν ἔνθηθαι τῶν ἀ-γώνων ἱερατικῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τριῶσι τριῶν τῆς 'Εκάτης. Heindorf receives ὁσίων, but considers it to imply a reference to the mysteries, in which the circuituous approaches to Orcus were exhibited to the view of the spectators. Upon the construction supr., πεκαμιρομενος without an accusative of the object, see Matthiae Gr. s. 306. 2. Cf. in Criton. c. 2. init. πεκαμιρομενος εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἑνυπήνων. Χειροφ. Сytor. vii. 5. 63. 'Εστεραμενοι εἰ καὶ εἰ τῶν ἄλλον ζωῶν, &c.

Ὡς ἄγνοει τὰ παρόντα.] Heusde, Spec. Crit. p. 23. denies the sense of ὃς ἄγνος supr. and proposes ὃς ἄγνακτει τὰ παρ., as being correctly joined with ἐπεταί preceded. and so opposed to ἀντιτινίασα καὶ πολλά παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόλις, κ. τ. 7. Λ. seq. But all the editions sanction the reading in the text, which requires no emendation, and signifies that the soul is not unaccompanied with its present state; its immediate condition has not beenfallen it suddenly nor unexpectedly, for it had already been familiarized with it, by the study of philosophy, and meditation upon death. Therefore it must be pleased with a change which it was long since aware was to be for its good, and would gladly accompany the guide, of whose conduct its own felicity was the undisbodied object. This sense, it evident includes the meaning which Heusde desired to make more obvious, but which is thus sufficiently apparent without his correction. Ἀγνακτει, besides, may be taken in the full signification here, in which its norist occurs in that splendid passage Illiad, ν', 18. sqv.—ἀταλλη ἐκ κατα' ἐν' αὖτ' Ἡπανθέν ἐκ καθώμων, οὗ ἡγονηθην ἀνακτα,—where it evidently implies the joyful recognition, or confession of the
presence of their sovereign by the monsters of the deep.

"H δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔιτον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνου ἐπομημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστηταμένου δαιμονοῦ οὐχετά ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ θὰ περ αἱ ἀλλα, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκινήν τοιούτον, ἢ φόνον ἀδίκου ὑμμενήν ἢ ἀλλὰ ἅττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τοῦτον ἀδέλφα τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἄπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὕτε ἔννεμποροι οὕτε ἕγεμον ἔθελε γεγνεθαι, αὕτη δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἔχομεν ἁπορία, ἐως ἀν δὴ τίνες χρόνοι γένονται, ὅν ἐξέλθωντον ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπουσαν ὀίκησιν. ἢ δὲ καθαρὸς τε καὶ μετρίως τοῦ βίον διεξελθοῦσα,
§ 58. After αὐτή intell. ἐστὶν. Anaximander and Hecataeus may be here alluded to, who had set such inquiries on foot respecting the form and magnitude, &c., of the earth. V. Strabon. i. p. 13. c. Diog. L. ii. 2. STALL. Forster correctly renders ὅση, tantula: cf. infr. Ἐτι τοινυν—πάμμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτῷ.

"Ὡς ἐγώ—πέτεισμα[ Vulg. πέπισμα; but the former is preferable, both on account of ὥς σε πέτιθε seq. and. ὥς τύχας preced.

Οὐχ ἢ Γλαῦκον γέ μοι τέχνην.] This proverb was in use among the ancients in regard to difficulties which required no great power of intellect or ingenuity to solve. It is so applied in the present instance; but how the proverb itself originated is altogether uncertain. Schol. Plat. Γλαῦκον τέχνην ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥᾴδιον καταγεγομένων, ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνω ἐμπείρως καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰρηγαμένως. "Iπαπασος γάρ της κατεσκέψεως χαλκοῦς τίπτασας εἰσίκουσιν ὥς τοι, ὧς τίμης εἰσίκουσιν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς ἑαυτὰ ὡς ὑπαρχόντα (1. ἐπαρχεῖν) τοῦτο εἰ τῶν πρῶτων ἐσίκουσιν ἐπιτρήτω μή εἰναι τοῦ ἐευτέρου, ἡμίπλον ἢ τοῦ τρίτου, εἰσπολύν ἢ τοῦ τέταρτον κρυμνομένου ἢ τοῦτον ἐπιτελεί συμβοηθάν τινα.

καὶ λέγεται Γλαῦκον ἐνώπιον τῆς εἰ ἐκκαί τῶ ἐπι τῶν ἐσίκουσιν φθόγγον πρῶτον ἐγχειρήσει ἐν αὐτῶν χειροποιήται καὶ ἀπὸ τοῖς τῆς πραγματείας ἐτί καὶ τῶν λέγεσθαι τῆν καινομένην Γλαῦκον τέχνην. (Conf. Pausan. Phoc. c. 16.) ἐπορεύομαι λεγεν τέχνην καὶ ἃμα μὲν ἐγώ ἑσώς ὡς ἀν ὧς τε ἐήν, ἃμα δὲ, ἐι καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ τί ἐμος, ὅ Γλαῦκον τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τῆν μέντοι ἴδεαν τῆς γῆς, οῖαν πέπεισμαι εἰναι, καὶ


tous topous autês oudein me kolwei legein. 'Alλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

Πέπεισμα τοίνυν, ἡ δ' ὁς, ἐγὼ ὦς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὐσα, μηδὲν αὐτὴ δειν μὴτε ἄερος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσείν μὴτε ἄλης

iii. 4. 11. This form is rarer among the Latin writers. Liv. iii. 50. "Decemvir simul iis, quæ videbant, simul his, quæ acta Romae audierant, perturbati." Ibid. xxxi. 46. "Simul minarum, simul pro-
missionum in futurum memorès."—

STALL.

Ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ περιφρέουσαν ὁμονωμίας. Cf. in Tim. c. 15, a. med. Ἔγινε εἰς, προ-

τὸν μὲν ἡμιτρόπον, ἐλαυνόμενος ἐπὶ πε-

tὸν δὲ πάντως πᾶλον τεταμένον, φιλ-

λακα καὶ ἐλημονωχόν νεκτὸς τε καὶ

ὕμων ἐμαχανησατο, πρωτήν καὶ ρηνεβιςτάτην σωμάτων ὁσα ἐντὸς οὐ-

ρανοῦ γέγονεν.

Upon the word ἐλαυνόμενος, in this passage, the disputes have arisen con-
cerning Plato’s opinion of the earth; whether, according to Aristotle (de Ca-

do. 11. 13. p. 659. B.—11. 14. p. 663. E.), who, reading ἐλαυνόμενος, gives it the sense of κινούμενος, and Diogenes Laertius (111. s, 35.), he maintained the earth’s rotation upon its axis, or whether, according to Proclus, ad h. i. who condemns this interpretation, (and reading ἐλλαυνόμενον gives it the sense as in Tim. Plat. Lex. συγκεκλησιμένον καὶ περιελαυνόμενον. Ἡλλασίς γὰρ οἱ ἐσμοι ἐν τοῖς ἐσμοι) he held the earth to be im-
moveably fixed upon its axis. But in fact, as Ruhnken and Hemsterhuis justly observe, the reading in this case makes no difference, for both ἐλλαυνόμενος and ἐλαυνόμενος are precisely the same. The former, in Plat. Lex. as supr., quotes two translations of the passage which do not remove its ambiguity. Cic. Acad. ii. 39. Jam vero terram, altricem nostram, quo trajecto axe sustinuet, dixique noctisique efferetricem, &c. Chald. p. 41. Terr-

ram vero matrem et altricem omnium ter-

renorum animantium contrictam limiti-

bus per omnia vadentis et euncta contin-

entis poli, &c. And the latter, ibid., admits the possibility of either inter-

pretation; Terram quæ circum axem se summa celeritate convertit et torqueit." Cic. Acad. ii. 39. or "quæ circum axem protensus convoluta et adstricta hæret. Vincula quibus terram natura constrixit," Macrob. ad Somn. Scip. i. The second opinion is ably advocated by Letronne (Journal des Savans. 1819. Juin) in an article upon M. J. V. le Clerc’s Penseées de Platon, sur la Morale, &c, Paris, 1819, in which the author supports the opinion of Aristotle, as supr. Letronne understands ἐλαυνόμενος (περί) in a pas-

sive sense, and instead of signifying, the earth revolving, i. e. turning itself on its axis, he takes it to mean rather being rolled, i. e. agglomerated round its axis; the expression being metaphorical, from wool or flax twisted or coiled in a ball round the spindle of a distaff. So the term is applied to the earth as being wound round its own axis, which, pro-
longed at either extremity, becomes the axis of the universe.—πᾶλον ἐκ παν-

τῶς τεταμένον. Hence it will appear that ἐλαυνόμενος περί πᾶλον is nearly synonymous with περιφερῆς οὐσα in the text, which Letronne quotes in further confirmation of his opinion. He cites two passages also from the Timaeus in favour of the earth being immovable fixed; in which Plato seems to have sufficiently decided the point himself. In the one he speaks of the double motion of the sun and planets, their di-

urnal and proper, and in another he de-

scribes their diurnal motion as a revo-
lution of the whole firmament, which is evidently incompatible with the rotation of the earth upon its axis, whence it is cer-
tain that he, then at least, believed the earth to be immovable in the centre of the universe. This opinion, however, he is said by Theophrastus, apud Plut. Quest. Plat. t. x. p. 183., to have re-
pented of late in life. It may be added, that this passage, as supr., ἰστιν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, κ. τ. λ, is borrowed from Timaeus the Locrian, 111. s. l. to whom, among others, Plato is indebted for his acquaintance with the tenets of Pytha-
goras, and whose doctrine respecting the
earth was, that being placed in the centre of the universe, it formed the boundary of night and day, causing sunrise and sunset by the separation of the horizons, and that it was the most ancient body which the universe contained.—This is also in favour of the argument of Proclus, to which Letronne’s is nearly alike. But the question cannot still be considered as divested of an uncertainty which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remove. V. Boeckh. de Plat. Syst. Cael. Glob. p. vii.—xi. Wytt. ad Bak. Posid. p. 61.

"Allo icainiin einai autin—] h. e. alla to to ovdramon auton eautou pantag omou eina kai tiyn thyn autin thyn isorropoos icainon einai, intell. ad eam sustinendum. Stall,—the dative eautou depending upon omoioteta: so in Theaetet. p. 176. B. thew kata to ennonton. Stephens correctly explains the passage: eum ad eam reutinndam satis esse, quod cæsum sibi quaquaversal simile sit et quod ipsa sit aequilibris.

"Iisorropostan. A spherical body, which is isorropou, i.e. equally attracted on all sides towards its centre, has no need of any foundation to support it, but remains fixed and still; but besides, the earth is situated in the centre of the universe, ovdramon, which is itself isorropos, and with which the earth has a common centre. Aristotle attributes the origin of this theory to Anaximander; de Calo, ii. 13. eis ei ditei ei ela tiyn omoioteta phain autin meines, eis per ton arxaios 'Anaximandro moulon gar outhei anw h kato, ei eis tia plagia fyrhsan prosiskei (f. prosisei) to epi to mouso iserum jurisdictions, kai omoiow proos to eischaton iou' ama de dounan ioui tis tanantia pouisbain tiyn kihntan' oste i anagheni meines. These are the earliest notices of the phenomena of gravitation and the centripetal forces, which have been since developed in such complete and amazing perfection by the great Interpreter of "nature and nature’s laws" to man. "Iisorropou gar plagia. Cie. de Nat. Deor. ii. 39. "de principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede mundi, solidis et globosa, et unilde ipsa in sece notibus suis conglobata." De Orat. iii. 45. "Incollomitas ac salutis omnium causa videmus hunc statum esse hujus totius mundi atque nature, rotundum ut cæsum, terraque ut media sit, caque sua vi mutuoque tectur."—"Omoiniion tivos, of something like itself, like the plagia. Isor.

Hamamegi ti einau auton. Aytou must be referred here to tiyn thyn. Cf. supra, c. 37. sub. fin. ouo gar auton.

Metri "Hrakleion sthlon atopo Phasis." Heindorf arranges the passage with a view to its sense; and "hmws ei kein tois mechi "Hrak. sthli. atopo Phasis. in smkro twn moriwn per twn thalamatan oikoyntan, eis per peri telima mny. h. batarxhousc oikoyntan: the words peri twn thalamatan pertaining to hmws preceded, and not, as some incorrect-ly explain it, Ficinus among others, to batarxhous. Socrates says that the then known portion of the habitable world, between Phasis, a river of Colchis on the east, and the pillars of Hercules
on the west, but a small portion of the globe itself, compared with whose magnitude, men were but as ants and frogs, and the Mediterranean sea, which is here understood as extending from Pontus to the pillars of Hercules, a mere marsh. India afterwards succeeded the Phasis and Pontus as the eastern boundary of the habitable world, whence Juvenal, 10. i. "Omnibus in terris quae sunt a Gadibus usque Auroram et Gangem," &c. Aristot. de Calo. ii. 14. fin. Meteorolog. ii. 5. Upon the use and sense of τὴν θάλασσα simply, as supr., Larcher observes, ad Herodot. i. 185., "We must recollect that Herodotus wrote for the Greeks, and therefore understood by this term, 'this sea,' that part of the Mediterranean near which the Greeks abode. He has used the same expression B. i. c. i. 'This sea,' therefore, (cette mer-ci) in Herodotus, signifies the sea nearest to the Greeks, i.e. that whose coasts they inhabited, the Ἐλληνικὴ θάλασσα in B. v. c. 54., the Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα of B. viti. c. 28., the sea in which they sailed. The island of Cyprus, that is so say, the Mediterranean sea or some part of it. Diodorus Siculus, in like manner, calls the Mediterranean, οὐρσβα, B. v. c. 18. p. 264. v. c. 23. p. 349. Thus in Horace, 'hoc mare' signifies the sea nearest Rome. Epod. ii. 49. sqq." For μῆκος supr. Aug. Tub., and Orig. read μέγερος, but the former is sanctioned by the more numerous and better editions, besides its being in accordance with the precept of the older grammarians, that μέγερος and ἄγχος were to be used in the Attic dialect even before words beginning with a vowel. — Lobeck, ad Phrynic. p. 14.


Παντοκατα καὶ τὰς ἱδρὰς καὶ τὰ μεγίθη.] i. e. Diversified both in their shape and size.—Εἰς αὐτὴν εὐνοίρηκεται, Compare with this construction of the infer. in the orat. obliqu. c. 16. supr. sub. fin. "Οὐτά αὐγακαίτας ταῖς ψυχάς, κ. τ. λ.—Τῆς ὁμίχλης, Hesych. ὁμίχλην ἀήρ παχύς, σκοτεινός, ἀχλώς, ἐστάτως σκοτία. Αὐτὴν ἐὰν τὴν γῆν ἐκαθάρας.] Proclus, in Tim. i. c. 56., acknowledges that Socrates and Plato were indebted for this idea of the pure Earth to the sacred tradition of the Egyptians; ὦ δὲ Πλατών ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐν κολλῷ φησίν οἰκεῖν: αὐτὴν ἐὰν ἐὰν ἄρα ὁλὴν ὑφηλήν ἢ καὶ ἠ τῶν Λαυρυπτίων ἵππη φήμη παραδείσωκε. Κείσθαι.] Rests. "Οὐν ἐὰν αἰθέρα, κ. τ. λ.] Which the majority of those who are accustomed to treat of such subjects, call by the name, αἰθέρα. —Υποστάθηρα, sedimen, grounds, or lees. Anaxagoras also held the doctrine of a higher and celestial earth.—Simplex. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 33. B. 34. A. Hesychius explains ὑποστάθηρα by τρογλί, τροζέ. V. Wessel. ad Diod. Sic. t. i. p. 211.

T 2
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰσοδότον λέγειν· οὔ δὲ υποστάθημι ταύτα εἶναι καὶ ξυρρέειν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοίλα τῆς γῆς.

'Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι καὶ οἴσεσθαι ἀνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡς περὶ ἐν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγος οἰκῶν οἷοῦτο τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔδαφος ὄρον τὸν ἤλιον καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ ἀστρά τινα, ἵνα τὴν θαλάσσην ἥγοιτο οὐρανόν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτα τά καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπόποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἄφγυμένοι μηδὲ ἐφρακῶς εἰς· ἐκδύναις οὖν καὶ ἀνακύψας εἰς τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὡςφα λαθρότερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ἄν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκόως εἰς τὸν ἑωρακότος. ταύτον δὴ τούτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴσεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τοῦ ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρά χωροῦντα. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταύτον, ὡςφα ἀσθενεῖας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὖν οἰκεῖος ἐντὸς εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπὶ ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα, ἐπεί εἰ τις αὐτὸν ἐπὶ ἄκρα ἔλθω ἤ πτημὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπ—
omission of αν in vett. edit., which has been supplied after him, he accounts for from the participle following beginning with αν.

'Ανακυύσαντα.) Having emerged: ἀνακυύσαντες properly signifies to lift up the head after stooping, as birds do when they drink. Cf. Lucian, de Sacrific. t. i. 532. ἦπερβοντο εἶ καὶ ἀνακυύσαντι μικρών εἰς τὸ ἀνώ, καὶ ἀτεχνώς ἐπὶ τοῦ νόστου γενομένος, φῶς τε λαμπρότερον φαίνεται, καὶ ἱλιός καθαρώτερος, καὶ ἔστρω εὐανεύστερα, καὶ τὸ πάν ἡμίρα καὶ χρυσὸν τὸ ὀπάσειον. Plato uses the term in a similar sense, in Phdrd. p. 316. Α., where he speaks of the soul as elevating itself above the darkness of the material world, to the full enjoyment of the pure light of truth; ἀπερεδόσα ἄ ν ιν εἶναι φαμίν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὁμ. Οὔτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἔκει κ. Repeated after the parenthesis ὡς πέρ ἐνθάδε, κ. τ. λ., to make the sense more clear.—Καὶ εἶ ἡ φύσις ἰκανή,—and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight (of those things which are in heaven, and on the surface of the earth,) one would perceive that it was of a truth the heaven, of a truth the light, and of a truth the earth. Upon ἀνέρχεσαι θεωροῦσα, see Matthie Gr. s. 550. b.

"Ηδὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἄπας ο ὄπος ὄ τι εἶναι σωφρόνος, γυνώναι ἄν ὅτι ἐκείνος ἐστιν ο ἀληθῶς οὐρανός καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ἡ ἁληθῶς γῆ. Ἡδὲ μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἄπας ὁ τόπος ὄ τι εἶναι σωφρόνος ἐστὶ καὶ καταβέβρωμένα, ὡς περ ὁ Ἐκλήσια ἡθική ἡθικήν καὶ ὁ ἄπο γάλαξαν καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσίν, ὅπου ἄν καὶ ἡ γῆ ἢ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν κάλλυς κρίνεσ-
that the earth is spoken of as opposed to something preceding.

Ei tis anôdhen theôto.] Should one survey it from above; being placed on an eminence.

"Ocs peri ai diwdekaïkontoi sphaïraí."

Balls made of twelve pieces of different coloured leather. Socrates alludes here to the dodecahedron, which is according to Plato, the figure of the world. The elementary parts of the world he held to be of regular geometrical forms, whence the five regular, or Platonic bodies, the cube, tetrahedron, octahedron, icosahedron, and dodecahedron; the particles of earth he held to be cubic, those of fire pyramidal, those of air in the form of an octahedron, and those of water in that of an icosahedron; that these are adjusted in number, measure, and power, in perfect conformity to the geometrical laws of proportion; that so from perfect parts one perfect whole was produced, of a round figure, as in itself most beautiful, and best adapted to contain all other figures. The dodecahedron is a body comprehended under twelve equal sides, each of which is a pentagon, or it may be conceived to consist of twelve quinquangular pyramids, whose vertices meet in the centre of a sphere conceived to circumscribe the solid, with consequently equal altitudes and bases. Cf. Plutarch, de Placit. Phil. ii. 6. Πυθαγόρας, πίνετο σχημάτων ὄντων στερεών, ἀπερ καλείται καὶ μαθηματικά, ἐκ μέν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγονέναι τήν γην, ἐκ τῆς πυραμίδος τὸ πῦρ, ἐκ τοῦ ὀκταaedρον τοῦ ἀέρα, ἐκ τοῦ εἰκόσαεδρου τὸ νεόρ, ἐκ τοῦ ὀνείδοκειρον τῆν παντὸς σφαίραν. Πλάτων ἐκαὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις Πυθαγορίζει.

"ἀν καὶ τὰ ἐνθείας εἰς." Of which the colours which the painters use are, as it were, samples or patterns: καταχρόνται being used here in the sense of χρύσων as frequently, and especially by Plato.

Heind. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ. Sc. γῆν, i. e. for this part of the earth, indeed, &c.

Γύψου.] Gypsum, or chalk. Herodot. vii. 69.

Στίθοντα — ποικίλα. Refulgent amid the diversity of the other colours.—Ἐνυφιέξες ποικίλων.Ἐνυφιέξες used here, as frequently elsewhere, for ἐνυφίας; hence the earth is said to be completely and throughout diversified with colours; the necessary property of a variegated surface.

Καὶ αὖ τὰ ὅρη—καὶ τοὺς λίθους, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Isaiah, 54. 11. 12., "O thou afflicted, tossed with tempest and not comforted! behold, I will lay thy stones with fair colours, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy windows of agates, and thy gates of carbuncles, and all thy borders of pleasant stones." Ezekiel, c. 28. 13., "Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, and the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy taborets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day thou wast created."

λόγον, τὴν τε λειτουρτα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρῶματα καλλιώτερον ὄν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ιάσπιδα καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐ τοιούτον εἰναι καὶ ἐτὶ τούτων καλλιώ. Τὸ δ᾽ αὑτὸν τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι έκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι καθαροὶ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδησμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι, ὡς περ οἱ ἐνθάδε, ὑπὸ σηπεδόνως καὶ ἄλμης, ὑπὸ τῶν δευρὸ ἔξωρρυηκότων, ἢ καὶ λίθοι καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ζῶοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἰσχὴ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτων τε ἀπασι καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργυρῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις αὐτοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανηγῆ γὰρ αὐταὶ πεφυκέναι, ὅταν πολλὰ πλῆθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὅστε αὐτὴν ἱδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεῶν. ξώα δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκούντας.

Τὴν τε λειτουρτα.] So Stephens correctly, for Vulg. τὴν τελειοτία, the former being most applicable, not to stones merely, but equally suitable as the εἰδαφάσκιος and χρώματα καλλι to mountains also; besides that τὴν τελειοτία is evidently by no means compatible with καλλίον seq.

Ὡν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε.] i. c. ὡν καὶ τα ἐνθάδε λιθίδια ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα εἶναι μόρια, of which those well known (ταῦτα) little stones here which are so precious, or so highly prized, are merely fragments. STALL.

Σάρδια.] Cornelian, or chalcedony; so called from Sardis in Lydia, where it was discovered first. Plin. H. N. xxxvii. 7.—Ιάσπις, jasper; of which the varieties are purple, blue, and green. Id. xxxvii. 8.—Σμάραγδος, emerald, or according to others beryl, or aquamarina, probably green crystal, spar, or malachite. Id. xxxvii. 5.

Καλλιώτερος.] Vulg. καλλιώ. Sc. ἐκείνῳ ἐνιαν πάντα. 

Κατεδησμένοι.] i. c. καταβεβρωμένοι, Hesych. interpr.

Ὑπὸ σηπεδόνως καὶ ἄλμη. ὑπὸ τῶν ο. ξ.] Eusebius inserts καὶ after ἄλμης, approved by Heindorf, from both of whom Wyttenbach dissents, and would remove the second ὑπὸ. But as Stallbaum justly observes, it is by no means unusual for prepositions to be repeated in apposition, when one noun is added to another for emphasis' sake, as supr. V. Bremi. ad Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 24.

Καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ζῶοις τε καὶ φ.] To other things, to animals, and even plants. When τα καὶ are joined in the same member of a sentence, τα is copulative and καὶ representative. Seag. Viger. c. viii. s. 7. r. 1.

Τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν. ] i. c. The earth itself; as opposed to those precious things which were just said to have been found in it.

Θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεῶν. ] Cf. Origen, adv. Celsum, iii. p. 499. Ἔσον ἐπὶ σοι, ἃς ἐστο, καί ταῦτα ἐπιτίθενται ἐπισί καὶ οἱ τῶν Πνευμάτων καὶ Πλάτωνος παρατελεσμένοι περί θυσίας λόγον, περικυκλικῶς ἀναβαίνουν ἐπὶ τῆς αὑτῆς (the arch or vault) τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπουρναίῳ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εὐδαιμονῶν θεῶν θεάματα.

Τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ, κ. τ. λ. ] Some of those men and animals inhabited the midlands, others lived in the vicinity of the air, which was to them what the sea
was to those who dwelt in the caverns of the earth. And others inhabited the islands near to the mainland, which were encompassed by the sea.—*Οὑς περ ἴμηίης, sc. οἰκούμενυ.* Dovill. ad Chariton. p. 538. ed Lips. "In comparisones post ὡς περ modo casus praecedenti nominis convenit, modo nominativus ponitur, intellecto verbo ex antecedentibus.

Τάς ἐλ ὦσας. Cf. Ovid. Met. i. 107. "Ver erat aeternum, placidisque tepen-
tibus auris Mulciber Zephyri."—*Κρά-σαι, temperature.*

Φρονήσει.] Vulg. ὀφρύσει, approved by Heind. and Stall.

Οὐν ῥῆν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ.] Tim. Plat.

Lex. Ἔδος. τὸ ἀγαλμα. καὶ ο ἄτοσ ἐν ζω ἰερυνατ. So the Latins use sektes for the temples of the gods. Drakenburch. ad Sil. Ital. xii. 41. Burmann. ad Ovid. Met. x. 229. "Εδος is also frequently used for the statue or image itself, Ἀρ-
pian. Mithridat. p. 717. τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀθη-

ēν, τ. κ. ι. Vulg. ἄλση τε καὶ ἰερα, i.e. sacred groves, and shrines consecrated in

them to the gods; so in Liv. xxxv. 51. "famum et lucem."

'Ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητάς, κ. τ. λ.] i.e. In which the gods, in reality, dwell, δὲ,

that is, their presence is immediately ac-

knowledged, not secondarily and by un-
certain revelations. Philostr. Heroic. p. 666. θεοὺς τε γὰρ, ὧν ὑπάρχει εἰσι, γι-

νώσκουσι τότε, οὐκ ἀγάλματα θερα-
pεύσουσι καὶ ὑπονοίας, ἀλλὰ ξυνο-

σίας φανεράς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιούμεναι.

—Φήμας, colloquial intercourse with the
gods; Ἀνειδ. vii. 90. "deorum collo-

quio."—Μυατίας καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ora-
cular responses and visions (lit. sensible

perceptions, either in dreams or waking)

of the gods.—Αὐτοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς, and

such like communication takes place be-
tween men (αὐτοίς) and gods (αὐτοὺς.)

'Ακόλουθον.] Conformable, analogous.

§. 60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τῆς γῆς οὐτῳ πεφυκέναι

Such Socrates describes the earth natu-

rally to be, and all that pertains to it.

Having divided it into upper, middle, and

lower, and fully discussed the nature and

character of the first, he passes rapidly
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπους δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ὧ ὧ ἡμεῖς οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους οὔτας τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν ἐλαττον ἕχειν τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ’ οὖς καὶ βραχυτέρους τὸ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἄλληλους συντετραγ-θαί τε πολλαχῇ, καὶ κατὰ στενώτερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἕχειν, ἣ πολὺ μὲν ὤδωρ ἐρεῖν ἐξ ἄλληλων

over the second, which he supposes to be the habitation of the less pure and unenlightened mortals, and proceeds to a deliberative consideration of the third, the nethermost parts of the earth. His portrayal of the infernal regions is drawn forcibly and effectively, but is involved in no ordinary difficulty from his minute and many description of the four rivers by which those regions are traversed, upon which Aristotle remarks, Meteorolog. ii. 2. Τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ Φαῖον ἐγερμένοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης ἀνατόμου ἑστὶ κ. τ. λ. Ἐκ τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι—πλατυτέρους.] Cf. supra. c. 58. a med. καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλούς ἐν πολλοΐς τοι-ούτως τόσοις οἰκεῖοι εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῶς περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοιλὰ καὶ παντοκατά καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὸ μεγεθὺ, &c. Socrates now proceeds to say, that amongst or throughout those cavities (κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα) there were many places, themselves of course cavities, bearing different proportions as to shape and size, to that space which we inhabit, supra. c. 58, from Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, i.e. Europe (those being called Europeans by Aristides, t. 2. 307. ed. Cant., ὥσις σημεῖον Ἡρακλέους ἐντὸς καὶ ποταμοῦ Φασίδου.) Some of those places being deeper down and wider (ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον) than the region in which we dwell; some deeper and more narrow (τὸ χάσμα—ἐπαττον ἐ-χειν); others more shallow (βραχυτέρους τὸ βάθει) and broader. Olympiodorus mentions a fourth class, which was both shallow and narrow, Cod. i. p. 157. "Ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων εἰς τὰ μέ-σα αὐτῆς καταβάς ὁ λόγος, τιταραγχή διείλε τὰς κοιλὰς οἰκίσκες· τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι βαθείας καὶ στενάς· τὰς δὲ κατὰ διάμετρον (i.e. on the contrary,) εὐφείας τε καὶ ἐπιταλάντων· τὰς δὲ ἐπιπολαί-ους καὶ στενάς τὰς, δὲ καὶ βαθείας τε καὶ εὐφείας.—Ἀναπεπταμένους, pae-ntiores, Gotv. Cf. Iliad. φ’. 531. πεπταμένοις δ’ ἐν χωρὶ πῖλας ἔχειτ’. Mosch. 2. 19. εἰς έτι πεπταμένοις ἐν ὦμασιν έγχε γυναίκας. "Ἑστὶ δ’ οὖς.] i. e. έστιν δ’ εἰ. See Matthiae Gr. s. 482.

Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν] i. e. But all these places have a subterranean communication, by frequent and mutual perforations, some more narrow and others broader. They have conduits also, by which means great quantities of water flow from one place to another, as into craters. There are also perennial rivers of inconceivable magnitude under the earth, both with warm and cold waters; there are vast rivers of fire too, and many of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which those places severally are filled, to whichever each time the overflow may chance to come.

eis ἀλλήλους ὡς περ ἐις κρατήρας, καὶ ἀνεάνων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθῃ ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν, καὶ θερμῶν ὕδατων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ υγροῦ πηλοῦ, καὶ καθαροτέρου καὶ βορβορωδέστερον, ὡς περ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύκακος πηλού, ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ ὡς δὴ καὶ ἕκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, διὸ ἀν ἕκαστος τοῦ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιφροῆ γιγνομένη, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἀνὸς καὶ κάτω ὡς περ αἰώραν τινα ἐννοοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιαῦτε τινα. ὃν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ διαμετέρεσσε τετρημένον δι’ όλης τῆς γῆς, τούτῳ ὁ περ Ὄμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ.

Κρατήρας.] V. Wesseling, ad Diodor. v. 4. where Ceres is said to have lighted the torches with which she continued to search by night for Proserpine, ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιτνὴν κρατήρων, i. e. from the fires which burst from the summit of Etna. Cf. Lucret. vi. 701. "Nunc tamen, illa modis quibus irritata repente Flamma foras vastis Ετνα fornacibus efflet, Expediam ... In summo sunt ventigeni Crateres, ut ipsi Nominant, nos quos faucesc perhibemus et ora."

Πηλοῦ ρέοντες ποταμοὶ.] Strabo, vi. p. 413. B. τακείσης ἐν τοῖς κρατήρας τῆς πίτρας, εἰς ἀναβαθμίσεις τό ὑποχείλον τῆς καφωψης υγρὸν πυλός εἶστι μέλας, ῥέον κατὰ τῆς ὀρεινῆς εἰσα πτείσει λαβόν γίνεται λύθος κυλίς τῶν αὐτῶν φωλαττόν χρόναν ἧν ῥέον εἶχεν, &c.

Ὁ ρύαξ:] So the stream of burning lava, from the craters of Etna, was properly called; Diod. S. xiv. 59. ἔθαρμόνων τῶν πάρα τῆς θάλασσαν τόπων ὑπὸ τὸν καλομένον ῥύακος, ἀναγκάζον ἦν τοῦ πεζῶν στρατόπεδον περιπορεύοντα τῶν τῆς Λιτνῆς λόφων. Thucyd. iii. 116. Ἐβρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐαρ τούτο ὁ ῥύας τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Λιτνῆς.

Ὡς περ αἰώραν τινα.] Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 162. Ὄτι τῶν ὁποιῶν ἔμελατῶν ἀντιθέσεως αἰτίαν εἶναι φήσιν τὴν αἰώραν, ἢ ἐστιν ἀντιπαλάντωσις καὶ πρὸ αὕτης ἡ ψυχὴ ξένον ποιοῦσα τὴν γῆν, εἰσπνεοῦν καὶ ἐκπνεοῦν καὶ ὅτι (I. ἔτι) πρὸ ταῖτής ἡ εἰμινοια καὶ θεία αἰτία: where αἰώρα is correctly explained by ἀντιπαλάντωσις, a reciprocal preponderance of the bowls of a balance when set in motion, in which there are equal weights. So this αἰώρα, or libration which existed in the earth, caused a perpetual efflux and influx of those rivers, according to the elevation and depression of the places themselves. Αἰώρα, in gymnastics, is applied to an exercise familiar to early life; two boys, one at either end of a beam whose centre rests on a log, reciprocally rising and falling, are said ἀντιπαλαντεύειν, i. e. αἰωρεῖν. See infr. αἰωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Ficinus, Scap. Lex., and others, explain αἰώρα by πας πενελε, which is wholly inconsistent with the sense and tenor of the passage. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα,—i. e. that this αἰώρα is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. One of the chasms or έγκυκλος in the earth is far larger than the rest, called by Homer and other poets Tartarus; into this all the rivers already mentioned are emptied, and from this they are again discharged to their respective beds and currents; hence the αἰώρα, which some interpreters removing the stop after τινα, explain as if it was itself ἐν τὶ τῶν χασμάτων, &c. which is utterly inadmissible as far as regards both meaning and grammar.

tήλε μάλ', ἢχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἠστι βέρεθρον. 
ὅ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποι- 
ητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ 
χάσμα συνρέουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ 
τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσι γίγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τοιού-
τοι δι' ὅλας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ρέωσιν. Ἡ δ' αἰτία ἐστὶ 
τοῦ ἐκρέου ἐνενεθὲν καὶ εἰσρεῖ τάντα τὰ λέι-
ματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὔδε βάσιν τὸ υγρόν τοῦ-
το. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμάινει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄφρ 
καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ παντὸν ποιεῖ. ἔνυπτηται 
γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ ἐκείνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ 
καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὃς περ τῶν ἀναπνεύστων 
ἀεὶ ἐκπελεῖ ταῦτα καὶ ἀναπνεῖς τέρω τὸ πνεῦμα, οὐτω 
καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐνυποροῦμενον τὸ υγρὸ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοὺς τινὰς 
ἀνέμους καὶ αμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσίον καὶ εξίον. 
ὅταν τε οὖν ὀρμήσαν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν-
Aeneid. vi. 577. "— tum Tartarus ipse 
Bis patet in praecipius tantum, tenditique 
sub umbras, Quantaus ad aetherium cali 
suspectus Olympum." Hesiod. Theogon. 
720. Τάσσον ἐνεργῷ ὑπὸ γῆς, ἐσον οὐ-
ρανός ἐστ' ὑπὸ γαίας. Paradise Lost, 
B. I. "Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, 
where peace And rest can never dwell; 
hope never comes That comes to all; but 
torture without end Still urges, and 
a fiery deluge fed With ever-burning sul-
phur unconsum'd: Such place eternal 
Justice had prepared For those rebellious: 
here their prison ordained In utter dark-
ness, and their portion set As far removed 
from God and light of Heaven, As from 
the centre thrice to the utmost pole."— 
Βέρεθρον, Hesych. interpr. βαθός, βα-
ραθός, κατόρθωτα, ἐκατον, ἤ πη-
λώσις τότος, ἢ κοίλωμα καταχώνον. 
Ἀλλοι πολλοὶ των ποιητῶν. ] Hesiod. 
Hippol. 1290. 
Εἰς γὰρ τούτῳ.] These words are to 
be referred to ἐν τῷ—τιτρημίμον ἐί ὄλυς 
τῆς γῆς, supr. of which they explain the 
cause, whence γάρ. τ. τ. χ. 
Τοούσας εἰ οἷς ἂν κ. [ h. e. ιων ἐσ-
τιν ἡ γῆ, οἰς ἂν ἐρωσιν. 
Ποθείμα ὦν ἐχει ο_DAC] 
Pie liquor nec fundum nec fundamentum 
habet. WytT. —Αἰωρεῖται εῇ καὶ κυ-
μαίνει, rolls or librates, and fluctuates et 
and down; ἄνω καὶ κάτω are not to be 
understood of two places only, but of all 
the parts of this earth which are diamet-
rically opposed. It is to be observed that 
the cause of this motion in this 
liquid body is its being equally attracted 
on all sides towards its own centre, as in 
the case of the earth, supr. c. 58. 
Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ.] Olympi-
iod. "Ὅτι ὄντος πνεῦς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς 
γῆς, καὶ ύβατος καὶ ἄρος, εἰκότως 
γίνεται πολύ πνεῦμα ἔκει. τοῦ μὲν 
pνεύος ἐκστρέμοντος τὸ υδρόν (turning 
the water into vapour), τὸ εἰ υβάτος εἰς 
pνεύμα ἀναλομένον.—Περὶ αὐτὸ, sc. 
τὸ υγρόν. 
"Ὅταν τε οὖν ὀρμήσαν—ἰπαντλυν-
τες. ] When, therefore, the water rushing 
with violence, descends into that place 
which is called κάτω, the region under-
neath, (—καλούμενον is added because 
in reality neither ἄνω nor κάτω can be 
applied to the earth, except relatively, 
according to the different situations of its 
habitants), then (τότε) having passed 
through the earth (εἰς τῆς γῆς) τί φωνε
into the beds of the rivers (τὰ ἰεύματα) there (κατ’ ἐκείνα), and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship. This is suggested as a feasible interpretation of a passage involved in some perplexity. It is to be observed, that τὸτε κατ’ ἐκ. has been adopted supr. after Zeunius and Wytenbach, as corresponding to ὅταν πρε. for τοὺς κατ’ ἐκ. the reading of Bekker and Heindorf, who arranges the passage in explan. τὰ ἰεύματα εἰσρέπει διὰ τῆς γῆς τοὺς κατ’ ἐκείνα καὶ πληροὶ αὐτὰ, in which, however, he admits, “durusculum esse ἐκείνα sejungere a sequ τὰ ἰεύματα, durum itidem, εἰσρέπει ad dativum τοὺς κατ’ ἐκείνα trahere; sed ad tamen non constare sensus.” The latter and more serious difficulty is obviated by τὸτε: but with regard to the former it is absolutely necessary to the sense that κατ’ ἐκείνα should have the force of ἐκεῖ, as being opposed to ἐνθάδε infra. Further, as κάτω is but a relative term, the water may be said, when it has reached the opposite surface, to have emerged, ἀνω, διὰ τῆς γῆς, and to have spread itself not through the rivers, (as Wytenbach explains τὰ ἰεύματα, in flumen, and again, ὡς περὶ ὧ ἐπανθλούντης, ut apud nos faciant fuit, qui aquam antiqua haurientes eam alteri aquae affundunt;) but through the beds of the rivers, which became empty again on the return or ascent of the waters to us here, ἐνθάδε, who dwell in some one of the, relatively speaking, superior ἔγκολα τῆς γῆς. So V. Cousin;—vers des lieux de fleuves. The sense in which ἐπανθλούντης is taken supr. clearing a ship’s sink by pumping, evidently accords both with ψυμικνηι ἄνω κατὰ κάτω supra. and ἡ ἐπανθλαίτειο infr. It agrees also with the interpretation of Schleiermacher and Schneider V. Ἀντλία. V. Cousin in loc. “Tous les traducteurs: Comme quand on verse de l’eau qu’on a puisée, ou quelque chose d’équivalent, à l’exception de Dacier: comme quand on puisse de l’eau avec deux seaux, interprétation arbitraire et ridicule. Quant à la première, elle est tout-à-fait insignifiante et indigne de Platon. Il faut qu’il ait voulu indiquer quelque mécanisme particulier dont on se servait de son temps pour vider les vaisseaux, et par lequel on mettait l’eau en mouvement dans une autre direction que celle de la pesanteur. Nous n’avons que le mot pompe pour exprimer cela.”

Τὰ ἐνθάδε.} Intell. ἰεύματα.—Διὰ τῶν ὀχέτων, through the channels.—Εἰς οὗ ἔκαστον, into which severally they make their way.

Πολύ κατοτέρω ἡ ἐπηνθλείτο.} Far deeper down than they were drawn up; referring to οἱ ἐπανθλούντες supra., and so obviously as to preclude the emendation of Heindorf, ἐπηνθλείτο. See upon this construction ἡ ἐπηρτ. Matthiae Gr. s. 450. Obs. 2. Wytenbach explains it more fully κατῶρ, ἡ ἡ ἐπ. inferior quam ubi, &c., but he is certainly wrong in giving adjinadebatur as the sense of ἐπηνθλείτο.

Πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω—τῆς ἐκροής.] But all below or lower than their effluis.
than the place of their discharge: τῆς ἐκροῆς being the same as ἣ ἐπηντλείτω precedent. Socrates meaning to say that these waters, upon their return to Tartarus, issued out again, some deeper, others less so, but all in some degree below the point at which they were discharged.

Καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξεπέσεν, ἕνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος ἢ ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἃ παντάπασι χύκλῳ περειλ-θόντα, ἢ ἀπάξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περειλιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὡς περ ὦι ὦφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω κα-θέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δ’ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ’ οὐ’ ἀναυτες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

When they have descended or sunk as low as possible; of the intransitive sense, as here, of καθιέναι, Heindorf adduces examples ad Theaxet. c. 65. V. Lobeck, ad Soph. Aj. 842. where μπινέναι, ἀφίναι, ἀφίναι, &c. are shown to be capable of a similar construction.

Ἐκατέρωσε.] Socrates had already said, that on the return of these streams to Tartarus they re-entered the earth always at a lower point than that of their discharge into Tartarus, also that some emptied themselves at a place transversely opposite to that at which they had so entered, and others at the same side. While others, having made one or more circuits of the earth, emptied themselves again into Tartarus, as low down as they could. But as all these waters, which so penetrate in different directions through, and girded round the earth, were forced to return to a common centre, they could only as they re-en-tered at both sides of the chasm, descend so low as its centre, but not beyond this, for on both sides, if they descended lower, they would be ascending a steep, whereas they could evidently not pass at either side beyond the sphere of their attraction. Ἐκατέρω-σε.—ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ῥεύμαις, and τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν μέρος, may be explained by ἀνω καὶ κάτω,—εἰς τὸ ἐπ’ ἱκείνα τῆς γῆς, καὶ οἱ τὸ ἐπί τάξιε—κατ’ ἱκείνα—τὸ ἐνβάλει supr. Heindorf refers it to ἔνυα μὲν καταν.—ἔνυα ἐλ κατά τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. But it is not easy to arrive at any certainty upon the de-
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

§. 61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρέματα ἐστὶ τυγχάνει δ' ἀρα ὅντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἀττα ρέματα, ὡν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ ρέον περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὁκεανὸς ἐστὶ, τούτου δὲ καταντικρύ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δὲ ἐρήμων τε τόπον ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσίαδα, οὖ αἰ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἰ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἰ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκτέμπουνται εἰς τὰς τῶν ἡών γενέσεις. Τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγ γῦς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκτίππει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ κἀμένουν, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζον τῆς παρ' ἑμῖν θαλάττης, ἥνουσαν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ ἐνετείθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολέρος καὶ πηλώδης, περιελπτόμενος δὲ τῇ γῆ ἄλλοσε τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἑσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσίαδος λίμνης, οὖ ἐνυμμηγνυμένοις τῷ ὕδατι ταῖς τῶν ἐκβολῶν γενέσεις.] See supra. c. 15. init. c. 31. init. Ἐρυθώνταυ. n. V. Cousin; Ροντενευγός dans ce monde pour y animer de nouveaux étores. Τοῦτον κατὰ μίσον ἐκβάλει.] h. e. Ἐκεῖ, as in c. 60. supra. here called ἐκβόλη. Musgrave, ad Eurip. Iph. T. 1042.—Πότῳν νοτερόν εἴπας ἐκβολῶν, reads ἐκβολῆς, and adds,—"ἐκβολῆς hic a poeta dici videtur, tanquam scaturigio quedam a terra proveniunt.—Ἐκβολῆ enim est fons, scaturiga. Auct. de Mundo; πυγῶν ἁλαζόνες καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολοί, καὶ ἐνυμμηγνυμένοις, p. 12. Pausanias; πρὸς αἱ τὰς Ἐρασίνου ταῖς κατὰ τὸ δῶρο ἐκβολοῖς. p. 67. Ed. Syb. Non hic loquitur de Erasini in mare exitu, sed de loco uli e terra ἐκβάλλει.—Κατὰ μίσον, i. e. between Ocean and Acheron.

Καύμενον.] Att. for kaúménon. V. Pierson on Marris, p. 231.—Τῆς παρα ἑμῖν θαλάτης, the Mediterranean, c. 58. supra. περὶ τὴν θάλατταν.

Θολέρος καὶ πηλώδης.] Turbid and muddy. —Περιελπτόμενος δὲ τῇ γῆ, i. e. but making the compass of the earth, it arrives, among other places, at the extremity of the Acherusian lake, &c.—Heindorf proposes to read περιελπτόμενος δὲ τῆς γῆς ἄλλοσε τε (et in alias terrae partes) ἀφικνεῖται, &c.; making τῆς γῆς to depend upon ἄλλοσε, because the reading in the text would imply that the river encompassed the earth externally, whereas the sense requires that the passage should be understood of its windings under ground. But proba-
bly perieit. τὸ γῆ may be used in reference to the earth externally, and περιελιχθεῖς ἐἷς ὑπὸ γῆς of its internal windings after it had reached the extremity of the Acherusian lake, and before it arrived at Tartarus. Τῷ γῆ is wanting in Theodor. Cur. Aff. xi. p. 154, and Euseb. MS. Oxon. Præp. Evang. xi. 38. p. 567.

Κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου.] i. e. Eἰς τι κατωτέρω μέρος τοῦ Ταρτάρου. Cf. supr. Ἐντείθεν ἐς πάλιν ὑόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς—πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει.

Οὐ καί οἱ ἄρνακες ἀποσπάζ. ἀναρ.] i. e. Of which (Pyrophlegeton), the burning currents emit with violence distinct and forcibly separated portions, in whatever part of the earth they may be.

Εἰς τὸν πρῶτον δεινόν.—Κυνός, not only signifies a cerulean, or blueish colour, but also a gem of a similar colour, but inclined to yellow, which some make a species of jasper, others of sapphire. Plin. H. N. 37. 9. Theophr. de lapid. p. 218. Bas. Meurs. Cypr. ii. 5. p. 94. Schneider, in Lex. explains κυανόν, as copper ochre, and also lapis Lazuli.

Δείνας ἐννάμεις.] i. e. A mischievous effect.

Χωρὶς ἑννάτις.] i. e. Εἴξ ἑννάτις χωρεῖ.


Μέσως βεβιωκείναι.] Those who have not been distinguished for the extremes of good or evil in life, are said μέσως βεβιωκείναι, to have run a middle course between virtue and vice, without being remarkable for an adherence to either. Eutrop. de Claudio, 7. 8. "medie im-
peravit." Tacit. Hist. i. 49. de Galba.
" ipsi medium ingenium magis extra vitia, quam cum virutibus." — Λ δὲ αὐτοῖς ὄχιματά, — it is not certain what Plato meant by ὄχιμα, the material vehicle of the soul; upon which Wyttenbach —
" Itaque accipierunt ex fabula verisimilitudine, in fluvialis itineris usum navigia postulantibus," V. Cousin; ils s'enlarquent sur des nacelles, &c.
Εὔρεσιν τιμᾶς φέρουσαι. ] They obtain the reward of their good works.— Cf. de Rep. x. p. 615. B. εὶ τινας εὔρεσις εὐρετητοὺς καὶ ικιας καὶ ὑποι γεγονότες εἶν.
Καὶ μεταμόλων αὐτοῖς. ] Aet when it has repented them.—Matthew Gr. s. 564. "Εἴκολλε τὸ κύμα. ] Cf. supr. c. 60. Λυωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνεται ἀνα καὶ κάτω. Κατὰ τῶν Κοκυτῶν.] 1. e. Into Co-cytus, so as to be borne among the course of its current. Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. vil. 5. 16. τὸ δὲ ωρὰ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἐχώρει ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ. Βut κατὰ τὴν ἔλημνὴν τὴν Ἀχερωνισάκα σχῆ, at the Acheronian lake. Xen. Anab. v. 2. 16. Ἀλοφόρων στὰς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ὑπόπους έκδυνατος κατεκολύει τῶν ὀπλατῶν ἔξω. — Φερόμενοι, sc. υπὸ τούτων τῶν πολιάμων.
The interpretation given above, is alike independent of any correction.

Those who have weaned themselves from the body and its appetites, and in the study of the sublime precepts of philosophy, enjoy the only real freedom, that of the unpolluted and unshackled mind.

Wisdom's self

Or seeks to sweet retired solitude;

Where, with her best nurse, Contemplation,
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,
That in the various bustle of resort
Were all too ruffled, and sometimes impaired.
He that has light within his own clear breast,
May sit the centre and enjoy bright day:
But he, that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,
Benighted walks under the mid-day sun;
Himself is his own dungeon. — Comus.
"Ανευ τε σωμάτων.] Ολυμπιόδ. Αλι καθαρθείσαι τέλεως εἰς τὸν ὑπερκόσμιον τότον ἀποκαθίσταται ανέω σωμάτων.

§. 63. Ἡ ἰένεκα χρῆ ὁν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ τιοιάτοις, εἰ καὶ τοῖς ὑπερκόσμιοις. Παῦ ποιεῖν ὡστε ἁρετήσας καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἠ ἐπίτις μεγάλη.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἐξειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διεληλύθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀμήρι: ὥστε μὲν τοι ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιάυτ' ἀττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκίσεις, ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται ὁδός, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἀξίων κινδύνευσαι οἰομένοι οὕτως ἐξειν' καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαύτα ὡς περ ἐπάθειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἐγώγε καὶ πάλαι μηκῶν τῶν μύθων. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτων δὴ ἐνεκα θαρρείν χρῆ περὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῆ ἀνδρα, ὡς τις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἥδονας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἐνασε χάιρειν ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὠν-

"Ανευ τε σωμάτων.] Ολυμπιόδ. Αλι καθαρθείσαι τέλεως εἰς τὸν ὑπερκόσμιον τότον ἀποκαθίσταται ανέω σωμάτων.

§. 63. Παῦ ποιεῖν ὡστε:] i.e. Παντερύποτο μιχανάσθαι; to make every effort, to leave no means untried, so as to, &c.—Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐπίτις μεγάλη, for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι.] It is to be observed that Socrates expresses himself strongly here against any one insisting upon the truth of the theory just laid down, of which and all such it is impossible but that the principles should be speculative and vague. The grand point of the whole discussion had been fully established as an immutable and incontrovertible truth; this once disposed of, as if to unbend the minds of his auditors, and to divert them, for the brief remaining period of his life, from dwelling upon its afflicting close, the philosopher entered upon the subject of a future state, and its concomitant punishments and rewards. From the first he disclaimed being himself assured, or any attempt to assure others that these opinions were to be admitted as well founded or true; that the good and evil should be after this life required according to their works, was not to be denied, but the nature of this retribution, upon which reason can only speculate, as still remaining unrevealed, it would be absurd to endeavour to illustrate or define.

Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν:] h. e. Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι ἐσοκαί, ὡστε τὸν ἐξειν καὶ ἀξίων κινδύνευσαι (sc. ὡστε τὸν ἐξειν καὶ ἀξίων κινδύνευσαι) i.e. this (ὅτι μὲντοι ἡ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιάυτ'. ἀτ. κ. τ. λ.), it appears to me to be both becoming in one who so thinks, and worth one's while who so thinks to run the risk of the belief, or to run the risk of having it so thought.—V. Cousin; La chose vaut la peine qu'on hasarde d'y croire.—Ἐπιμέλειαν, see supr. c. 24. a med.

Περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς.] In respect to his soul.
In the previous section, Plato suggested that the poet should adopt a tragic demeanor and embody the spirit of the tragic hero. This is a moment of transition, where the poet assumes the role of the tragic character, reflecting the gravity and solemnity of the situation. With the change in perspective, the poet's words take on a more serious tone, as if they are speaking the very immortal words of the poet and the tragic hero himself. This is a moment of self-reflection, where the poet contemplates the nature of tragedy and the role of the poet in society.

Plato, in his dialogue, stresses the importance of the poet and the role of the tragic hero in society. He argues that the poet should not only entertain but also educate and uplift the audience. The poet, like the tragic hero, should embody the spirit of the tragic hero, even if it means sacrificing personal comfort and happiness. This is a moment of profound insight, where the poet reflects on the nature of tragedy and the role of the poet in society.

In summary, the poet assumes the role of the tragic hero, embodying the spirit of the tragic hero in every word and action. This is a moment of self-reflection, where the poet contemplates the nature of tragedy and the role of the poet in society. The poet is a mirror of the tragic hero, reflecting the spirit of the tragic hero in every word and action.
ποιῆτε, καν μη γνών ωμολογήσητε· εάν δε υμῶν αυτῶν ἁμελητε, καὶ μη θέλητε ὡς περ κατ’ ίχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζην, οὐδὲν τῶν πολλά ωμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιῆσετε. Ταῦτα μὲ τοινὶ προβυποθησόμεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; „Οπως ἂν, ἐφη, βούλησθε, εάν πέρ γε λάβητε με καὶ μη ἐκφύγων ύμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἵσμη καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας ἔπευ, Οὐ πεῖθω, ἐφη, ὥς ἀνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὕτως ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυν διαλεγόμενος καὶ διατάτων ἐκαστών τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ οἴστε μὲ ἐκείνων εἰναι ὁν ὠφεται ὁλίγον ὡστερον νεκρῶν, καὶ ἔρατα δή πῶς με ἀπάτη. ὅτι δε ἐγὼ πάλαι πολλὰ λόγου πεποίημαι ὡς ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενὸ ἀλλὰ οἰχῆσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς ευδαιμονίας, ταύτα μοι δοκῶ αὐτὸ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθοῦμενος ἁμα μὲν ύμᾶς, ἁμα δ’ ἐμαντόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς

"ονω. 
Οὐδ’ ἐάν πολλὰ ωμολογήσῃς· κ. τ. λ.] i.e. No matter how many promises you may have made, or how earnestly, you will avail nothing the more; it will be all to no purpose. Seag. Vig. c. iii. s. 10. r. 6. 
Οὐ πείθω, ἐφη. —Κρίτωνα, κ. τ. λ.] I do not convince Crito that I am this Socrates who now confers with you, &c. i.e. Socrates could not yet, he says, persuade Crito, that he who had hitherto conducted this discussion, and arranged its several arguments, was actually Socrates, the living and immortal mind and soul, whereas Crito spoke as if the dead body, concerning the disposal of which he had asked the question, was still Socrates himself, even after the spirit had fled. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 43. "(De humatione) Socrates quidem quid senetur, appareat in eo libro, in quo mortitur: de quo jam tam multa dictimus. Cum enim de immortalitate animorum disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus urgeret, rogatus a Critone quemadmodum sepeliri velit: 'Multum vero, inquit, operam, amici, frustra consumis; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi, me hinge avolatumur, neque mi quidquam reflecturum. Vermutamen, Crito, si me adduci poteris, ant scielus nactus eris, ut tibi videtur, sepelito. Sed, nisi crede, nemo me vestrum, cum hine excessero, consequatur.' Preclare id quidem, qui et amico permitserit, et se ostenderit de hoc tuo genere nihil laborare." 
'Eis μακάρων δὴ τινὰς.,] Supr. c. 57. Οὕτως ἄγειν ἐπιχείρει εἰς δὴ τινὰ τόπον.—''Άλλως, το πρὸς πορεύσαι, fruitlessy.
'Eγγυήσασθε οὖν με—τὴν ἐναρτ. ἤγη.] Enter then into security for me to Crito, of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges. 'Εγγυάσθαι τινα signifies, to become secure or caution for another. Demosth. p. 809. ed. Relsk. πρὸς τὸν εἰς μάρτυρας παραχύσματα, ὡς οἰκ. ἐγγυησάμην ἐγὼ τὸν Παρμένιον, ὅτι ἦδον ἐσεσκετίνην ἢρμανεο. Μείνημαι μάρτυρας, ἐχος ἐχθαίρειν, &c. are forms familiar to the Greeks, so supra., 'Εγγυάσθαι ἤγη, and since ἤγηνάσθαι governs an accu.
Krístovna, ἐφη, τὴν ἐαντίαν ἐγγύνην, ἡ ἦν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυνάτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴ παραμενεὶν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴ μὴ παραμενεὶν ἐγγύσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνοι, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ράον φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὀρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἡ καόμενον ἡ κατορττόμενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεῖν ἀττα πᾶσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἡ ἐκφερεῖ ἡ κατορττύει. Ἐξ γὰρ ἱσθι, ἡ δ’ ὡς, ὧ ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλὸς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακών τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ ταρμέν τε χρή καὶ φάναι τοῦμον σῶμα βάπτειν, καὶ βάπτειν οὕτως ὁποι ἀν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

§. 65. Ταύτ’ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήμα τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἰπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ’ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτέ δ’ αὐτοῖς τῆς ξυμφόρας διεξιόντες, ὡσ ἡμῖν γεγονοῦσα εἰς, ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι οὓς περ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὅρφανοι τὸν ἐπειτα

sative of the person, hence the form ἐγγύσαι ἐγγύσασθαι τινὰ τινι οὐ ψε ψε ψε

Οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴ παραμ. Intell. ἡγεῖσατο.

Ἀγανακτῆ. Should lament or be troubled. Infr. c. 66. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐμπροσθεν χρόνων ὤνει ἐπαιτεί ἐκόμεν, καὶ ἕκα τὸ ὑπὸ κλαίναι καὶ ἦγανακτὸν ὤνειν ὁτια ὁτιαν αἱ κατεκλασι.

Ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτη. Fieiu. appears to have read ὡς ἡ προτιθεται Σωκράτης ἡ ἐκφέρεται ἡ κατορτύτεται: but as Heid. observes, there is no reason for changing the text as supr., as Crito is understood from c. seq. to have undertaken the charge of the funeral rites. Προτιθεθαί, to lay out the dead body. Eurip. Phem. 1329. εἰγὼ δ’ ἦκεν μετὰ—gammaν Ιουκάστην, ὅπως Λουσὴν προβῆται τ’ ὁυκ ἐν ὄντα παῖς ἤμών. Heucb. 609—611. ὡς παῖ- δα—λοίσων προβοῖαμεν τ’ Βιργ. Ἀνειδ. ix. 486. "—nec te tua funera mater Pro- duxit, pressive oculos, aut vulnera lavi." Εκφέρειν κατορτύτεναι are terms also peculiar to the burial ceremonies. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. v. 17. 3. 4. Οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸντο. Not only as far as regards itself, sc. τὸ μὴ καλὸς λέγειν. Heind. With Socrates, Epite- tus observes, ὧρις παίδευσες, ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; in Arrian. i. c. 17. p. 93. —Πλημμελές, sc. εἰσίν, is culpable. Schefer Melett. p. 4. conjectures that it should be written πλημμε- λεί, upon which Heindorf.—"de homin- nibus frequens est πλημμελένια: num itidem de rebus? —Φάναι, to di- rect.

§. 65. Ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήματι. I.e. Πλε προς Περικλῆς καὶ ταύτα παραβάλειν ἐπί τοῦ πόλεμου.
Eis Ἀργος, οὗ σε λείψας μένει ἐκεῖ. — Περιείχομεν οὖν, κ. τ. λ., more fully, periμ. οὖν τοῦτο μέν—ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοῖς εὐαί εἰς ἱστοις. — Τοῦτο μὲν being omitted sometimes before τοῦτο εἰς ὧν μέν before ὧν. Cf. supra. c. 55. init. Ἀμυγονοῦ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰς ἐκεῖνον.

Δύο γὰρ αὐτῶν υἱῶν. Cf. Αριστοτ. Σοκρ. c. 23. Υἱίς—τρεῖς. supra. c. 3.— Τὴν ἐς Ζανθιππην.— Αἱ οἰκείαι γυναίκες, the female attendants, relations, or kinwomen. Some commentators explain this of the wives of Socrates, in which case, as Heindorf correctly observes, it should have been written, not αἱ οἰκείαι γυναίκες, but αἱ γυναίκες αὐτῶν. Cf. Ἐλείαν. Var. Hist. xii. 1. 18. ὕπο τῶν οἰκίων γυναικῶν αἱ εἰτυχῶν αὐτάς συνανθίονται, ἐπιστημονικά τε ἤπαθος τὰς μόριας, καὶ ἐπιστημονικά ταῖς πρόσωπα. In the variety of conflicting testimonies it is not easy to arrive at the truth of this part of Socrates’ history, regarding his wives and children. That he had two, Myrto and Xanthippe, most of the ancient writers agree upon, but whether they were both alive at the same time, and whether Myrto or Xanthippe was mother to Lamprocles, or Sophroniscus and Menexenus, seems still a matter of great doubt. The probability is, that Lamprocles, the eldest, was the son of Myrto, and that the two younger were the sons of Xanthippe, of whom only mention is made by Plato and Xenophon.


Καὶ ἡν ἡν ἐγγύς ἠλίων ἐνυμήν.]

And it was now near sunset. Cf. infra. Ἀλλ’ εἶπαι—ἐτὶ ἡλίου εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρέσσι καὶ οὖσιν ἀεικινία. Ἐκ τοῦτο ἀττα. i. q. Ὀλίγα ἀττα, ραπευναι οὐκ. HEIND.

Οὐ καταγωγοῦσαν γε σοῦ. I will not reproach you at least with what I reproach others.

Τῶν ἀρχιτόων.] Sc. Τῶν ἐνεῖκα.
Καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσωμεν. [Referring to πειρῶ ὡς ράστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἂμα δακρύσας μεταστρέφομεν ἀπῆει. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν, Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἂμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὁσ ἀστείος, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς· καὶ παρὰ παντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆτε καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίος με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλὰ ἄγε δή, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθόμεθα αὐτὸ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τῷ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται εἰ δὲ μή, τρυμάτω τὸ ἀνθρωπός. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλὰ οἶμαι, ἐφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐτί ἠλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὅρεσι καὶ οὕτω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἂμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὑφὲ πῦνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὐ μάλα, καὶ ἐγγεγενομένους γέννους ὑ ἐνίοις ὅν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγουν ἐτί γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότος γέ, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὗς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδανεῖ ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐγώγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποίησοι οὐδὲν γὰρ οἵμαι κερδαίενει ὀλίγον ὡστερον πίων ἀλλο γε ἡ γέ-

result, and claim for a few brief moments more from death, the object in whose life it lived, and in whose sacrifice its only hope had perished.

Πῦνοντας. ] Bibere solitos. Wytτ.— the present for praeterite.
Εὖ μάλα. ] Very freely.
Καὶ ἐγγεγενομένους. ] Et quidem nonnullos suis amoribus potitos. StePh.— "De Genere enim h. l. intelligendum ἐγγεγένεσθαι. HeInD."
Ἐγχωρεῖ. ] Phavorin. Ἐγχωρεῖ λαμβάνεται ἀντὶ τοῦ οἴων τε καὶ ἐννιατῶν ἑστίν οἴων, ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι τόδε.
Οἴμαι κερδαίενει. ] With this construction of the infinitive, Cf. in Crit. c. 14. a med. Ἄμολογεῖς—πολειτευομένοι. Ficinus appears to have read κερδαίενει.—Ἡ γέλωτα ὀφλήσει παρ’ ἐμαντο,’ i.e. than to bring ridicule upon myself, to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.
λωτα ὁφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλυχόμενος τοῦ ξὺν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἐτὶ ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἰδι, ἐφη, πιθόν καὶ μή ἄλλως ποίει.

§ 66. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἐνενεσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστώτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν ἀγών τῶν μέλλοντα δώσειν τῷ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον' ἰδον δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἀνθρωπον, Ἔσειν, ἐφη, ὥς βελτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτον ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη, ἢ πιόντα περιέναι, ἔος ἀν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γέννηται, ἐπείτα κατακείσθαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. Καὶ ἀμα ὥρετε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει. καὶ ὁς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἑλεως, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρόματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥς περ εἰσθῆι ταυρηδόν ύποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, Τι λέγεις, ἐφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τιν; ἐξέστην ἡ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τρίζομεν, ὅσον οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ δ' ὅσι' ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαί ἡγεῖ ποὺ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξεστί τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοίκησιν τῆς ἐνθέδε ἐκεῖσε εὑρυχῇ γενέσθαι; ἢ δ' καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαι τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτῃ. Καὶ ἀμα ἐπὶ τῶν ταύ-

Φιλόδημος οὐδὲν ἐπὶ ὁμότος. ] Socrates alludes here, probably, to a distich of Hesiod, "Εργ. κ. 'Ημ. 365. 'Αρχο-

μένον ἐτὶ πίθου καὶ λίγουντος, κορά-

σαθαν' Μισσόθα φικόσαθαι διαν' ἤ' ἐνι πνημανα λιών.


ασ, quod illam potionem publice mix-

tam, non aliter quam medicamentum immortalitates obduxit, et de morte disputavit usque ad ipsam mortem: male cum illo actum est, quod gelatus est sanguis, et paulatim frigore inducto ven-

arum vigor constuit." Plin. Hist. Nat. xxv. 25. " Ciuta quoque venenum est, publica Atheniensium poena invisa.— Schol. in Aristoph. Ran. 125. ἀτὸ τῶν ποιῶν γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θάνατος ἄρχεται, πρῶτοις αὐτῶν ἀποφύγων ως τοῦ ζωτικοῦ ἀίματος περὶ τῆς καρφιᾶν συστελλομέναν. Οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. ] And so (while walking up and down,) the poison will work or be effectual of itself; i. e. will require nothing more. V. Cousin : le poison agira de lui même. The Latins use faure in a similar sense. Ficinus appears to have read ποιήσεις: so Steph. and Bas. 2.

Καὶ μάλα ἑλεως. ] With the utmost cheerfulness; καὶ μάλα is often so used, with an intensive or augmentative power in καὶ: so infr. καὶ μάλα εὔχερος, κ. τ. λ.

Ταυρηδόν υποβλέψας. ] Looking sted-

fastly, or intently.

"Εξεστι τε καὶ χρή. ] It is both lawful and expedient.
'Επισχόμενος.] i. e. Putting the cup to his lips: CORNAR., correctly, according to the sense of the middle voice: επισχόμενος τίνι πιέων, act. signifying to give a drink to any one, as in Aristoph. Nub. 1385. et μένοι γε βρυόν επούς, εγὼ γυναὶ ἐν πιέων ἑπέχουν.

Κατέχεω τὸ μὴ δακρυέων.] i. e. Τὰ δάκρυα. Matthiae Gr. s. 543. Obs. 2.


Οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπος.] i. e. "Οτι τουσώτου ἄνθρωπος, &c. Hom. Illiad. ε. 757. Ζεύς πάτερ, νεκρείσθη Ἀδης καὶ κρατηρεὶ ἐργά, ὢσατόν τε καὶ ὁ οὖν ἀπόλοια λαῖον Ἀχαϊων Μάνοι.—".

'Απολλόδωρος εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθότοι.] i. e. But Apollodorus, even before this, never ceased weeping, and then indeed bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of every one present except Socrates himself.—Οὐδένα ὄντινα,—upon this construction, see Matthiae Gr. s. 306.—Κατεκλάσε, Steph. conj. for κατεκλάσατο. Thes. Gr. Ling. voc. κατακλάσατο.

Οία,] In what manner! how! Cf. Hom. Odyssey. β'. 239. Aristoph. Pac. 33.—Οὐκ ἡκιστα,—the superlative of negative adjectives or adverbs is often put with οὐ for the positive without οὐ, especially οὐκ ἡκιστα for μᾶλτα,—Matthiae Gr. s. 463.

"Οτι ἐν ἐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτάν.] Correctly rendered by Ficinus, cum fausitis acclamationibus: so Cornar., cum laudatione et honore verborum pronunciatione. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. pp. 162, 202, 214, 268. Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 168, 261. "Οτι ἐν ἐφημίᾳ τελευτάν ἐξίσουν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ως ἀγάθον καὶ ἐρωτὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὑπνότος καὶ ὤτι ἤντοι περίσσεια τὰ τοιαύτα τῆς ἀνάγκης ὄρμην. The precept of Pythagoras generally, as regarding this εφημία, is mentioned by Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 149. and its especial importance at the time of
χάνει τε ἄγετε καὶ καρπηρεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχώνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ διακρίνειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύσεθαι ἐφή τα σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίοιο· ὦτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἀνθρωπος, καὶ ἀμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ ὦτως ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, δια- λιτῶν χρόνον ἐπέσκοπε τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἥρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐφή. καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ αὖθις τὰς κυήμας· καὶ ἐπαυιών ὦτως ἤμιν ἐπεδείκυντο ὦτι ψυ- χοίτε καὶ πήγυντο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο, καὶ ἐπευν ὑπειδᾶν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχί- σεται. Ἡδὴ οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἤν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἱπτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ, ἐπιν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἑφθέγξατο, Ἡ Κρίτων, ἐφή, τοῦ Ἀσκληπίω ὀφείλομεν ἀλκτρώνα. ἀλλ

death, c. 257. "Ολος δ' ἀχρὶ τῆς τί- λευσις εἶναι τι προστεταγμένων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἑστάσεων καὶ πάρηγγελλε μη βλασφημείν, ἀλλὰ ὠσπερ εἰς τὰς ἀναγωγικὰς οἰωνίζοντι μετὰ εὑφήμιας, ἤμπερ ἐποιοῦτο εἰσωθομείνως τῇ πείρᾳ. (or as Witt. conj. ἐνθυμοῦ- νοι τῇ ἀνεχρίαν σφοντίσματε fortitudi- nem.)

"Επέσκαιν τοῦ ἀκρίδειν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 353.

Διαλογίων χρόνων.] After some time.


Καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο.] And he himself touched him; sc. after he had made those who were standing by touch him, to show how far the poison had already operated in removing all sensation.


Robinson, Grec. Antiq. B. v. c. 3.

Τῷ Ἀσκληπίῳ—ἀλκτρώνα.] Those who during sickness had been in danger of death, used to sacrifice a cock to Ἀσ- culapius, in fulfillment of a vow to that effect, when the deity appeared, by their recovery, to have attended to their prayers. So Socrates would have it understood by this injunction to Crito, that he now felt himself on the eve of liberation from the many pains and perils of his mortal career, and of being restored to the enduring and unmixed
enjoyment of another and a better life. Many different opinions have been given on this subject as to the actual intention of Socrates: Laetant. iii. 20. Tertullian. Apolog. 46. and Havercamp. in loc. Luperc. Beryt. Gram. peri tov pará ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων ἀλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἂλλο λέγεις. Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ἀλάγων χρόνων διαλύσων ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τά ὁμματα ἐστησεν ἵδιον δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ἐξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλ-

§. 67. Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτὴ, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταῖρον ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἁὲν, τῶν τότε
δν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

SIMI. Cf. Xenoph. Anab. i. 9. 1. Κύρως μὲν οὕτως ἐγκεκλισμένος, ἀνίφον ὁν Περσῶν τῶν μετὰ Κύρων τῶν ἀρχαῖων γενομένων βασιλεύσατος τε καὶ άρ- χειν αξιώτατος, ὅπερ παρὰ πάντων δι- μολογεῖται τῶν Κύρων ἕκοκυντων ἐν πείρᾳ γενίσθαι.

Upon closing the Phædo, it may probably be asserted with safety, that one only, and that a deeply serious impression, will remain upon the minds of those who have attentively considered the grandeur and importance of its subject,—one not the less interesting because it fully proves how far unaided reason can advance alone, and at what point it fails without the support and guidance of revelation, by which it is finally enabled to arrive at the eminence, from whence, with a vision unimpaired and unobscured, it surveys and comprehends the otherwise inscrutable control of the Supreme "in the heavens above and in the earth beneath."

Again, to turn from the subject to the philosopher himself, what noble or generous emotion of the heart can fail to be awakened in the contemplation of his character, as portrayed by the master-hand of his devoted and admiring disciple? With the same calmness, self-possession, and gentle affinity which had adorned his life; with the same firmness of soul, integrity of purpose, and singleness of heart which had dignified his pursuits, and with the same zeal which had ever signalized his investigation of unclouded truth, Socrates, on the last day of his earthly existence, appears in the successful support of the soul's immortality, and the uncompromising advocacy of that virtue and purity which alone can render that immortality blessed. The prison, the poison, and the monstrous injustice of the sentence which ordained them, form no theme of complaint with the truly martyr-philosopher; if adverted to at all, it is in language best calculated to deprive death of its worst concomitant, despair, and to console the grief in which he could not participate, by imparting to his mourning friends a share of his own cheering conviction, that to die was really but to begin to live.

The circumstances attending the last moments of Socrates are detailed with the most affecting simplicity, and a fidelity undeviatingly true to the principal and subordinate characters in this unrivalled scene. There is no unnatural straining after false effect; no inappropriate overlay of highly-wrought poetical embellishment. The death of such a man is drawn from the model of his life; unostentatious, meek, and resigned throughout; it may be presumed that there are but few can quit this record of his great yet unobtrusive virtues, and not exclaim with Cotta—"Quid di- cam de Socrate? Cujus morti illacry- mari soleo, Platonem legens."

Socrates was born at Alopecæ, a village near Athens, in April or May, b. c. 468, in the eleventh month of the Ar- chon Apsephon; or, according to others, in April or May, b. c. 469, in the fifth month of Apsephon, and died b. c. 400, in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, in the month Thargelion, during which the annual offering was sent to Delos.—Clint. Fast. Hellen. introd. p. xix.

He was the son of Sophroniscus, a poor sculptor, and Phæarecta, a mid- wife, and was trained to his father's art, which he appears to have studied not without success, having executed a group of the habituated graces, which, it is said, were allowed admission into the Acropolis. At his father's death he was left but a small inheritance, which he lost by the dishonesty of a relative, and still continued to support himself by the exercise of his art, devoting all his leis- sure moments to the study of his more favorite pursuit, philosophy.

His disposition, abilities, and strong propensity towards learning, recom- mended him to the notice of Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who took him under
his protection, and entrusted him with the tuition of his children. He now relinquished his former occupation, and became a diligent attendant upon the public lectures of the eminent philosophers of his time. His first preceptor was Anaxagoras, upon whose departure from Athens, he attached himself to Archelaus. Prodicus, the sophist, was his preceptor in eloquence; Evenus, in poetry; Theodorus, in geometry; and Damo in music; Aspasia had also some share in the philosophical education of Socrates.

He was not long in attaining to the eminence he deserved; he was the first who checked and exposed, by his own character and influence, the mischief and impositions of the sophists, a large body of professional preceptors at Athens, who, by a vicious system of instruction, being themselves possessed merely of a superficial and seeming knowledge, by an idle abuse of language, and a pernicious perversion of reason, were gradually corrupting the minds and misleading the abilities of the Athenian youth. His successful opposition, and overthrow of this class of false philosophers, whom he encountered with the arms of good sense, irony, and powerful argument, though in the highest degree advantageous to his country, proved, among other things, eventually fatal to himself.

He became, says Tennemann, the instructor of his countrymen and of mankind, not for the love of lucre nor of reputation, but in consequence of a sense of duty. He was desirous, above all things, to repress the flight of speculative theories by the force of an imperishable good sense; to submit the pretensions of science to the control of a higher authority, that of virtue; and to re-unite religion to morality. Without becoming, properly speaking, the founder of a philosophical school, yet by his example, by what he taught, and by his manner of communicating it, he rendered, as a wise man and popular teacher, immense service to the cause of philosophy; calling the attention of inquirers to those subjects which are of everlasting importance to man, and pointing out the source from which our knowledge (to be complete) must be derived; from an investigation of our own minds.

Concerning the genius, or daemon of Socrates, there have been many and different opinions. The Abbe Fragquier, Mem. Acad. Bell. Lett. t. iv., understands it of the wisdom and prudence of the philosopher, which enabled him to foresee what others never would have thought of; for prudence, according to Cicero, is a kind of divination. Plutarch and Apuleius, who have written separate treatises on this subject, are in favour of a similar explanation. So also Dr. Nares, in his Essay on the Daemon of Socrates, Svo. 1782., who remarks, that Socrates believed in the gods of his country, and was not free from the superstition connected with that belief; whence it may be inferred, that in the expressions usually understood to refer to his daemon, he alludes only to some species of divination perfectly analogous to the omens of his age and country, calling the sign, whatever it was, by means of which the supposed intimations were made to him, a daemon or divinity. He would otherwise, as Xenophon observes, have incurred the charge of falsehood and arrogance if he had not declined assuming to himself the merit of an unerring judgment, and if he had pretended to any gift superior to that which is obtained from the divine wisdom by the suggestions of reason.—Whatever Socrates may have intended by it, still, as the same writer observes, it afforded abundant scope for that portion of his accusation in which he was charged with the introduction of new deities.

Socrates has left nothing in writing after him, but his illustrious pupils, Plato and Xenophon, have in some measure supplied this defect. Of the disciples who survived him, Xenophon, Eschines, Simo, Crito, and Cebes disseminated the principles of their master, and lived agreeably to them. Among those who especially devoted themselves to the pursuits of philosophy, Antisthenes, the Athenian founder of the Cynic school, subsequently Aristippus, the chief of the Cyrenaic, and afterwards Pyrrho, gave their attention exclusively to questions of morals, and their practical application. Euclid of Megara, Phaedo of Elis, Menedemus of Eretria, were occupied with theoretical or metaphysical inquiries. But the superior genius of Plato embraced both these topics at once, and united the two principal branches of Socraticism, either of which was found sufficient to employ the generality of the Socratic philosophers alone. (Cf. Tennemann, Man. Phil. Enf. Hist. Phil.)
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Ω.
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THE END.
APOLOGIA SOC RATIS.

(1.) Qua vos ratione, o viri Athenienses, affecerint accusatores mei, nescio equidem: me certe sic affecerunt, ut mei ipsius pene oblitus fuerim; tanta persuasione dicere visi sunt: quamvis nihil, ut ita loquar, veri ad vos detulerint. Sed ex multis, quae falsa as-severabant, id sum potissimum admiratus, quod vobis cavendum esse monuere, ne a me, quasi eloquente, deciperemini. Quod enim assere mi ne minime erubuerint, cujus ego mox redargutionem opere ipse facturus eram, quandoquidem in præsentia vobis appareo longe ab eloquentia alienus: hoc, inquam, mihi super omnia visum est impudentissimum: nisi forte eloquentem isti vocant vera dicentem. Si enim ita dicant, profiterer equidem, quamvis non eorum more, veri nihil dixerint; a me vero vos vera omnia audire sitis. Neque vero, per Jovem, o viri Athenienses, fucatam a me orationem, quemadmodum ab ipsis, verborum nominumque elegantia, neque aliter exornatam, sed ex improviso passim contingentibus verbis coacervatam audietis. Confido enim me justa dicturum, neque quisquam vestr um speret, me aliter esse dicturum: alioquin neque ætatem hanc, o viri, deceret, adolescentu lorum more verbis studiose formatis hue ad vos ingredi. Quin immo vehementer, o viri Athenienses, id oro et obsceco, ut, si iisdem me verbis in respondingo utentem audietis, quibus et in foro apud argentari orum mensas, ubi plerique vestrum me nonnunquam audiverunt, et alibi uti so leo; ne admiremini, neve graviter id feratis. Sic enim se res habet. venio equidem nunc primum in judicium, plures quam sep-tuaginta annos natus: ex quo fit, ut in hac judiciali causa revera sim peregrinus. Et profecto, quemadmodum si peregrinus Athenas venissetem, ignosceretis utique mihi peregrina voce et forma lo-quenti, pro educationis meæ consuetudine: ita et in præsentia vos precor, neque id quidem injuria, ut loquendi formam minime at-tendatis; quæ prout contingit, tum melior, tum deterrior esse po-
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test: sed idipsum consideretis, hue mentem adhíbeatis, justane, an injusta dicam. hoc enim judícis officium est: rhetorís autem offici-Ium, vera loqui.

(2.) Justum est autem, o viri Athenienses, me primo quidem ad accusationem primam falsó conflictam, et ad primos accusatores respondere: deinde ad novissímmam, atque novissímos. Me quidem multí jam multísannis falsó apud vos accusarunt: quos equidem magís formído, quam Anyí magísto temptútorá: quamquæ et hi sunt in persuádendo potentés. Sed illí potentióres, o víri, qui pleróquœ vestrum a perscriptúra occupárum, accusántes me procul a veritáte, atque vobís persuáudentes, esse vidélíce Socratem quendam sapientem, eorum quæ super aerem, quæque sub terra fúnt, perscrutatórem, qui soleat inferiörem rationem disserendo superiörem ostendere: hi profecto, o viri Athenienses, qui hunc de me rumorem divulgaüerunt, mei accusatóres potentissími sunt. Quí enim hæc audíunt, opínantur harum rerum perscrutatóres non crédere deos esse. Profécto accusatóres hujusmodi et permultí sunt: et longó jam tempore me accusant; et in ea ætate vobís suaserunt, in qua plérique vestrum puerí, aut certe adolescéntuli, perfxíce credídistis, deserta in causa, nemíne me défendente. Atque id, quod a defensionis ratione omnium alieníssimum est, neque nóminne quidem illórum scire licet, atque proferre; præterquam si quis illórum coneódis sit. Quotcumque vero per invidiíam et calumniam hæc vobís rursus persuaserunt, quive ipsi persuasi persuaserunt alíis; hi omnes infinií omnino sunt: nec eorum quemquam in judícium traducere, nec redarguere licet; sed necesse est, adversus ístos, tanquam in nocte, pugnare défendendo, atque refellendo, nemíne respondenté. Exístimæ ergo et vos, quemadmodum dicebam, accusatóres meos duplices extíttisse: et qui nuper accusarunt; et qui jam diu, quáles modo descriptebam: atque judícate, me quidem oportére prius respondere illíss, quos et ipsi prius, multóque magís audívisistis. Sed jam respondendum mili est, o viri Athenienses, illíss críminibus, conandúque in hoc tam brevi tempore opiniónem ístam delere, quam vos per calumnias decepti, longó jam tempore contra me concepístis. Ópto autem íta demum adversários refellere, atque obtinere, si modo id vobís et mihi meliùs sit futurum. Quanquam difficile id fore arbitror: neque admodum, quále id sit, me latet. Verum, ut Deo placet, íta succedat. nos autem legí parere oportet, ac defensionem pro nobis afférre.

(3.) Repetámus igitur ab iniíto, qué sit accusatio, ex qua adversus me nata est illa calumniá, qua confísum Melítm níhi díem dixit. Quid ergo aiunt accusatóres mei? tarnquam enim sí in judício ãdès- sent, eorum recíetur accusatio, in quá contra me juránt, quæ et vicissímm a me exígit juramentum. Socrates injuste agí, atque níminum curióse perquisírit, quæ sub terra et quæ in cçlo sunt, inferiöremque rationem reddit superiörem. Præterea aliós eadem docet. Talis utique est accusatio. Nempe talia quedam et vos vidístis in Aristophánís comedía: Socrates enim illíce persona circumfertur, affirmans, se per aerem pervagári: et complures ejusmodi nugas. Quárum ego rerum neque multum, neque parum
APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

quidquam scio. Neque propterea hæc dico, quod harum rerum scientiam parvi faciam, si quis in hujusmodi rebus sit sapiens; absit ut tanti erimini reus a Melito accuser, ut præ timore hæc negem: sed quia revera, o viri Athenienses, horum nihil scio. testes autem hujus plerosque vestrum adduco. Oro vobiscum ipsi repetendo invicem aperi, quotquot me colloquentem aliquando audivistis: audivistis autem plerique vestrum. Recensete igitur invicem, num quis vestrum aliquando ii de rebus quidquam, sive multum, sive parum audiverit disputantem: atque ex hoc denique cognoscitis, ejusmodi esse cetera, quae multi de me circumferunt.


(5.) At vero requiret forsan aliquis vestrum, Quidnam, o Socrates, tuum est opus? et unde adversus te exorta sunt hæ calumniæ? nisi enim aliiquid praeter aliorum consuetudinem agere, nunquam tantus de te rumor concitatus esset. nam unde de te sermo tam frequens, nisi egisses aliiquid a ceteris alienum? Dic ergo nobis quid tandem id sit, ne nos de te temere aliiquid judicemus. Justa sane hæc mihi videtur interrogatio: atque ego vobis conabor ostendere, quidnam id sit, quod mihi nomen hoc, et calumni iam peperit. Sed audite jam; et si vereor, ne forte quibusdam vestrum joci mari videar. verumtamen existimate, me vobis vera omnino ducturum. Equi- dem, o viri Athenienses, non ob aliud certe, quam ob sapientiam quandam, ejusmodi nomen nactus sum. Sed ob quam sapientiam? forte ob eam, quæ humana sapientia est. nam hæ revera sapiens esse videor. Tili vero, quos paulo ante commemorabam, majorem

(6) Considerate vero, quorum gratia hæc dicam, debœo enim vobis aperire, unde hæc adversum me calumnia sit exorta. Profecto, cum hæc audissem, ita mecum ipse reputavi, Quidnam Deus ait? quidve voluit? Ego enim mihi conscius sum, neque in magnis, neque in parvis esse me sapientem. Quid igitur sibi vult, cum me asserit sapientissimum? Deum quidem mentiri non est credendum: neque enim id fas est Deo. Atque ita in diuturna ambiguitate versatus sum, perscrutans, quid significaret oraculum: post haec autem vix tandem post longas ambages viam ejusmodi sum ingressus. aggressus enim sum quondam ex his, qui sapientes videntur, quasi in hoc, sicubi unquam, redargutionem vaticinis facturus, oraculoque ostensurus, non me quidem, quem praefecerat, sed illum, esse in sapientia praeferendum. Dum ergo illum examinarem: (hujus vero nomen promere non est necessarium; sed crat quidam ex his, qui in republica versatur:) illum, inquam, dum examinarem, unaque dissererem, o viro Athenienses, hunc in modum affectus sum: visus mihi est vir ille videri quidem sapiens tum alis, tum vel maxime sibi ipsi; esse vero nequaquam. deinde conatus sum illi ostendere, putare quidem eum, esse se sapientem, sed minime esse. Quapropter et ille infensus mihi redditus est: et multi qui aderant, graviter id tulerunt. Itaque ad meipsum reversus, ita mecum ipse reputavi: Ego profecto sum hoc homine sapientior. appareat enim neuter nostrum pulchrum bonumque aliquid nosse: sed hoc interest, quod hic quidem cum sciat nihil, scire se aliquid opinatur; ego vero, quemadmodum nescio, ita nescire me puto. Videor ergo in hoc tantâla re hoc homine sapientior esse, quod, quæ ignoro, neque scire me arbitror. Post hæc alium adii ex his, qui illo insuper sapientiores habentur: in eoque considering omnino similiter judicavi, atque illum aliosque multos mihi reddidi inimicos.

(7) Proinde similiter deinceps processi ad alios, non ignorans, quantum adversus me odium concitarem: ideoque non absque dolore quodam timoreque procedebam. Veruntamen necessarium mihi visum est, oraculum divinum omnibus anteferre, passimque
progregi perscrutaturation, quid sibi velit oraculum; hujusque gratia omnes, quotcumque aliquid scire videntur, adire. Et per canem, o viri Athenienses, (oporet enim vobis vera fateri,) tale aliquid mihi contingit haec ex divino oraculo perquirenti, ut, qui opinione hominum maxime probabantur, eos quasi omnium imprudentissimos invenirem; qui vero inferiores habebantur, eos, quantum ad prudentiam spectat, probabilius se habere. Operæ pretium est, referre vobis errores laboresque meos, quos equidem propterea sustinui, quo a me oraculum adeo probaretur, ut redargui ultra non possit. Post civiles homines ad poetas me contuli, tragœdiarum et dithyramborum aliornunque carminum auctores, quasi hic perspicue admodum deprehensurus, esse me his rudiorem. Acceptis itaque eorum libris, in quibus elaboravisse maxime videbantur, sciscitatus sum eorum sensa, ut nonnihil ab ipsis perdisce rerem. Erubesco, o viri, verum hic vobis aperire: dicendum est tamen. Alliæ paene omnes præsentes, ut ita dixerim, melius de rebus his loquerentur, de quibus ipsi poema conscrisperunt. Deprehendi igitur brevi id in poetis, eos videlicet non sapientia facere, quæ faciunt, sed natura quadam, ex divina animi concitatione, quemadmodum et hi, qui divino furore afflati vaticinantur. nam et hi multa quidem dicunt, atque praefara; sed eorum quæ dicunt, nihil intelligunt. Tali quodam pacto poëtae accepitquisse mihi videntur: et simul animadverteri, eos in alias quoque propter poësiam omnium se sapientissimos judicare, in quibus non sunt sapientes. Abii ergo et hinc eadem omnino sententia, qua et a civilibus vatis abiceram.

(8) Tandem vero me ad artifices contuli; mihi ipsi conscius, me, ut ita loquar, in artificiali nihil scire; hoc autem noveram multa et pulchra scire: neque in hoc equidem deceptus sum. sciebant enim, quæ ipse nesciebam, et hac in parte me sapientiores erant. Sed, o viri Athenienses, in codem errore, quo et poetas, peritos artifices deprehendi. nam ob hoc ipsum, quod sua rite periciebant, unusquisque eorum se in ceteris quoque vel maximis sapientissimis esse putabant. Atqui hic erro illam quoque, quæ ipsis inerat, sapientiam offeracabat. Quamobrem, si meipsum oraculi loco interrogaret, utrum eligam, itane me habere, ut habeo, videlicet neque scientem quæ illi sciant, neque meam inscitiam ignorantem: an utraque habentem, quæ illi habent: responderem plane mihi ipsi simul atque oraculo, praestare, ita ut habeo me habere.

(9) Ob hanc utique inquisitionem meam, o viri Athenienses, inimiciiæ multæ difficillimæ atque gravissimæ adversus me coortæ sunt; ex quibus multa sunt calumniae consecuta. Nomen vero sapientis mihi propterea exortum est, quod præsentes plurimum illa me putant scire, in quibus alios refello. Videatur autem, o viri Athenienses, revera solus deus sapiens esse; atque in hoc oraculo id sibi velle, humanam videlicet sapientiam parvi, immo nihilii pendendam esse. quod vero Socratem nominat sapientem, ob id facere, quo nomine meo, tanquam exemplo quodam utens, quasi sic dicat: Is, o viri, sapientissimus est, qui, quemadmodum Socrates, novit revera sapientiam suam esse nihilii pendendam. Hae igitur ego sic affectus, et nunc perquirere passim, deo parentis, et perscrutari non
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desino, convenientis si quem aut civium aut peregrinorum esse existimem sapientem. ac si quando mihi ille talis non videatur; tunc ipse deo suffragatus, illum sapientem non esse demonstro. Atque ob occupaciones ejusmodi nullum mihi ferme relinquitur otium vel ad publicum aliquid agendum, vel privatum; sed in extrema paupertate ob Dei cultum sun constitutus.

(10) Praeterea adolescentes maxime opulentii, quive a negotiis vacant, me ultro sequentes delectantur, cum refelli a nobis homines spectant. quin etiam ipsi nonnunquam me imitati, alios deinde confutare contendunt. Qua quidem in re plurimam reperiant turbam hominem, aliquid se scire putantium, cum aut nihil sciant, aut perparum. qui vero ab his convincuntur, non tam illis quam mihi redduntur insens: clamantque esse Socratem quendam seclestissimum juventutisque corruptorem. At si quis sciscitetur ab eis, quidnam vel agendo vel docendo corrumpat, nihil quidem assignare possunt, immo prorsus ignorant. Sed ne deesse illis materia videatur, ad ista confugiant, quae communi voce facile philosophantibus objici solent: eos scilicet neque sublimia super terram neque profunda sub terra: neque deos esse putare, rationemque inferiorum quasi superiorem ostendere. vera enim, ut puto, fateri nolunt, se scilicet indignatos, propterea quod convicti fuerint, simulare se illa scire, quae nesciant. Uptote igitur ambitiosi et vehementes, et multi, ac velut ex composito, atque obnixae diligentisque persuasiosis studio me criminantes, vestras aures impleverunt, et jam dui et nuper calumniis in me studiose confictis. Ex his etiam Melitus, et Anytus, et Lycon contra me surrexerunt. Melitus quidem ob poetas mihi infestus; Anytus vero ob artifices atque reipublicae gubernatores; Lycon denique gratia rhetorum. Quamobrem, quemadmodum ab initio dicebam, admirarer quidem, si opinionem istam tantis conceptam calumniis, tam inveteratam, nunc in tam brevi tempore amovere a vos possem. Haec quidem, o viri Athenienses, vera vobis loquor: neque celo, neque subtraho aut magnum quidquam, aut parvum; quamvis ferme norim, in his dicendis me eidem fore molestum. Quod quidem argumentum vobis est, me vera loqui, atque haec esse calumniat contra me exortam, ejusque causas ejusmodi esse. et sive in præsentia sive in posterum haec inquiritis, ita esse inveniitis.

(11.) Ad illa igitur, quæ primi accusatores detulerunt, haec mihi sufficiens apud vos sit defensio. Ad Melitum vero bonum et, ut ipse ait, patriæ amatorem, ceterosque sequentes accusatores deincept responsedere pergam. Sed horum rursus, tanquam alii quidam accusatores sint, accusationem juramento assertam vicissimque asserendam in medium adducamus. Habet vero ferme se hunc in modum: Socrates injuste agit, juventutem depravans, ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans, sed alia quædam nova daemonia. Accusatio quidem est ejusmodi. hujus autem accusationis quamlibet partem discutiamus. Juvenes depravare me obiectit, atque in hoc injuriam facere. Ego vero, o viri Athenienses, contra inuiari Melitum dico; propterea quod serio ludit, tam facile homines in judicium trahens, simulansque seriis se rebus incumbere, earumque
rerum habere curam, quae ipsi nunquam curae fuerunt. Hoc autem ita esse, conabor et volvis ostendere.


(13.) Praeterea obsecro te per Jovem, o Melite, respondes nobis, utrum melius versari possimus inter bonos cives, an inter malos. Responde amabo. nihil enim difficile te rogo. Nonne mali semper mali aliquid agunt his, quibuscum versantur? boni autem bonum? Procul dubio. Estne ullus, qui detrimentum suscipere potius quam emolumentum velit ab his, quibus familiariter utitur? Respondes, o bone vir, lex enim respondere te jubet. Estne quisquam qui damnum pati velit? Nullus. Age ergo, tu me huc in judicium vocas quasi juventutis depravatorem. an dicis, me id volentem facere, vel nolentem? Equidem volentem dico. Numquid tu, o Melite, longe minor natu usque adeo me grandiori sapientior es, ut plane cognoscas tu quidem, malos obesse familiaribus, bonos vero prodesse? ego autem in tantam insaniam prolapsus sim, ut neque
id cognoscam, si quem ex familiaribus pejorem reddidero, periclitaturum me, ne quid ab eo mali perpetiar; atque hoc tantum miui ipsi malum, ut tu ais, volens inferam? Hae equidem tibi, o Melite, non credo. arbitrator quoque, neminem tibi alium concessurum. Sed aut non depravo adolescentes; vel, si depravo, invitus facio. quapropter tu in utroque mentiris. At si inuitus corrumpo, non huc in judicium involuntaria delicta lex trahi jubet, sed privatim doceri atque castigari. constat enim, si didicero, non amplius me id facturum, quod per ignorantiam faciebam. Tu autem familiari me emendare nohuiisti: sed in judicium rapis, quo eos trahi lex jubet, qui pœna indigent potius, quam disciplina.

(14.) Jam vero ex his manifestum est, o viri Athenienses, quod modo dicebam, nullam huic Melito aut magnum, aut parvam erudendae juventutis curam fuisses. Nunc age dic, qua ratione me asseras, o Melite, pervertere juventutem. An videlicet, quemadmodum in accusatione scripsisti, quia doceam, non putare deos, quos civitas putat, sed alia quaedam nova daemonia? an non? in his docendis affirmas, juvenes me corrumpere? Omninm quidem ac vehementer hae assero. Per deos ipsos, o Melite, de quibus nunc nobis est sermo, apertius et mihi et his enarra. Nam ego quidem nondum plane intelligo, utrum dieas, docere me juvenes, ut putent aliquos quidem deos esse. quod si ita est: ego deos esse puto, neque omnino sum absque deo: neque in hoc injuste ago, quamvis non eos, quos habet civitas, sed alios esse deceam. Utrum, inquam, hoc est, in quo me criminariis, quod videlicet deos alios introducam? an me ais omnino negare deos, rursusque, ut negent, alios quoque docere? Assero equidem, te omnino negare deos. O admirabiles Melite, curam ista dicis? Neque solem igitur, neque lumam esse deos credo, ut homines alii. Per Jovem ita, o judices. nam solemn quidem lapidem esse dicit; lumam vero terram. Anaxagoram tu quidem, o amice Melite, accusandum censes; atque ita hos parvi facis, existimans, eos literarum ignaros esse, quasi nesciant, libros Anaxagorae Clazomenii ejusmodi opinionibus esse plenos, et locus est gymnasticus. Juvenes ais hae a me dicere? quae liceret interdum, etiam si multa sint, unius drachmæ pretio emere ex orchestra Socratesque deridere, si sua esse fingeret, præsertim quam tam absurda sint. Sed per Deum, o Melite, putasne revera, nullum me deum existimare? Nullum per Jovem. Incredibile est, o Melite, quod dicis; et quidem, ut mihi videtur, etiam tibi ipsi. Mihi enim, o viri Athenienses, nimirum contumeliosus ac petulans iste vir, ipsamque accusationem contumelia quadam et petulantia et juvenili temeritate procul dubio conscrispisse videtur. videtur enim eum ab eum quidem componere, tentans, an Socrates sapiens deprehendat ipsum quasi ludentem, sibique ipsi contraria proponentem; vel Socrates una cum auditoribus ipsis decipiatur. Hie namque repugnare sit et in ipsis accusationibus verbis mihi videtur, ceu si dixerit, Contra leges agit Socrates deos non putans, sed deos putans. Quæ quidem jocantis nuge esse videntur.

(15.) Animadverterite, o viri, quo pacto Melitus mihi videtur haec dicere. Tu vero responde nobis, o Melite. Sed vos, quod ab initio
Rursus, haud non nullus. sed ac perinde quae. Nonne equidem quam, oravi, tarde opera daemonia illis dem omnino opera vel nonne fitentem, que deo, huic piam videlicet an perimet, cedis, potius loqueris, vel apud circo putet. mones agat, tione ratione ejusdem, ratione in tilios qnisnam tione. Quod existimantem, (16.) rem quo negas? tibicines mirum, esse in vel plurimos an interro-gabit ita: autem et vero estne accusatio, esse, deos concitatam, autem esse, et meo deos decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum aliqnis, filios, neque tibi malevolentiam esse, non vera deos concitatam, et me decinam, deorum alienis, neque deos, neque heroes. Nulla certe ratione fieri posse aliter ostendi potest. (16.) Ceterum, o viri Athenienses, quod quidem ego non deliquerim, quemadmodum Melitus accusat, haud magna mihi purgatione opus esse videtur: sed ea, quae dicta sunt, sufficiere judicio. Quod autem ab initio dixi, malevolentiam plurimum esse contra me apud plurimos concitatam, id profecto verissimum est: et hoc me perimet, si quidem perim: non Melitus, neque Anytus; sed mul-torum calumnia et invidia: quae quidem alios quoque multos viros bonos peremit hactenus, et, ut arbitror, perimet. nihil enim grave, vel mirum, si in me obesse non desinat. Forsitan vero ita me quis-piam interrogabit: Nonne te pudet, o Socrates, tale quidam exercere, ex quo continuo in periculum venias moriendi? Equidem huie objectioni justam hanc responsionem dabo: Haud recte, o vir, loqueris, si putas, magnam aut vitae aut mortis habendam esse rationem homini, cujus vel parva quaedam utilitas sit: ac non illud potius duntaxat considerandum, quoties aliquid agit, utrum justa agat, an injusta, aut boni viri opera, sive mala. Alioquin ex hac ratione tua spernendi fluissent semidei omnes, quotcumque apul
Trojan occubuerunt, et alii, et in primis ipse Thetidis filius: quia usque adeo mortis contempsit periculum, ne turpem subiret infamiam, ut cum ibi dea mater properanti ad Hectorem occidentum praeditisset, his ferme, ut arbitror, verbis: O fili, si pro vindicta Patrochi amici tui ab Hector interficiis, ipse peribis; inquit enim, Subito post Hectorem infelix tibi sors imminet: cum, inquam, ab ea haec accepiisset, usque adeo discrimen mortemque contempsit, ut multo magis timuerit turpem vitam amicorum inultis injuriis, quam mortem: statimque respondit, mori se malle pro justa amici vindicta, quam moras trahentem apud naves ridiculum contemptumque vivere. Hunc ergo periculi mortisque curam habuisse quisnam dixerit? et profecto ita res se habet, o viri Athenienses. Quo quisque in loco vel seipsum constituit, arbitratus id optimum esse, vel a superiori jubetur consistere; in eo, ut mihi videtur, permanere oportet, periculumque subire, neque mortem, neque aliud quidquam magis quam turpitudinem formidantem.

(17.) Equidem, o viri Athenienses, graviter aberrarem, si cum illis paruere praefectis, quos ipsi mihi praeposuisist et in Potidæa, et in Amphipoli, et in Delio: (tunc enim, ubi illi me consistere jussurunt, ibi constiti, ut quisquam alter, mortisque discrimen subivi:) ubi deus me posuit, permanequare voluit, ut opinatus sum atque existimavi, videlicet philosophantem in vivere, ac meipsum atiosque scrutari; ibi ob mortis alteriusve rei metum ordinem desererem. Pergrave, inquam, id esset delictum, et tunc reversa me juste quis in judicium traheret, quasi deos non putantem, videlicet oraculo non parentem, atque mortem timentem, putantemque me sapientem esse, quam sapiens minime sim. Num mortem timere, o viri, nihil est alius, quam sapientem videri cum, qui non sit sapiens. quippe cum id sit seire videri, quae nesciat. Nemo enim scit, utrum mors summum bonorum omnium contingat homini, metuunt autem, perinde ac si eam scirent maximum esse malorum. Cui vero dubium esse debet, quin haec ipsa inscitia sit maxime vituperanda, per quam aliquis se putat seire, quae nesciat? Ego autem, o viri, in hoc forsan a multis hominibus diffiro: ac si qua in re sapientiorem me aliquo esse dicerem, in hac utique dicerem, quod cum hand sufficiente, quae sunt apud inferos, norim, simile ter me non nosse cognosco. Injurias autem inferre, superiorique non obedere vel deo vel homini, malum turpeque esse scio. Haec igitur, quae nescio, utrum bona sint, nunquam magis timebo, atque fugiam, quam illa, quae mala esse cognosco. Quamobrem si me nunc absolvatis, (non credentes Anyto, qui dixit, aut me in judicium ab initio vocandum non esse, aut vocatun necessario esse damnamum: nam si a vobis absolvere, fore ut filii vestri, Socrates securi vestigia, omnes omnino corruprarentur) si, inquam, ad haec vos ita dicatis: o Socrates, Anyto non credimus, teque sententis nostris absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam post-hac in hac inquisitione philosophiaque verseris: ac si id facere [deprehendare, mortem obseas.] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus dimittere me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: o viri Athenienses,
diligo vos equidem atque amo; Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis, et quandui spirabo viresque supetent, philosophari non desinam, exhortans et docens quemcunque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc in modum: Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, civitatis amplissimae ac sapientia et potentia praestantissimae, non erubesces in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum et gloriae et honoris quam plurimum sit? ut autem prudentia et veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque curas? Ac si quis vestrum mecum contenderit, id se curare asseverans, haud statim dimittam illum, neque recedam, sed sciscitabor, examinabo, redarguam. Quod si mihi non videatur possидere virtutem, attamen profiteri; objurgabo, quod ea, quae plurimi pretii sunt, nihilii pendent, vilissima vero plurimi faciat. Hoc equidem officium praestabo juniori et seniori, quemcunque nactus fuero, rursusque peregrino et civi; magis autem civibus, quanto mihi genere propinquiores estis. Hoc enim Deus ipse jubet. Reor autem, quod et vos latere non debet, nullum adhuc bonum vobis in hac urbe majus contingisse, quam hoc meum ministerium, quod Deo parens exhibeo. Nihil enim aliud agens circumeo, quam suadens junioribus senioribusque vestrum, neque corporum, neque pecuniarum, neque aliarum omnino rerum curam prius vehementiusque, quam animi, habendam esse, ut quam optimus sit; docens, non ex pecuniis virtutem, sed ex virtute pecunias, aliaque bona omnia et privatim et publice hominibus provenire. Si igitur haec docens perverti juvenes, essent certe perniciosa. at si quis dicas, me alia quam hae docere, nihil dicit. Horum gratia, o viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, nec si mihi sit plurium moriendum.

(18.) Ne conturbemini, o viri Athenienses; sed quemadmodum ab initio rogavi, me æquo animo audiatis: erit enim vobis, ut arbitrator, utile, si, quæ nunc dicturus sum, audietis. equidem vobis nonnulla dicturus sum, quæ audientes forsitam ad clamorem in præsentia provocemini. ego vero silentium a vobis exposco. Scitote, si me ocideritis talem, qualem vobis modo dicebam, non me læsuros esse vos magis, quam vos ipsos. Me quidem neque Melitus, neque Anytus unquam lædet. neque enim posset: siquidem nefas est, ut arbitrator, meliorem virum a deteriori lædi. Interficere tamen potest, vel pellere, vel contumeliam quadam afficere. atque haec iste quidem et aliis aliquis ingentia putet esse mala: ego vero non puto; sed multo pejus esse, illa facere, quæ nunc iste facit, aggrediens, injuste virum occidere. Quamobrem, o viri Athenienses, non tam mihi nunc opus est, defensionem pro me ipso meditari, ut aliqus existimaret, quam vobis: ne quid me condemnantes contra id munus, quod deus vobis tribuit, delinquatis. Si enim me interfeceritis, haud facile alium talem reperietis, vere quidem, et si forte id dictum ridiculum est, civitati vestrae a deo adhibitum, velut equo cuidam magno et generoso, sed ipsa mole pigriori, atque calcaribus excitari indigenti: qualem videtur me deus civitati addidisse, qui singulos exsuscitans et monens, et objurgans, non cesso diem totam
ubique vobis assistere. Talem vero alterum non facile nancisci
mini, o viri Athenienses. ergo, si mihi credideritis, me vestris sen-
tentiosis absolvetis. At vero si forte dormitantium more, graviter
ferentes vos exauscitar, me, ut vult Anytus, temere occideritis; re-
liquum omne tempus dormietis, nisi forsan deus vobis prospiciens
alium quendam miserit. Me vero esse talem, ut a deo civitati tri-
butus suisse videar, hinc potestis animadvertere. Non humanum
certe id esse videtur, quod ego mea quidem omnia omnino neglege-
rim, atque in hae rei familiaris negligentia tot annos jam perseve-
rem, vestro semper intentus bono, dum singulos adeo, tanquam pa-
ter, aut frater natu major, suadens, curam virtutis habere. Quod
si quam pro officio meo mercedem reciperem, humanam quandam
id rationem haberet. nunc vero, quod et vos plane videtis, accusa-
tores isti mei, quamquam impudentissime alia contra me omnia coa-
cervarunt, hoc unum tamen solita illa impudentia nequaquam ausi
sunt pertentare, testesque adhibere, qui probent, me unquam pro
his mercedem ullam exegisse, aut petisse. Hujus autem rei sufi-
cientem vobis, ut arbitror, testem affero, paupertatem meam.

(19.) Sed forsae absurdam aliqui videre potest, me privatim haec
consulere singulis, anxie nimis circumventem; publice vero in con-
cionibus autem non fuisset hoc idem civitati consulere. Hujus au-
tem causa est, de qua iepe me passim dicentem audivistis, divinum
videlicet quiddam atque daemonicum in voce quadam mihi adeste.
quod quidem Melitus in accusatione derisit, sed mihi quidem ab ipsa
pucritia hoc adest, vox scilicet quadam, quae quotes fit, me prohi-
bet agere, quod acturus eram, provocat vero nunquam. hoc, in-
quam, est, quod mihi repugnet, quo minus me ad publica conferam.
Et recte admodum mihi adversari videtur, constat enim, o viri Aten-
ienses, si quondam negotia publica aggressus fuisset, jandiu mi-
hi suisse pereundum: itaque nullam vel vobis, vel mihi attulissent
utilitatem. Ne mihi succenseatis, oro, vera dicent. nemo enim diu
salvus esse potest, si aut vestro, aut alteri cuiquam populo legitime
adversetur, quo multa injusta atque iniqua, que fieri solent in civi-
tate, prohibeat. sed necesse est, cum qui reviera pro justitia pugnat,
si modo brevi salvus futurus sit, privatum degere, neque rempublica
am attingere.

(20.) Horum equidem magna vobis affareram argumenta; non
verba quidem, sed, quod vos multifacitis, facta. Audite jam, que
mihi contigerint, ut planius perspicaciss, nulli me quidquam contra
justitiam ob mortis metum concessurum suisse, atque non conce-
dentem, simul suisse periturum. Referam vobis equidem molestia
quedam atque judicialia, vera tamen. Ego enim, o viri Athenien-
es, nullo adhuc publico functus sum munere, nisi quod ad consi-
lium sum electus. contigit autem, tribunum meam Antiochem co tem-
pore praesidere, quo vos decem illos exercitus duces, quia navali
pugna interemptos non susceperint, dammare simul omnes prope-
rastis, injuste quidem, ut cunctis postea vobis notum fuit. Tunc
ego solus ex omnibus praefectis me vobis opposui, ne quid ageretis
praefer leges, meisque sufragis restiti. Quo in tempore, cum ora-
tores multi parati essent deferre mecum nomen, atque in judicium
trahere, vosque ipsi ingenti idem clamore juberitis; existimavi, oportere me magis pro lege atque justitia subire periculum, quam vobiscum sentire, non sentientibus justa, ob metum carceris aut mortis. Et haec quidem facta sunt, civilitate adhuc sub libertate populi constituta. postquam vero ad paucorum potentiam deventum est, rursus triginta illi, qui rempublicam occuparunt, vocantes me una cum aliis quatuor in Tholom, jussurunt Leontem Salaminium ex Salamine adducere, quo ille necaretur; qualia videlicet multa illi, et aliis multis eo tempore mandabant, ut complures criminibus suis insolverent. Tunc ego non verbis quidem, sed re ipsa, rursus ostendi, nihil omnino, quamvis dictu rusticius videatur, curare mortem; illud vero omnino curare, ne quid injustum neve impium facerem. Me vero potestas illa terribilis nequaquam ita conterruit, ut injusto aliquid facerem. Sed ubi Tholo egressi sumus, reliqui quatuor in Salaminam adventantes captum Leontem duxerunt: ego vero domum abivi: ac forsan prorpcrea me illi interficissent, nisi brevi eorum potestas dissoluta fuisset. Atque horum testes vobis erunt permuti.

(21.) An ergo putatis, tot annos me victurum fuisses, si publica tractavissem, bonique viri officio fungens, justitiæ suffragatus esse, atque, ut oportet, unum id officium omnibus praeculissem? Permultum abst, o viri Athenienses: neque enim aliis quibusquam hominum ita se gerens, diu salvus esse potuisses. At ego per omnem vitam, sicubi publica tractavi negotia, tales me præstiti, et privatim idem ipse, nemini unquam praeter id quod justum est, concedens, vel aliiis, vel horum alicui, quos ii, qui me criminantur, meos affirmant esse discipulos. Ego autem nullius unquam præceptor fuì. Sed si quis dicentem me ac mea tractantem audire desideravit, sive junior, sive senior, nulli unquam id negavi. Neque vero is ego sum, qui pecuniis accepit dispu tem, non acceptis vero taceam: sed pariter diviti atque pauperi interrogandum me praebœ; ac etiam, si quis respondingo audire velit, quæ dico. Et si quis horum probus fiat, vel non, haud justo crimen subirem: quippe cum nulli unquam doctrinam vel tradiderim ullam, vel promiserim. Quod si quis dixerit, privatim a me quidquam vel didicisse, vel audisse, quod nec aliiis omnibus commune fecerim, non verum dicit.

(22.) Sed quam ob causam quidam mea consuctudine oblectentur, o viri Athenienses, audite. Omnino verum est, quod vobis supra dicebam, delectari homines, cum redargutioni eorum adsunt, qui se, cum non sint, existimant sapientes. Est enim res non injucunda: mihi vero, ut dixi, a Deo injuncta et per vaticinia, et per sonnia, et per omnem modum, per quem aliqua alia sors divina homini quidquam mandarit agendum. Hæc, o viri Athenienses, et vera sunt, et facile arguenda. Enimvero, si ego juvenum alios quidem nunc corrumpo, alios vero jamdii corrupi, consentaneum esset, ut nunc illorum aliiqui seniores facti, quoniam intelligerent, me sibi adolescentibus male consuluisse, contra me insurgent, ac poenas deposcerent. at si ipsi nollent, saltem necessarios illorum aliiquis, patres et fratres, et alios cognatos, si quid mali a me eorum necessarii passi fuissent, commemorare nunc et poenas exigere.

[23.] Quae igitur pro defensione mea, o viri Athenienses, habeo, ferme hæc sunt, et alia forte similia. Sed forsan vestrum aliquis, ad se moresque solitos se recipiens, graviter ferat, quod, cum levioribus etiam in causis reus multis cum lacrymis soleat deprecari, atque supplicare, ac filios in judicium producere, ut commiserationem commoveant, et alios domesticorum amicorumque permultos: ego nihil horum faciam, quamvis in extremo, ut videtur, discrimine constitutus, his ergo offensus aliquis contra me pertinaciæ irritetur, atque ipsa in ira sententiam contra me ferat. Si quis ergo inter vos ejus mentis est, ego tamen non censeo obsecrandum, sed hac ratione potius æque me hunc allocuturum: Sunt et mihi, o vir opertime, cognati quidam. Neque enim, ut inquit Homerus, ex quercu vel petra, sed ex hominibus natus sum. Itaque et cognatos habeo, o viri Athenienses, et filios tres; quorum unus jam adolescit, duo autem sunt parvuli, nullum tamen eorum huc adducam, supplicaturus eo pacto a vobis absolvì. Curnam igitur nihil horum faciam? Non pertinacia ualla, neque contemptu, viri Athenienses: utrum vero audacter me habeam ergo mortem, an non, alia ratio est. Ad existimationem tamen, et mei, et civitatis totius, non arbitrator pertinere, ut ista faciam in hac ætate, et hoc nomine, quod nactus sum; sive id verum sit, sive falsum. Attamen jam opinione hominum praecocupatum est, Socratam inter multos præcipuo quodam excellere. Si ergo hi, quì inter vos sapientia, vel fortitudine, vel quavis alia virtute præstare existimantur, tales erunt, quales sèpe quosdam, cum de illis judicaretur, vidi, turpe nimium erit. Qui cum esse alierius pretii existimarentur, attamen in judicio mirum in modum commiserationi studebant; quasi grave aliquid passuri, si ex hac vita decesserint: perinde ac immortalis esset futuri, si vos illos non occidatis. Atqui hi mihi videntur civitati dedecus afferre: propterea quod existimare peregrinorum aliquis potest, eos, qui in-
ter Athenienses virtute praestant in magistratibusque ceterisque honoribus superiores habentur, nihil a mulieribus differe. Hae autem, o viri Athenienses, nec vos, qui aliquis auctoritatis esse videmini, facere decet; neque, etiam si nos facere velitum, permittere: sed hoc ipsum ostendere, vos eum multo magis dannaturus esse, qui commiserationes ejusmodi introducens, ridiculam reddiderit civitatem, quam illum, qui quietus judicium expectaverit.

(24.) Proinde, o viri Athenienses, accedit ad ea, quae de civitatibus existimatione dicta sunt, quod nec justum mihi videtur esse, judicem precari, neque precando absolvit, sed docere atque suadere. Non enim ad hoc sedet iudex, ut per gratiam concedat, sed ut judicet secundum leges. Atque id iurejurando promisit, non per gratiam cuiuscumque libuerit condonare, sed judicare secundum leges. Non igitur licet, vel nobis assefacere vos dejequare, vel vobis, assefieri, neutri enim nostrum religionem servarent. Nolite ergo, o viri Athenienses, exigere, talia me apud vos agere, quae neque honesta, neque justa, neque sancta esse puto: et id quidem omnino, præsertim vero per Jovem, cum impietatis erga deum a Melito hoc accusuer. Profecto, si pergerem persuadere vobis, precandoque flectere, cum juraveritis, docerem utique, vos non putare deos esse; ac revera, dum pro me defensionem paro, me ipsum interim acusearem, quasi deos ne quaquam existimaret. Sed multum abest, ut ita se res habeat. existimo namque esse deos, o viri Athenienses, magis quam quisquam meorum accusatorum; ac vobis deoque permittio, de me judicare, ut mihi et vobis sit conducturum.

(25.) Quod vero non graviter feram, o viri Athenienses, me a vobis esse damnatum, et alia multa faciunt, et illud in prinis, quod non praeter spem id accidit: verum multo magis admiror utrorumque numerum calculorum. Si quidem non putabam, tam paucorum numero ab absolutione abesse, nunc autem, ut videtur, si tres solum calculi aliter cecidissent, evadebam. Melitum certe nunc evasisse videor: neque evasisse solum; sed unicumque constat, nisi surrexisserunt Anytus et Lycon, me accusantes, nille drachmas illum fuisse pensurum, quoniam partem quintam calculorum non accepiisset.

(26.) Licetur ergo judicium morte vir iste. esto. sed ego, o viri Athenienses, quonam me liceamini postulabo? An non videlicet eo, quo dignus sum? Quid ergo? quidnam dignum est, pati me aut pendere, ob id, quod quae didici, non siluerim, sed neglexerim, quaecumque multa facit vulgus, quaestum, rem familiaris; praefecerunt, conciones, ceterosque magistratus; praeterea auffugerim conjurationes atque seditiones, quae in republica contigerunt, arbitratus, meipsum revera ad aequiora officia esse natum, quam ut ab his salutem meam pendere existimarem? Ad haec, inquam, me non contuli, quibus occupatus, neque vobis, neque mihi ipsi fueram profuturus: sed unius huic officio duxi totum incubi, ut privatim unumqueque vestrum salutans, maximam, ut equidem existimo, affirrem utilitatem, suadens videlicet unicuique, nihil ex rebus suis prius, quam seipsum esse curandum, ut quam optimus prudentissimusque evadat; nec res civitatis curandas esse prius, quam civi-
tatem ipsum; et aliarum item rerum curam eadem ratione esse habendam. Quid igitur, cum sim talis, a vobis reportare dignus sum? Bonum certe, o viri Athenienses; si modo pro dignitate revera existimetis: ac tale quidem bonum, quale mihi conveniat. Quid igitur convenit viro egregio beneficoque, cui vacare a ceteris occupationibus expediatur, quo vobis ad virtutem cottortari quest? Nullum certe est alius præmium, o viri Athenienses, quod magis virum talem deceat, quam in Prytaneo publico sumptu nutriti: et multo quidem magis, quam si quis vestrum equo, aut bigis, aut quadrangis Olympia vicerit. Nam ille quidem facit, ut felices videamini; ego vero, ut sitis, præterea illa nutritione non indiget, ego indigeo. Itaque, si pro dignitate ac justitia æstimari oportet, ego me hoc dignum existimo, almonia scilicet publice in Prytaneo mihi exhibenda.

(27.) Forte vero hæc vobis dicens ita protervus videor, ut in superioribus visum sum, ubi commiserationes supplicationesque detestabar. Id autem haud tale est; sed ejsusmodi potius, o viri Athenienses. Persuasum est enim mihi, ut nemini sponte injuriam faciam, quod quidem ideireo vobis non persuadeo, qua breve tempus habuimus colloquendi. Verum, si lex talis apud vos esset, quais apud ceteros, ut, ubi mors pœna sit, in eo judicio non dicem unam, sed plures disceptetur, vobis, ut arbitror, persuasissem. nunc vero haud facile fuit, in tam brevi tempore calumnias magnas diuere. Cum igitur mihi persuasum sit, nemini faciendam esse injuriam, permutum abest, ut mihi ipsi sim facturus. Quid ergo? numquid veritus, ne id subeam, quo Melitus me dignum censet, quod quidem ideo nescire me utrum bonum sit an, malum, ut hoc devitem, eligam eorum aliquid, quæ plane mala esse scio, atque hoc me dignum esse censebo? Utrum ergo vincula? Et quid oportet me in carcerem vitam agere, semper undecimviris servientem? Utrum pecunias solvere, atque, donec solutæ sint, in vinculis permanere? At vero id tantundem est, atque quod supra dicebam, cum mihi desit, unde pecunias persolvam. An forte exsilium? forte enim hoc dignus esse censebor: nemia tamen, o viri Athenienses, me cupiditas vitæ teneret, si adeo imprudens esset, ut non possem animadvertere, si vos cives mei consuetudinem meam sermonesque perferre non potuistis, sed usque adeo gravis invidiosaque vobis fuit mea consuetudo atque oratio, ut mox liberarent vos ab illa jam decreveritis, alios tamen facilis me putem toleraturos. Permutum abest, o viri Athenienses. Praeclara scilicet mihi vita foret, in hac ætate exsulanti, et aliam ex alia civitatem permutantis, et in continua repulsa viventi. Equidem, ut plane intelligo, quocunque proficiscar, audituri me, sicut et hic, sequentur adolescentes: ac si eos repellam, ipsi vicissim, senioribus id persuadentes, me repellent. si non repellam, eorum patres et cognati ob hos ipsos me expellent.

(28.) Forsitan vero dicet aliquis: Nonne potes, o Socrates, in exilio silentium et quietem agere? At hoc omnium est difficili­num aliquidus vestrum persuadere. Sive enim respondero, id esse non parere Deo, proptereaque me non posse quiescere, non credetis mihi, quasi per ironiam loquenti: sive dixerō, me ab hoc officio
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nolle vacare, quia id homini maximum contingit bonum, diebus videlicet singulis de virtute verba facere, atque de aliis, de quibus me quotidie loquentem vos auditis, atque ita me ipsum aliosque scrutari, vitamque inconsideratam respuendam esse censere; hoc etiam multo minus mihi credetis. Haec vero, o viri Athenienses, ita ut dico, se habent; sed haud facile persuaderi possunt. Et simul nuncquam malo dignari me consuevi. Quod si mihi forent pecuniae, judicium pecuniis liceret, quot pensurus forem; neque obsesset mihi illas amittere. Nunc vero non adsunt; nisi forte, quantum valeo solvere, tantis aestimari velitis. Possum vero ferme argenti minam. tanti ergo judicium aestimo. Plato autem hic, o viri Athenienses, et Crito, et Critobulus, et Apollodorus jubent me triginta minis liceri. Ipsi vero tantum vobis promittere parati sunt. licet ergo tanti. promissores vero argenti hujus hi vobis erunt sufficientes.

(29.) Non multæ tempori gratia, o viri Athenienses, crinimandi materiam præbusitis voluptibus civitatem vituperare, quia scilicet Socratem occideritis, virum sapientem. dicent enim illi, licet non sim, me sapientem, qui vos vituperare volent. Si ergo breve tempus expectavissetis, absque vestra opera me contingebat mori. Videste atatem meam, quam procul jam sit a vita, morti vero propinqua. Neque vero haec adversus vos omnes dico, sed adversus eos tantum, qui me morte damnarunt. Dico etiam haec ad hos ipsos. Forsan putatis, me, o viri Athenienses, in judicio concidisse talium verborum inopia, quibus utique persuasissetem vos, si omnia facienda dicendaque putavissetis, quibus a vobis absolverer. Longe vero se res aliter habet. Cerne ob paupertatem damnatus sum, non verborum quidem, sed audaciae atque impudentiae, et quia talia apud vos dicere nolui, qualia vobis auditu gratissima contingissent, audientibus videlicet me deflentem atque lamentantem, et alia facientem multa atque dicentem, ut dixi, me indigna; qualia frequenter ab aliis audire consuevistis. Sed neque ab initio censui, decere, ob periculum devitandum, illiberale aliquid facere; neque nunc me peœnitet, haec defensionis ratione usumuisse. Malo equidem, tali quadam defensione fretus, mortem obire, quam contraria supervivere. Neque enim in judicio, neque in bello, vel mihi, vel alteri, omnia, quibus vitemus mortem, sunt facienda. Nam in præcis sepe constat interitum vitari, si quis, objectis armis, supplex ad insequentes se convertat. Alia quoque in singulis periculis machinamenta sunt, quibus interitum quis effugiat, si quem non pudeat facere quælibet atque dicere. Sed considerate, o viri Athenienses, haud id quidem difficile esse, mortem effugere, sed multo difficilius, pravitatem, velocius enim illa currit, quam mors. Atqui ego nunc, utpote ob senectutem, tardior a tardiore captus sum; accusatores autem mei, utpote vehementes atque veloces, ab ea, quae velocior est, pravitate. Et nunc quidem ego abeo damnatus a vobis, mortem subiturus; isti vero a veritate ipsa damnati, pravitati injustitiaeque obnoxii. atque ego quidem poenae acqueescere, et isti. Haec igitur forte sic oportebat se habere; arbitrorque, ea habere se mediocriter.

(30.) Post haec autem vobis, qui me condemnastis, cupio divinare. Nam illuc mihi jam perventum est, ubi solent homines divi-
nare, quando videlicet sunt prope mortem. Prædico equidem vobis, o viro Athenienses, si me interfeceritis, supplicium vobis statim post mortem meam esse venturum, ac per Jovem multo durius eo, quo me affeceritis. nunc enim id egistis, putantes liberare vos; quo minus rationem vitae vestrae redarguents ciuquam reddere compel-lamini. Id vero contra omnino vobis accidet. Nam plures futuros arbitror, qui vos redarguant, quos ego compesciebam, etsi vos id
non sentiebatis: tantoque illi infestiores erunt, quanto et juniores; idque vos gravius id feretis. Profecto, si putatis per interfectionem hominem a vituperatione vos absolvire, nimium aberratis. Non enim est hæc liberatio vel valida satis, vel honesta. sed illa tam facilima, quam optima est, non disturbare quidem alios, sed se ipsum comparare, ut quam optimus evadat. Ihæ ergo vobis, qui me condemnastis, vaticinatus, finem facio.

(31.) Vobis autem, qui me absolvistis, libenter de hujusmodi re, quæ contigit, verba facerem, quamdiu magistratus negotio distinctur, necdum eo vado, ubi me oportet mori. Sed, o viri, assistite mihi id tempus. Nihil enim probet, invicem (dum licet) confabulari. Nenum vobis tanquam amicis demonstrare volo, quod mihi modo accidit, quidnam menti significet. Mihi quidem, o judices, (vos enim judices recte appellare possum,) mirabile quiddam contigit. Vix enim illa daemonis vaticinatrix mihi semper in superiori tempore frequenter omnino offerre se consuevit, et in rebus quidem levissimis se opponens, si quid minus recte facturus fuisset. Nunc autem ea mihi, quæ videtis, acciderunt, quæ profecto putaret aliquis atque existimaret, extrema esse malorum. sed mihi neque domo exuunti mane Dei signum adversatum est, neque dum in judicium veniebam, neque in aliqua sermone parte, dum verba faciebam: quamvis alias frequenter, dum loquerer, in medio sermonis cursu consueverit cohibere. nunc autem in hac re nusquam, vel agenti, vel loquenti est adversatum. Quam vero hujus rei causam esse putem, vobis aperiam. Apparet enim, mihi quod contigit, bonum esse. nec recte ullo modo judicatur a nobis, quicunque mortem opinamur esse malam. Cujus quidem rei magna apud me hæc est conjectura, quod signum mihi, ut consuevit, repugnavisset, nisi bonum quid acturus fuisset.

(32.) Cogitate autem hoc pacto possumus, spem multam esse, id esse bonum. duorum enim aliter mors est. nam aut tanquam nihil omnino sit, sensum nullum ullius rei retinet is qui decessit et vita; aut, quemadmodum dicitur, permutatio quædam et transmigratio animæ ab hoc in alium locum. Sive ergo nullus remanet sensus, sed tanquam somnus quidam est, in quo quis somnium cernit nullum, admirabile lucrum existit in morte. Reor equidem, si quem oporteat ad eam noctem, quam tanta transegit quies, ut ne insomnium quidem ullum videret, alias noctes disque vitae totius conferre, atque dieere, quot ipse noctes atque dies in vita melius dulcissuse peregerit: reor, inquam, nemum privatum aliquem, sec nec magnum quidem regem, aliquas numerare posse. Si ergo tale quidem est mors, lucerum esse equidem dico: (et enim nihil plus hoc pacto totum tempus quam nox una esse videtur:) sin autem mors
est tanquam transmigratio quaedam hinc in alium locum, ac vera sunt quae dicuntur, videlicet in alio seorsum a nobis loco omnes defunctos esse, quidnam melius quam hoc esse potest, o judices? Si quis enim illuc profectus, liber ab his qui profitenter judices esse, veros repererit judices, qui judicare illic perhibentur, Minoem, Rhadamantum, Æcum, Triptoleumum, aliosque, quotunque semidei justè vixerunt, nunquid ejusmodi transmigratio parvi pendenda censebitur? Rursus Orpheum Musœumque conveniret et Hesiodum et Homerum, quam multo aliquis nostrum redimeret? Equidem, si hæc vera sunt, sæpius mori velim, quippe cum mihi imprimitis mirifice grata sit futura habitatio illa atque consuctudo, quandoquidem una cum Palamede futurus sum, et Ajace, Telamonis filio, et aliis antiquorum, quicunque falso damnati judicio decesserunt et vita, apud quod meos casus cum illorum casibus conferre utrinque, ut arbitror, non injucundum foræt. Illud praeterea maximum, illig degere scrutantem singulos atque examinantem, quemadmodum hic feci, quisnam illorum sapis sit, et quis, cum non sit, se tamen existimet sapientem esse. Proinde quanti faciendum est, o judices, perscrutarì duces; qui tantum ad Trojan dixit exereitum? vel Ulixem vel Sisyphum aliosque quam plurimos, quos referre quis potest, viros et nullieres? quibuscum loqui atque examinando versari, inæstimabilis prorsus felicitas esset. siquidem hujus causa, qui illic degunt, haud amplius moriuntur: suntque illi nobis et in rebus alius beatiore, et in eo insuper, quod reliquum jam tempus permanent immortales; si quidem vera sunt, quæ dicuntur.

(33.) Vos quoque, o judices, bene de morte sperare debitis, idque unum cogitare verum esse, viro videlicet bono nihil mali accidere posse neque viventi, neque defuncto; neque res illius a diis negligi. Neque vero mea nunc casu aliquo acciderunt, sed mihi id constat, mori jam et a laboribus liberari, mihi melius exitisse. atque hanc ob causam divinum illud signum mihi non obstitit. Nec equidem haud admodum his indignor qui accusarunt me vel condemnarunt: quamvis non hæc mente accusaverint me atque damnaverint, sed quia detrimentum mihi inferre sperabant. ob hoc utique illis est successendum. (Sed jam ad eosdem illos reversus, sic eos alloquor:) Tantum tamen vos precor, o viri, ut meos quoque filios, cum adoleverint, si ipsi similiter atque ego vobis molesti sint, pœnis similiter afficiatis; præsertim, si videantur vobis vel pecuniarum, vel alterius cujusquam rei majorem, quam virtutis, curam habere: atque si videri velit, putentve, se alicujus esse pretii, cum nullius sint, illos objugetis, quemadmodum ego vos; quod non illis in- cumbant, quibus est incumbendum, ac existimem, cum nullius pretii sint, se aliqquad esse. Quod si hæc feceritis, justa a vobis passus uero, egoque et filii. Sed jam hora est hinc abire, me quidem, ut moriar; vos autem, ut vitam agatis. Utri vero nostrum in melius cant, omnibus praeterquam deo est incertum.
CRITON.

SOCRATES, CRITON.


CR. Profunda aurora. So. Admiror, quemadmodum ipse custos carceris tibi obtemperare volucrit.

CR. Familiaris jam mihi est, o Socrates, ob crebrum huc adventum meum. Praeterea beneficii nonnulli a me accepti. So. Venisti modo? an jam est dudum?

CR. Satis dudum. So. Proinde cur non statim me excitasti, sed silentio assedisti?

CH. Nunquam per Jo vena, o Socrates, excitasem. neque enim ipse vellem in tanto dolore evigilare. Sed te jam-dudum admiror, sentiens, quam suaviter doraiias; et consulto non excitavi te, ut quam placidissime degeres. Equidem et per omnem vitam ob hujusmodi morem beatum te judicavi; maxime vero in praesenti calamitate, quod eam tam facile ac placide feras.


(2) So. Bona, o Crito, fortuna: si ita dis placet, ita esto. non tamen existimo, illam hodie redituram. Cr. Undenam id conjectas? So. Dicam equidem, siquidem postridie, quam navis redierit, mihi est obeundum. Cr. Sic utique aiunt hi, penes quo rei hujus potestas est. So. Itaque non hae die venturam puto, sed altera. conjecturam vero ex somnio quodam accipio, quod paulo

(3.) Cr. Manifestum certe, sed, o beate Socrates, etiam nunc crede mihi, ac salvus esse velis. Mihi enim, si tu obieris, non una tantum calamitas immetit: sed prater id, quod te orbatus fueri tali necessario, qualem alterum nunquam reperiam, videbor utique multis, qui neutrum nostrum satis noverint, cum potuissem te servare, si minus pecunias pepercissem, te penitus neglexisse. Atqui quenam major potest esse infamia, quam videri, pluris fecisses pecunias quam amicos? non enim poterit persuaderi compluribus, te hinc abire noluisse, nobis, quo id ageres, omni studio contendentibus. So. Quid vero a nobis, o beate Crito, tanti vulgi opinio aestimatur? probatisimini enim vivi, quorum magis habenda ratio est, haec ita gesta esse, ut gesta sunt, arbitrabuntur. Cr. Attamen vides, o Socrates, compelli nos opinionem quoque vulgi curare. Praesentia enim haec declarant, posse vulgus non minima malorum, immo fere maxima, sì quis in populò calumniis agitetur, infere. So. Utinam, o Crito, posset vulgus maxima infere mala, ut vicissim maxima posset bona. Et bene quidem se res haberet. neutrum vero potest; quippe cum neque prudentem, neque imprudentem efficere valeat. faciunt vero quodlibet, utcunque contingit.

(4.) Cr. Haec quidem ita se habeant. Ad id vero, Socrates, mihi responde, num forte mi ceterorumque necessariarum tuorum respectus te retinet, ne, si hinc evaseris, calumniatores nos posse vexent, quasi te hinc furati fuerimus: ceganurque vel totum patrimonium, vel permultas pecunias amittere, vel prater hae aliud quippiam pati. Si quid tale times, curam ejusmodi pone. Justum namque est, nos tuæ salutis gratia non hoc solum, verum etiam, si oportuerit, majus aliiud subire periculum. Verum mihi obtenpera, neque aliter facias. So. Et haec equidem et alia multa, o Crito, considero. Cr. Ne igitur haec vereare, neque enim multum est argomentum, quod postulat hi, qui servare te atque hinc educere pollicentur. Vide præterea, quam tenues sint calumniatores tui, ut non magna ad eos placandos largitione sit opus. Tibi vero pecuniae adsunt meæ, ad hoc, ut opinor, sufficiences. Proinde si quo mei respectu adductus non putas meas pecunias erogandas, adsunt hospites isti parati persolvere. quorum unus etiam huc attulit sufficiens pecuniam, ad hoc ipsum paratam, Simmias Thebanus. ad hoc ipsum promtus est et Cebes, alique permulti. Quamobrem, ut modo dicebam, nihil tale metuas, quo minus serves teipsum. Sed neque etiam illud, quod in judicio dixisti, te remoretur, si hac urbe exires, quo teipsum verteres te minime habiturum. aliis enim multis in locis quocumque profectus fueris, te homines colent: ac si velis in Thessalia te conferre, reperies illic hospites meos, qui te plurimi libenter libentissime complecentur; tutumque praesidio suo adeo reddent, ut nemo in Thessalia tibi injuriam sit facturus.
Accedit ad haec, o Socrates, quod rem minime justam aggregi videris, si, cum salvis esse possis, teipsum perdas, taliaque contra te facere studeas, qualia inimici ipsi tui contunderent, contende-runtque, te perdere properantes. Proinde filios quoque tuos per dere mihi videris. quos cum liceat tibi educare atque erudire, deseris omnino, et quantum in te, eorum mores fortunae committis. Accident vero eis verisimiliter, qualia evenire orphanis consueve-runt. Profecto oportebat non genuisse filios; aut in eis educandis erudiendiisque laborem non recusare. Tu vero mihi videris, quae elegisset vir segnis ac piger, nunc elegisse: decebat autem contra viri boni fortisque eligere; præsertim te, per omnem vitam virtutis studium profitentem. Itaque non possum tua nostraque vice, familiarium tuorum, non erubescere, veritus, ne tota haec res tua ignavia quadam nostra sic tractata fuisse videatur. Et primum quidem ille tunc in judicium ingressum, cum liceret non ingredi; deinde concertatio ipsa judicii similiter acta; et extremus hic finis, tanquam ridiculum quiddam, per ignaviam segnitiemque nostram effugisse nos videbatur, quod nec nos te servaverimus, neque tu ipse te, cum id fieri absque magna difficultate puterit, si vel parum in nobis usus industriaeque fuisse. Haec igitur, o Socrates, considera, ne praeterquum quod mala sunt, etiam dedecori tibi nobisque sint: sed tibi consuele, immo vero non jam amplius consulendi tempus, sed consultum jam esse oportuit, unicum vero consilium est; vide-licet venienti haec nocte cuneta haec facta esse oportere. Sin autem ultra tardamus, nihil omnino fieri ulterius poterit. quamobrem om-nino mihi adhíbe fidem, o Socrates, nec ullo modo aliter facias.

(6.) So. Omne Crito, studium hoc tuum permulti faciendum esset, si qua ratione recta susceptum esset. sin minus, quanto vehem-entius est, tanto molestius. Considerandum est igitur, agendane haec nobis sint, an non. nam ego is sum non modo nunc, sed et semper, qui meorum nulli parem, praeterquam rationi, quae ratio-cinanti mihi optima videatur. Rationes itaque illas, quibus supe-rioribus temporibus usus sum, nec nunc quidem, postquam in hanc fortunam incidi, rejicere possum: sed similes mihi ferme apparent, easdemque in presentía, quas et prius, veneror atque profiteor: adeo, ut nisi nunc meliores affixture possimis, plane seire debas, me tibi non concessurum: non, si etiam plura, quam nunc, multitudinis potentia comminata, nos tanquam pueros larvali terribiliisque facie perterriere conetur, pecunia et damna, catenas, cedens objiciens. Cr. Quanam igitur ratione mediocris considerabimus? So. Hac utique, si id, quod tu de opinionibus paulo ante diecas, resum-al: utram semper recte se habeat necne, oportere scilicet qua-rundam opinionem rationem habere, quarundam vero minime. An forte prius quam in periculum mortis inciderem, recte id diecubatur: nunc vero constat, frustra, disputationis gratia, ita dictum fuisse, cum revera joco etiam u fugisque esset adductum. Cupio equidem, o Crito, una tecum considerare, nunquid sermo ille prior alienus appareat mihi, nunc in haec fortuna constituto; an prorsus idem qui et prius: atque utrum dimittendus sit a nobis, vel ipsi obtem-perandum. [Dicebatur autem, ut opinor, semper sic ab iis, qui se
aliquid dicere existimabant, ut nunc quidem ego dicebam: nemo, hominum opiniones partim plurimi faciendas ac sequendas, partim vero minime. Hoc, per Deos, o Crito, nonne tibi recte dici videtur? tu enim, ut fert hominum conditio, tantum abes a periculo ut crastino die moriaris; nec te in errorem inducit praesens calamitas.\]


(9.) So. Igitur ex his, quae confessi sumus, hoc considerandum, utrum justum sit conari me hinc exire, Atheniensibus non dimittentibus, vel injustum: ac si appareat, justum esse, tentemus: si minus, dimittamus. Quas vero tu affers considerationes de pecuniarum sumptu, de vulgari opinione, de filiis educandis: cavendum est, o Crito, ne excogitaciones revera horum multorum sint, qui facile interficiunt, atque eorum, qui similiter, inquam, si possent, reviviscerent, et id quidem absque mente. Nobis vero, quando quidem sic exigit ratio, nihil aliud attendendum est, quam quod modo dicebamus, utrum agamus justa, pecunias largiendo, grahamque habendo his, qui me hinc educant: utrum, inquam, in hoc agamus justa, nos quidem educti, illi vero educentes; an potius utrique in his omnibus agendis, agamus injuste: atque si appareat, nos iniqua aggradi, ne excogitandum quidem id est; sed manuete subire decret et mortem, et quodvis aliud supplicium prius, quam quidquam agamus inique. Cr. Recte loqui videris, Socrates. considera tamen, quid agamus. So. Consideremus, o bone vir, una. ac si qua in parte me dicentem redarguere poteris, redargue. ego enim assentiar. sin minus, desine quae so, o vir beate, jam toties eadem verba repeterete: oportere sci licet me hinc, Atheniensibus invitis, abire. Equidem multi facio, persuaso te haec agere; non autem invito. Attendite itaque, numquid considerationis initium tibi sufficienter dictum sit; conareque quod rogatus sis ita respondere, ut maxime censeas respondendum. Cr. Conabor equidem.

 PLATONIS

quodcumque ab aliis ipse passus fueris. Et vide, o Crito, ne quid, dum haec concedis, praeter sententiam tuam nobis assentiare. Per-
paucis enim, scio quid loquer, sic vel appareat, vel apparebit. At
vero quibus sic appareat, et quibus aliter, his non est communis de-
liberatio; sed necesse est, eos, cum ultro citroque consilia sua respi-
ciunt, invicem se despiceret. Animadverte igitur et tu diligenter,
utrum tibi milique communis sit haec opinio, mecumque sentias:
atque utrum ab hoc principio exorsi deliberamus, quasi nunquam
rectum sit, vel injuriari, vel ulcisci injuriam, vel malum referre in
eum qui intulit. An hic discedes a nobis, in hoc principio non
consentiens? Mihi quidem et jamdiu et nunc ita videtur. Quod
si tibi appeti aliter, dic, et doce. Sin autem in superioribus per-
manes, jam quid sequatur audi. Cr. Consentio equidem et per-
maneo. So. Dico ergo deinceps, immo potius interrogo, Utrum
qua quis confiteatur alicui, justa esse, facere debeat, an fallere?
Cr. Facere.

(11.) So. Ex his jam ita considera. Si nos hinc abeamus praeter
civitatis consensus, utrum male aliquidus faciemos, et his quidem,
quibus minime decet, vel non: et utrum in his permanebimus, quae
justa esse conveniunt, vel contra? Cr. Nequeo equidem, o So-
ocrates, ad haec respondere. Neque enim intelligo. So. Verum ita
considera, perinde ac si, volentibus nobis hinc sive aufragere, sive
quomodoque hoc vocandum sit, veniant leges, civitatisque hujus
respublica, et instantes nobis sic inquiant: Die nobis, o Socrates,
quidnam cogitas facere? an non intelligis, haec re, quam aggerediris,
te nobis legibus, totique patriae, quantum in te est, interitum ma-
chinari? an putas, civitatem ullam amplius stare posse, ac non
subverti, in qua judicia publica nullam vim habeant, sed a privatis
hominibus contemnuntur atque frangantur? Quid ergo dicemus ad
haec, o Crito, aliaque hujusmodi? Permulta enim in hane senten-
tiam afferre quis potest; praeertem orator, pro lege ita soluta de-
clamans, quae quidem sententias publico judicio latas jubet ratas
esse. an respondebimus illi, civitatem non recte judicando nobis
injuriam intulisse? itane, an aliter? Ca. Ita per Jovem, o So-
ocrates.

(12.) So. At enim leges ipsae sic respondent: O Socrates, nonne
nobis tecum id convenit, standum tibi esse judiciis, quae civitas
tulerit? Quod si leges ita loquentes admiraremur, forte dicent:
Noli, Socrates, quae modo diximus, admirari: immo responde,
cum tibi et interrogaet et respondere sit consuetum. Die age, quid-
nam nobis civitatique succenses, quo dissolve nobis contendas?
principio, nonne nos te genuimus? atque per nos pater tuus matrem
accept tuam, et provocavit? Dic inger, an has inter nos leges, quae
sunt circa conjugia, improbes, atque his aliqua in parte, quasi
minus rectis, succenses. Nihil succenseo, dicerem. Sed an his
legibus, quae educatione eruditionique natorum provident, in qua
ipse quoque eruditus es? an non recte dispositurum haec leges ad
hoc officium conditae, cum juberent patrem tuum in musica te et
gymnastica erudire? Recte dispositisse concederem. Age ergo,
postquam per nos genitus es, educatusque ac eruditus, primo qui-
dem num potes negare, te nostrum esse et natum et servum, ipsumque te et progenitores? deinde, cum id ita se habeat, an putas jus ex aequo tibi atque nobis esse; et quae nos tibi facere aggradiamur, eadem vicissim in nos abs te referri justum esse judicas? An, cum nec ad patrem, nec ad dominum, si eam habeas, tibi jus ex aequo sit, ut, quae ab illis patiare, in eos referre possis; neque si jurgio hi te laessant, contra jurgare, neque si te verberent, vicissim verberare, neque alia ejusmodi in eos tentare licet: contra patriam vero ac leges tibi licebit? adeo ut, si, nos judicantes id esse justum, interficere te velimus, tu vicissim nos leges et patriam pro viribus coneris occidere, dicasque, te in his agendis justa facere, qui virtutis curam revera habere poteritis. An sic es sapiens, ut te latuerit, et patri et matri et progenitoribus omnibus patriam esse anteponendam; atque esse venerabilissim quiddam sanctiusque, et in superiori sorte, tum apud deos, tum apud homines mentis compotes, patriam collocandam? colereque eaem oportere magis, eique obedere; ac rigidius se gerenti mitius assentiri, quam patri: et, si quid jubeat, vel dissuadere illi quantum liceat, vel facere; et patientissime sustinere, quidquid jusserit patiendum? ac, sive mandaverit verberari te, sive in vincula conjici, sive in praelium miserat ad vulnera excipienda, mortemque subeundam, obediendum est omnino. jus enim ita dictat; et neque tergiversandum, neque fugiendum, neque ordinem deserendum, sed et in bello, et in judicio, et prorsus ubique, ea sunt, quae respublica patriaque jusserit, facienda: aut certe verbis, quatenus justum est, uti licet ad persuadendum illi eamque placandam: vi autem uti nefas est, vel contra matrem, vel contra patrem, maxime vero omnium contra patriam. Quidnam ad haec dicemus, Crito, verane loqui leges, an contra? Cr. Mihi quidem videntur.

(13.) So. Proinde leges fortasse dicent: Animadverte, o Socrates, utrum vere dicamus, te injusta contra nos aggreди. Nos quidem, quae et alios cives genuimus, educavimus, nutrivimus, participes bonorum omnium, qua in nostra erant potestate, effecimus: tamen permisimus cuilibet Atheniensium, cognitis iam civitatis moribus legibusque, et reipublicae gubernandae forma, si cui non placeamus, licere, acceptis suis, quocunque placuerit hinc abire. Nec ulla ex nobis legibus impedit aut denegat, sive quis vestrum, cui nos civitasque minime placeamus, in coloniam aliquam hinc velit discedere, sive habitacionem alio transferre cupiat, quo minus id pro arbitrio facere valeat, secunque sua perferre. At vero quicunque ex vobis, postquam cognoverit, quemadmodum nos judicia disponimus, et in ceteris omnibus regimis civitatem, permanserit tamen, hunc jam assequarum, opere ipso convenisse nobiscum, quocunque jussertime, se facturum. Atque eum, qui non paruerit, tripliciter injuriari censemus: et quod genitricibus nobis non obtemerat; et quod nutricibus non obsequitur; et quod pactus nobis obedire, neque obedire, neque persuadere nobis studet, si quid minus recte facere videamur: cumque praecepta nostra libere proponamus, neque mandemus rigide, sed permittamus alterum e duobus, aut ver-
bis persuaderi nobis, aut mandata explere; tu horum neutrum facis.


(15.) Considera rursus, si hæc transgressus fueris, et ea quæ inique cogitas perpetraveris, ad quid tandem id vel tibi, vel necessarius tuis conduct. Cuique enim constat, in periculo necessarios tuos fore, ne ipsi quoque in exsilium expellantur, priventurque civitate, et patrimonio suo expolientur. Tu autem si quam in civitatem finitimam te contuleris, vel Thebas, vel Megaras, (utraque

(16.) Ceterum, o Socrates, fidem nobis adhibens nutriticibus tuis, neque filios tuos, neque vitam, neque alium quidquam pluris facias, quam justitiam: ut cum in vitam alteram transmigraveris, valeas illie privisidibus horum omnium reddere rationem. Nempe si leges transgressus hie feceris, neque melius, neque justius, neque sanctius id vel tibi contiget, vel tuis; neque illuc tibi profecto conducent. quin potius injuriam passus abito, si abieris, non a nobis quidem legibus, sed ab hominibus. Verum si adeo turpiter auffegeris, etiam versa vice injurias malaque referens, conventiones nobiscum initas et promissa transgressus, atque ladeos eos, quos minime oportebat, te ipsum scilicet et amicos et patriam, nosque leges: nos utique et vivent tibi insensae hic erimus, et in altera vita leges, quae illie sunt nostrae sores, haud quaquam te benigno recipient, scientes, te nos pro viribus disperdere conatum fuisse. Quamobrem, ne Crito alter tibi quam nos persuadeat, caveto.
(17.) Haec equidem, o dulcis amice Crito, audire videor, quem-admodum Corybantes tibias audire se putant. atque in me sermo-num ejusmodi sonitus adeo reboat, ut alia audire non possim. Vides, quae in praesentia mihi apparent: quibus si quid contradicere aggrediaris, frustra conabere. verumtamen si quid te profecturum confidis, dicas. Cr. Ergo vero quod dicam, o Socrates, nihil habeo. So. Desine ergo, Crito; et pergamus hac, quandoquidem hac nos Deus ipse ducit.
ECHECRATES, PILÉDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIMMias, CRITO, MINISTER UNDECIM VIRORUM.


(3.) Ph. Conabor equidem a principio tibi omnia enarrare. Solebamus quotidianie diebus superioribus ad Socratem proficiscer ego atque alii, convenientes mane in illa curia, in qua et judicium factum fuerat: carceri enim erat proxima. Colloquentes igitur inter nos operiebamur semper illie, quoad career aperiretur. aperiebatur enim haud admodum mane. eo autem aperto ingrediiebamur ad Socratem, et ad plurimum diem cum ipso confabulabamur. Tune ergo prius solito convenimus, pridie namque ejus diei, cum e carere egressi essemus vespere, navem ex Delo audivimus redisse. itaque ediximus invicem, summo mane nobis fore ad locum solitum redeundum. Cum vero reversi essemus, exiens nobis obvius janitor, qui nos solebat admittere, cxpectare jussit nec prius ingredi quam ab ipso accessiremur. Solvant enim, inquit, undecei viri Socratem, illique denuntiant hodie mortem esse obtundam. Neque deinde admodum commoratus redivit ad nos, jussitque intrare. Itaque introucunt Socratem quidem invenimus compedibus paulo ante solutum; Xan-
et turn censui videlicet et sciebam atque verum musica mihi poeta praeceptum. idem ipsum feceras nam facere. totiens tempore num multi sacra dum o
Nam inquit, praesentia. fabulatorem, eorum spondeam sed puguantia connexa. alterum bulam affabuntur ejus quamque videtur, manuque plangentem. quidem intuitus, mulieres ibis thippen (5.)

(4.) Ad haec Cebes, per Jovem, inquit, o Socrates, opportune mihi id in memoriam revocasti. cum enim poemata composueris, intendens sermones Æsopii proemiumque in Apollinem: tum alií multi me interrogaverunt, tum Evanus præcipue atque prius, quonam consilio, postquam huc devenisti, hæce feceris, quæ prius feceras nunquam. Si igitur tibi curæ est, ut habeam, quod respondeam Evano, quando iterum ex me quæserit, quod certo scio ipsum esse facturum; die queso, quid illi sit respondendum. Vera, inquit, o Cebes, responde, me id effecisse, non ut vel sibi gratificarer vel cum suis carminibus decertarem: sciebam enim facile id non esse: verum ut insomnia quedam experirer, me simul expians, num forte hæc sit ea musica, quam sepulcrum jam exercere me jubent. Nam frequenter in superiori tempore insomniwm idem, licet alia atque alia forma sese mihi offeream, eadem semper ita praecipit, Fae, o Socrates, musicam, atque exerce. Ego igitur, quod in superiori tempore faciebam, hoc mihi præceptum arbitrabam: et quemadmodum currentes adhortari solemus, sic, quod ipsa ante faciebam, ad idem me insomniwm cohortari putabam; quasi philosophia maxima musica foret. Postquam vero facto jam de me judicio mori me interim Dei festivitas inhiberet: censui oportere, si forte insomniwm totiens iubeat populum hanc musicam exercere, non negligere ejus præceptum. Tutius enim fore arbitratus sum, antequam et vita migrarem, expiare animum atque, ut monet insomniwm, poemata facere. Quamobrem primo equidem cecini eum ipsum, cujus tunc sacra celebrabantur: atque post Deum, judicium oportere eum, qui poeta futurus sit, non sermones sed fabulas facere, me vero non esse fabulatorem, nonnullas ex fabulis Æsopi, quas sciebam, promptiores habebam, ut in quamque prius incidi, modulatus sum.

(5.) Haec igitur, o Cebes, refer Evano: et valere jube, atque consule, ut si probe sapit, me sequatur. migro enim hinc hodie.
demens aliquis forsitan id putaret, fugiendum scilicet esse a domino; neque cogitaret non esse id, quod bonum est, fugiendum, sed in eo maxime permanendum. ideoque absque ratione fugeret. Qui vero mentem habet, semper apud eum, qui sit melior, esse cupit. Atque ita, o Socrates, contra omnino conveniens esse videitur quam quod paulo ante dicebatur. Sapientes quidem decere graviter mortem ferre; insipientes vero libenter. Socrates igitur, cum hae audisset, detectari visus est argutia Cebetis. conversusque ad nos, Semper, inquit, hic Cebes rationes quasdam perscrutatur; neque admodum facile, quod quivis dixerit, vult admirare. Tunc Simmias, Mihi quoque, inquit, nonnullam videtur Cebes dicere. Quo enim consilio sapientes viri meliores revera quam ipsi sint, fugiant illisque earere facile patiuntur? Atque mihi videtur Cebes sermonem in te intendere, quod tam facile et nos reliquas et Deos, ut tu ipse fateteris, principes bonos. Justa dictis, inquit Socrates. arbitror enim vos dicere, meipsum tanquam in judicio oportere purgare. Sim. Et maxime quidem.

(8.) So. Age ergo, conabor nunc apud vos accuratius, quam super apud Atheniensium judices fecerim, me defendere. Equidem, o Simmias atque Cebes, nisi me migraturum putarem primum quidem ad Deos alios sapientes et bonos, deinde ad homines defunctos his, qui hic sunt, meliores, injuste agerem non moleste ferens mortem. Nunc certe habetote, sperare me ad viros bonos iturum. sed hoc quidem pauca omnino asseraverem. Quod vero ad Deos dominos valde bonos iturus sim, certum habetote, si quid alius ejusmodi, et hoc utique me affirmaturum. Propter eam habu simili terrae mortem moleste fero: sed bono animo sum; speroque superesse aliiquid his, qui defuncti sunt; atque, ut jam dixi dicitur, multo melius bonis fore quam malis. Sim. Quidnam, o Socrates, cogitas? minquid ipse cum istae sententia hinc abire? an nos quoque participes ejus relinquere? nempe commune nobis quoque id bonum arbitror esse debere. praeterea ista demum te apud nos purgaveris, si, quae dicas, nobis etiam persuaseris. So. Dabo equidem operam. sed Critonem prius auscultemus. videtur enim mihi jamdudum nonnulla significare velle. Cebes. Quidnam putas alius, o Socrates, quam quod jamdum mihi dict is, qui tibi venenum est daturus? jubebit enim te moneri, ut quam parcellissime loquaris: dicens eos qui disputant, nimirum incaelese: nihil vero tale bibituris venenum convenire. alioquin eos, qui id fecerint, cogi interdum bis, quandoque ter venenum bibere. So. Mitte ipsum, tantum id, quod est officii ejus, paret, tanquam bis et, si oportuerit, ter praebiturus. Simmias. Et antea quidem fere id responsurum sciebam. sed me ille jamdudum stimulat. So. Mitte ipsum. Ego vero, o judices, rationem vobis jam reddere volo, ob quam mihi videatur vir, qui per omnem vitam incubuerit philosophia, merito magna cum fiducia imminenter exspectare mortem, atque bona spe esse, se ibi, postquam hinc migraverit, maxima bona reportaturum. quemadmodum igitur id ita se habeat, o Simmias atque Cebes, conabor equidem aperire.

(9.) Quicunque philosophiam recte aliquando attigerunt, nimirum

(II.) So. Nonne igitur ex his omnibus necessario sequitur, opinionem ejusmodi legitimis philosophis usque adeo constare debere, ut ad se invicem ita loquautur? Necessaria jam ratione conclusit, nos quadam rationis ipsius via ad id considerandum perducit, videlicet duce corpus habemus, animusque noster tauto malo crit admissus, nunquam nos id, quod desideramus, verum ad votum consecuturos. Impedimenta enim pene innumeralibila corpus praebet propter necessarium ejus alimoniam. praetera morbi nobis hinc incidentes investigationem veritatis impediunt: amoribus, cupiditatis, timoribus, multiplicibusque imaginibus, multis denique nugis nos implet, ut verissime dicatur nihil pensi unquam ac veri nobis affere. Nam ad bella, ad seditiones, ad pugnas nihil aliquid quam corpus multiplex, ejusque cupiditates impellit. Omnia enim pecuniarum gratia fiant. Pecunias autem quaerere coginam corporis gratia, usui ejus inservientes, atque ita fit, ut propter haec omnia a philosophi studii abstrahamus. Extremum vero omnium est, quod si quid ab ipso otii nobis contingat, nosque ad considerandum aliquid conferamus, investigatingus nobis rursus ubique sese opponens, tumulti quodam perturbat animum, et quasi percutiens reddit attonitum, adeo ut hoc obstaculo impediti verum perspicere nequeamus. Ceterum nobis revera demonstratum est, si quando optamus pure aliquid intelligere, recedere a corpore oportere atque ipso animo res ipsas considerare. atque tunc, ut appareat, com-
potes evademus ejus, quod affectamus, cujusve amatores profitemur nos esse, scilicet sapientiae, cum videlicet mortui fuerimus, quemadmodum significat ratio: dum autem vivemus, nequaquam. nempe si nihil cum corpore pure discerni potest, et dubus alterum: aut nullo modo possimus scientiam consequi aut post mortem. Tunc enim animus ipse per seipsum erit seorsum a corpore; prius vero nequaquam. Atque dum vivimus, ita; ut videtur, proxime ad scientiam accedemus si quam minimum cum corpore commercium habuerimus, neque quicquam cum illo communicaverimus, nisi quantum summa cogat necessitas; neque hujus natura replebimus, sed ab ejus contagione cavebimus, quoad deus ipse nos solvat. Atque ita puri et a corporis insanias liberati, ut consentaneum est, cum talibus erimus, cognoscemusque per nos ipsos sincerum quoddlibet, id est, forsitam ipsum verum, nam impuro quidem purum attingere nefas est. Talia equidem, o Simmia, judico necessarium esse omnes discendi cupidos loqui invicem atque opinari, an non ita tibi videtur? Sim. Et maxime quidem omnium, o Socrates.

(12.) Si haec igitur vera sunt, o amice, magna spes est eunti illuc, quo nunc ego profiscor, sicubi, et ibi sufficierunt ejus rei se compotent fieri, cujus gratia tantum nostrum negotium in superiori vita suscipimus. Hanc ergo migrationem, in praesentia mihi in-junctam, bona cum spe suspicio: similiterque quivis alius, qui modo putavit praparatam sibi mentem tanquam purificatam. Sim. Ita prorsus. So. Purificatio vero nonne in hoc consistit, quod jam-dudum dicebamus, videlicet ut, quam maxime possimus, sejunga-mus a corpore animum, cuncte assuefaciamus per se undique a corporis contagione sevocari et colligi, itaque (quoad ejus fieri po-test) habitare; idque, et in praesenti tempore et in futuro, a corpore tanquam a vinculis resolutum? Sim. Maxime quidem. So. Nonne igitur haec mors appellatur, solutio animae et separatio a corpore? Sim. Prorsus. So. Solvere vero ipsum, quemadmodum confitemur, omni tempore maxime ac soli student, qui recte et philosophantur, atque haec ipsa philosophorum meditatio est, animum a corpore solvere atque separare, nonne ita? Sim. Ita videtur. So. Quam-obrem, ut in principio dicebamus, ridiculum foret, si vir, qui se in vita sic comparavit, ut quam proxime ad mortem accederet, ea deinde adveniente perturbaretur, nonne ridiculum? Sim. Quidni? So. Revera igitur, o Simmia, recte philosophantes mortem commentantur, atque ab ea minime omnium perverterunt. Ita vero considera. Cum enim corpus quidem ubique aspernentur, animum vero ipsum cupiant secundum seipsum habere; nonne summa esset absurditas, si tune, quando id eventit, expavescent molesteque fer-rant; neque libenter illuc proficiscantur, quo cum pervenerint, spes est eo quidem, quod amabant in vita, potiri (amabant autem sapientiam); co autem, cujus commercium moleste ferebant, liberari? An vero amatis et mulieribus et illiis defunctis, multi jam sponte voluerunt ad inferos proficisci, sperantes eos ibi visere cum eisque versari, quos amaverant: sapientiae autem verus amator, vehementer in hac ipsam spem adductus, non alter erat pro digni-tate ulla se comparaturum, quam si moriatur, inimicentem mortem
aegre feret, ac non libenter hinc illuc emigrabit? Arbitrari quidem, o amice, oportet, si vere philosophus sit, magnopere apud ipsum hanc opinionem valere, ut non alibi puram sapientiam posse assequi speret quam in futura post mortem vita. Si autem hoc ita se habet, nonne, quemadmodum modo dicebam, praeter rationem foret omnino, si mortem vir ejusmodi formidaret?

expiatius neque iniatus migrabit ad inferos, cum jacere in luto: quicunque vero purgatus atque iniatus illuc accesserit, cum diis habitare, aiunt enim, qui mysteria tractant, ministri Bacchi ferentes ferulas nathecophori quidem feruligeri multi sunt. Bacchi vero pauci. Hi vero, ut equidem opinor, non aliis sunt, quam qui recte philosophati sunt. quorum quidem in numero esse me, neque infereorem quidem omni studio pro viribus conatus sum; an vero recte contenderit aliquidve profecerim, cum illuc pervenerimus, certo sciemus, si deus voluerit, paulo post, ut mihi videtur. Hae igitur mea excusatio est, o Simmia et o Cebes, quam videlicet ob causam, cum vos eosque, qui hic sunt, dominos relinquam, merito non aegre feram neque perturber, spero enim, me et illic non minus, quam hic, bonus dominos amicosque inventurum. Multi vero id minime credunt. Si igitur defensio mea vobis magis quam Atheniensiibus judicibus persuasit, bene se res habet.

(14.) Cum haec Socrates dixisset, suscipliens sermonem Cebes sic inquit, Cetera quidem, o Socrates, recte dicta videntur: quantum vero ad ipsam animam spectat, valde ambigunt homines, ne anima a corpore separata musquam sit uterius, sed ea ipsa die, qua homo mortem obierit, intrepidamque sequentem a corpore dissolvatur, atque exhalans, quasi ventus aut fumus, dissipetur atque evanescat, neque usquam ulterior omnino sit aliquid. Precepto si esset alicubi collecta in somnium, et ab his malis, quae tu modo narrabas, libera, multa nimirum bonaque specesse, o Socrates, vera, quae disebas, fore. Ceterum ad id forfasse persuasione fideque non parva opus est, ut credatur, superesse animam post iterum hominum, atque aliquid vim intelligentiamque habere. So. Vera, o Cebes, loqueris. Verum quid agendum censes? an forte de his ipsis contra, sibi fore an aliter probable sit? Ce. Libenter equidem audirem de his rebus, quid sentias. So. Neminem arbitror haec audientem, nec si comedus quidem sit, esse dicturum nugari nune me, ac de quibus minime oporteat verba facere. Si ergo placet oportetque considerare.

(15.) Id hoc pacto consideremus, utrum videlicet apud inferos sint mortuorum animae, nee. Vetus quidem hic exstat sermo, cujus memores sumus, abire quidem illuc animas defunctorum, rursusque huc reverti fieriique ex mortuis. Atqui si hoc verum est, ut ex mortuis iterum viventes fiant, essent animae illie nostrae. neque enim rursus fierent, si alicubi non essent. Atque haec sufficiens conjectura est, ita esse, si revera constet, haud aliunde viventes fieri quam ex mortuis. at vero nisi id sit, alia opus erit ratione. Ce. Omnino. So. Neque vero id in hominis solum, si planius intelligere vis, consideres, sed in animalibus omnibus et plantis atque, ut summatis dicam, in omnibus quae gignuntur, in his, inquam, omnibus consideremus, nunquid omnia sic fiant, neque aliunde quam ex contrariis contraria, quibuscumque tale aliquid contingit: quemadmodum pulchrum turpi quodammodo contrarium est et justum injusto, aliaque ejusmodi quam plurima videmus. Ergo utrum necessarium sit, cuicunque aliquid est contrarium, nullo modo aliunde id quam ex suo contrario fieri? Veluti quando quid majus


(17.) So. Animadvertite ergo, o Cebes, haud ab re nos haec, ut arbitror, concessisse. Nisi enim continuæ altera vicissim alteris
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reddentur, quasi quodam circulo remeantia, sed directa quaedam progressio foret, duntaxat ex altero in ejus oppositum, neque rursus reflectentur in alterum facerentque regressum; omnia tandem, mihi crede, tandem subirent figuram atque affectionem, fierique cessarent. Ce. Quonam id pacto dicis? So. Haudquaquam intellectu difficile est, quod loquor. Perinde enim ac si in somnum caderetur quidem, ab eo vero in vigiliam nunquam resurgeretur, minime te latet, omnia tandem eo deventura, ut Endymion ridicula quaedam fabula videatur, neque appareat usquam; eum cetera quoque universa somno similer opprimantur. Proinde si confunde- rentur quidem omnia, nunquam vero discernentur, Anaxagora illud repente contigeret, Universa videlicet esse simul. Eadem ratione, o amice Cebes, si, quaecumque vitam acceperint, moriantur, mortua vero cum fuerint, mortua relinquantur neque iterum reviviscant; an non necessarium est omnino, cuncta demum interisse nihilque vivere? Nam si ex aliis quidem viventia fierent, postea vero perirent, quid obstaret, quo minus in interitum cuncta consu- merentur? Ce. Nihil prorsus, o Socrates; sed mihi omnino vera loqui videris. So. Est certe, o Cebes, maxime omnium ita, ut mihi videtur; neque nos hae ipsa quasi decepti confessi summus: sed revera revivescientia est, atque ex mortuis viventes fiant, mor- tuorumque supersunt animae. atque bonis quidem melius est; malis vero pejus.


(20.) So. Nonne, si eam sortiti ante nativitatem ipsam jam ha- bentes nati sumus, scivimus et ante oratum atque statim nati, non solum ipsum æquale majusque et minus, verum etiam ejusdem gene- ris omnia? non enim de æquali magis nunc nobis est sermo quam de ipso pulchro, de ipso bono, de ipso justo atque sancto, et, ut dico, de omnibus, quibus proprium hoc ipsum, quod est, assignamus, et interrogationibus interrogantes et respionibus respondentes, ut necessarium sit nos, antequam nasci, horum omnium scientiam habuisse. Sim. Est ita. So. Ac si, acceptis scientiis, non semper obliscircemur, oportet et cum ipsis nasci, semper etiam per omnem vitam seire. Nam seire id est, acceptam aliequot rei scientiam retinere nec amisisse, an non oblivionem scientiae jactu- ram esse dicerimus? Sim. Ita prorsus, o Socrates. So. Sin autem acceptam ante oratum scientiam nati animumus; deinde vero freti sensibus circa ipsas scientias illas, quas ante haberamus, recipi- mus: nonne id, quod dicerem appellamus, esset scientiam propriam recuperare, atqui id Reminisci nominantes recte nominaremus? Sim. Recte. So. Fieri enim id posse apparuit: videlicet ut cum quis aliquid senserit vel videndo vel audiendo vel aliter sentiend, aliud quiddam ex hoc agnoscat, cujus erat oblitis, cui quidem hoc quoddammodo propinquabat, sive simile id sit sive dissimile. Ita, quod jam pridem dico, e duobus alterum, aut enim scientes nati sumus, scimusque per omnem vitam omnes; aut, quos deinde dici-
mus discere, duntaxat reminiscuntur; atque disciplina reminiscen-
tia est. Sim. Sic omnino se res habet, o Socrates.

(21.) So. Utrum igitur eligis, o Simmia? vel cum scientia nos
esse natos, vel reminisci postea, quorum prius scientiam acceper-
Quid vero? potesne eligere, quid de hoc videatur tibi? Vir scien-
s postest eorum, quae seint, reddere rationem, an contra? Sim.
Necesse est, o Socrates, posse. So. An vero tibi videntur omnes ra-
tiones de his, quae modo tractabamus, afferre posse? Sim. Opta-
rem equidem: sed multo magis vereor, ne cras nullus hic homo
sit, qui pro dignitate id sciat efficere. So. Non igitur, o Simmia,
putas omnes hoc intelligere? Sim. Nullo modo. So. Reminis-
cuntur ergo, quae aliquando didicerant. Sim. Necesse est. So.
Quando vero acceperunt animae nostrae scientiam? non enim post
Ita. So. Erant igitur, Simmia, animae etiam prius, quam in hu-
manam speciem devenierit, seorsum a corpore, intelligentiamque
habebatis. Sim. Nisi forte, o Socrates, dum nasceremur, ipsae
scientias acceperimus. nam id etiam tempus reliquam est. So. Est
sic, o amice, sed quonam alio tempore eas amissimus? non enim
habentes jam eas nascimur, ut modo confitebamus. An in eodem
perdimus, quo et accepiius? an aliu tempus affere potes? Sim.
Nullo, Socrates, modo. sed nihil me dicere minime adverte-
bam.

(22.) So. An ergo sic nobis se res habet, o Simmia? Si quidem
sunt ea, quae quotidian praeclaimus, pulchrum scilicet quidam
atque bonum et omnis ejusmodi essentia, ad quam omnia sensibus
percepta referimus, quae et prius erat nostra et tuncquam nostram
querentes invenimus atque ad ipsius exemplar referimus; necesse
est, ita, ut et ipsa sunt, nostram quoque animam prius etiam, quam
nasceremur, exstitisse. At si haec non sunt, frustra utique ratio
haec tractata esset. An non ita se habet, atque par necessitas est,
et ipsa esse et animas nostras, ante quam nascemerum: et nisi ipsa
sunt, neque haec utique sunt? Sim. Mirifice, o Socrates, eadem
mihis videtur esse necessitas: atque pulcherrime hoc ratio nos
perducit, ut similiter tam animam nostram quam essentiam ipsam,
quam modo dicebas, ante quam nasceremur, exstisit esse confiteamur.
Nihil enim tam certum habeo quam esse ejusmodi omnia, et quidem
maxime, scilicet pulchrum ipsum et bonum aliaque omnia, quae tu
modo dicebas. Et quantum ad me attinet, satis est demonstratum.
So. Quid vero videtur Cebeti? oportet enim illi quoque persuadere.
Sim. Satis et illi arbitrator persuasum, quamvis omnium repugna-
tissimis sit et ad credendum tardissimus. opinor tamen sufficienter
illi probatum, ante ortum nostrum animam exstisitisse.

(23.) An vero post interitum nostrum etiam futura sit, nec mihi
quidem ipsi, o Socrates, satís adhuc videtur ostensum. sed nunc
etiam restat multorum dubitatio illa, quam in medium Cebes ad-
duxerat, ne videlicet homine moriente simul anima dissipetur atque
ita esse desinat. quid enim prohibit fieri quidem illam et aliunde
constitui, atque esse prius etiam, quam in corpus hominis laberetur:
postquam vero ab eo discesserit, tunc illam insuper interire? Ce. Recte loqueris, Simmia. Videtur enim quasi dimidium ejus, quod oportet, probatum, ante videlicet, quam nasceremur, nostram animam exstitisse: oportet autem id quoque ostendere, postquam mortui fuerimus, non minus fore quam esset, antequam nasceremur, si modo finem suum demonstratio sit habitura. So. Demonstratum quidem est istud, o Simmia et o Cebes, etiam nunc, si modo velitis, et id, quod modo probatum est, et illud, quod ante concesseramus, videlicet omne vivens ex mortuo fieri, in unum connectere. Si enim est anima primum, et cum in hanc venit vitam fitque homo, necesse est non aliunde eam quam ex mortuis proficiere: cur non necessarium sit, ut etiam post mortem corporis maneat, cum oporteat ipsum ad hanc vitam reverteri? Demonstratum igitur et nunc est, quod dicitur.

(24.) Veruntamen videmini tu atque Simmias cupere idem rursus diligentius pertractari: ac forsitan puerrorum more formidatis, ne revera corpore egredientem ventus dissolvat atque dispergat, presertim si ventis vehementius flantibus exeat. Ad hæc Cebes subridens, tanquam nobis id formidantibus, inquit, o Socrates, contra persuadere conare: immo vero non tanquam formidantibus nobis: sed fortasse est inter nos puer alicuius talia metuens: huic ergo animam persuadere, ne mortem eam larvas pertimescat. So. Oportet certe huic mederi carminibus quotidie, quoad sanus efficiatur. Ce. Sed ubinam medicum ejusmodi nauciscemur, o Socrates, cum tu discesseris? So. Ampla est, o Cebes, Græcia, in qua sunt viri praestantes: quam plurimae sunt barbaræ nationes; per has omnes ejusmodi medicum debitis perquirere, neque pecunias parentes neque laboribus, nihil est enim, pro quo commodius omnia quis expendat. Perscrutandum quoque est etiam inter vos ipsos. Forte enim non facile invenietis, qui melius quam vos id quæt efficere, Ce. Fict id quidem. sed redeamus jam, si tibi placet, unde digressi sumus. So. Mihi quidem placet. quid enim probetur? Ce. Recte respondes.

tationem aliquando aliquam ipsa recipiunt? an ipsorum unumquodque semper id, quod est uniforme, existens ipsum per seipsum, eodem modo et secundum eadem se habet, neque unquam neque usquam nec ullo pacto mutationem aliquam suscipit? Ce. Necesse est, o Socrates, haec eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habere. So. Quid autem dicemus de multis, quae similibet pulchra dicuntur, scilicet hominibus, equis, vestibus vel alis quibusque talibus, quae vel pulchra dicuntur vel aequalia, vel etiam de omnibus, quae illis synonyma sunt? num haec secundum eadem se semper habent? an potius omnino contra quam illa, videlicet neque ipsa sibimet neque invicem unquam, ut simpliciter loquar, ullo pacto secundum eadem eodemque modo se habent? Ce. Haec, o Socrates, nunquam eodem modo sunt. So. Et haec quidem tangi, videri alissque sensibus attingi possunt. quae vero semper secundum eadem permanent, sola intelligentiae ratione percipitur; suntque invisibilia, quae talia sunt, neque cernuntur.


(27.) So. An non et hoc evenire in superioribus dicebamus, ut cum anima ad aliquod considerandum socium sibi corpus assumit, vel per visum vel per auditum vel per alium sensum (hoc enim est per corpus considerare, quia per sensus id agitur) tunc quidem a corpore trahatur ad ea, quae nunquam eodem modo sunt, atque ipsa aberret perturbeturque, quasi ebria vacillet, utpotest quae talia quædam attigerit. Ce. Prorsus. So. At vero quotiens ipse animus per seipsum excogitat, illuc se confert ad purum, sempiternum, immortale, semper eodem modo se habens: et tanquam ipsius cognatus semper inhaeret illi, quotiens ipse rediderit in seipsum, cique liceat, cessetque ab errore: et circa illa semper secundum eadem eodem modo se habet, utpotest qui talia jam attigerit, atque haec ejus affectio sapientia sive prudentia nominatur. Ce. Praeclare ac vere omnino loqueris, Socrates. So. Utri igitur speciei rursus tibi videtur, ex his quae et in superioribus et modo dicta sunt, anima esse similior atque cognator? Ce. Arbitror quidem, o Socrates, quemlibet vel indicilem prorsus et pertinacem et hac discursione concessurum, animam et per totum et per omne similiorem esse et, quod semper eodem


(30.) Ce. Ita per Jovem. So. Sin autem polluta impuraque a corpore decedat, utpote quæ corpus semper amplexa ipsum duntaxat.
colecerit et amaverit, ejusque voluptatibus et libidinibus quasi veneficiis quibusdam delinita fuerit, ut usque adeo capta, ut nihil aliud putet esse verum, nisi quod corporeum sit, quod tangi, quod videri possit, quodve bibat et quod edat, et quo in venereisi utatur: quod vero oculis quidem occultum et invisibile sit, verumtamen intelligibile et philosophia comprehendendum, habere odio consueverit formidareque et fugere: sic, inquam, institutam animam putasne ipsum per se sinceram evadere? 

Ct. Nullo modo. So. Sed infec-tam involutamque, ut arbitrator, contagione corporea, quam consue-tudo congressusque cum corpore, propert continuam familiaritatem plurimumque ejus cultum, inservit quasi jam naturalem? 

Ct. Ita putamus. So. Ponderosum vero, o amice, id putandum est et grave terrenumque et visible, quod anima ejusmodi secum trahit: idque ab eo graviter et ad visibilem retrahitur locum, metu invisibiliis atque occulti: et quemadmodum fertur, circa monumenta sepulchraque revolvitur, circa quae jam nonnulla apparuerunt animarum umbrosa phantasmata, qualia praeterunt simulacra tales animae, quae videlicet non purae decesserunt a corpore, sed visibilem aliquid tra-hentes: quo fit, ut videri possint. 

Ct. Consentaneum est, o Socrates. So. Consentaneum tamen, o Cebes, non esse has honorum animas, sed malorum, quae circa hæc obberrare coguntur, penas dantes vitae improbe acte. itaque tam diu circumvagantur, quoad, cupiditatem naturae corporeae comitante, rursus induant corpus.

(31.) Induunt autem, ut decens est, ejusmodi mores, quales in vita exercerunt. 

Ct. Quales dicis mores, o Socrates? 

So. Ejusmodi eos quidem, qui ventri dediti per inertiam atque lasciviam vitam egerunt, neque quicquam pensi pudorisque habuerunt, decens est, asinos similique subire. an non putas? 

Ct. Consentanea loco quieris. So. Qui vero injurias, tyrannides, rapinas præ ceteris secuti sunt, in Luporum, accipitrum, milvorum genera par est per-transire. num alio has migrare dicendum est? 


Ct. Manifestum id quidem. So. Nonne horum felicissimi sunt et in optimum proficiscuntur locum, quicumque populiarem civilisque virtutem, quam temperantiam et justitiam nominant, exercuere, absque philosophia quidem atque mente, sed et consuetudine exercitationeque acquisi-tam? 

Ct. Quonam pacto hi felicissimi sunt? 

So. Quoniam decens est, hos in tale quoddam genus iterum civile miteque demigrare, quodam modo apum aut vesparum vel formicarum; atque deinde in idem rursus genus humanum, modestosque ex illis homines fieri. 

Ct. Ita decet.

(32.) So. In deorum vero genus nulli fas est pervenire praeter eos, qui discendi cupiditate flagrantes et philosophati sunt et puri penitus decesserunt. 

Horum quidem gratia, o amice Simmia atque Cebes, qui recte philosophantur, ab omnibus corporis cupiditatibus abstinent; atque ita perseverant, nec se illis unquam tradunt: neque familiaris jacturam paupertatemque formidant, quemadmodum multi pecuniarum cupidi: neque rursus contemptum atque ignominiam, quemadmodum qui magistratus amiant et honores, deinde ab his

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(33.) Cē. Quonam pacto, o Socrates? So. Dicem equidem. Cognoscunt profecto viri scientiae cupidi, quemadmodum eorum animam suscepti revera ligatam in corpore atque implicitam, ae per ipsum quasi per carcerem quendam res considerare coactam : cumque per seipsam id non faciat, omni prorsus inscitia involutam : (cognoscunt praeterea,) quemadmodum philosophia perspiciens, quam callide corporum vinculum adstringat animam ; quippe cum per ipsum fiat concupiscentiam, per quam devinctus animus adjunctur sit ad seipsum devincendum : cognoscunt, inquam, viri scientiae cupidi, quemadmodum philosophia eorum animam ita constitutam suscipient, paulatim instruit solvereque aggregitur, ostendens quam fallax oculos, quam fallax aurum ceterorumque sensuum sit judicium, suadens ab his discedere, quatenus hæerere illis summa non cogat necessitas, seque in se ipsam revocare atque colligere, nec ulla credere, praterquam sibi, quatenus videlicet ipsa per seipsam intelligat quodlibet eorum, quae sunt, existens per seipsam : quod vero ipsa per alia considerat, existens in aliis aliiud, nihil existimare verum: (esse vero ejusmodi quidem sensibile atque visibile:) quod autem ipsa per se considerat, intelligibilis atque invisibile. Huic ergo solutioni veri philosophi animus repugnandum non esse judicam, sic a voluptatibus, cupiditatisibus, doloribus, timoribus, pro viribus abstinet: judicam, quando quis vehementer delectetur vel metuat vel doloat aut cupiat, haud tantum ab his duntaxat pati malum, quantum quis forsan existimariat, videlicet si propter concupiscentias vel aegrotet quispiam vel pecunias consumperit: sed quod malorum omnium maximum, extremum, turpissimum est, perpeti, neque tam illud animadvertere. Cē. Quidnam hoc est? So. Quod videlicet omnis anima hominis cogitum defectari vel dolere circa aliiquid vehementer, simulque putare illud, circa quod hoc maxime patitur, manifestissimum esse atque verissimum, cum longe sit secus. hæ autem maxime sunt, quæ visibilia sunt. Rnome? Cē. Omnino. So. An non in hac passione anima quam maxima ligatur a corpore? Cē. Quonam pacto? So. Quoniam omnis voluptas atque dolor, quasi clavum tenens, animam corpori affigit atque connectit, efficitque corpoream adeo, ut jam opinetur ea esse vere, quae suadeat corpus. nepe ex eo, quod eadem opinetur cum corpore eisdemque oblectetur, cogitum, ut puto, ejusdem moris ejusdemque alimoniae fieri: ut nunquam possit pura in vitam alteram proficisceri, sed semper plena corporis labae egrediatur; idioque cito cadat rursus in aliud corpus, et quasi sata iterum innascatur, atque propter a commercio divinae, puræ, uniformis essentiae aliena prorsus evadat. Cē. Verissima narras, o Socrates.

(34.) So. Horum igitur gratia, o Cebes, justi scientiae studiosi
temperantiam fortitudinemque sequuntur; non autem illorum, quo-
Non certe, sed ita veri philosophi animus cogitaret: nec ullo modo 
arbitraretur, cum ipsum philosophia solvisset, oportere iterum vo-
luptatibus doloribusque se dedecere iterumque vinciri, atque irritum 
opus facere, quasi telam Penelopes retetemem. immo vero horum 
tranquilitati studens, sequensque rationem, ac semper in ea perma-
nens, verum et divinum opinionemque supereminens contemplatur: 
a quo nutritus ita vivendun censet, quam diu vivat; atque sperat 
se, ubi decesserit, in cognatum atque tale migrantem ab humanis 
eximis malis. Ex hujusmodi quidem educatione non est, cur metuat, 
o Simmia et Cebes, ne cum reedatat a corpore, distrahatur et dissi-
petur, omnisque in ventos viva reedcat.

(35.) Cum haec Socrates dixisset, longum factum est silentium. 
et ipse quidem Socrates, quae dicta fuerant, secum, ut videbatur, 
repetebat, idemque plerique nostrum faciebat. Cebes autem et 
Simmias parumper insuper invicem colloquuti sunt. Hos ergo in-
tuitus Socrates, Quidnam vobis, inquit, de his, quae dicta sunt, 
videtur? an forte aliquid insuper in his desideratis? multae enim 
adhuc dubitationes objectionesque supersunt, si quis sufficienter ea 
sit tractaturas. Si igitur alud quiddam inter vos agitatis, nihil 
dico, sin autem in his, quae dicta sunt, hæsitatis, ne vereamini 
loqui atque percurrere, si qua in parte putatis melius dici posse. 
quin etiam socium me assumite, si mecum id commodius fieri posse 
existimatis. Sim. Verum equidem, Socrates, tibi fatebor. Jam-
dum ambigens uteque nostrum impellit alterum jubetque interrog-
gare propter audienti cupiditatem, veremur autem, ne id tibi ob 
presentem calamitatem rogitando simus molestiores. Hae Socrates 
audiens lenten arrisit, dicens, Papæ, o Simmia, quam difficile aliis 
persuaderem, hanc me fortunam handquaquam adversam existimare, 
quando ne vobis quidem id persuadere possum: quippe cum me-
tuatis, ne difficilior mæstiorque sim in praesentia, quam in supe-
riori fuerim vita. Atque, ut appareat, deterior cygnis ad divinandum 
vobis esse videor. illi quidem, quando se brevi presentium morti-
turos, tunc magis admodum dulciusque canunt, quam antea con-
sueverint, congratulantes, quod ad Deum sint, cujus erant famuli, 
jam migraturi. Homines vero, cum ipsi mortem expavescant, 
cygnos quoque falsa criminantur, quod lugentes mortem ob dolor-
em cantum emittant: profecto hanc animadvertunt nullam esse 
aven, quae cantet, quando esuriat aut rigorat aut quovis alio affliciatur 
im commodo: non ipsa philomela nec hirundo, nec epops, quas ferunt 
per querimonia cantere lugentes. At mihi neque hae aves pra-
dolore videntur canere, neque cygni, sed quia Phæbo sacri sunt, 
ut arbitror, divinatione prædicti præsagunt alterius vitae bona: 
ideoque cantant alacrius gestuuntque ea die quam superiori tempore. 
Atque et ego arbitror me cygnorum esse conservum eidentque Deo 
sacrum; neque deterius vaticinium ab eodem domino habere quam 
illos; neque ignavius e vita decedere. Quapropter licet vobis hujus 
graatia dicere et interrogare quicquid libet, quod Atheniensium un-
deceimviri sinunt. Sim. Praeclare loqueris. itaque et ego tibi ape-
rium, qua in re dubitem: et rursus hic Cebes, quidnam ex superiori disputatione minus admittat. Mihi quidem, o Socrates, quemadmodum fortasse tibi quoque, videtur de his quidem rebus manifestam veritatem in vita praesenti aut nullo modo aut summa cum diffcultate intelligi posse. Quae tamen de his dicatur, ea nullo modo redarguere, adeo ut non prius desistas, quam examinando alteruter acquisescat, mollis nimum judico esse viri. oportere enim circa haec alterutrum efficere: aut discere vel invenire, quemadmodum se habeant: aut, si haec fieri nequeant, optimam atque tutissimam humanarum rationum eligere, qua quis tanquam rate vehatur, atque ita procellas hujus vitae pertranseat, si nequeat firmiori quodam vehiculo vel divino aliquo verbo tutius ac minori cum periculo tranare. Atqui ego nunc non verebor interrogare, præsertim cum ad hoc ipse nos adhorteris: ne forte meipsum quandoque sim culpaturus, quod nunc, quæ mihi videantur, minime dixerim. Profecto mihi, o Socrates, una cum hoc Cebete tua reputanti haud satis confirmata videntur.

(36.) So. Forsan vere, o amice, opinaris. sed dic, qua in parte minus sufficienter dicta fuisset censeas. Sim. In haec utique. Nenpe de harmonia et lyra et fidibus idem possit quipsiam dicere, harmoniam videlicet esse invisibile quiddam et incorporatum et perpulchrum atque divinium in lyra rite temperata: ipsam vero lyram fidesque corpora esse atque corporea et composita terrestriaque et mortali cognata. Cum igitur aliquis vel lyram frergerit vel fides inciderit sive disruperit, poterit quis eadem, qua tu, ratione affirmare, necessarium esse illam superesse harmoniam neque disperdi. nulla enim machinatio foret, lyram quidem esse adhuc, fidibus jam disruptis, atque ipsas fides mortalis generis: harmoniam vero, que divini et immortalis cognata erat, prius quam mortale illud interisse. Ille vero diceret adhuc esse alicubi harmoniam, atque prius ligna et fides putreseri, quam illa aliquid patiatur. Arbitror quidem, o Socrates, te animadvertisse, nos tale aliquid potissimum esse animam cogitare. Esse videlicet in corpori nostro intentionem et complexionem quandam ex calido, frigido, sicco, humido ceterisque talibus; horumque temperantiam consonantiamque animam esse, resultantem videlicet in corpore, postquam haec ipsa bene moderateque invicem temperata fuerint. Si ergo anima harmonia quædam est, quotiens horum natura in corpore propter morbos aliaque mala immoderate vel remittitur vel intenditur; necesse est, animam quidem, quamvis divinissimam, subito interire, sicut solent ceteræ consonantiae, sive quæ in vocibus, sive quæ in alis artificum operibus fiunt; reliquias autem corporis cujusque diutius permanere, quousque vel ardeant vel putreant. Considera igitur, quid huic rationi sit respondendum, si quis censeat animam temperantiam quandam esse eorum, quæ sunt in corpore, prioremque in morte perire.

(37.) Tunc Socrates, quemadmodum sepe solebat, intuens acerius atque ridens, Juste, inquit, tu quidem loqueris, Simmia. Si quis ergo vestrum me facundior est, cur his non respondebat? non enim ignave rationem attigisse videtur. Judico tamen, antequam Simmiae respondeatur, quid Cebes quoque damnet, esse audiendum, ut tem-
pore interjecto deliberandi habeamus facultatem: deinde, his auditis, vel his concedendum, si consentanea vero videantur afferre: sin vero minus, rationem superiorem defendendam esse atque retinendam. Quamobrem dic age, o Cebes, quidnam potissimum te turbet, quo minus assentiaris. Ce. Mihi quidem videtur eodem revolvi eidemque quod in superioribus dictus, crimini obnoxia esse. Quod enim fuerit anima nostra, prius quam in humanam descendat speciem, haud equidem retracto, quin bellissime dictum fuerit; ac nisi dictu esset invidiosum, sufficierent demonstratum asseverarem. Attamen nobis mortuis superesse, non sic assentior. Neque tamen Simmiæ concedo objicienti, non esse animam validiorem corpore atque diuturniorem. Videtur profecto mihi his omnibus anima praestare quam plurimum. Hic ergo ratio superior (ad me conversa) sic inquiet: Quidnam uterius ambigis? cum videas homine defuncto, quod in eo imbecilius fuerat superesse; cur non concedis oportere etiam, quod validius diuturniusque erat, hoc ipso in tempore superesse? Sed adverte jam, quanti momenti sit, quod ad id respondeo. similitudine mihi quoque opus est, quemadmodum Simmiæ. Profecto mihi perinde haec dici videntur, ac si quis de homine texte sene defuncto diceret, nondum interisse illum, sed forte alicubi superesse, conjecturamque affernet vestis, qua ipse, cum texuisset, usus fuerit; assereretque eum adhue esse incolumne neque interisse: ac si quis id non credat, interrogaret ab eo, utrum diuturnius sit hominis genus an vestis, qua quotidie quis utatur. Quod si respondet genus humanum diuturnius esse, tunc demonstratum id esse putaret, videlicet multo propterea magis sospitem esse hominem, quandoquidem, quod in eo crat fragilius, nondum perierit. Hoc autem, o Simmæ, ita se habere non arbitror, sed considera tu quoque, quid dicam. profecto quivis intelligeret, inepte illud adduci. Nam hic textor, qui multas contriverit vestes multasque texuerit, multis quidem posterior obiit, ultima vero prior: neque propterea magis sequit, hominem esse veste viliorem atque debiliorem. Eadem fieri similitudinem animae ad corpus posse arbitror: ac si quis de his duobus eadem illa adducat, congrue dicere videretur: videlicet animam quidem esse diuturniorem, corpus vero debilius minusque diuturnum: verum diceret, quemlibet animorum plura consumere corpora, præsertim si multos vivant annos. Si enim fluat corpus homineque etiam vivente dissolvatur, anima vero, quod consumitur, retexat continue; necessarium tamen erit, quando perierit anima, tunc ultimam habere vestem, eaque sola priorem perire. Cum vero perierit anima, tunc demum imbecillitatem naturæ suæ corpus ostendere, cito putrescens atque evanescent: ut haec ratione nondum confidere valeamus, tunc etiam cum decesserimus, animam nostram superfore. Nam si quis dicerit etiam plura, quam quæ tu dicis, conceesserit, nec solum ante ortum nostrum animam exstissit, verum etiam nihil prohibere, etiam post obitum quorundam remanere; sæpiusque accedere ac decedere factatur: (adeo enim naturam animae validam esse, ut sæpius corpori indita se corpusque servet:) hic tamen concessis, nondum illud fibi daret, non defatigari in multis generationibus animam; sed
tandem aliqua ex pluribus morte diceret omnino deler. quin etiam adderet, neminem mortem illam dissolutionemque corporis, quae animae quoque iterum infert, posse discernere: esse enim impossibile, ut quisquam nostrum id sentiat. Quod quidem si ita se habeat, nemo non stulte in morte confidit, nisi demonstrare possit animam omnino immortalem atque indissolubilem esse. aliquin consentaneum est necessarium esse, ut, qui moriturus est, animae metuat suae, semperque sit sollicitus, ne in ea, quae proxime imminet, corporis disjunctione prorsus intereat.

(38.) Omnes igitur, cum haec audivissemus, conturbati sumus, ut postea invicem aperuimus, quod cum superiori disputazione nobis fuisse magnopere persasum, viderentur nos ab eo statu in presentia deturbasse, atque eo jam dejeecessarily, ut nedum rationibus jam adductis, sed et dicendis insuper fidem ullam adhiberemus; vereentes, ne vel nos nequaquam boni essesemus judices, vel res ipsae fide essent indignae. Ech. Veniam equidem per Deos do vobis, o Phaedon. nam mihi quidem, modo te audientes, tale quiddam veniebat in mentem: Cuinam ulterior rationi credamus? quippe cum ratio illa Socratis, usque adeo paulo ante probabilis, jam fidem amiserit. mirum est enim, quantum apud me contra possit ratio illa semperque potuerit, quae animam nostram harmoniam quandam esse probat: et nunc quidem audita me subito in memoria redivavit, quantum mihi quoque alias persuaserit. Quo efficitur, ut alia quadam ratione iterum, tanquam ab initio, prorsus indigam, quae mihi persuadeat animam cum corpore non interire. Dic ergo, per Jovem precor, quo pacto disputationem peregerit Socrates, et utrum ipse quoque, quemadmodum de vobis ipse lateris, graviter id ferre visus fuerit; an contra benigne suam defenderit rationem: praeterea utrum satis, necne, eam tutatus fuerit, haec nobis, quam potes diligentissime, refer omnia. Ph.e. Equidem, o Echecrates, saepe admiratus Socratem, nunquam majori cum voluptate, quam tunc praeens, sum admiratus, meque affuisse ibi mirifice gaudeo. Haubuisse quidem illum, quod objectionibus responderet, forte non est mirandum. sed haec in eo potissimum sum admiratus, primo quidem quam juvende, benigne, amice adolescentium verba recepit: deinde quam sagaciter sensit nos illorum rationibusuisse comotos: demum quam opportune nobis adhibuit medicinam, et quasi fugientes atque victos redivavit nos, convertitque ad prosequendum atque considerandum. Ech. Quonam pacto? Ph.e. Dicam equidem. Sedebam forte ad dexteram ejus in subsellio quodam humili, juxta lectulum. ipsa vero Socrates sedebat longe superior. Attractans igitur caput meum comprimesque crines super cervicem: (consueverat enim nonnunquam, ubi contigisset, in meos crines ludere) Cras forsitan, inquit, o Phaedon, istas pulchras incides comas. Ph.e. Sic arbitror, o Socrates. So. Non certe, si mihi assensus fueris. Ph.e. Quid ergo? So. Immo hodie et ego meus et tu tuas, si nobis ratio intereat, neque eam ipsi suscitare possimus. Atque si ego tu essem ac me fugeret ratio, more Argivorum jurarem non prius comam nutriturum, quam vicissim Simmiam Cebetemque expugnavissem. Ph.e. At vero contra duos ne Hercules quidem
PHÆDO.

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dicitur sufficisse. So. At tu me Iolaum, dum lux est, advoca. Ph.E. Advocavit eundem, sed non tanquam Hercules Iolaum, immo tanquam Iolaus Herculem. So. Nihil referit.


(40.) So. In primis igitur diligenter id caveamus, ne persuadea-
mus nobis nihil in ratiocibus esse sanum; sed multo magis, nondum esse nos sanos. Itaque totis viribus, ut sani efficiamur, est annitendum: tibi quidem et aliis totius reliquae vitae gratia, mihi vero gratia mortis: qui in periculo sum, ne in hoc ipso tempore non ut philosophum me geram, sed ut contentiosum atque pertinacem; quod quidam homines a disciplina alienissimi facere solent. Illi enim, ubi aliqua de re ambigitur, non ut res ipsa, qua de agitur, se habeat curant; sed ut, quae posuerunt ipsi, presentibus videantur vera, obnixe contendunt. Atque ego mihi videor in hoc duntaxat in praesentia ab illis differre, quod non, ut presentibus probem ca, quae dico, annitar, ( nisi quatenus forte contigerit,) sed ut mihi ipsi vera quam maxime videantur. Sic enim cogito, dulcis amice; et vide quanto cum lucro sit ratio mea. Si forte vera sunt, quae dico, operae pretium est ita credere: sin autem nihil superest post mortem, attamen hoc ipsum tempus ante obitum presentibus minus ero molestus minusque deplorabo. Haec autem ignorantia minime perseverabit mecum, (malum id quidem esset,) sed paulo post delebitur. Sic equidem, o Simmia, paratus, et Cebes, revertor ad disputandum. Vos tamen, si mihi assentiamini, non Socrati cedite, sed veritati; si enim verum vobis loqui videbor, concedite: sin minus, omnino contradicite, diligenter caventes, ne ego dum amnitor, meipsum simul vosque decipiam, et velut apes, aculeo in vobis relicko, abeam.

(41.) Sed jam accendendum est. Primum quidem redigite in memoria mihi, quae dieebatis, si minus meminisse vobis videbor. Simmias quidem, ut arbitrator, diffidit ac metuit, ne anima, quamvis divinior pulchorque corpore, prius tamen pro harmonia naturae intereat. Cebes autem mihi visus est concedere diuturniorem esse animam corpore; sed his addidit scire posse neminem, ne cum multa saepius consumperisit corpora, tandem quandoque postremum relinques corpus ipsa quoque pereat, atque mors ejusmodi tantum sit interitus animae; corpus vero dissolvi continue consueverit. An non haec sunt, o Simmia et Cebes, quae nos oportet considerare? Sim. et Ce. Confitemur profecto. So. Sed nunquid omnia, quae dicta in superioribus fuerant, negatis? an quaedam negatis, sed conceditis alia? Sim. et Ce. Quaedam procul dubio. So. Quid igitur de eo, quod disciplinam diximus reminisciantem esse; atque si ita se res habeat, necessario consequi, alicubiuisse animam, priusquam corpore clauderetur? Ce. Mihi quidem istud dum diceres, mirifice placuit: atque nunc, si qua unquam in alia, in hac maxime sententia permaneo. Sim. Similiter ego quoque affectus sum; vehementerque admirarer, si mihi unquam hac de re alter videretur. So. At vero necesse est, hospes Thebane, alter tibi videri, si in hac opinione permanseris, harmoniam videlici esse compositum quiddam; animam vero harmoniam quandam ex his, quae per corpus intensa sunt, constitutam. Nuncum enim admittes consonantiam compositam prius esse quam illa, ex quibus componi consonantiam oportebat. nunquid admittes? Sim. Nullo, Socrates, modo. So. Animadvertis igitur cogi te id confiteri, quando dicis, animam quidem esse prius quam in humanam spe-


Tum pectus pulsans, cor sic affatur Ulixes,
Hoc quoque cor perfer, namque et graviora tulisti.

An putas Homerus haec dixisse, tanquam harmonia quaedam sit, ac talis, ut corporis passionibus subjiciatur, non autem ducat atque

(44.) So. Age, harmoniam Thebanam satis, ut videtur, jam placavimus. rationem vero Cadmeam, o Cebes, quonam pacto et qua ratione placabimus? Ce. Tu mihi, Socrates, viam inventurus vis deris. nempe rationem hanc adversus harmoniam mirifice, præter opinionem nostram, excogitasti. Cum enim audirem Simmiam dubitantem, valde admirabar, si quis rationibus ejus resistere posset. Itaque summae mihi fuit admirationi, ipsum nec primum quidem potuisse orationis tuae impetum sustinere. Quapropter non admirarer, si Cadmeus quoque sermo idem patetur. So. Parcius ista, bone vir; ne qua invidia nobis sequentia inturbet. Sed haec quidem Deo curae erunt: nos autem, ut ait Homerus, cominus congressi periculum faciamus, an forte quid dicas. Summa vero eorum, quæ perquiris, est ejusmodi: demonstrandum esse judicatas, animam nostram indissolubilem immortalemque esse; ne vir philosophus in morte securus, magnaque cum fiducia sperans, in alia vita longe beatoirem ob philosophiae studium se futurum, insipiens sit stulte- que confidat. Ostendere autem, validum quiddam esse animam atque divinis persimile, priusque etiam quam nos exstitisse, nihil impedimento esse a\is, quo minus haec omnia non immortalitatem quidem significent, sed duntaxat animam corpore diuturniorem esse, multaque ante nos secula fuisse, novisseque et egisse permuta; nihil.tamen magis ob hoc immortalem esse existimandam. immo hunc ipsum in humanum corpus ingressum, quasi morbum quendam, interitus ejus initium esse: adeo, ut et in haec vita sit misera et in corporis morte depereat. Nihil autem diifferre censes, sive semel tantum sive sæpius labatur in corpus, ut quivis nostrum per- timescat. Merito namque timendum esse, nisi stultus sit, ei, qui neque sciat neque assignare queat immortalitatis animæ rationem. Talia quaedam sunt, quæ dicis, o Cebes: egoque ea consulto sæpius repeto, ne quid nos fugiat, sive addere hic quicquam velis sive de- mere. Ce. Nihil equidem in presentia habeo, quod aut minuam aut adjungam: atque haec sunt, quæ dico.

(45.) Tunc Socrates, cum aliquantum se receptisset, ad se conversus, Haud leve quiddam requiris, inquit, o Cebes, sed ejus gratia oporteat generationis corruptionisque causam pertractare. Ego igitur, si vis, ea tibi, quæ mihi evenerunt, ennarrabo. deinde si quid eorum, quæ dixerò, ad questionis tuae veritatem aperiendam conducere putabis, utere. Ce. Volo equidem. So. Audi igitur jam narratem. Equidem, o Cebes, cum essem juvenis, mira quadem ejus sapientiae cupiditate flagrabam, quam naturalem vo- cant historiam. Praeclarissimum enim esse censebamus, causas in- telligere, per quas singula fiant atque intereant, et qua sint ratione: sæpiusque me sursum decorsumque jactavi, talia quaedam primo considerans, nunquid, postquam calidum et frigidum putrefactionem aliquam acceperunt, quemadmodum nonnulli dixerunt, tunc
animalia coalescunt. præterea, utrum sanguis sit, quo sapimus, vel aëris vel ignis: aut nihil horum sit, sed cerebrum, quod præbeat sensus audienti, videnti, offacienti: ex his autem memoria et opinio fiant: ex memoria vero et opinione quietem accipiente, per hæc scientia oriatur, prœinde horum corruptiones considerans, atque eas, quæ circa cœlum terramque passiones contingunt, tandem adeo mihi ad hæc consideranda visus sum hebes, ut nihil magis. Conjecturam vero ad id afferam tibi sufficientem. nemo ob ejusmodi considerationem usque adeo sum occæcatus, ut ea etiam, quæ prius manifeste sciebam, ut mihi aliiisque videbatur, dediscerem, et alia videlicet multa, quæ antea me scire putabam, et qua ratione homo crescat. id namque opinabar ante esse cuilibet manifestum, hominem videlicet per cibum potumque augeri. Quando enim per hæc carnes carnis ossaque ossibus adduntur, codemque modo in alis, quando sua cuique adhibentur, tunc sane molem primo parvam, deinde magnam evadere, atque ita parvum hominem effici magnum. Sic ego tunc opinabar, nonne satis belle tibi videor? Ce. Mihi quidem. So. Animadverte hæc insuper. Arbitraber enim, satis recte mihi videri, quotiens hominem vel equum, magnum parvo propinquum, alterum altero judicarem capite ipso esse majorem. atque multo etiam evidentius decem plura apparebant mihi quam octo propterea, quod denarius duo præter octonarium contineret. præterea bicubitum cubitali majus, quoniam dimidio superaret. Ce. Nunc vero quidnam de his judicas? So. Procul equidem, per Jovem, abesse mihi videor, ut aliiquis horum causam intelligere putarem, qui nondum mihi ipsi persuadere possum, ut, quando quis uni addat unum, tunc vel illud unum, cui unum adjectum est, fiat duo: vel et adjunctum et illud, cui adjunctum est, propter alterius ad alterum adjectum evadat duo. admiror equidem, si, cum utrumque horum separatum erat, utrumque unum erat, neque erant tunc duo: postquam invicem cohaeserunt, hæc ipsa causa fuerit, ut duo fierent, congressio videlicet, per quam propius jam posita sunt. neque etiam, si quis unum dividat, adhuc possam persuaderi, hanc ipsam divisionem causam esse, ut duo evadant. contraria enim tunc atque superius causa fit, qua duo fiant. tunc enim, quia conjungebantur propius invicem, alterumque admovebatur alteri: nunc vero, quoniam removetur alterum ab altero atque separatur. Neque, propter quid unum fiat, adhuc scire me arbitròr; neque, ut summam dicam, alii quicquam, quæ fiat aut pereat aut sit, per hanc ipsam viam habeos profiteor: sed alium quendam ipse modum frustra misceo; hunc vero nullo modo admittó.

(46.) Verum, cum audissem aliquando ex libro, ut ille aiebat, Anaxagorae, legentem quendam hanc Anaxagoræ ipsius sententiam, videlicet mentem omnia exornare omniumque causam esse: hoc utique causa genere magnopere sum delectatus, existimans quodammodo consentaneum, mentem esse omnium causam: putabamque, si id ita esset, ut mens omnia exornaret, singula per hanc ita esse disposita, ut optime disponi potuerant. Propterea, si quis vellet causam invenire, qua singula fiant aut percant aut sint, hoc
pilædo.

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ipsum esse inveniendum, qua videlicet ratione optimum sit unicui-
que, aut esse aut quodvis alium pati vel agere. Atque hoc pacto
nihil aliud considerandum homini vel de seipso vel de alios, nisi
quod potissimum sit et optimum. Necesse vero est eum, qui id
norit, illud quoque, quod est deterius, cognovisse: quippe cum
eadem horum scientia sit. Hæc utique mecum ipse reputans, gau-
debam, invenisse ratus Anaxagoram magistrum, qui me, id quod
tantopere cupiebam, causas rerum doceret; primumque mihi dice-
ret, utrum plana sit terra vel rotunda: et cum hæc dixisset, sub-
jungeret mihi causam atque necessitatem, affirmens videlicet idipsum,
quod melius est; meliusque fuisse eam esse talem. Proinde si ter-
ram diceret in mundo mediam esse, mox exponeret melius exstississe,
ut media esset. Quod si ille hæc ostenderet, ita me comparabam,
qui nullam amplius causarum speciem positurus. Praeterea de
sole et luna ceterisque stellis, earumque inter se velocitate conver-
sionibusque, et de hujusmodi omnibus me similitur quasitum
auditurumque comparaveram, quod videlicet et qua ratione hæc
melius sit singula vel facere vel pati, quodqueque agant vel pati-
antur. Neque enim putabam, cum ab initio dixisset mente omnia
exornari, ipsum aliarm postea causam rebus assignaturum, præter-
quam quod optimum sit eas ita se, ut habent, habere. Itaque
arbitrabar eum in redendis tum singulorum tum cunctorum com-
muniter causis, singulis quidem assignare, quod unicuique opti-
um, cunctis vero commune bonum. Neque vero spes ipse meas
parvi faciebam, sed summo quodam studio acceptos libros, quam
velociissime poteram lectitavi, ut occessisse, quid optimum quidve
ejus contrarium esset, cognoscerem.

(47.) Hac igitur mirabili spe ductus, cum legere pergo, video
hominem mente quidem nullo modo utentem, nee causam ullam ad
ipsum rerum ornatum referentem, sed æreas naturas et æthreas
aqueasque et talia multa incredibilia pro rerum causis assignantem.
Qua quidem in re ille mihi perinde visus est agere, ac si quis dice-
ret, Socratem, quaeunque facit, mente facere: deinde volens sin-
gulorum, quae facio, causas explicare, dicat primum quidem nunc
me hic propterca sedere, quoniam corpus meum ex ossibus nervis-
que componitur: et ossa quidem solida sunt et juncturarum inter-
valla inter se habent: nervi autem sic instituti ut et extendi et con-
trahi valeant, complectantur ossa cum carnibus atque cete, que illa
continent. Elatis igitur ossibus in suis conjunctionibus, nervi, qui
et intendunt et remittunt commode, faciunt, ut flectendi cujusque
membrum habeam facultatem, atque hanc ob causam hic inflexus se-
deam. Ac rursus disputationis meæ alias quasdam ejusmodi causas
assignaret, voces et aërem et auditum aliaque generis ejusdem quam
plurima, causas verissimas negligens: videlicet quoniam Athenien-
sibus melius visum fuerit me condemnare, ideoque mihi etiam me-
lius sit visum hic sedere; justiusque judicarim exspectantem dare
pœnas, quas illi jubeant. profecto per Canem, jamdiu, ut arbitror,
ih nervi atque hæc ossa apud Megarenses aut Bœotios essent, ipsius,
quod optimum est, opinione delata; nisi justius honestiusque cen-
suissem pœnas civitati pendere, quascunque a me exigat, quam
subterfugere atque exsulem vivere. Verum talia quædam causas appellare a ratione est remotissimum. Si quis autem dixerit absque ossibus et nervis atque similibus non possè me, quæ mihi facienda videantur, implere, vere utique dicet. Attamen asserrere propter hæc me facere, quæcunque facio, dum ipsa mente ago, non autem ejus quod optimum sit optione, multa magnaque sermonis negligentia esset. Nam quï sic est affectus, nequit discernere, alienum esse veram rei alienius causam; aliud vero illud, sine quo ipsa causa esse non potest causa. quod quidem multi mihi videntur, quasi in tenebris attractantes, alieno appellare nomine, dum causam nuncupant. Quapropter nonnulli vertiginem circumponentes terræ, sub celo eam stabilem faciunt. alií vero tanquam latum pistoris alveum aère velut base suffulciunt. Potentiam vero ipsam, qua nunc ita disposita sit, ut optime disponi poterat, neque perquirunt neque dæmoniacam quandam habere vim putant: sed Atlantem quendam robustiorem et immortaliorem, magisque omnia continentem invenisse se opinantur. ipsum autem bonum atque decens connectere atque continere revera nihil existiment. Ego igitur liben-tissime cujusvis essem essem disciplum, ut quemadmodum se habeat hæc ipsa causa, deserem. Postquam vero hæc privatus sum; neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere potui: secundum navigationem ad causam investigandam molitus sum. Visne, o Cebes, hanc tibi a me demonstrari? Ce. Mirifice cupio.

(48.) So. Censui tandem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem. Forte vero nostra hæc similitudo non omni ex parte congruit, non enim prorsus assentior, cum, qui res in rationibus contemplatur, in imaginius aspicere pothius quam qui in operibus intuetur. Verum tamen hæc via iter direxti meum, supponensque rationem semper, quam esse judicio validissimam, quæcunque huic consonare videantur, pono equidem tanquam vera; idque ago et circa rerum causas et circa reliqua omnia: quæ vero dissonant, vera esse nego. Volo equidem, quæ dico, tibi apertius explanare, puto enim te non-dum intelligere. Ce. Per Jovem, haud multum.

(49.) So. Verum novum nihil adduco; sed quæ et sæpe alias et in superiori disputazione dicere nunquam destiti. Pergo jam igitur demonstrare tibi causæ speciem, quam continue pertractavi; ac re-deo ad illa jam sepius decantata, ab hisque excordior, supponens aliquid esse ipsum per se pulchrum et bonum et magnum, et cetera omnia, quæ quidem si tu mihi dederis, caque esse concesseris, spero tibi ex his ipsum causam demonstrare; itemque invenire, esse animam immortalem. Ce. Quasi vero jam tibi concesserim, nihil tibi opus est præcludio, quo minus jam concluas. So. Considera jam, quæ sequuntur deinceps, utrum in his mihi consentias. Arbitror
enim, si quid est aliud pulchrum præter ipsum pulchrum, non ob aliud quippiam esse pulchrum, quam quia pulchri ipsius est participe, atque omnia dico similiter, nunquid hanc causam recipis? Cæ. Recipio equidem. So. Ergo nondum ultra percepiö, neque possum ceteras istas praecertas causas cognoscere. Si quis autem mihi dixerit, quare pulchrum sit quodlibet, videlicet quia vel colorum habeat floridum vel figuram vel aliud quodvis talium, cetera equidem valere sino: (in ceteris enim omnibus solo perturbari:) id vero unum simpliciter atque procul dubio, et forte jam inepte, penes me teneo, nihil aliud esse, quod aliquid faciat pulchrum, quam ipsius pulchri sive præsentiam sive communicem, sive quaequaque ratione et quoequaque modo id proveniat. Neque enim id adhuc affirmare: sed pulchro pulchra omnia esse pulchra, id mihi videtur tutissimum, tam mihi quam aliis respondere: atque huic fundamento innixus, puto nunquam cadere; sed et me et quemvis alium tuto respondere posse, quoequaque pulchra sunt, ipso pulchro fieri pulchra. nonne et ipse consentis? Cæ. Consentio equidem. So. Ergo et quæ magna sunt, ipsa magnitudine esse magna: et quæ majora sunt, similiter esse majora: et quæ minora, parvitate esse minora. Cæ. Ita est. So. Igitur neque tu quidem assentieris, si quis aliquem dixerit alio quodam capite esse majorem; atque eum, qui minor est, eodem capite esse minorem: sed testificaberis, te quidem nihil aliud esse dicturum, quam omne majus alio non alia re alla quam magnitudine esse majus; atque ob hoc majus, ob ipsum seifict magnitudinem: minus autem, nullo simuliter alio quam parvitate, et propter hoc esse minus, propter ipsam videlicet parvitate: metuens, ut puto, ne, si quem dixeris capite majore esse vel minorem, quispiam tibi sie objiciat: primum quidem eadem re et majus fore majus et minus fore minus: deinde, quod capite, quæ res parva est, majorem affirmes esse majorem. hoc autem dicet monstrum esse persimile, ut parvo aliquo magnum quiddam esse dicas. nonne haec metuere? Tune Cebes subridens, Evidem, inquit. So. Nonne similiter quoque metuere dicere, decem plura quam octo esse duobus, atque ob hanc causam superare, potius quam multitudine atque propter multitudinem? ac similiter bicubitum cubitali majus esse dimidio, potius quam magnitudine? id enim similiter est metuendum. Cæ. Omnino. So. Quid vero, si uni addatur unum, additamentum ipsum esse causam, ut duo fiat, vel si dividatur, divisionem ipsum duorum esse causam, dicere non formidares? altiusque exclamares, nescire te, quonam alio pacto quicquam fiat, nisi participatione quadam essentiae uniuque propriæ, cujus sit particere? atque in his nullam aliam habere te causam, cur duo fiat, præter ductatis ipsius participationem: sed oportere hujus participatione fore, quaequaque futura sunt duo: et similiter unitatis, quoequaque futurum sit unum? Has vero divisiones adjunctionesque et ceteras ejusmodi argutias valere sine res; relinquueresque sapientioribus te, per eas pro arbitrario responsuris: tu vero tuam, quemadmodum dici solet, metuens umbram et impetritiam, atque innixus totissimae illi positioni, sic utique responderes? at vero, si quis eandem positionem complexus instaret, valere si-
neres; neque prius responderes quam, quae inde manant, conside-
rasses, utrum consenent invicem aut dissonent? Ubi vero illius
ipsius rationem oporteret afferre, codem modo afferres, atque aliam
rursus positionem adduceret, quae superiorium optima videretur,
quoad ad aliquid sufficiens pervenires? Nunc quam vero simul con-
funderes contentiosorum more, ubi et de principio et de his, quae
a principio deducuntur, disputas; si modo velles eorum aliquid,
quae vere sunt, invenire? nam illis fortasse nullus haec de re sermo
est, nulla cura. Possunt enim pra sapientia et simul omnia com-
miscere et tamen sibim placere. Tu vero, si ex philosophorum
numero es, quae dico, ut arbitror, facies. Sim. et Ce. Verissima
loqueris. Ecu. Per Jovem, o Phaedon, merito admodum consen-
scunt. mirifice enim illae mihi videtur rem ipsam vel hebetissimo
cuique explanasse. Phl. Sic prorsus, o Echecrates, presentibus
omnia similiter virum fuit. Ech. Quid mirum? cum nobis
quoque, qui non interfuismus, nunc similiter audientibus videatur.
(50.) Verum quænam post haec dicta fuerunt? Phl. Ue equi-
dem arbitror, postquam haec illi Soerati conceessert, conceesserunt
que, speciem quamlibet aliquid esse, et quae harum participia sunt,
ipsarum denominationem habere; deinceps hunc in modum interro-
gavit. Si haec ita se habent, nonne, quando Simmiam diesis Socrates
quidem majorem esse, Phaedone vero minorem, tunc affirmas in
Simmia utrumque esse, et magnitudinem simul et parvitatem? Ce.
Equidem. So. Attamen Simmiam confilteris excedere Socratem,
non ita revera, ut verba sonant. non enim ita natura institutum esse
existimas Simmiam, ut ea ratione superet, qua est Simmias; sed
magnitudine, quam habet: neque rursus Socratem, eo quod Socrates
est, excedi; sed quia parvitatem praé magnitudine illius habeat. Ce.
Vera loqueris. So. Similiter nec a Phaedone superari, eo quod
Phaedon sit Phaedon; sed quia Phaedon praes Simmiae parvitatem mag-
nitudinem habet. Ce. Ita est. So. Sic itaque Simmias denomination-
em parvi habet et magni: siquidem in amborum medio positus,
alterius quidem parvitatem magnitudine superat, alterius vero mag-
nitudini parvitate cedit. Et simul subridens inquit: Videor equi-
dem affectatius descriptissse, verumtamen est, ut dico. Ce. Sic ap-
paret. So. Dico autem propter eam, quia cupio videri vibi, quod et
mihic videtur. Opinor enim, non solum magnitudinem ipsam nun-
quam velle magnum simul parvamque esse; verum etiam neque
hane, quae in nobis est, magnitudinem unquam recipere parvitatem,
neque superari velle: sed e duobus alterum accidere: vel fugere
seque subtrahere, quando adventat contraria parvitas; vel cum ad-
venerit, interire: nolle autem exspectare, atque in parvitate reci-
pienda alius esse quam erat. quemadmodum ego, cum susceperim
sustinuerimque parvitatem, quamdiu is ipse sum, qui sum, sic ip-
semet sum parvus. Illud autem, magnum quod ipsum est, nunc
sustinuit esse parvum. similiter parvum, quod est in nobis, nun-
quam vult magnum aut fieri aut esse: neque alius quiequam con-
trarium, quamdui est id, quod erat, patitur simul contrarium
fieri aut esse; sed aut abit aut perit, cum adventat contrarium. Ce.
Ita prorsus existimo.
(51.) PILE. Tunc quidam eorum, qui aderant, haec audiens, (quis autem ille fuerit, non satis memini,) Dii boni, inquit, nonne in superioribus contrarium eorum, quae dicitur, nobis est concessum, videlicet ex minori majus fieri atque ex majori minus; esseque procul dubio generationem contrarium ex contrariis? nunc autem videmini, fieri id non posse, dicere. Cum vero Socrates, admo- vens caput, auscultasset, Viriliter, inquit, id recordatus es: non tamen intelligis differentiam inter id, quod modo dictum est, atque illud superius. Tunc enim dicebatur, ex contraria re rem contraria fieri: nunc vero contrarium ipsum sibimet contrarium fieri nunquam; neque quod in nobis, neque quod in natura contrarium est. tunc quidem, o amice, de his, quae habent contraria, dicebamus, haec illorum cognomine appellantes. at nunc de illis ipsius lo- quimur, quae his insunt, quorumve præsentia cognomem habent ca, quae nominantur. Illa vero ipsa dicimur nunquam velle mutuam inter se generationem suscipere. Et simul Cebetem intuitus, inquit: Num te quoque, Cebes, aliquid eorum, quae nunc objecta sunt, perturbavit? Ce. Hand equidem ita sum affectus: ac tibi afirmo non multum me turbari. So. Id ergo simpliciter confessi sumus, contrarium nunquam sibimet fore contrarium. Ce. Omnino.


(54.) So. Rursus tanquam a principio mihi dicas. nec tamen per id, quod nunc interrogo, sed per alii quiddam mihi respondens, me imitatus, dico autem praeter tumam responsionem illam a principio positam, juxta tumam quoque responsionem aliam per ea, quae modo dicta sunt, adinventam. Nempe si me interroges, O Socrates, quidnam in corpore si sit, calceet corpus: non tumam responsionem illam ruderisque tibi dabo, videlicet si caliditas; sed exquisitionem ex praesentibus verbis, ut si insit ignis. Similiter si me interroges, quid si in corpore sit, agrotabit: non respondebo, si agrotatio;


(56.) So. Deum vero et ipsam vitae speciem, et si quid alud est immortalis, indissolubile quoque esse omnes confiterentur. Ce.

(57.) So. Hoc autem, o viri, justum est, cogitare, si anima sit immortalis, eam non solum temporis hujus, in quo vivere dicitur, verum etiam universi gratia curatione pluriorem indigere, nam grave periculum fore putandum est, si quis neglexerit animam. Si enim mors totius dissolutio esset, nimirum improbi lucarentur, cum et a corpore et ab eorum pravitate cum anima liberarentur. Nunc autem, cum anima immortalis appareat, nulla superest malorum declinatio, nulla salus, nisi ut optima et prudentissima fiat. Nihil enim alium, cum migrat ad manes anima, secum transiért præter eruditionem atque educationem, quæ quidem statim in principio transmigrationis illius pluriorem vel prodesse vel obesse dicuntur. Ferunt enim, quemlibet hinc illuc emigran tem ab eo daemone, quod viventem sortitus fuerat, in locum quendam duci, ubi oporteat ommes una collectos judicari, ac deinde ad inferos proficisci eo ducit, cui mandatum erat, ut hinc decedentes ad illa loca traducat, sortitos vero illuc, que oportebat sortiri, tempusque debitum commoratos, ab alio quodam ducit rursus huc reduci post multos temporis longosque circuitus. Est autem iter non tale, quale ait Telephus apud Æschylum, ille siquidem simplicem inquit viam ad inferos ferre. Ego vero neque simplicem neque unam esse puto. Alioquin nullis ducibus opus esset: quippe cum unica via aberrare possit nemo. Quinimmo multos transtes multosque anfractus habere, quod quidem ex sacrificiis et ritibus conjectare licet. Animus ergo moderatus et prudentes ducem sponte sequitur, neque ignorant praesentia. sed qui cupiditate corporis est infectus, quemadmodum supra dixi, per multum tempus ad ipsum ardentem afficitur: et circa locum visibilem multis reluctatus modis multaque perpersus vix tandem ab eo abducitur daemon, cui ejus cura erat injuncta. Cum vero ad ea
loca, ubi alii quoque animi sunt, pervenerit, quisquis admodum immundus est et hujusmodi obnoxius criminii, qui vel injustis se contaminaverit caedibus, vel alia his similia similibumque airmorum opera perpetraverit; hune quidem animum omnes fugiunt atque declinant, nec reperitur ullus, qui vel socius vel dux ejus fieri velit. itaque omni auxilio destitutus eo usque pererrat, quoad certa temporum curricula implementur: quibus tandem impelitis in habitatio- nem sibi convenientem ab ipsa necessitate transfertur. Qui vero puram moderatamque transegerit vitam, deos socios ducesque nactus ibi habitat, ubi unicumque convenit.

accidere propter ea, quod propter imbecillitatem tarditatatemque ad supremum usque aërem transscendere nequeamus. Quod si quis ad sumnum evaderet, vel alis fretus eo volaret, hine prodeuntem inde jam prospectum; quemadmodum pisces emergentes e mari nostra hae aspicient. Ac si natura ad inspi ciendum sufficeret, cogniturn protinus, cælum illud esse verum veramque lucem, veram quoque terram, siquidem quæ a nobis incolitur terra, hique lapides totusque hic locus adesa sunt atque corrupta; ut ea, quæ in mari sunt, a salscedine. neque nascitur in mari quicquam existimatione dignum; atque ut ita dixerim, nihil est in eo perfectum; sed cavernæ, arena, limus incredibilis atque sordes, ubicumque sit et terra, quæ quidem ad has nostras pulchritudines nullo modo sunt conferenda. Illius vero loci pulchritudo hanc nostram multo magis apparebit excedere. Proinde si fabulam quoque narrare oportet perpulchrum, operæ pretium, Simmia, est, audire, quales sint hæ terrarum plagae, quæ subjacent caelo. Sim. Immo vero libentissime hanc fabulam audiemus.

(59.) So. Ferunt igitur, o amice, primum quidem talem videri terræ illius faciem, si quis superne despiciat, quæ sunt hæ pilae, quæ ex coris duodecim contextæ sunt, variis scilicet distinctam coloribus: quorum hi nostri colors, quibus pictores utuntur, similitudinem quandam retinent. Illic vero universam terram ex talibus multoque etiam nitidioribus ac purioribus esse: partim quidem purpuream, mira pulchritudine prædictam; partim vero coloris aurei; partim gypso et nive candidiore: praeterea ex coloribus alis simili liter exornatam, ac etiam pluribus pulchrioribusque, quam in nostram notitiam pervenirent. Enimvero has ipsas ipsius concavitates, aqua aëreque repletas, speciem quandam coloris splendididam in primis afferre inter ceterorum colorum varietatem, ut una quædam species ejus varia semper appareat. In hujusmodi vero terra convenien ti ratione similes naschi arbores et flores et fructus. praeterea montes et lapides ibidem simili ratione habere perfectionem atque perspicuitatem coloresque admodum pulchriorum: quorum quidem partículæ quædam sint lapilli, qui apud nos habentur in pretio, Sardia. Jaspides, Smaragdi ceterique ejusmodi, illic vero nihil esset, quod non tale sit aut etiam pulchrioris. Cujus quidem rei causa sit, quoniam lapides illi puri sint neque, quemadmodum nostri, a putredine salsagineque attriti atque corrupti; quibus in hunc locum confluenteribus lapides et tellus animaliaque et plantae inscintur atque ægrotate coguntur. Terram vero ipsam his omnibus exornari, atque auro etiam et argento ceterisque similibus, præfulgentia quidem hæc ibi nasi et multa et magna, quæque omnem terram; ut eam videre spectatorem felicium sit spectaculum. Proinde ibi esse animalia multa et homines, partim regionem mediterraneam incolentes, partim circa aërem, quemadmodum nos circa maris litora, partim etiam insulas quæ haud procul a continentia positæ aëre circumdantur. Sed, ut summam dicam, quod nobis aqua est et mare ad usum nostrum, idem illic esse aërem: quod vero nobis aër, id illis ætherem esse. Tempora vero apud illos tantam habere temperiem, ut illi et sine morbo continue et longe diutius, quam nostri,
vivant. item visu, auditu, prudentia ceterisque talibus nobis tantum praestare, quantum et aër aequo et aëter aëri puritate praestat. Praeterea illic esse deorum tempula et luocos, in quibus revera dii familia-riter habitent, et responsa et divinationes deorumque sensus familiaritatisque ejusmodi hominibus ad deos esse. Solem quoque et lunam stellasque alias, quales revera sunt, apud eos videri: ceteris in rebus beatitudinem eos his rebus congruum possidere.

(60.) Itaque universam terram sic natura institutam, et quae circa eam sunt similibur tradunt. Esse praeterea in ipsa per ejus concavitates loco in circulum multa, partim quidem profundiora atque ampliora, quam sit regio a nobis culta; partim vero profundiora quidem, sed hiatum angustiorem habentia nostra hac regione, esse et alicubi minus profunda, sed ampliora quam nostra. Haec autem omnia sub terra sibi invicem obviare, atque irrupere multis undique modis, tum per angustiora, tum per ampliora; discursusque habere et exitus, quibus magna aquirum copia ex aliis in alia, velut in crateres, confluat. item perpetuum fluminum sub terra incredibiles magnitudines aquirum, tum calidum, tum etiam frigida- rum: plura quinque ignem et ignis initantes amnes: multos quoque lultulent humoris, partim quidem prioris, partim vero sordioris; ceu torrens luti, qui in Sicilia est, et juxta ipsum amnes lutei inde fluentes. Quibus singula completer loca, quacunque eos continget perfluere. Haec autem omnia sursum deorsumque ferri, veluti suspendiculo quodam sub terram posito, atque ita librato, ut utrinque vicissim inclinet atque attollat. Est autem id suspendicum ob naturam quandam ejusmodi: unus aliquid ex terrae hiatibus est pro- fecto quam maximus, perque universam terram trajectus et patens, de quo Homerus, Longe nimis barathrum stat sub tellure pro- fundum. quod et ipse alibi, et multi poëtarum Tartarum appellau- runt. In hoc utique receptaculum omnia confluent fluminata, atque inde rursus effluunt. Talia vero sunt singula, per quales labuntur terras. Quod autem hinc effluent omnia rursusque refluant, haec est causa, quod hic humor nec fundum habet nec fundamentum. itaque elevatur, et sursum deorsumque redundat. Idenque facit aër et spiritus, qui circa ipsum versatur. Sequitur enim ipsum, et quando ad superiora terrae, et quando ad haec nostra perlabitur. Et quemadmodum in respirantibus flatus continue exspirat atque res- pirat, sic et ibi spiritus una cum humore elatus vehementes quos- dam ventos et incredibles commovet, sive influat sive effluat. Qua- propter cum aqua in locum inferioriorem delabitur, per meatus terrae juxta ejusmodi rivos influit, passimque per eos exundat et implet, velut hi, qui hauriunt. Cum vero illine hue erumpit, haec quoque iterum loca compleat. Plena vero cum sunt, per rivos terraeque meatus exuberat, et cum humores singuli illuc profluxerint, quo quisque profuit opportunius, maria, lacus, fluminata, fontes efficiunt. Proinde rursus hinc relabentes per terram, partim quidem per lon- giores pluresque anfractus, partim vero per pauciores atque bre- viores rursus in Tartarum confluent: aliis certe multo profundius quam hausti fuerint, aliis vero paulo; omnes autem inferioris influunt, quam effluverint: et aliis per contrariam partem elabuntur, quam
illapsi fuerint; alii vero per partem eandem. at quidam passim circumfluentes aut semel aut seseius, spirasque circa orbem terrarum instar anguium replicantes, quantum fieri potest, infra relapsi tectum commiscerunt; licet autem utrinque partem ad medium usque defluere, ultra vero nequaquam. uterius nam prolapsus utrinque foret ascensu.


(62.) Cum vero haec ita natura disposita sint, quando in eum locum defuncti pervenerint, quo daemon unumqueque perducit, primo illic judicantur, et qui honeste saneteque, et qui aliter vixerint. Itaque quicunque in vita quodam modo tenuisse medium quoddam comperipient, ad Acherontem profecti vehiculis, que uniceius adunt, in paludem perveniunt Acherusiam: ibique habitant, purgantarque penas dantes injuriarum: et, cum purificati sunt, absolventur: rursusque pro merito singulis benefactorum praemia reportant. Quia vero ob scelerum magnitudinem insanabiles esse videntur, qui videlicet sacrilegia multa et magna vel caedes iniquas vel alia horum similia perpetratedint, hos omnes conveniens sors mergit in Tartarum, unde nunquam egredientur. Qui autem sanabili quidem peccata, sed ingentia commiserunt, veluti si qui contra patrem vel matrem irati per vim aliud fecerint, sed peneitentia ducti eos in cetera vita coluerint, vel qui simili quodam pacto fuerint homicidae, eos in Tartarum quidem necesse est cadere: sed ubi per annum commorati a fluctu ejiciuntur, homicidae quidem per Cocytum, parentum vero violatores per Pyrophlegethontem. Postquam vero ab his delati fluminibus ad paludem Acherusiam perve-
nerunt, clamant illic vocitantque eos, quos vel necaverunt vel in-
juriiis affecerunt; suppliciterque rogant atque deprecantur, ut eos
permittant progressi per paludem ibique absolvit: ac si imperat rerunt,
penetrat illuc finemque malorum accipiant: sin minus quenque per-
suadere, referuntur in Tartarum atque inde rursus in flumina; neque
per hæc mala deferri prius cessant, quam ab his, quos affecerunt
injuriiis, imperatrerunt. hæc enim pœna illis a judicibus est imposita.
Qui autem pie præ ceteris vixisse inventiunt, hi sunt, qui ex his
terrenis locis, tanquam e carere, soluti atque liberati ad altiora
transcendent, puramque supra terram habitant regionem. Inter hos
autem quicunque satias per philosophiam purgati sunt, absque cor-
poribus omnino totum per tempus vivunt, habitationesque his etiam
pulchriores nanciscuntur: quorum pulchritudo neque facilis dictu
est, neque praesens tempus ad dicendum sufficeret.

(63.) Sed horum, quæ narrata sunt, gratia, o Simmia, omni
studio est annuntiandum, ut in hac vita virtutem et prudentiam sapien-
tiamque consequamur. Praenium namque pulchrum est, et spes
est ingen. Haec igitur eo se pacto prorsus habere, quo ego disposui,
non decet virum sanæ mentis asserrere: esse tamen vel haec vel taia
quædam circa animos nostros eorumque habitations, quandoqui-
dem animus ipsè immortalis apparat, et decere mihi videtur; et
dignum, quæ periclitantes ita existimare. honestum enim pericu-
llum est; oportetque haec quasi carmina quædam magorum ritu
mentibus nostris infundere. quamobrem ipsæ jam diu protraha fa-
bulum. Sed horum gratia bonam sçem de animo suo habere debet,
quicunque voluptatibus ornamentisque corporis neglectis, tanquam
alienis ad diversumque declinantibus voluptates, quæ in discendo
perciipientur, studiose sectatus fuerit, animumque non alieno, sed
suo decoraverit ornamento, temperantia, justitia, fortitudine, liber-
tate, veritatem: sic ex hac vita migrationem exspectans, tanquam,
cum fatum vocaverit, migraturus. Vos quidem, o Simmia et Cebes
alieque presentes, in posterum quodam in tempore singuli transmi-
gratis, me vero nunc, ut tragicus aliquis diceret, jam vocat fatum.
ac ferme tempus est, ut ad lavandum divertam. praestat enim, ut
pute, post iàvaerum venenum bibere, ne in lavando cadavere mo-
lestiam mulieribus progbeamus.

(64.) Cum haec dixisset Socrates, Crito sic inquit: Die age, o
Socrates, quidnam hic aut mihi mandas agendum vel erga filios tuos
vel circa cetera? quidve agendo maxime tibi gratum fecerimus? Nihil
equidem, inquit, novi præcipio, sed quod semper vobis præ-
dico, videlicet si vestri curam habebatis, et mihi et vobis ipsis gratæ
evadent, quæcumque feceritis, etiamsi nunc verbis non concedatis.
at vero si vos ipsos neglexeritis, nolentes secundum ea, quæ nunc
et superiori tempore dicta sunt, quasi per vestigia vitam dirigere,
nihil prorsus perficetis, etsi multa nobis nunc disputantibus conce-
datis. Ista quidem, ait Crito, curæ nobis erunt. sed quemadmo-
dum sepeliri te juges? Utcunque, inquit, libet: si tamen me ap-
prehendetis, ac nisi ego vos effugero. Et simul subridens, et ad
nos conversus, Non persuadeo, inquit, Critone, me esse hunc So-
cratem, qui nunc disputo et singula dicta dispono. sed opinatur me
illud esse, quod paulo post videbit, cadaver. itaque interroget, quem-admodum me sepeliat. Quod autem jamdud plurimis verbis contendo, postquam venenum bibero, haud ulterius apud vos me esse futurum, sed ad beatorum prefecturum felicitatis, hoc quidem mihi videor frustra Critione dixisse, consolans vos simul atque meipsum: Fidejubete igitur pro me Critione contraria quadam fidejussione, quam ipse judicibus fidejussit. Ille enim me judicio sistere; vos autem me non sistere, cum obiero, fidejubete, sed abiturum: ut Crict obtum facilius meum ferat; neve meum corpus vel cremari cernens vel sepeliiri, me deploret, quasi dira patientem: neque dicat in funere proponi Socratem aut effirri aut sub terram condi. Certum id habeto, optime Crito, maledictum non solum in hoc ipso delinquire, verum etiam animis nonnihil officere, at enim confidere oportet, atque dicere corpus sepeliri meum, atque ita sepeliri, ut tibi placebit maximeque justum esse sensebis. His dictis surrexit, intravitque cubiculum quoddam, quasi lavaturus. Crito autem se-cutus est. Nos vero expectare jussit. Exspectabamus ergo, de his, quae dicta erant, inter nos colloquentes rursusque considerantes. Praeterea conquerebamur fortunam nostram: qui tanquam parente orbati reliquum vitae tempus orphani futuri essemus. Cum Socrates lotus esset, delati sunt ad eum pueri sui: duos enim filios habebat parvulos, unum vero jam grandem. venerunt et mulieres domesticce. Ad eas Socrates cum in praesentia Critionis verba fecisset, et quae volebat mandavisset; mulieres quidem et pueros abire jussit, ipse vero ad nos reedit, jam circiter solis occasum; permutum enim tempus intus fuerat commoratus. Cum vero ad nos venisset lotus, consedit. Nec multa post hae locutus erat, cum venit Undecimvirorum lictor, qui illi adstans, O Socrates, inquit, non arbitror eam in te novitatem me deprhehensurum, quam reprehendere in ceteris ipsius. illi enim indignantur mihi atque exsecrenantur, quando illis denuntio venenum esse bibendum, ita magistratibus compellentibus. te vero cognovit praeertim in hoc tempore generosissimum mansuetissimumque et optimum virum omnium, qui unquam hunc in locum devenerunt: et nunc euidem certo scio te mihi haud infestum fore, sed illis, penes quos rei hujus causam esse cognoscis. Nunc ergo seis, quem tibi nuntium affetam. Vale, atque annitere, quae necessaria sunt, pro viribus facile ferre. et simul his dictis abibat lacrymans. Socrates autem in eum respiciens, Et tu, inquit, vale, et nos id faciemus. Simulque ad nos conversus, Quam urbanus est homo hic? inquit. neque solum in hoc, sed in superiori etiam tempore me salutabit colloquebaturque nonnumquam, fuitque semper virorum optimus. Et nunc quam ingenuum me lacerymat? Sed age, o Crito, illi pareamus, ac si jam tritum est venenum, aliquis huc affetat. si nondum est tritum, conterat ille. At reor euidem, inquit Crito, o Socrates, nondum solem reliquisse montes nec occidisse. Et novi alios, postquam id sibi nuntiatum est, valde sero bibere illud consuevisse, largiter coenatos atque potos, interdum vero etiam illorum potitos, quorum amore afflicebantur. Quamobrem ne adeo festines; adhuc enim superest tempus. Tunc Socrates, Merito, inquit, o Crito, illi ista faciunt. putant enim haec
facientes lucrari. Atque ego merito ista non faciam. nihil enim me lucraturum spero, si paulo posterius venenum bibero, nisi ut mihi ipsi sim ridiculus, tanquam vitæ cupidus atque parcus ejus rei servator, cujus nihil jam mihi amplius adest. Sed age jam mihi obtempera, nec aliter facias.


(66.) Ilic finis fuit amici nostri, o Echecrates, viri, nostro quidem judicio, omnium, quos experti sumus, optimi et apprime sapientissimi atque justissimi.
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