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Depart tn0»n t of State
I 3',
) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2148
July 1989
-^^^^imDmo?
M0f»parinn»ni of Siaie
bulletin
Volume 89 / Number 2148 July 1989
The Dki'artment ok State Buij.etin. published by the Office of PubUc Com- munication in the Bureau of Public Af- fairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and govern- ment agencies with information on de- velopments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin's contents include major ad- dresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State: statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; se- lected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may be- come a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are jniblished frequently to provide ad- ditional information on current issues but should not necessarily be inter- preted as official U.S. policy statements.
JAMES A. BAKER, III
Secretary nf State
MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
COLLEEN LUTZ
Chiel', Editdrial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is neces- sary in the transaction of the public busi- ness requii-ed by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through September :l(), 19S9.
Dkpartment of State Bulletin (ISS^' 0041-7610) is published monthly (plus an- nual indexl by the Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage paid at Wasl ington, D.C, and additional mailing of- fices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- ington, D.C. 20402.
NtJTE: Most of the contents of this publi- cation are in the public domain and not copyrighted. Those items may be re- printed; citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be ap- preciated. Permission to reproduce all copyrighted material (including pho- tographs) must be obtained from the origi- nal source. The Bi'i.i.etin is indexed online by Magazine Index (Dialog file 47; BRS file MAGS), in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature and the online ver- sion of Reader.s' Guide (WILSONLINE file RDG), and in the PAIS (Public Affairs In- formation Service, Inc.) Bulletin. .'Articles
are abstracted bv Readers' Guide Ab- stracts (WILSONLINE file RGA). The Bulletin also participates in Mead Dat Central's full-text online services, LEXI and NEXIS.
For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- ments, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402.
CONTENTS
FEATURE
1 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
ie President
Change in the Soviet Union The Future of Europe Security Strategy for the 1990s
ie Secretary
News Conference Principles and Pragmatism:
American Policy Toward the
Arab-Israeli Conflict Interview on "Face the Nation" Trip to Moscow and NATO
{Secretary Baker. Joint
Statement) The Challenge of Change in
U.S. -Soviet Relations
ifrica
FY 1990 Assistance Request for Sub-Saharan Africa {Alison Rosenberg)
Cease-Fire in Sudan {Department Statement)
ifms Control
'' Biological Weapons Prolifera- tion {H. Allen Holmes) CFE and CSBM Talks Resume in Vienna {White House Statement)
lanada
President Meets With Prime Minister Mulroney {President Bush, Brian Mulroney)
ast Asia
1 Student Demonstations in China {Richard L. Williams)
48 U.S., Japan Agree to Codevelop FSX Aircraft {President Bush, Lawrence S. Eagleburger)
Economics
Competitiveness in the Global Marketplace {Richard T. McCormack)
World Trade Week, 1989 {Proclamation)
49
51
Europe
52 Deconfrontation on Cyprus {Department Stafeynent)
Middle East
53
54 55
55
Visit of King Hussein I
{President Bush,
King Hussein) Jordan — A Profile Relief Aid to Lebanon
{Department Statement) Situation in Lebanon
{Department Statements)
Oceans
56 U.S. Responsibilities in
International Fisheries Mat- ters {Edward E. Wolfe)
Refugees
59 Update on Immigration and
Refugee Issues {Jonathan Moore)
Science & Technology
62 U.S. Contributions to Communi- cations Development
United Nations
65 U.S. Opposes PLO Admission to
UN Agencies {Secretary Baker, Sandra L. Vogelgesang, Department Statement)
Western Hemisphere
66 Panama Elections {President
Bush, Lawrence S. Eagle- burger, Department and White House Statements, Text of OAS Resolution)
68 Elections in Argentina {Depart- ment Statements)
71 Elections in Bolivia {Depart- ment Statement)
73 U.S. -Mexico Relations
76 Mexico — A Profile
Treaties
76 Current Actions
Press Releases
78 Department of State
Publications
79 Department of State
80 Foreign Relations Volumes
Released
81 Background Notes
Index
epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
To Our Readers:
With this issue, we celebrate the gold- en anniversary of the Department of State Bulletin.
When this periodical was first published, no one could have forseen the crucial role the United States would play in world events during the next half-century. In order to illus- trate the extent of these changes, we are pleased to reproduce here the full text of the first Bulletin issued on July 1, 1939. Through the Administra- tions of 10 Presidents and 15 Secre- taries of State, America has assumed global responsibilities in political, economic, military, scientific, envi- ronmental, and humanitarian affairs to an extent unimaginable in those twilight days just prior to World War II.
The words and phrases that have become part of our vocabulary and lore in the past 50 years — cold war, Uruguay Round, narcotics interdic- tion, American hostages, Cuban mis- sile crisis, perestroika, intifada. Camp David agreements, INF Treaty, Tien- anmen Square, acid rain, to cite but a few — illustrate the growth in com- plexity and scope of U.S. foreign rela- tions. Our language of acronyms — UN, OECD, NATO, GATT, UNCTAD, OAS, OAU, EEC, UNEP, etc.— dem- onstrate the growing interdependence of nations and the crucial importance of diplomacy.
Throughout this time, the Bulletin has attempted to provide as accurate and as complete a record as possible of U.S. public policy on inter- national issues, for contemporary readers and for the researchers of future generations.
Just as the issues have become far more complex and varied, so has our publication — in the range of its subject matter, in the volume of its material, and in its format and style. We have gone from a weekly to a monthly in order to keep subscription rates low. New technology has al- lowed us to speed up the printing process and increase our use of graphics and photos, and this revolu- tion is only just beginning.
But whatever changes have been made, we have sought, above all, to maintain the integrity and utility of the only official monthly record of national foreign policy published by any country in the world. As we ap- proach the 21st century, our goal is to continue to provide the same level of quality and coverage and to be as adaptable to the enormous changes looming ahead as we have been to those of the past. That promises to be an exciting challenge!
July 1, 1989
Department of State Bulletin/July
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
■^ f
riN
JULY I, 1939 Vol. I: No. 1— Publication 1349
Qontents
Announcement 3
Peace and neutrality legislation: Statement by the
Secretary of State 4
Department of State appropriations for the fiscal year
1940 4
Visit to Washington of the Crown Prince and Crown
Princess of Norway 9
Mexico: Perfecting of land titles in the State of Veracruz . 10
Use of the original records of the Department of State . . 10
Training of Chilean students in the United States ... 12 International conferences, commissions, etc.:
Biennial Congress of the International Chamber of
Commerce 13
International Commission of Inquiry, United States
and Bolivia 13
Fifteenth International Conference on Documentation . 14
Treaty information 14
Foreign Service 16
Aimiversaries:
Anniversary of inauguration of postal service between
the United States and France 16
Legislation 16
Publications 16
epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
Announcement
'T^HE present issue inaugurates The Department of State Bulletin. This periodical will
be published weekly and will contain the texts of press releases, information regard- ing treaties, and other material on current developments in American foreign relations and the work of the Department of State. It will take the place of the Department's weekly pamphlet Press Releases and monthly Treaty Information bulletin, which are being discontinued with the issues for June 1939. Indexes to The Department of State Bulletin will be prepared and published semiannually.
The decision to discontinue the Treaty Information bulletin and the Press Releases pamphlet was arrived at after careful consideration by the Department of State and con- sultation with a nimiber of organizations and persons outside the Government who use one or both of those publications. A large majority of the organizations and persons consulted were of the opinion that the publication in a single bulletin of the material which was being issued in the weekly and monthly periodicals mentioned would be most desirable. This opinion coincided with the belief of the Department that a single bulletin containing both treaty information and information on other closely related aspects of the conduct of American foreign relations would constitute a more useful and convenient source for current reference and for filing than two separate publications.
The material to be published in The Department of State Bulletin wiU be so organized as to enable persons who are interested in certain special subjects to follow developments in their particular fields by reference each week to the appropriate section of the Bulletiti. Data, for instance, of the character of that previously contained in the Treaty Information bulletin will henceforth be printed each week in a separate section of the Bulletin.
The Department of State Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C, for 10 cents a copy, or for $2.75 a year by subscription.
lEililor's Note; Dii UlliH ."ilition. page i; was blank.]
Department of State Bulletin/July 1!|
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
PEACE AND NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION
Statement by the Secretary of State
[Released July 1]
I am still thoroughly convinced that the six- point peace and neutrality program set forth in my letters to Senator Pittman and Representa- tive Bloom on May 27, 1939,^ would be far more effective in the interests of peace and in keeping the country out of war than the pres- ent embargo law or any equivalent.
This legislative proposal was submitted to the appropriate committees of the two Houses of Congress after lengthy conferences with mem- bers of these committees and with other lead- ing Members of Congress of all political per- suasions. It was my hope and belief that, while this proposal might not contain all that every individual Member of Congress or every oflS- cial of the executive branch of the Govern- ment wished, it would in the present interna- tional exigencies be regarded as desirable by
a majority of Congress. Its failure to pass the House by a narrow margin is a matter of re- gret and disappointment from the standpoint of peace and the best interests of this country in its international relations.
This six-point peace and neutrality proposal is not only best calculated to keep this Nation out of war in the event war comes, but also, what is all-important at this time, best cal- culated to make a far greater contribution than could the present law or its equivalent toward the discouragement of the outbreak of war. At the same time, while doing this, it would like- wise keep this Government and Nation lUO percent within the limits of universally recog- nized international law.
In these circumstances, I must continue to urge the adoption of this proposal.
-f + 4- ^ -f -f -♦■
DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1940
The first of the following tables shows the increases and decreases in the State Depart- ment's appropriations for the 1940 fiscal year as compared with the 1939 fiscal year. The sec- ond table shows increases and decreases in the
" See Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 505, Jiine 3, 1939, pp. 475-477.
estimates as submitted to the Congress by the Bureau of the Budget and as approved by the President compared with the 1940 appropria- tions approved by the Congress.
The Department's appropriation bill for 1940 was approved by the President on June 29, 1939.
Ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
JULY 1, 1939
TABLE I
Department op State Appbopeiations fob Fiscal Ybab 1940 Compabed With Fiscal Yeab 1939
(Note. — For purposes of comparison it should be carefully noted that the 1939 column Includes all deficiency appropriations in addition to those in the regular annual appropriation bill, whereas for 1940 only the latter are shown since no deficiencies for that year have yet been passed.)
Appropriation title
Appropriations for 1940
Appropriations for 1939
Increases (+)
Decreases (— )
for 1940
Reasons for increases or decreases
Department Proper
Salaries, Department of State -
Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Agree- ments.
Contingent Expenses, Depart- ment of State.
Printing and Binding, Depart- ment of State.
$2, 192, 000
225, 000 138, 000
225, 000
$2, 072, 600
250, 000 95, 810
+ $119,400
-25,000
+ 42, 190
172, 750
Printing and Binding, Depart- ment of State (Supplemental for special items for 1939).
Passport Agencies, Department of State.
Collecting and Editing Terri- torial Papers.
Promotion of Foreign Trade
Total Department Proper.
60, 000 19, 800 43, 000
2, 902, 800
15, 000
63, 500 20, 000 40,000
2, 729, 660
+ 52,250
-15,000
-3,500
-200
+ 3,000
+ 173,140
Increases of $92,640 for 47 addi- tional permanent positions; and $26,760 to reduce the deficit which is now required to be covered by lapses.
General reduction which will re- quire readjustments in present set-up.
Increases of $7,875 for general sup- plies and services; $2,000 for replacement of trucks and pur- chase of one additional car; $11,065 for equipment for addi- tional personnel and replace- ments, particularly of machines. Decrease of $4,500 in travel. The sum of $25,750 was continued available for 1939 from 1938 and, therefore, was in addition to the appropriation of $95,810. In- crease for 1940 over funds actu- ally available for 1939 is, there- fore, $25,750 less than the $42,190, which is on the basis of appropriations.
Increases of $13,600 for consolida- tion of consular regulations and instructions to diplomatic offi- cers; $18,000 for Foreign Rela- tions; $4,500 for press releases; $4,110 for passports and passport forms; $9,000 for Foreign Service requirements; and $3,040 for mis- cellaneous items.
Non-recurring for 1940.
Decrease based on trend of expend- itures for past year. General decrease.
Funds available for 1939 were $4,500 more than the appropria- tion of $40,000 due to the avail- ability of the unexpended balance for 1938. For 1940 no balance is brought forward.
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Appropriation title
Foreign Service
Salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers.
Salaries of Foreign Service Officers.
Transportation, Foreign Service..
Office and Living Quarters, For- eign Service.
Cost of Living Allowances,
Representation Allowances-
Appropriations
for 1940
$650, 000
3, 580, 000 600, 000
Retirement Fund
Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks.
Salaries of Foreign Service Clerks (Supplemental for urgent needs in 1939).
Miscellaneous Salaries and Allow- ances, Foreign Service.
Contingent Expenses, Foreign Service.
Contingent Expenses, Foreign Service (Supplemental for tele- graph expenses in 1939).
Emergencies Arising in the Diplo- matic and Consular Service.
Total Foreign Service
FoEEiGN Service Buildings.
2, 020, 000
300, 000
140, 000
199, 400 2, 550, 000
700, 000
1, 135, 000
Appropriations (or 1939
$640, 000
3, 505, 100 556, 700
1, 962, 000
280, 000
125, 000
187, 600 2, 359, 020
41, 700
680, 180
1, 158, 500
Increases (+)
Decreases (— )
tor 1940
+ $10,000
+ 74,900 + 43, 300
175, 000
12, 049, 400
750, 000
140, 000 175, 000
11,810,800
+ 58,000
+ 20, 000 + 15,000
+ 11,800 + 190, 980
-41,700 + 19,820
-23,500
Reasons for increases or decreases
- 140, 000
+ 238, 600
+ 750,000
Increase of $22,500 required for raising ranks of Ministers to Colombia, Panama, and Vene- zuela to Ambassadors. De- creases of $10,000 for Minister to Czechoslovakia; and $2,500 addi- tional to be saved on lapses.
Increases of $49,900 for automatic promotions and $25,000 for 10 additional officers.
Increases of $12,500 for transfers of Ambassadors and Ministers; $10,600 for new officers; $4,200 for new clerks; $8,500 for tem- porary details; and $7,500 trans- ferred to this appropriation from Contingent Expenses for trade conference travel.
Increa.ses of $12,000 for 10 addi- tional officers; $11,970 for addi- tional clerks; and $34,030 to reduce deficit which it is neces- sary to cover by lapses on allow- ances for living quarters.
Increases of $2,400 for additional officers: $3,150 for additional clerks; and $14,450 for increased living costs.
To make readjustments in the in- terest of uniform treatment in the allotment of these funds, and to make more adequate provision for official entertainment le- quired by heads of mission.
Increases of $100,000 for some 700 promotions; $66,020 for 58 addi- tional permanent clerks; $15,920 for transfers to this appropria- tion of personnel previously paid from other appropriations; and $9,040 for temporary clerks.
Non-recuiring for 1940.
Increases of approximately $18,000 for some 600 promotions at an
' average of $30; $1,820 for addi-
"' tional personnel.
Reductions of $15,000 in program for purchase of household furni- ture; $10,000 for trade conference travel transferred to "Trans- portation, Foreign Service" $2,500 in item for special train- ing of Foreign Service officers $650 in automotive equipment. Increase of $4,650 for supplies postage, and miscellaneous items
Non-recurring' for 1940.
New appropriation under act of May 25, 1938.
partment of State Bulletin/July 1989
JULY 1, 1939
|
Appropriation title |
Appropriations for 1940 |
Appropriations for 1939 |
Increases (+) Decreases (-) for 1940 |
Reasons for increases or decreases |
|
International Obltgations |
||||
|
Contributions, Quotas, etc. to In- |
$870, 000 |
$835, 590 |
+ $34,410 |
Increases of $1,319.67 for Pan |
|
ternational Bureaus. |
American Union; $27,303.44 for Pan American Sanitary Bureau; and $10,786.89 for International Labor Organization. Decrease of $5,000 for Meeting of Interna- tional Road Congress which is a non-recurring item. |
|||
|
(Convention for the Promotion of |
75, 000 |
+ 75,000 |
New item growing out of conven- |
|
|
Inter-American Cultural Re- |
tion signed at Buenos Aires, De- |
|||
|
lations. |
cember 23, 1936. |
|||
|
Mexican Boundary Commission |
193, 000 |
143, 300 |
+ 49, 700 |
Increase is entirely for operation |
|
(Regular). |
and maintenance of the Rio |
|||
|
Grande Rectification Project |
||||
|
which is to be assumed by the |
||||
|
regular Commission upon com- pletion. Anticipated completion of this |
||||
|
Rio Crrande Rectification Proiect |
229, 500 |
-229, 500 |
||
|
j_l^H_/ y^ X c* 1-1 v.* \^ ^ V w ^-' VI *-* x^n' V* v^ *"* .■■ iv-'j^^^-'v — |
project. |
|||
|
Lower Rio Grande Flood Control |
800, 000 |
311,500 |
+ 488,500 |
Although there is an increase in the |
|
Project. |
actual amount appropriated for 1940, there was a considerable balance brought forward to 1939 from 1938 which made funds available for 1939 somewhat in excess of the appropriation for 1940. |
|||
|
Rio Grande Canalization Pro- |
500, 000 |
646, 500 |
-146,500 |
Reduction in construction work. |
|
ject. |
||||
|
Fence Construction on the Boundary, Arizona. International Boundary Commis- |
25, 000 |
25, 000 |
||
|
42, 000 |
41, 500 |
+ 500 |
Increase is for additional field work. |
|
|
sion, United States and Can- |
||||
|
ada, and Alaska and Canada. |
||||
|
Salaries and Expenses, Interna- |
37, 500 |
36, 600 |
+ 900 |
Increase for travel, supplies, com- |
|
tional Joint Commission, |
munication service, and miscel- |
|||
|
United States and Great Brit- |
laneous items. |
|||
|
ain. Special and Technical Investiga- |
47, 000 |
49, 000 |
-2,000 |
General reduction. |
|
tions, United States and Great |
||||
|
Britain. |
||||
|
International Fisheries Commis- sion. International Pacific Salmon Fish- |
25 000 |
25, 000 |
||
|
40, 000 |
25, 000 |
+ 15,000 |
For more extensive field work in |
|
|
eries Commission. |
cooperation with Canada. |
|||
|
Eighth American Scientific Con- gress. |
85, 000 |
+ 85,000 |
Special appropriation for participa- |
|
|
tion by the United States in this conference. |
||||
|
Seventh General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics. Ninth International Seed Testing Congress. |
4,500 |
+ 4,500 |
Special appropriation for organiz- |
|
|
500 |
+ 500 |
ing this Congress to be held in the United States. Special appropriation in connection |
||
|
with holding this Congress in the |
||||
|
United States. |
||||
|
Payment to Government of Nica- ragua. |
72, 000 |
+ 72,000 |
Special appropriation' under agree- |
|
|
ment with Nicaragua. |
||||
|
Fifteenth International Congress of Architects. |
15, 000 |
-15,000 |
Non-recurring. |
|
|
Tenth Pan American Sanitary Conference. International Committee OD Po- |
3,500 |
-3, 500 |
Non-recurring. |
|
|
50, 000 |
-50,000 |
Appropriation for 1940 undeter- |
||
|
litical Refugees. |
mined at present. |
Department of &tate Bulletin/July 19|
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
8
DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
|
Appropriation title |
Appropriations for 1940 |
Appropriations for 1939 |
Increases (+) Decreases (-) for 1940 |
Reasons for increases or decreases |
|
International Obligations — Con. Fourth International Conference |
$15, 500 50,000 15,000 3,600 50,000 10, 000 |
-$15,500 -50,000 -15,000 -3,600 -50.000 -10,000 |
Non-recurring. Non-recurring. Non-recurring. Non-recurring. Non-recurring. Non-recurring. |
|
|
on Private Air Law. Pan American Highway. |
||||
|
Third Pan American Highway |
||||
|
Conference. Commission of Experts on Codifi- |
||||
|
cation of International Law. Tenth International Congress of |
||||
|
Military Medicine and Phar- macy. Arbitration of Smelter Fumes |
||||
|
Controversy. |
||||
|
Total Intbknational Obli- gations. |
$2, 816, 500 |
2, 581, 090 |
-1-235, 410 |
|
|
Gband ToTAi |
18 518 700 |
17, 121, 550 |
+ 1,397, 150 |
|
TABLE II
Dbpartment of State Estimates as Submitted to Congress by the Bureau op the Budget Compared With
Appropriations Approved by Congress, 1940
Title of appropriation
Department op State
Salaries, Department of State
Salaries, Reciprocal Trade Treaties
Salaries, Inter- American Program
Contingent Expenses, Department of State
Contingent Expenses, Inter- American Program .
Printing and Binding, Department
Printing and Binding, Inter- American Program,
Passport Agencies
Territorial Papers
Promotion of Foreign Trade
Total, Department of State
Foreign Service
Salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers
Salaries of Foreign Service Officers
Transportation, Foreign Service Officers
Office and Living Quarters
Cost of Living Allowance
Representation Allowance
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund
Salaries, Foreign Service Clerks
Miscellaneous Salaries and Allowances
Contingent Expenses, Foreign Service
Emergency Fund
Total, Foreign Service
Foreign Service Buildings Fund
Estimate submitted to Congress
$2, 205, 000. 00
250, 000. 00
39, 360. 00
143, 000. 00
5, 430. 00
214, 500. 00
45, 500. 00
63, 500. 00
20, 000. 00
44, 500. 00
3, 030, 790. 00
655, 000. 00 580, 000. 00 610, 000. 00 030, 000. 00 308, 500. 00 145, 000. 00 199, 400. 00 570, 000. 00 710, 500. 00 154, 500. 00 175, 000. 00
12, 137, 900. 00
1, 000, 000. 00
Appropriation
approved by
Congress
$2, 192, 000. 00 225, 000. 00
138, 000. 00 '225,' 000.' 00
60, 000. 00 19, 800. 00 43, 000. 00
2, 902, 800. 00
650, 3, 580,
600, 2, 020,
300,
140,
199, 2, 550,
700, 1, 135,
175,
000. 00 000. 00 000. 00 000. 00 000. 00 000. 00 400. 00 000. 00 000. 00 000. 00 000. 00
12, 049, 400. 00
750, 000. 00
Increase (-1-) Decrease (-)
-$13,000.00 -25,000.00 -39,360.00
- 5, 000. 00
-5,430.00 + 10, 500. 00 -45,500.00
-3, 500. 00 -200. 00
- 1, 500. 00
-127,990. 00
|
-5, |
000. |
00 |
|
-10, |
000. |
00 |
|
-10, |
000. |
00 |
|
-8, |
500. |
00 |
|
-5, |
000. |
00 |
|
-20, |
000. |
00 |
|
-10, |
500 |
00 |
|
-19, |
500. |
00 |
-88, 500. 00
-250,000.00
Apartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
JULY 1, 1939
Title of appropriation
Estimate submitted to Congress
Appropriation
approved by
Congress
Increase (+) Decrease (— )
International Obligations
Contributions, Quotas, etc
Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural
Relations. Mexican Boundary Commission:
Regular Commission
Lower Rio Grande Flood Control
Rio Grande Canalization
Fence Construction
International Boundary Commission:
United States and Canada and Alaska and Canada
International Joint Commission:
Salaries and Expenses
Special and Technical Investigations
International Fisheries Commission
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
Eighth American Scientific Congress
Seventh Assembly of International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.
Ninth International Seed Testing Congress
Payment to Nicaragua
$870, 133. 00 75, 000. 00
198, 300. 00 1, 000, 000. 00 1, 000, 000. 00
43, 000. 00
38, 500. 00 49, 000. 00 31, 500. 00 40, 000. 00 90, 000. 00 5, 000. 00
500. 00 72, 000. 00
$870, 000. 00 75, 000. 00
193, 000. 00
800, 000. 00
500, 000. 00
25, 000. 00
42, 000. 00
37, 500. 00 47, 000. 00 25, 000. 00 40, 000. 00 85, 000. 00 4, 500. 00
500. 00 72, 000. 00
Total, International Obligations- Grand Total
3, 512, 933. 00
2, 816, 500. 00
-$13a 00
-5,300.00
-200,000.00
-500,000.00
+ 25, 000. 00
- 1, 000. 00
- 1, 000. 00 -2,000.00 -6,500.00
-5,000. 00 -500. 00
-696,433.00
19, 681, 623. 00
18, 518, 700. 00
1, 162, 923. 00
VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND CROWN
PRINCESS OF NORWAY
[Released June 26]
Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Norway will arrive in Washington, for an unofficial visit, at 9 : 15 p. m., the evening of Tuesday, June 27. They will be accompanied by the Minist«r of Norway and will be met at the Union Station by the following committee:
The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and Mrs. Hull
Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne, wife of the Minister of Norway
Mr. Jorgen Galbe, Counselor of the Norwegian Legation, and Madame Galbe
Mr. George T. Summerlin, Chief of Protocol
Mr. James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Rela- tions, Department of State, and Mrs. Dunn
Mr. John Hickerson, Acting Chief of the Divi- sion of European Affairs, Department of State, and Mrs. Hickerson
Mr. Aage Bryn, First Secretary of the Nor- wegian Legation, and Madame Bryn
Mr. Ditlef Knudsen, Attache of the Norwegian Legation, and Madame Knudsen
Mr. Torfinn Oftedal, Attache of the Norwegian Legation
Lt. Col. H. M. Rayner, United States Army, Military Aide to the Crown Princ«
Comdr. R. B. Carney, United States Navy, Naval Aide to the Crown Prince
On Wednesday, June 28, the Secretary of State and Mrs. Hull will give a luncheon for Their Royal Highnesses, who will remain in Washington until Friday afternoon, June 30.
Department of State Bulletin/July 1!
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
10
[Released June 28]
Following is the list of guests attending the lunch- eon given by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Hull in honor of Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Norway, June 28, 1939, at the Carlton Hotel:
Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Norway; the Honorable the Minister of Norway and Madame Munthe de Morgenstierne ; Maj. N. R. 0stgaard and Madame 0stgaard ; Capt. N. A. Ramm ; Mr. Jens Schive ; Mrs. Woodrow Wilson ; the Honorable the Attorney General; the Honorable the Secretary of Commerce ; Mrs. Charles L. McNary ; the Honorable Walter F. George and Mrs. George; the Honorable Robert L. Doughton and Mrs. Doughton ; Mrs. Sol Bloom ; the Honorable Edith Nourse Rogers ; the Honorable Jere Cooper ; the Honorable the Under Secretary of State and Mrs. Welles ; the Honorable Lucille F. McMillan ; Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas Roose- velt ; the Honorable Jesse Jones and Mrs. Jones ; Mr. George T. Summerlin ; Mr. David Lawrence ; Mr. Ulric Bell; Miss Ramona Lefevre; Miss Beth Camp- bell ; Lt. Col. Harold M. Rayner, United States Army, American military aide to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Norway ; Comdr. Robert B. Carney, United States Navy, American naval aide to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Norway.
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MEXICO: PERFECTING OF LAND TITLES IN THE STATE OF VERA- CRUZ
[Released June 26]
The Department of State has been informed that the State of Veracruz, Mexico, has ex- tended until July 22, 1939, the period within which proprietors of immovable property (in- cluding those who have inherited immovable property) may legalize their property rights by instituting the necessary proceedings to "perfect" the said rights in cases where titles of ownership are not properly inscribed in the Public Registry of Property. As stated in the Department's press release of March 21, 1939,- provision for such perfection of title was made
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in Veracruz State law promulgated September 22, 1938.
The American consul at Veracruz, in report- ing this extension, states that in order to com- ply with the law it may be necessary for Amer- ican property owners affected by the law to engage an attorney. The consul will be glad, upon request, to furnish any interested Amer- ican citizen with a list of attorneys. He can- not, of course, assume any responsibility for the integrity or ability of any attorneys ap- pearing on the list who may be employed by such property owner.
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USE OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Released July 1]
In view of the contemporary international situation, the Department has found it neces- sary to revise in certain respects the regula- tions set forth in Departmental Order No. 751, of April 5, 1938, relating to the use of the original records of the Department of State.' The revised regulations as contained in De- partmental Order No. 796, dated June 19, 1939. are as follows:
"Section 91, Title 20, of the United States Code reads in part as follows: 'The facilities for study research and illustration in the Gov- ernment departments . . . shall be accessible, under such rules and restrictions as the officers in charge of each department or collection may prescribe, subject to such authority as is now or may hereafter be permitted by law, to the scientific investigators and to duly qualified individuals, students and graduates of any in- stitution of learning in the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia . . .' Pursuant to the provisions quoted and in order
'Press Releases, Vol. XX, No. 495, March 25, 1939, pp. 222-223.
" See Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 479, December 3, 1938, p. 401.
JULY 1, 1939
11
to clarify the present procedure in the Depart- ment, the following regulations, superseding those contained in Departmental Order No. 751, dated April 5, 1938, and all previous depart- mental orders on the subject, are hereby pre- scribed to govern the use of the original records of the Department of State.
"In view of the contemporary international situation it will not be possible to make the confidential or unpublished files and records of the Department of a date later than December 31, 1918, available to persons who are not offi- cials of the United States Government. In order that the Department's records may be made available as liberally as circumstances permit, the Department each year will give con- sideration to the situation then existing with a view to advancing the date fixed whenever such action is deemed possible. The use of these records by Government officials will be subject to such conditions as the chiefs of the appro- priate policy divisions in the Department of State may deem it advisable to prescribe.
"The confidential or unpublished records of the Department of a date prior to December 31, 1918, or such subsequent date as may be fixed by the Department, may be made available to persons who are not officials of the United States Government, subject to the following conditions :
"Files which are in current use in the De- partment or which cannot be made public with- out the disclosure of confidences reposed in the Department or without adversely affecting the public interest should not be made available to inquirers. Papers received by the Depart- ment from a foreign government which have not been released for publication by that gov- ernment should not be made available to in- quirers without the consent of the government concerned. If there is reason to believe a for- eign government may be willing to permit the use of the papers in question under certain conditions the permission may, in the discre- tion of the appropriate officials of the Depart- ment, be requested. If such permission is re- quested, the expenses of communicating with
the foreign government (cost of telegrams, postage, etc.) will be met by the person desir- ing to consult the papers.
"Permission to consult the records of the Department through the date fixed by the De- partment may be granted, subject to the limi- tations set forth in this order, to such persons as lawyers, publicists, historians, instructors, and professors in accredited colleges and uni- versities, and holders of the doctor's degree (or its equivalent) in foreign relations or allied subjects from such colleges and universities, provided that they are authorities of recog- nized standing in the field to which the records relate and that they have an important and definite use for the information desired. Due to lack of personnel the Department is not in a position to assemble large quantities of papers or extensive files for consultation by persons not officials of the Government, and requests for permission to consult material should therefore be definitely limited in scope and confined to specific subjects or particular papers.
"An application from an alien to consult the Department's records under this order shall be considered only if accompanied by a letter from the head of the embassy or legation at Washington of the country of which the alien is a citizen, subject or national. Such a letter must show that the applicant is favorably known to the appropriate embassy or legation and that the mission is familiar with the pur- pose of the applicant's work.
"All applications to consult the original records of the Department of date prior to the one fixed by the Department shall be re- ferred to the Chief of the Division of Kesearch and Publication. If the Chief of the Divi- sion of Research and Publication is of the opinion that the applicant possesses the requi- site qualifications as set forth in this order, he shall have assembled and shall submit to the chief of the policy division charged with the consideration of questions in the field which is the object of the research or inquiry all of the relevant papers and files which the applicant
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
12
desires to consult with the exceptions herein- after noted. If the applicant is permitted to use all or part of the papers desired, the chief of the policy division concerned will inform the Chief of the Division of Research and Publication under what conditions the papers may be examined, that is, whether copies may be made of the relevant documents or whether only notes may be taken and whether the copies or notes may be published in whole or in part or used only for background information, or any other conditions which the chief of the policy division mentioned may deem it advis- able to prescribe. This decision will be final except in cases of unusual importance where the question may be referred to an Assistant Secretary of State or higher officer. Docu- ments or papers previously released or pub- lished, and unpublished papers clearly involv- ing no question of policy, may be made avail- able to qualified applicants by the Chief of the Division of Research and Publication without reference to other officials.
"Upon receiving the decision of the chief of the policy division mentioned, with the condi- tions therein deemed advisable and necessary to prescribe, the Chief of the Division of Re- search and Publication will thereupon arrange for the applicant to consult the files subject to the conditions mentioned. After the papers have been consulted the applicant will submit all notes, copies of documents, etc., which he has made to the Chief of the Division of Research and Publication. The latter, when necessary, will refer these notes, copies, etc., to the chief of the policy division concerned for examination if desired by the chief of the latter division. The chief of this policy division may, after such examination, return the papers to the Chief of the Division of Research and Publication for transmittal to the applicant or he may, in his discretion, retain the notes and refuse the applicant permission to use them.
"The provisions of this order are to be inter- preted as liberally as possible. In this regard it is to be borne in mind that the further it is possible to go in the way of promoting legiti-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mate historical research and the study of the foreign policy of the United States without violating the confidences necessary for the transaction of diplomatic affairs, the more likely the Department will be to receive the support and trust of the intelligent public."
■f > *
TRAINING OF CHILEAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
[Released July 1]
A group of graduate students of Chilean engineering schools today called on Assistant Secretary of State Berle to pay their respects. They were presented by the Chilean Ambassa- dor. These students have come to the United States to spend several months in some of the important industrial plants of the country in order to obtain advanced instruction and prac- tical experience in certain branches of tech- nology. They are here under the sponsorship of the University of Chile and of a number of Chilean and American banks, transportation lines, and industrial concerns.
One group is under the sponsorship of:
The University of Chile (Engineering School)
Mining Credit Bank of Chile
Chilean State Railways
Consulate General of Chile in New York
Chile-American Association, Inc.
Wessel-Duval & Co.
General Motors Corp.
Baldwin Locomotive Works & Associated Companies
Bethlehem Steel Corp. & Associated Com- panies
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey & Asso- ciated Companies
Westinghouse Electric International Co.
Thomas A. Edison Co.
Carrier Corporation
Members of this group are located as follows :
Luis Rojas, Westinghouse Electric Inter- national Co.
Carlos A. Echazii, Westinghouse Electric International Co.
spartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
JULY 1, 19 39
Fernando Suarez, Baldwin Locomotive
Works Kamon Suarez, Bethlehem Steel Corp. Jorge Hevia, Bethlehem Steel Corp. Arturo Aranda, General Motors Corp. Isaac Faiguenbaum, General Motors Corp. Albert Arce, Carrier Corporation Alfonso Castro, Baldwin Locomotive
Works Carlos Alvarez, Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey
A second group is under the sponsorship of
13
W. R. Grace & Co., the General Electric Co., and Ingersoll-Rand Co.
These students and their locations are as fol- lows:
Ramon Cabezon B., General Electric Co. Julio Melnick A., Ingersoll-Rand Co. Luis Marti, Grace Industrial Department
The students presented also included Alberto Cabero, Jr., son of the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, and Mario Barranza, who is under the sponsorship of the Panagra airlines.
International Conferences, Commissions, etc.
BIENNIAL CONGRESS OF THE INTER- NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
[Released June 26]
Following is the text of a message from tlie President of the United States to Mr. Thomas J. Watson, in connection with the Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce being held at Copenhagen, Denmark, convening June 26, 1939:
"In these times of international uncertainty the existence of the International Chamber of Conmierce and its efforts to promote interna- tional economic activity are extremely hearten- ing to those of us who believe that only with the existence of stable and progressively im- proving world trade and finance will it be pos- sible to establish satisfactory international political relations.
"I am glad to take this opportunity of ex- pressing again my appreciation of the work done in the promotion of world trade and un- derstanding by the International Chamber of Commerce, which has been under your leader- ship for the past two years. To the Interna- tional Chamber of Commerce and to your suc- cessor I extend my best wishes for continued successful activities in this direction.
"Frankun D. Roosevelt"
In transmitting the foregoing message to Mr. Watson, Secretary of State Hull wrote:
"I have been requested by the President to transmit to you his message to the Interna- tional Chamber of Commerce at the June 26, 1939 Opening Session of its Biennial Congress. I should like to have you know that I echo the words of the President and that I wish for the International Chamber of Commerce a success- ful congress.
"CoRDELL Hull"
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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, UNITED STATES AND BOLIVIA
[Released June 26]
By the joint action of the Governments of the United States and Bolivia, Mr. Johannes Irgens, Norwegian diplomatist, has been ap- pointed to tlie position of Joint Commissioner for the International Commission provided for under the terms of the Treaty for the Advance- ment of Peace between the United States and Bolivia, signed January 22, 1914.
Department of State Bulletin/July 19
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
14
The present composition of the Commission is as follows:
American Commissioners :
National : A. R. Talbot, of Nebraska Nonnational : Ludvigs Seja, of Latvia
Bolivian Commissioners: National: Vacant Nonnational: Vacant
Joint C onvmissioner : Johannes Irgens, of Norway.
FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CON- FERENCE ON DOCUMENTATION
[Released July 1]
This Government has accepted the invitation of the Swiss Goverimient to participate in the Fifteenth International Conference on Docu- mentation, which will be held at Zurich, Swit-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE HTTT.T.TCTTTJ
zerland, from August 10 to 13, 1939, and the President has approved the appointment of the following persons as delegates on the part of the United States:
Vernon D. Tate, Ph. D., Chief, Division of Photographic Archives and Research, The Na- tional Archives
Miss Jose Meyer, European representative. Li- brary of Congress, Paris, France.
This Government was represented at the Fourteenth International Conference on Docu- mentation which was held at Oxford, England, in September 1938. At that meeting the dis- cussions concerned the best methods of obtain- ing authoritative information on bibliographic work in such fields of learning as archeology, archive work, economics, history, and linguistic studies.
Treaty Information
All material for the month of June 1939 con- cerning treaties to which the United States is a party or may become a party or treaties of gen- eral international interest will appear in the Treaty Information bulletin for June 30, 1939 ;
treaty data available after that date will be compiled in the Treaty Division and wiU ap- pear in this section of subsequent issues of The Department of State Bulletin.
ipartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
13
JULY 1, 1939
Foreign Service
The July 1, 1939, issue of the Foreign Serv- ice List will contain the following changes in heads of American diplomatic missions :
Norman Armour, of New Jersey, formerly Ambassador to Chile, appointed Ambassador to Argentina May 18, 1939.
Claude G. Bowers, of New York, formerly Ambassador to Spain, appointed Ambassador to Chile June 22, 1939.
Robert Granville Caldwell, of Texas, re- signed as Minister to Bolivia effective upon expiration of leave of absence.
Frank P. Corrigan, of Ohio, formerly Min- ister to Panama, appointed Ambassador to Venezuela January 20, 1939.
William Dawson, of Minnesota, formerly Minister to Uruguay, appointed Ambassador to Panama March 23, 1939.
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., of California, for- merly counselor of embassy at Lima, Peru, ap- pointed Minister to Iran July 7, 1939.
Antonio C. Gonzalez, of New York, resigned as Minister to Venezuela effective June 8, 1939.
Douglas Jenkins, of South Carolina, for- merly consul general at London, appointed Minister to Bolivia June 22, 1939.
Daniel C. Roper, of South Carolina, ap- pointed Minister to Canada May 9, 1939.
Laurence A. Steinhardt, of New York, for- merly Ambassador to Peru, appointed Ambas- sador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lics March 23, 1939.
Alexander W. Weddell, of Virginia, formerly Ambassador to Argentina, appointed Ambas- sador to Spain May 3, 1939.
15
Edwin C. Wilson, of Florida, formerly coun- selor of embassy at Paris, appointed Minister to Uruguay June 22, 1939.
The following changes have occurred in the American Foreign Service since June 24, 1939 :
John G. Erhardt, of Brooklyn, N. Y., For- eign Service officer detailed as inspector, has been designated first secretary of. embassy and consul general at London, England.
William M. Cramp, of Philadelphia, Pa., sec- ond secretary of legation at Tegucigalpa, Hon- duras, has been assigned as consul at Warsaw, Poland.
William C. Trimble, of Baltimore, Md., now assigned to the Department of State, has been designated third secretary of embassy and vice consul at Paris, France.
Douglas Flood, of Kenilworth, 111., vice con- sul at Barcelona, Spain, has been assigned as vice consul at Naples, Italy.
Robert C. Strong, of Beloit, Wis., vice consul at Frankfort on the Main, Germany, has been assigned as vice consul at Prague, Bohemia.
The following Executive orders concerning the Foreign Service have recently been issued :
Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg- ulations of the United States (Retirement of Foreign Service OflBcers). (E. O. 8176.) Federal Register, Vol. 4, No. 121, June 23, 1939, p. 2467 (The National Archives of the United States).
Executive Order Amending the Foreign Service Reg- ulations of the United States (Chapter III — Immu- nities, Powers, and Privileges). (E. O. 8181.) Fed- eral Register, Vol. 4, No. 123, June 27, 1939, p. 2491 (The National Archives of the United States).
[The above orders effect no material altera- tions in the Foreign Service Regulations but merely consolidate into one chapter the miscel- laneous sections throughout the Regulations pertaining to the diplomatic and consular branches of the Foreign Service as separate entities.]
Executive Order: Effective Date of Election by Re- tired Foreign Service OflBcers to Receive Reduced An- nuities. (E. O. 8180.) Federal Register, Vol. 4, No. 122, June 24, 1939, p. 2475 (The National Archives of the United States).
Department of State Bulletin/July 19
FEATURE 50th Anniversary of the Bulletin
16
Anniversaries
ANNIVERSARY OF INAUGURATION OF POSTAL SERVICE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE
[Released July 1]
Translation of a telegram from the Minister for For- eign, Affairs of France (Oeorges Bonnet) to the Secre- tary of State
Pabis, June 28, 19S9. Seventy-flve years ago a steamer to which France had been pleased to give the name of the American hero Washington insured for the first time, in thirteen and one-half days, the regular service of the French mall line between Le Havre and New York. On the occasion of this anniversary I desire to express to Tour Excellency, recalling myself to your recollection, the deep satisfaction which I feel In noting the prog- ress made with respect to the rapidity of communica- tions between France and the United States, a tangi- ble testimony of the unfailing friendship which unites our two countries.
Geoboes Bonnet
Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France
June 30, 1939. I hasten to thank Your Excellency for your cordial telegram on the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the in- auguration of a postal service between France and the United States by the French steamer Washington. The phenomenal expansion in transportation facilities between the United States and Europe since the maiden voyage of the French steamer Washington
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
has had a profound influence on cultural and com- mercial relations between our two countries.
CoBDEEX Hull
Legislation
Comanunlcation from the President of the United States transmitting supplemental estimate of appro- priation for the War Department, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, to remain available until ex- pended, amounting to $200,000, for investigation and survey of a canal and highway across the Republic of Nicaragua. (H. Doc. 351, 76th Ck)ng., 1st sess.) 2 pp. 5^.
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on present neutrality law (Public Res. 27, 75th Cong.), proposed amend- ments thereto, and related legislation affecting the foreign policy of the United States, April 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 2, 1939. (76th Cong., 1st sess.) 639 pp. 600.
An Act Making appropriations for the Departments of State and Justice and for the Judiciary, and for the Department of Commerce, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, and for other purposes. (Public, No. 156, 76th Cong., 1st sess.) 39 pp. 100.
Publications
Depabtment of State
Treaty Information, Bulletin No. 116, May 31, 1939. Publication 1342. iv, 20 pp. Subscription, $1 a year ; single copy, 1(>0.
Other Government Agencies
Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938. (Department of Commerce : Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com- merce.) 1939. 435 pp. $1 (cloth).
U. 5. COVERNHENT PRrNTlNG OFFICE: I9SB
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. — Price 10 cents Subscription price, $2.75 a year
PUBLISHED WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DIBECTOB OF THE BUBE^D OF THE BUDGET
>epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
THE PRESIDENT
Change in the Soviet Union
President Bush's address at Texas A&M U7iiversity's conunencement ex- ercises at College Station on May 12, 1989.^
My sincerest congratulations go to every graduate and to your parents. In this ceremony, we celebrate noth- ing less than the commencement of the rest, and the best, of your life.
When you look back to your days at Texas A&M, you will have a lot to be proud of — a university that is first in baseball and first in service to our na- tion. Many are the heroes whose names are called at muster. Many are those you remember in silver taps.
We are reminded that no genera- tion can escape history. Parents — we share a fervent desire for our children, and their children, to know a better world, a safer world. Students — your parents and grandparents have lived through a world war and helped Ameri- ca to rebuild the world. They witnessed the drama of postwar nations divided by Soviet subversion and force but sustained by an allied response most vividly seen in the Berlin airlift.
Containing Soviet Expansionism
Wise men — Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Rayburn, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan — crafted the strategy of containment. They believed that the Soviet Union, denied the easy course of expansion, would turn inward and address the contradictions of its inefficient, repressive, and inhumane system. And they were right. The So- viet Union is now publicly facing this hard reality.
Containment worked. Containment worked because our democratic princi- ples, institutions, and values are sound and always have been. It worked be- cause our alliances were and are strong; and because the superiority of free societies and free markets over stagnant socialism is undeniable.
We are approaching the conclusion of a historic postwar struggle be- tween two visions — one of tyranny and conflict and one of democracy and freedom. The review of U.S. -Soviet re- lations that my Administration has just completed outlines a new path toward resolving this struggle.
Our goal is bold — more ambitious than any of my predecessors might
have thought possible. Our review indi- cates that 40 years of perseverance have brought us a precious opportunity. Now it is time to move beyond contain- ment, to a new policy for the 1990s — one that recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world and in the Soviet Union itself.
In sum, the United States now has as its goal much more than simply con- taining Soviet expansionism — we seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. As the So- viet Union moves toward greater open- ness and democratization — as they meet the challenge of responsible inter- national behavior — we will match their steps with steps of our own. Ulti- mately, our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union tjack into the world order.
Looking for Signs of Soviet Change
The Soviet Union says it seeks to make peace with the world and criticizes its own postwar policies. These are words we can only applaud. But a new rela- tionship cannot be simply declared by Moscow or bestowed by others. It must be earned. It must be earned because promises are never enough. The Soviet Union has promised a more cooperative relationship before — only to reverse course and return to militarism. So- viet foreign policy has been almost seasonal — warmth before cold, thaw before freeze. We seek a friendship that knows no season of suspicion, no chill of distrust.
We seek a friendship [with the Soviet Union J that knows no season of suspicion, no chill of distrust.
We hope perestroika is pointing the Soviet Union to a break with the cycles of the past — a definitive break. Who would have thought we would see the deliberations of the Central Committee on the front page of Pravda, or dissi- dent Andrey Sakharov seated near the councils of power? Who would have
imagined a Soviet leader who can- vasses the sidewalks of Moscow and Washington, D.C.? These are hopeful- indeed, remarkable — signs. Let no ont doubt our sincere desire to see peres- troika continue and succeed. But the national security of America and our allies is not predicated on hope. It mu! be based on deeds. We look for endur- ing, ingrained economic and political changes.
While we hope to move beyond coi tainment, we are only at the beginninj of our new path. Many dangers and un certainties are ahead. We must not for get that the Soviet Union has acquirei awesome military capabilities. That was a fact of life for my predecessors. That has always been a fact of life for our allies. And that is a fact of life for me.
As we seek peace, we must also re main strong. The purpose of our mili- tary might is not to pressure a weak Soviet economy or to seek military su periority. It is to deter war. It is to dt fend ourselves and our allies and to d( something more — to convince the So- viet Union that there can be no rewar in pursuing expansionism, to convince the Soviet Union that reward lies in tl pursuit of peace.
Positive Steps Toward an Open Society
Western policies must encourage the evolution of the Soviet Union toward i open society. This task will test our strength. It will tax our patience. Am it will require a sweeping vision — let me share with you ray vision. I see a Western Hemisphere of democratic, prosperous nations, no longer threat- ened by a Cuba or a Nicaragua armed by Moscow. I see a Soviet Union that pulls away from ties to terrorist nations — like Libya — that threaten thi legitimate security of their neighbors. I see a Soviet Union which respects China's integrity and returns the Northern Territories of Japan — a pre- lude to the day when all the great nations of Asia will live in harmony.
But the fulfillment of this vision requires the Soviet Union to take posi tive steps, including:
First, reduce Soviet forces. Al- though some small steps have already, been taken, the Warsaw Pact still pos- sesses more than 30,000 tanks, more than twice as much artillery, and hun- dreds of thousands more troops in Eu- rope than NATO. They should cut thei forces to less threatening levels in pro
16
Department of State Bulletin/July 19(
THE PRESIDENT
I I'tiiiii to their legitimate security
Socond, adhere to the Soviet cliuation — promised in the final days [. Wnrld War II — to support self- Htermination for all the nations of istern and central Europe. This re- ires specific abandonment of the ezhnev doctrine. One day it should possible to drive from Moscow to mich without seeing a single guard iver or a strand of barbed wire. In ort, tear down the Iron Curtain.
Third, work with the West in posi- '8, practical — not merely rhetorical — ;ps toward diplomatic solutions to gional disputes around the world. I !lcome the Soviet withdrawal from 'ghanistan and the Angola agree- >nt. But there is much more to be ne around the world. We're ready. ;t's roll up our sleeves and get work.
Fourth, achieve a lasting political aralism and respect for human !;hts. Dramatic events have already curred in Moscow. We are impressed limited, but freely contested, elec- ms. We are impressed by a greater leration of dissent. We are impressed a new frankness about the Stalin a. Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now.
Fifth, join with us in addressing essing global problems, including the ternational drug menace and dangers the environment. We can build a tter world for our children.
penness and Arms Control
3 the Soviet Union moves toward ms reduction and reform, it will find illing partners in the West. We seek rifiable, stabilizing arms control and ms reduction agreements with the )viet Union and its allies. However, ms control is not an end in itself but means of contributing to the security America and the peace of the world, directed Secretary Baker to propose the Soviets that we resume negotia- ans on strategic forces in June. And, I you know, the Soviets have agreed. Our basic approach is clear. In the rategic arms reduction talks, we ish to reduce the risk of nuclear war. 1 the companion defense and space ilks, our objective will be to preserve ir options to deploy advanced de- nses when they are ready. In nuclear !sting, we will continue to seek the jcessary verification improvements in dsting treaties to permit them to be rought into force. We will continue to ;ek a verifiable global ban on chemical eapons. We support NATO efforts
to reduce the Soviet offensive threat in the negotiation on conventional [armed] forces in Europe. And, as I've said, fundamental to all of these objec- tives is simple openness.
Make no mistake, a new breeze is blowing across the steppes and cities of the Soviet Union. Why not, then, let this spirit of openness grow, let more barriers come down. Open emigration, open debate, open airwaves — let open- ness come to mean the publication and sale of banned books and newspapers in the Soviet Union. Let the 19,000 Soviet Jews who emigrated last year be fol-
One day it should be possible to drive from Moscow to Munich with- out seeing a single guard tower or a strand of barbed wire.
lowed by any number who wish to emi- grate this year. Let openness come to mean nothing less than the free ex- change of people, books, and ideas be- tween East and West. And let it come to mean one thing more.
Thirty-four years ago. President Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet leaders who, after the death of Stalin, promised a new approach toward the West. He proposed a plan called "Open Skies," which would allow unarmed air- craft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over the territory of the other country. This would open up military activities to regular scruti- ny and, as President Eisenhower put it, "convince the world that we are . . . lessening danger and relaxing tension."
President Eisenhower's suggestion tested Soviet readiness to open their society. The Kremlin failed that test. Let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive and radi- cal basis — one which I hope would in- clude allies on both sides. We suggest that those countries that wish to exa- mine this proposal meet soon to work out the necessary operational details, separately from other arms control ne- gotiations. Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would pro- vide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial access would show the world the meaning of
the concept of openness. The very So- viet willingness to embrace such a concept would reveal their commit- ment to change.
Economic Relations
Where there is cooperation, there can be a broader economic relationship. But economic relations have been stifled by Soviet internal policies. They have been injured by Moscow's practice of using the cloak of commerce to steal technology from the West. Ending dis- criminatory treatment of U.S. firms would be a helpful step. Trade and financial transactions should take place on a normal commercial basis.
And should the Soviet Union cod- ify its emigration laws in accord with international standards and implement its new laws faithfully, I am prepared to work with Congress for a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amend- ment, opening the way to extending most-favored-nation trade status to the Soviet Union. The policy I have just de- scribed has everything to do with you.
World Order of the Future
Today you graduate. You will start careers and families. And you will be- come the leaders of America in the next century. What kind of world will you know? Perhaps the world order of the future will truly be a family of nations.
It is a sad truth that nothing forces us to recognize our common humanity more swiftly than a natural disaster. I am thinking of Soviet Armenia, just a few months ago — a tragedy without blame, warlike devastation without war.
My son took our 12-year-old grand- son to Yerevan. At the end of a day of comforting the injured and consoling the bereaved, father and son sat down together amid the ruins and wept. How can our two countries magnify this simple expression of caring? How can we each convey the good will of our people?
Forty-three years ago, a young lieutenant by the name of Albert Kot- zebue, classof 1945 at Te.xas A&M, was the first American soldier to shake hands with the Soviets at the banks of the Elbe River. Once again, we are ready to extend our hand. Once again, we are ready for a hand in return. Once again, it is a time for peace.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents of May 22, 1989. ■
epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
17
THE PRESIDENT
The Future of Europe
President Bicah'n addresii at Bos- ton Universitifs commencement exer- cises on May 21, 19S9.^
As Boston University graduates, you take with you a degree from a great in- stitution, and something more — knowledge of the past and respon- sibility for the future. And take a look at our world today. Nations are under- going changes so radical that the inter- national system you know — and will know in the future — will be as differ- ent from today's as today's world is from the time of Woodrow Wilson. How will America prepare, then, for the challenges ahead?
It's with your future in mind that, after deliberation and a review, we are adapting our foreign policies to meet this challenge. I've outlined how we're going to try to promote reform in East- ern Europe, and how we're going to work with our friends in Latin Ameri- ca. In Texas, I spoke to another group of graduates of our new approach to the Soviet Union — one of moving beyond containment to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations, to help them share the rewards of inter- national cooperation.
Change in Western Europe
But today, I want to discuss the future of Europe — that mother of nations and ideas that is so much a part of America. And it is fitting that I share this forum with a very special friend of the United States — [French] President Mitter- rand, you have the warm affection and high regard of the American people. And I remember well, about 8 years ago, when you joined us in Yorktown, in 1981, to celebrate the bicentennial of that first Franco-American fight for freedom. And soon, I will join you in Paris, to observe the 200th anniversary of the French struggle for liberty and equality.
And this is just one e.xample of the special bond between two continents. But consider this city. From the Old North Church to Paul Revere's home nestled in the warm heart of the Italian North End, to your famous song-filled Irish pubs — the Old and New Worlds are inseparable in this city. But as we look back to Old World tradition, we must look ahead to a new Europe. His- toric changes will shape your careers and your very lives.
The changes that are occurring in Western Europe are less dramatic than those taking place in the East, but they are no less fundamental. The postwar order that began in 1945 is transform- ing into something very different. And yet certain essentials remain, because our alliance with Western Europe is utterly unlike the cynical power alli- ances of the past. It is based on far more than a perception of a common enemy. It is a tie of culture and kinshi]) and shared values. And as we look toward the 21st century, Americans and Euro- peans alike should remember the words of Raymond Aron, who called the alli- ance a "moral and spiritual commu- nity." Our ideals are those of the American Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. And it is precisely because the ideals of this community are universal that the world is in ferment today.
Now a new century holds the prom- ise of a united Europe. And as you know, the nations of Western Europe are already moving toward greater economic integration, with the ambi- tious goal of a single European market in 1992. The United States has often declared it seeks a healing of old enmi- ties, an integration of Europe. And at the same time, there has been a histor- ical ambivalence on the part of some Americans toward a more united Europe. To this ambivalence has been added apprehension at the prospect of 1992. But whatever others may think, this Administration is of one mind. We believe a strong, united Europe means a strong America.
Western Europe has a gross do- mestic product that is roughly equal to our own and a population that e.xceeds ours. European science leads the world in many fields, and European workers are highly educated and highly skilled. We are ready to develop, with the Eu- ropean Community and its member states, new mechanisms of consultation and cooperation on political and global issues from strengthening the forces of democracy in the Third World to man- aging regional tensions to putting an end to the division of Europe. A re- surgent Western Europe is an econom- ic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe closer toward the commonwealth of free nations.
A more mature partnership with Western Europe will pose new chal- lenges. There are certain to be clashes and controversies over economic issues America will, of course, defend its in- terests. But it is important to distin- guish adversaries from allies and allie from adversaries. What a tragedy; what an absurdity it would be if futurf^ historians attribute the demise of the Western alliance to disputes over beef hormones and wars over pasta. We must all work hard to ensure that the Europe of 1992 will adopt the lower barriers of the modern international economy, not the high walls and the moats of medieval commerce.
NATO: Maintaining Peace in Europe
But our hopes for the future rest ulti- mately on keeping the peace in Europi Forty-two years ago, just across the Charles River, Secretary of State George Marshall gave a commence- ment address that outlined a plan to help Europe recover. Western Europe responded heroically and later joined with us in a partnership for the com- mon defense — a shield we call NATO. And this alliance has always been dri\ en by a spirited debate over the best way to achieve peaceful change. But the deeper truth is that the alliance h; achieved a historic peace because it is united by a fundamental purpose. Be- hind the NATO shield, Europe has no^ enjoyed 40 years free of conflict — the longest period of peace the continent has ever known. Behind this shield, th( nations of Western Europe have risen from privation to prosperity — all be- cause of the strength and resolve of free peoples.
With a Western Europe that is noi coming together, we recognize that ne* forms of cooperation must be devel- oped. We applaud the defense co- operation developing in the revitalized West European Union, whose member worked with us to keep open the sea- lanes of the Persian Gulf. And we ap- plaud the growing military cooperatio between West Germany and France. And we welcome British and French programs to modernize their deterren capability and their moves toward coo] eration in this area. It is perfectly right and proper that Europeans in- creasingly see their defense coopera- tion as an investment in a secure fu- ture. But we do have a major concern i a different order — a growing compla- cency throughout the West.
18
Department of State Bulletin/July 198
THE PRESIDENT
And, of course, your generation 1 hardly be expected to share the ip of past anxieties. With such a long ace, it is hard to imagine how it lid be otherwise. But our expecta- ns in this rapidly changing world inot race so far ahead that we forget at is at stake. There's a great irony •e. While an ideological earthquake shaking asunder the very communist mdation, the West is being tested by nplacency.
We must never forget that twice in s century, American blood has been ;d over conflicts that began in Eu- je. And we share the fervent desire Europeans to relegate war forever the province of distant memory. But it is why the Atlantic alliance is so itral to our foreign policy. And that's ly America remains committed to the iance and the strategy which has sserved freedom in Europe. We must ver forget that to keep the peace in irope is to keep the peace for nerica.
NATO's policy of flexible response eps the United States linked to Eu- pe and lets any would-be aggressors ow that they will be met with any 'el of force needed to repel their at- ;k and frustrate their designs. And r short-range deterrent forces based Europe, and kept up-to-date, demon- ■ate that America's vital interests e bound inextricably to Western Eu- pe and that an attacker can never mble on a test of strength with just r conventional forces. Though hope is w running high for a more peaceful ntinent, the history of this century iches Americans and Europeans to main prepared.
viet Change
; we search for a peace that is endur- 5, I'm grateful for the steps that r. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets vance solid and constructive plans ' peace, then we should give credit lere credit is due. And we're seeing seeping changes in the Soviet Union at show promise of enduring, of be- ming ingrained. At the same time, an era of extraordinary change, ? have an obligation to temper timism — and I am optimistic — with udence.
For example, the Soviet Foreign inister [Eduard Shevardnadze] in- rmed the world last week that his na- m's commitment to destroy SS-23 issiles under the recently enacted
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty may be reversible. And the Soviets must surely know the re- sults of failure to comply with this sol- emn agreement. Perhaps their purpose was to divide the West on other issues that you're reading about in the papers today. But regardless, it is clear that Soviet "new thinking" has not yet to- tally overcome the old.
I believe in a deliberate, step-by- step approach to East-West relations, because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it is not yet complete. The Warsaw Pact retains a nearly 12-to-l advantage over the Atlantic alliance in short-range missiles and rocket launch- ers capable of delivering nuclear weap- ons and more than a 2-to-l advantage in battle tanks. And for that reason, we will also maintain, in cooperation with our allies, ground and air forces in Eu- rope as long as they are wanted and needed to preserve the peace in Eu- rope. At the same time, my Adminis- tration will place a high and continuing priority on negotiating a less mili- tarized Europe, one with a secure con- ventional force balance at lower levels offerees. Our aspiration is a real
peace — a peace of shared optimism, not a peace of armed camps.
Celebrating a Moral and Spiritual Community
Nineteen-ninety-two is the 500th anni- versary of the discovery of the New- World. So we have five centuries to celebrate, nothing less than our very civilization — the American Bill of Rights and the French Rights of Man, the ancient and unwritten constitution of Great Britain, and the democratic vi- sions of Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi.
And in all our celebrations, we ob- serve one fact: this truly is a moral and spiritual community. It is our inheri- tance, and so let us protect it. Let us promote it. Let us treasure it for our children, for Americans and Europeans yet unborn. We stand with France as part of a solid alliance. And once again, let me say how proud I am to have received this degree from this noble institution and to have shared this plat- form with the President of the French Republic, Francois Mitterrand.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■
Security Strategy for the 1990s
President Bush's address at the Coast Guard Academy commencement exercises in New London, Conn., on May2J,, 1989.^
Today, our world — your world — is changing. East and West. And today, I want to speak to you about the world we want to see, and what we can do to bring that new world into clear focus.
We live in a time when we are wit- nessing the end of an idea — the final chapter of the communist experiment. Communism is now recognized — even by many within the communist world itself — as a failed system, one that promised economic prosperity but failed to deliver the goods, a system that built a wall between the people and their po- litical aspirations.
But the eclipse of communism is only one-half of the story of our time. The other is the ascendancy of the dem- ocratic idea. Never before has the idea of freedom so captured the imagina- tions of men and women the world over.
And never before has the hope of free- dom beckoned so many — trade union- ists in Warsaw, the people of Panama, rulers consulting the ruled in the Sov- iet Union. And even as we speak today, the world is transfixed by the dramatic events in Tiananmen Square [Beijing, China]. Everywhere those voices are speaking the language of democracy and freedom, and we hear them and the world hears them, and America will do all it can do to encourage them.
So today I want to speak about our security strategy for the 1990s — one that advances American ideals and up- holds American aims.
Risks and Opportunities of New Challenges
Amidst the many challenges we'll face, there will be risks. But let me assure you, we'll find more than our share of opportunities. We and our allies are strong — stronger really than at any point in the postwar period, and more capable than ever of supporting the
iepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
19
THE PRESIDENT
cause of freedom. There's an oppor- tunity before us to shape a new world.
What is it that we want to see? It is a growing community of democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic free-market system generating prosperity and progress on a global scale. The eco- nomic foundation of this new era is the ])roven success of the free market — and nurturing that foundation are the val- ues rooted in freedom and democracy.
Our country, America, was found- ed on these values, and they gave us the confidence that flow's from strength. So let's be clear about one thing: America looks forward to the challenge of an emerging global mar- ket. But these values are not ours alone; they are now shared by our friends and allies around the globe.
The economic rise of Europe and the nations of the Pacific rim is the growing success of our postwar policy. This time is a time of tremendous op- portunity, and destiny is in our own hands. To reach the world we want to see, we've got to work and work hard. There's a lot of work ahead of us.
We must resolve international trade problems that threaten to pit friends and allies against one another. We must combat misguided notions of economic nationalism that will tell us to close off our economies to foreign competition — ^just when the global mar- ketplace has become a fact of life. We must open the door to the nations of Eastern Europe and other socialist countries that embrace free-market reforms.
And finally, for developing nations heavily burdened with debt, we must provide assistance and encourage the market reforms that will set those na- tions on a path toward growth. If we succeed, the ne.xt decade and the centu- ry beyond will be an era of unparalleled growth — an era which sees the flour- ishing of freedom, peace, and pros- perity around the world.
But this new era cannot unfold in a climate where conflict and turmoil ex- ist. And, therefore, our goals must also include security and stability: security for ourselves and our allies and our friends; stability in the international arena and an end to regional conflicts.
Such goals are constant, but the strategy we employ to reach them can, and must, change as the world changes. Today, the need for a dynamic and adaptable strategy is imperative. We must be strong — economically, dip- lomatically, and, as you know,
20
militarily — to take advantage of the opportunities open to us in a world of rapid change. And nowhere will the ultimate consequences of change have more significance for world security than within the Soviet Union itself.
Soviet Union
What we're seeing now in the Soviet Union is, indeed, dramatic. The proc- ess is still ongoing, unfinished. But make no mistake, our policy is to seize every, and I mean every, opportunity to build a better, more stable relationship with the Soviet Union — just as it is our policy to defend American interests in light of the enduring reality of Soviet military power.
We want to see perestroika suc- ceed. And we want to see the policies of glasnost and perestroika — so far, a revolution imposed from top down — institutionalized within the Soviet Union. And we want to see perestroika extended as well. We want to see a So- viet Union that restructures its rela- tionship toward the rest of the world — a Soviet Union that is a force for con- structive solutions to the world's problems.
The grand strategy of the West during the postwar period has been based on the concept of containment: checking the Soviet Union's expansion- ist aims, in the hope that the Soviet system itself would one day be forced to confront its internal contradictions. The ferment in the Soviet Union today affirms the wisdom of this strategy. And now we have a precious oppor- tunity to move beyond containment. You're graduating into an exciting world, where the opportunity for peace — world peace, lasting peace — has never been better.
Our goal — integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations — is every bit as ambitious as contain- ment was at its time. And it holds tre- mendous promise for international stability.
Other Regional Powers
Coping with a changing Soviet Union will be a challenge of the highest order. But the security challenges we face to- day do not come from the East alone. The emergence of regional powers is rapidly changing the strategic landscape.
In the Middle East, in South Asia, in our own hemisphere, a growing num- ber of nations are acquiring advanced
and highly destructive capabilities — in some cases, weapons of mass destruc- tion and the means to deliver them. And it is an unfortunate fact that the world faces increasing threat from armed insurgencies, terrorists, and, a you in the Coast Guard are well aware narcotics traffickers — and, in some re- gions, an unholy alliance of all three.
Our task is clear: we must curb thi proliferation of advanced weaponry; we must check the aggressive ambitions of renegade regimes; and we must en- hance the ability of our friends to de- fend themselves. We have not yet mas- tered the complex challenge. We and our allies must construct a common strategy for stability in the developing world.
Defense Strategy
How we and our allies deal with thesei diverse challenges depends on how we' we understand the key elements of de- fense strategy. And so let me just men tion today two points in particular.
First, the need for an effective de> terrent, one that demonstrates to our allies and adversaries alike American strength, American resolve; and
Second, the need to maintain an approach to arms reduction that pro- motes stability at the lowest feasible level of armaments.
Deterrence is central to our de- fense strategy. The key to keeping the peace is convincing our adversaries that the cost of aggression against us or our allies is simply unacceptable.
In today's world, nuclear forces ar essential to deterrence. Our challenge is to protect those deterrent systems from attack. And that's why we'll mov' Peacekeeper ICBMs [intercontinental i ballistic missiles] out of fixed and vu nerable silos — making them mobile an( thus harder to target. Looking to the longer term, we will also develop and deploy a new highly mobile single- warhead missile, the Midgetman. Witl only minutes of warning, these new missiles can relocate out of harm's wa} Any attack against systems like this will fail.
We are also researching — and we are committed to deploy when read,\ — more comprehensive defensive systoni. known as SDI [Strategic Defense Ini- tiative]. Our premise is straight- forward: defense against incoming missiles endangers no person, endan- gers no country.
Department of State Bulletin/July 198
THE SECRETARY
We're also working to reduce the reat we face, both nuclear and con- ntional. The INF [Intermediate- inge Nuclear Forces] Treaty demon- rates that willingness. In addition, in e past decade, NATO has unilaterally moved 2,400 shorter range theater irheads. But theater nuclear forces ntribute to stability, no less than rategic forces, and thus, it would be responsible to depend solely on stra- gic nuclear forces to deter conflict Europe.
jnventional Balance in Europe
le conventional balance in Europe just as important and is linked to e nuclear balance. For more than 40 lars — and look at your history books see how pronounced this accomplish- ent is — the Warsaw Pact's massive ad- intage in conventional forces has cast shadow over Europe.
The unilateral reductions that resident Gorbachev has promised give hope that we can now redress that ibalance. We welcome those steps be- ,use, if implemented, they will help duce the threat of surprise attack, nd they confirm what we've said all ong: that Soviet military power far iceeds the levels needed to defend the gitimate security interests of the .S.S.R. And we must keep in mind at these reductions alone — even if iiplemented — are not enough to elimi- !ite the significant numerical si'f ^ri- I'ity that the Soviet Union enjo-"- jght now.
Through negotiations, we can now ansform the military landscape of [urope. The issues are complex, stakes •e very high. But the Soviets are now jing forthcoming, and we hope to ;hieve the reductions we seek.
Let me emphasize — our aim is Dthing less than removing war as an ption in Europe.
The U. S.S.R. has said that it is illing to abandon its age-old reliance \\ offensive strategy. It's time to pgin. This should mean a smaller tree — one less reliant on tanks and "tillery and personnel carriers that rovide the Soviets' offensive striking 3wer. A restructured Warsaw Pact — le that mirrors the defensive posture ' NATO — would make Europe and the orld more secure.
Peace can also be enhanced by lovement toward more openness in lilitary activities. And 2 weeks ago, I roposed an "open skies" initiative, to xtend the concept of openness. That Ian for territorial overflights would
increase our mutual security against sudden and threatening military activ- ities. In the same spirit, let us extend this openness to military expenditures as well. I call on the Soviets to do as we have always done. Let's open the ledgers, publish an accurate defense budget.
But as we move forward we must be realistic. Transformations of this magnitude will not happen overnight. If we are to reach our goals, a great deal is required of us, our allies, and of the Soviet Union. But we can succeed.
Preserving Democracy
I began today by speaking about the triumph of a particular, peculiar, very special American ideal — freedom. And I know there are those who may think there's something presumptuous about that claim — those who will think it's boastful. But it is not, for one simple
reason: Democracy isn't our creation, it is our inheritance.
And we can't take credit for democ- racy, but we can take that precious gift of freedom, preserve it, and pass it on — as my generation does to you, and you, too, will do one day. And perhaps — provided we seize the opportunities open to us — we can help others attain the freedom that we cherish.
As I said on the Capitol steps the day I took this office, as President of the United States, "There is but one just use of power, and it is to serve people." As your Commander in Chief, let me call on this Coast Guard class to reaffirm with me that American power will continue in its service to the enduring ideals of democracy and freedom.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents of May 29, 1989. ■
Secretary's News Conference
Secretary Baker held a news conference at the White House on Maij2S. 1989.''
Before our briefing on the summit trip, I'd like to make an announcement.
The United States and the Soviet Union have now agreed on the date of June 19th to restart the START [strategic arms reduction talks] negotiations.
Turning now to the NATO trip, let me begin by touching on two topics that I hope will give you a context for the President's trip to NATO. First, I'll say a few words about the theme the President hopes to project on this trip; and second, I'll list the five-point work plan that the President would hope to emphasize in his meetings with col- leagues and in public statements.
The central theme of this trip will be that the alliance rests on the cor- nerstone of shared Western values. These common values — belief in democ- racy, human rights, the rule of law, free markets and free enterprise, re- spect for the individual — give the na- tions of the West both an anchor and a course to navigate for the future.
As to the past, 40 years ago these shared values brought our nations to- gether in search of a common defense. NATO became the shield to protect those values. As to the present, today
those values have positioned the West in the strongest posture ever. They are inspiring the hopes of many people in many parts of the globe, including in central and Eastern Europe, even in the Soviet Union itself.
As to the future, in the future these same values will provide a princi- pal basis for ending the division of Eu- rope, for drawing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union into the community of nations. Some have suggested that the future of Europe depends on a more narrow territorial vision — that is, an idea bounded by geographic borders and without a particular substantive content, and I'm referring there, of course, to the calls for a common Euro- pean house.
In contrast, it's our vision that the future of Europe depends on these common Western values. We see this as a substantive core established over cen- turies of striving to apply enlightened principles and not limited by any geo- graphic borders.
Now while the trends may be promising, it's our view that the alli- ance cannot rest on its laurels nor can it expect to reach its full potential without further effort. So the Presi- dent will be emphasizing five points for future work.
•epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
21
THE SECRETARY
First, we must continue to ensure a strong common defense, so the Presi- dent will discuss how we can maintain this defense at possibly lower levels as we make progress in the CFE [con- ventional armed forces in Europe] negotiations.
Part of this defense, of course, in- corporates short-range nuclear forces (SNF), so we will also be working to reach a common ground on this issue — one that demonstrates, if I may put it this way, a flexibility to negotiate given the changing circumstances while it preserves the elements necessary to support our longstanding and very successful deterrent strategy.
Second, we look to the further de- velopment of European institutions that will strengthen the European pil- lar of our alliance. For example, Euro- pean Communities (EC) economic integration should provide economic growth and European unity of action. It might well be characterized also as a magnet to those in the East who are trying to liberalize their own economic systems.
Third, we need to look East to see how the nations of the West can further the peaceful decentralization of eco- nomic, political, and social authority in Eastern Europe. In part, this could in- volve lowering tensions on borders, fol- lowing the example we've seen recently as far as Hungary is concerned. It could also involve offering the experi- ence of our governments and private groups in building diverse and open so- cieties in East European countries.
Fourth, we need to turn our attention — our collective attention — to new and difficult problems that could endanger all of us; for example, envi- ronmental risks and missile and chemi- cal proliferation. Obviously we need not rely only on one structure — that is, the NATO alliance — to address these prob- lems. For example, the Group of Seven countries has established the missile technology control regime.
Over time, the alliance or members of the alliance might also see the bene- fit of collective action in out-of-area is- sues, particularly in areas of regional conflict. For example, we worked together — not all members of the alliance but many members of the alliance — in the Persian Gulf.
And finally, we must also maintain our resolve in the pursuit of freedom in locales where cold war vestiges remain. I'm thinking in particular of Berlin, and we will continue to pursue the Ber- lin initiative which was launched by
22
President Reagan in 1987. We will con- tinue, for example, to call for the wall to come down.
Q. How about the missile issue? Will it be resolved before the NATO meeting? Are you closer, or are you farther apart, or do you care whether it's resolved?
A. What we've said all along here is that we are very hopeful that it will be resolved before the summit, and we remain hopeful. I can't tell you that we know that it will be. It is not resolved, there is still a gap to bridge, and we continue to work to try and bridge that gap.
Q. What's the stumbling block?
A. The stumbling block is how you go about adapting to the changes that are taking place, as I mentioned, and, at the same time, preserve the essen- tial ingredients of your deterrent strategy.
Q. Has the United States now been put into a position on this mis- sile issue where we are, in effect, negotiating between England and Germany?
A. No, not at all. No.
Q. What is the situation with Mrs. Thatcher? She doesn't seem too pleased with what she sees as a giv- ing in on our side.
A. I think that we will see the spe- cific position of the United Kingdom, just as we will see the specific position of the other alliance countries, as we move into the summit. She has a differ- ent view of the issue than [West Ger- man] Chancellor Kohl. It's important, we think, to try and bridge these gaps that exist before we get to the summit, and we will continue to try and to do that.
Q. When you say resolved — you hope it's resolved, do you mean with both sides, or are you saying that you're going to get there and we'll be with the Germans and then there will be—
A. No, no, I'm not saying that at all. We're going to continue to try and reach agreement on language before we get there, but I'm not going to pre- dict that that's going to happen. And let me say that we have made it very clear throughout the process that while we would prefer to resolve it before we get to the summit, it's an extraordi- narily important matter that deals with the security of the West, and, therefore, it should not be resolved at all costs. So if we have to take it on at
the summit, we will take it on at the summit.
Q. How close are you? Do you find the West German counter- proposal acceptable? Or how far awayi from being acceptable is it?
A. As I put it to you a minute ago,, there is still a gap between their posi- tion and ours, and we're not there yet.
Q. Do you find this closer to Koh or Thatcher on this in that way?
A. I'm not going to get into that kind of speculation because that's all it would be, is speculation.
Q. What made you decide to change from a position that you stoon firm on for a long time, which was never zero, to negotiations, willing- ness to negotiate?
A. I really didn't. What I said was that I thought negotiations would be a mistake — negotiations, that is, in the form of early, immediate, unconditiona. negotiations. I still feel that way, very strongly. And that is not something that we are willing to agree to. What we have proposed is a formula that coni tains, as I put it, I think, to you last Saturday up in IVIaine, significant conditions.
Q. If the SNF issue is not re- solved by the summit, are you con- cerned that the whole issue could dwarf or dominate or overwhelm this meeting?
A. I think that the issue will hv important, but I think the alliance w il really take a broader look at the whole question of the alliance — the more gen era] political and economic questions. And I just don't think that it will total ly dominate the summit. Yes, it will lit a very, very important issue.
Q. President Gorbachev has claimed that the Soviets are in the process of changing their military strategy toward one of defensive suf- ficiency. There have been a lot of comments coming from the White House that many of Gorbachev's ini- tiatives are merely words and not deeds. Do you see any signs in terms of factual evidence that he has shift- ed his military policy to this point, and will this be discussed at the NATO summit?
A. We think it is important to Idol for deeds rather than just words. I think that the conventional arms piM- posals that he proposed during the course of my trip to Moscow are signif cant and deserve serious consideration I think that's the view of most everyone.
Department of State Bulletin/July 198
THE SECRETARY
On the other hand, I think that the NF proposal that he made was ba- ically purely a PR ploy, when you con- ider that he did not suggest removing lose missiles even from Europe, just •oni those countries which the Soviet 'nion has had a client-state relation- hip with, and he did not propose dis- lantling or destroying those.
And when you look at it in the con- 3xt of what the alliance has done over le i)ast 10 years, we have unilaterally educed some 2,400, and we have dis- lantled practically all of those.
Q. On Sunday the President, chen asked about the SNF dispute, kid he felt this could well be resolved lefore the summit. You seem to be ^ggesting in a little bit more decisive ferms or definitive terms today that dat may not be the case. Is that —
A. I think the President himself 1st made the same suggestion, did he ot, in an interview he gave to some luropean correspondents. I am antici- ating your question, though — so go head and ask the question.
Q. My question was, what merged from the apparent conversa- ion with Chancellor Kohl that he al- jjded to, and what has happened over jhe last few days?
' A. I think what probably happened I'as that they had led themselves to be- jeve that our position was perhaps pmewhat different than it was when |iey actually looked at the piece of pa- er. That's the only thing I can think it light be.
Q. What do you mean by that, ^nd has, in fact, the President talked Dday with Chancellor Kohl? What as the upshot of that conversation, F there was one?
A. I don't believe he's talked to im today, no — has not talked to him Dday. We've received their response to ur proposal; we got it in here —
Q. Written response?
A. Yes, we got it in here late yes- ?r(hiy evening, and there has been no iiiitact since that time. We do, of ourse, e.xpect to get back to him.
Q. The basic issue seems to be — t least the experts tell us and you in- icated Saturday — was, rather, the lUture of nuclear deterrence on the "round in Europe. Do you see a time .'hen we will no longer depend upon hat? That has been our policy for a ong time. You indicated that it's oing to continue to be our policy for
a long time. Do you foresee an end to that, that the end of that could ever be negotiated?
A. We think it's very important that we have some sort of an indication in the comprehensive concept language that if there were ever to be negotia- tions in this area, we would not be talk- ing in any event about a third zero.
Your question goes even beyond that; it's very hypothetical and specula- tive, and I can't answer it, because it's so hypothetical. The deterrence — the nuclear deterrence — has been the very cornerstone of our flexible response strategy. The flexible response strate- gy has kept the peace for 40 years. We should be very, very reluctant to take any steps that would be seen to be mov- ing away from that. And that's why we are reluctant to take those steps.
Q. You mentioned the Gorbachev PR proposal — what you call the PR proposal — in his SNF offer. He seems to be doing pretty well with his PR proposals, and I wondered if the Ad- ministration now recognizes that there is a need, or recognizes a need, to counter them, and if there is any coherent strategy for doing that?
A. I think, as I indicated in my opening remarks, I don't think the West has ever been stronger. We are winning across the broad range of political — we're winning economically, we're winning politically. We have the other philosophy acknowledging that it is a failure — frankly acknowledging that.
So whatever we're doing is work- ing, and for the time being I don't think we ought to say that we're going to change that just for PR purposes.
At the same time, I think it is im- portant that we be seen to be creative, that we be seen to be forward-thinking and forward-looking. I think we are. But that doesn't mean that we, as I've said before — that we can necessarily win by going into an arms control grab bag and competing with him on that score.
There may be times and circum- stances under which we might think it's appropriate to do something like that, but we ought not to be, I don't think — we should not feel constrained to try and do that every time.
Q. Could I carry that to China? Are you somewhat disappointed at the students in the streets of Beijing? They have a name on their lips — it's Gorbachev's, not George Bush's.
And beyond that, can you explain the difference between the President and his position on China as opposed to Panama, where the President actu- ally urged the people to take action in Panama, but both of you are urging great restraint in China?
A. Gorbachev has been to China, and so there was a lot of coverage of this trip, so maybe that's one reason.
But let me tell you, they may have that name on their lips, but they have the policies of the West in mind. And it's the policies of the West, indeed, it's these common values that I've just talk- ed about as the theme for the 40th sum- mit, as far as we're concerned, that are motivating those students to do what they are doing.
And it is the philosophy of the West that they are advancing, and it is the values of the West that they are seek- ing. They are asking for democracy. They're asking for freedom of assem- bly. They're asking for freedom of ex- pression. So I don't feel badly about that, in the slightest.
In terms of difference between Panama and the People's Republic of China, without admitting the hypothe- sis of your question that the President was somehow — without admitting that, let me just say that there is a signifi- cant difference between China and Panama.
Q. He did say no caution.
A. Let me just suggest to you that China is moving after many, many years of embracing a different philoso- phy, both economically and politically. They are moving.
Panama is moving too, but it's mov- ing in the other direction. Panama used to have some semblance of freedom for its people. It used to have some sem- blance of democratic values. But Man- uel Noriega is taking it in the other direction and, in fact, stealing elec- tions and thereby thwarting the will of the people.
So China is going in the right di- rection; Panama is going in the wrong direction.
Q. If I could ask you about Nicaragua and the Russians. When Mr. Gorbachev promised to reduce or said he had actually cut out arms to Nicaragua, were there any conditions on it?
Secondly, in the U.S. Govern- ment, is it that you have found no evi- dence that there has been any slow- down or that there is a disagreement within the American Government as
department of State Bulletin/July 1989
23
THE SECRETARY
to whether there is a slowdown? What is your judgment today as to what he has promised — has actually come into the pipeline?
A. He hasn't promised anything. He notified us that there had been no weapons shipments to Nicaragua since the end of 1988. We do Itnow that there have, in fact, been shipments of mili- tary supplies and equipment. We also have not been informed that there are no longer weapons shipments going into Nicaragua from Cuba. So there was no promise; it was simply a matter of a no- tification in a letter.
Q. You've said that the SNF nego- tiations had threatened a major por- tion of NATO's deterrence. Unity you've also described as a major part of NATO's deterrence. Does not the dispute in itself have the potential to weaken NATO? And how do you rank the weapons versus unity in terms of deterrent capability?
A. You've got to have the unity of the alliance, and then you must have the arms control policies to support that, and you must have adequate deterrence.
Let me just say we have a wide range of common interests in the alli- ance on political, economic, and securi- ty issues. We're going to be dealing with all of these, not just with SNF. The alliance has survived many great- er threats to its existence than this; and we remain, as I said before, quite hopeful that we'll get this resolved and that we'll get it resolved before the summit. We may not get it resolved before the summit.
Q. A statement was read here yesterday expressing concern about the strength of the dollar, and report- ers were referred to Treasury. Is that in any way tied to the meeting be- cause the allies are concerned? And what's the current policy on the strength or weakness vis-a-vis the dollar?
A. I have better sense than to an- swer that question, I think. [Laughter]
I will say one thing. I do think it's important that the coordination proc- ess which was put in place at the Tokyo summit move forward effectively and as efficiently as possible. I think it's important that the major industrial de- mocracies of the world continue to work to coordinate their economic policies, and it's really the coordination of those underlying economic policies that's going to make a difference in terms of exchange rate stability.
24
Q. Would it be correct to say that the U.S. position on a third zero and on modernization are non-negotiable positions?
A. We're in the midst of discus- sions right now, so I'm not sure I under- stand really — there are many ways to express different positions, and what we're talking about here now are vary- ing ways to express different view- points and different positions.
Q. In talking about Gorbachev winning the PR war and so on, you said, "We can't be reaching into the arms control grab bag to try to com- pete," but then you said, "Though there may be times when we'll do that." Is the NATO summit one of those times? Is the President going to have some arms control —
A. Let me point out that one of those times was at the opening of the conventional arms talks in Vienna when
we suggested that we would see if we couldn't remove our chemical weapons stocks from Germany at an earlier date than they were planned to be removed. That's the kind of thing I'm talking about.
Q. Mr. Shamir [Israeli Prime Minister] responded to your speech yesterday, calling it useless. What's your response to him?
A. I think it was a very balanced speech. If you look at the speech in its entirety, you see that it was very bal- anced with respect to what we think, a> least, is required of all of the parties if we're going to move forward to make, progress toward peace in the Middle East. It calls on the Palestinians, it calls on the Israelis, it calls on the So- viets, and it says what we really think needs to be done.
'Press release 97.
Principles and Pragmatism: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Secretary Baker's address before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee on May 22, 1989.'^
You know, it's been said that AIPAC manages to bring together the execu- tive and the Congress in a way that they might not normally associate. I'd agree with that, and I would add only that we have a name for such coming together. We call it bipartisanship. And American bipartisan support for Israel is a great and an enduring achieve- ment, not only for AIPAC, not only for Israel's supporters but also, above all, for America's national interest.
There have been many, many an- alyses of the U.S. -Israeli relationship over the years, and most of them begin with the fact that we share common values of freedom and of democracy. That is the golden thread in the tapes- try of U.S. -Israeli ties, and there are, if I might suggest it, other strands as well.
Ed [AIPAC President Ed Levy] has mentioned some of what I did in the Reagan Administration, but let me tell you that I was proud to work in that Administration — an Administration that recognized the importance of U.S.- Israeli strategic cooperation and an
Administration that, I think, gave fiber and sinew to our strategic partnership.
I'm also proud to have had a small part to play in the historic free trade agreement which may well become a model for other nations. I really think we probably would not have gotten home on the Canadian-U.S. free trade agreement had we not had a U.S.- Israel free trade agreement. The President believes — President Bush believes — and I believe that on these isi sues, there can only be one policy and that is a policy of continuity. American support for Israel is the foundation of our approach to the problems — the very, very difficult problems — of the Middle East.
This support has become all tht' more important as we approach what, think, is a critical juncture in the Mid- dle East. For many years, we have as- sociated that region with either the vanished glories of ancient history t.r the terrible costs of modern conflict. But now, I think, the world is chang- ing. We have seen longstanding prob- lems in other regions begin to abate. The President spoke last week of prom: ising and hopeful, even though incom- plete, developments in the Soviet
Department of State Bulletin/July 198
THE SECRETARY
nion. Everywhere there is a quicken- g consciousness that the globe is be- g transformed through the search for jmocracy, the spread of free enter- •ise, and technological progress. And,
course, nowhere is that more true, , we meet here today, than in the
ople's Republic of China.
The Middle East should be able to irticipate fully in these new develop- ents. Oftentimes we think of the igion as a place full of precious (sources, such as oil and minerals, ut the area's most precious resource, we really stop and think about it, is le lives of its peoples.
And that is the stake. Are the peo- es of the Middle East going to safe- aard their most precious resource? re they going to join the rest of the langing world in the works of peace? r is this region going to pioneer in inflict once more through the prolif- ■ation of chemical weapons and ballis- c missiles?
The people of Israel are vitally incerned with these questions. Israel,
course, is a vigorous democracy. The raelis are among the world leaders
communications, electronics, and 'ionics — the new technological revolu- ans. And Israel understood long ago lat the most important of its natural
sources is the skill and the intel- jence of its people.
eace Process:
rinciples and Pragmatism
his is the wider context in which we id Israel must consider the peace •ocess. The outcome is of vital con- 'rn both to Israel's future and for our sion of a free and peaceful world.
Not so long ago, we marked a de- ide of the Camp David peace accords, hat occasion reminded us not only of 3w far we have come but of how much irther we have to go. I would like to ;port to you that we and Israel have iken some important steps forward.
Before Prime Minister Shamir jsited Washington, we had called for j)me Israeli ideas on how to restart the eace process. We did so based on our i)nviction that a key condition for rogress was a productive U.S. -Israeli artnership. And I believe that the ?st way to be productive is through )nsultation rather than confrontation.
Let me assure you that we were jt disappointed. The Prime Minister ill, I'm sure, forgive me if I divulge ) you a conversation at our very first leeting. The Prime Minister said, in
preparing for his visit, he had studied President Bush and me, just as he sus- pected that perhaps we had studied him. I had been described by the media as an ever-flexible pragmatist. The Prime Minister, he said, had been de- scribed as an inflexible man of ideologi- cal principle. Then the Prime Minister volunteered, that in his view, the jour- nalists were wrong, and they were wrong in both cases. "Yes," he said, "I am a man of principle, but I am also a pragmatist who knows what political compromise means." And he said that it was clear that I, although a pragma- tist, was also a man of principle, and that principle would guide my foreign policy approach. Needless to say, I didn't disagree with the Prime Minister.
If ever an opening statement achieved its goal of establishing a strong working relationship, this was it. I think it's fair to say that we under- stood each other to be pragmatists, but pragmatists guided by principle.
As we approach the peace process, together, we understand Israel's cau- tion especially when assessing Arab attitudes about peace. I don't blame Israel for exercising this caution. Its history and, indeed, its geopolitical situation require it.
At the same time, I think that cau- tion must never become paralysis. Ten years after Camp David, Egypt re- mains firmly committed to peace, and Arab attitudes are changing. Egypt's readmission into the Arab League on its own terms and with the peace trea- ty intact, I think, is one sign of change. Evolving Palestinian attitudes are an- other. Much more needs to be done — to be demonstrated — that such change is real. But I don't think that change can be ignored even now. This is surely a time when, as the Prime Minister said, the right mix of principles and prag- matism is required.
U.S. Views
As we assess these changes, U.S. poli- cies benefit from a longstanding com- mitment to sound principles, principles which have worked in practice to ad- vance the peace process. Let me men- tion some of those principles for you.
First, the United States believes that the objective of the peace process is a comprehensive settlement achieved through negotiations based on UN Se- curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In our view, these negotiations must in- volve territory for peace, security and
...negotiations must involve territory for peace, security and recognition for Israel and all of the states of the re- gion, and Palestinian politi- cal rights.
...for negotiations to succeed, they must allow the parties to deal directly with each other, face to face.
. . . some transitional period is needed, associated in time and sequence with negotia- tions on final status.
...in advance of direct nego- tiations, neither the United States nor any other party, inside or outside, can or will dictate an outcome.
recognition for Israel and all of the states of the region, and Palestinian political rights.
Second, for negotiations to suc- ceed, they must allow the parties to deal directly with each other, face to face. A properly structured interna- tional conference could be useful at an appropriate time, but only if it did not interfere with or in any way replace or be a substitute for direct talks between the parties.
Third, the issues involved in the negotiations are far too complex, and the emotions are far too deep, to move directly to a final settlement. Accord- ingly, some transitional period is needed, associated in time and se- quence with negotiations on final sta- tus. Such a transition will allow the parties to take the measure of each oth- er's performance, to encourage atti- tudes to change, and to demonstrate that peace and coexistence is desired.
'epartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
25
THE SECRETARY
[To the Arab world], we would say: end the economic boycott; stop the challenges to Israel's standing in inter- national organizations; repu- diate the odious line that Zionism is racism.
For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a
greater Israel Foreswear
annexation. Stop settlement activity. Allow schools to re- open. Reach out to the Pal- estinians as neighbors who deserve political rights.
For Palestinians, now is the time to speak with one voice for peace Practice con- structive diplomacy — Amend the covenant — Reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peace- ful intentions. You have the most to gain from doing so —
For outside parties — in par- ticular, the Soviet Union — now is the time to make "new thinking" a reality as it ap- plies to the Middle East. . . . restore diplomatic ties with
Israel stop the supply of
sophisticated weapons to countries like Libya.
Fourth, in afivance of direct nego- tiations, neither the United States nor any other party, inside or outside, can or will dictate an outcome. That is why the United States does not support an- nexation or permanent Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza, nor do we support the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
26
I would add here, that we do have an idea about the reasonable middle ground to which a settlement should be directed; that is, self-government for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in a manner acceptable to Palestinians, Israel, and Jordan. Such a formula pro- vides ample scope for Palestinians to achieve their full political rights. It also provides ample protection for Israel's security as well.
Prenegotiations
Following these principles, we face a pragmatic issue, the issue of how do we get negotiations underway. Unfor- tunately, the gap between the parties on key issues such as Palestinian rep- resentation and the shape of a final settlement remains very, very wide. Violence has soured the atmosphere, and so a quick move to negotiations is quite unlikely. And in the absence of either a minimum of good will or any movement to close the gap, a high- visibility American initiative, we think, has little basis on which to stand.
If we were to stop here, the situa- tion would, I think, be gloomy, indeed. But we are not going to stop with the status quo. We are engaged, as I men- tioned a moment ago; we will remain engaged; and we will work to help cre- ate an environment to launch and sus- tain negotiations. This will require tough but necessary decisions for peace by all of the parties. It will also require a commitment to a process of negotia- tions clearly tied to the search for a permanent settlement of the conflict.
When Prime Minister Shamir vis- ited Washington, he indicated that he shared our view that the status quo was unacceptable. He brought an idea for elections to, in his words, "launch a political negotiating process" which would involve transitional arrange- ments and final status. The Prime Min- ister made clear that all sides would be free to bring their preferred positions to the table and that the negotiated outcome must be acceptable to all. The United States welcomed these Israeli ideas and undertook to see whether it could help in creating an atmosphere which could sustain such a process.
Just last week, the Israeli cabinet approved a more detailed version of the Prime Minister's proposal, indicating Israeli Government positions on some, but not all, of the issues which are in- volved. The Israeli proposal is an im- portant and very positive start down the road toward constructing workable negotiations.
The Israeli Government has of- fered an initiative, and it has given ust something to work with. It has taken t stand on some important issues, and this deserves a constructive Palestin- ian and broader Arab response.
Much work needs to be done — to elicit Palestinian and Arab thinking on the key elements in the process, to flesh out some of the details of the Israeli proposals, and to bridge areas where viewpoints differ. Both sides, ol course, are going to have to build polii ical constituencies for peace. Each ide; proposal, or detail should be developei if I may say so, as a deal-maker not as deal-breaker.
It may be possible to reach agree- ment, for example, on the standards a workable elections process. Such el( tions should be free and fair, of cour; and they should be free of interferem from any quarter.
Through open access to media anfl outside observers, the integrity of the) electoral process can be affirmed. An| participation in the elections should bl as open as possible.
It is, therefore, high time for seri| ous political dialogue between Israelii officials and Palestinians in the terri-< tories to bring about a common undert standing on these and other issues. Peace, and the peace process, must b( built from the "ground up." Palesti- nians have it within their power to he' define the shape of this initiative and to help define its essential elements. They shouldn't shy from a dialogue with Israel that can transform the cui rent environment and determine the ground rules for getting to, for con- ducting, and, indeed, for moving be- yond elections.
We should not hide from ourselve? the difficulties that face even these steps here at the very beginning. For' many Israelis, it will not be easy to ei ter a negotiating process whose suc- cessful outcome will, in all probabilit; involve territorial withdrawal and thf emergence of a new political realit\'. For Palestinians such an outcome w ill mean an end to the illusion of conti'ol over all of Palestine, and it will mean full recognition of Israel as a neighboi and partner in trade and in human contact.
Challenges Ahead
We do not think there is a real con- structive alternative to the process which I have outlined. Continuation o the status quo will lead to increasing
Department of State Bulletin/July 19
THE SECRETARY
olence and worsening pi-ospects for lace. We think now is the time to ove toward a serious negotiating proc- s, to create the atmosphere for a re- wed peace process.
Let the Arab world take concrete eps toward accommodation with rael — not in place of the peace proc- s, but as a catalyst for it. And so we 3uld say: end the economic boycott; op the challenges to Israel's standing international organizations; repudi- e the odious line that Zionism is ,cism.
For Israel, now is the time to lay iide, once and for all, the unrealistic sion of a greater Israel. Israeli in- rests in the West Bank and Gaza — curity and otherwise — can be accom- odated in a settlement based on Reso- tion 242. Forswear annexation. Stop ittlement activity. Allow schools to re- )en. Reach out to the Palestinians as jighbors who deserve political rights.
For Palestinians, now is the time I speak with one voice for peace. Re- )unce the policy of phases in all lan- aages, not just those addressed to the fest. Practice constructive diplomacy, )t attempts to distort international •ganizations, such as the World Health rganization. Amend the covenant, ranslate the dialogue of violence in le intifada into a dialogue of politics id diplomacy. Violence will not work, each out to Israelis and convince lem of your peaceful intentions. You ive the most to gain from doing so, id no one else can or will do it for you. inally, understand that no one is jing to "deliver" Israel for you.
For outside parties — in particular, le Soviet Union — now is the time to .ake "new thinking" a reality as it ap- lies to the Middle East. I must say lat Chairman Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told me in Mos- )w 10 days ago that Soviet policy is Tianging. New laws regarding emigra- on will soon be discussed by the Su- i-eme Soviet. Jewish life in the Soviet Inion is also looking better, with stu- ents beginning to study their heritage ■t'l'ly. Finally, the Soviet Union tiiced with us last week that Prime linister Shamir's election proposal as worthy of consideration.
These, of course, are all positive ii;ns. But the Soviets must go further I demonstrate convincingly that they ii' ,-erious about new thinking in the irali-Israeli conflict. Let Moscow re- tdie diplomatic ties with Israel, for xample.
The Soviets should also help pro- mote a serious peace process, not just empty slogans. And it is time for the Soviet Union, we think, to behave re- sponsibly when it comes to arms and stop the supply of sophisticated weap- ons to countries like Libya.
I said at the beginning of these remarks that the Middle East had ap- proached a turning point. I believe that this region, which is so full of poten- tial, will not remain immune from the changes which are sweeping the rest of the world. These changes begin with the quest for democracy, for individual freedom, and for choice. Long ago, of course, Israel chose this path. And long ago, the American people decided to
Secretary's Interview on "Face the Nation"
Secretary Baker' was interviewed in Houston on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" on Mail U. 19S9. by Terence Smith and Bill Plante. CBS News.''
Q. You just heard the two Senators [Nancy Kassebaum and Bob Graham] talking in very serious terms about the situation in Panama. Is there a point there where the Administration has to take another step, and what might it be?
A. I think that the steps that the Administration has taken so far need to be given — if I might put it this way — some time to work. I don't think that we ought to assume that they're not going to work. They are measured responses.
I heard your question and the re- sponses of the Senators about the OAS [Organization of American States] meeting on Wednesday. Let's see how that meeting goes. I think that we've got good diplomatic support in the re- gion. I think it's important to note that this should not be a U.S.-versus- Panama problem. This is really a prob- lem for Latin American countries in the region as well as for the United States.
Q. Do you agree with Senator Graham that it's important to get rid of Gen. Noriega at almost any cost? In other words, how far does this country go to get Noriega out?
A. I think it's very important that the will of the Panamanian people be
walk with Israel in its quest for peace and in its quest for security.
The policy I have described today reaffirms and renews that course. For our part, the United States will move ahead steadily and carefully, in a step- by-step approach designed to help the parties make the necessary decisions for peace. Perhaps Judge Learned Hand expressed it best when he said, ". . . we shall have to be content with short steps; ...but we shall have gone forward, if we bring to our task. . . pa- tience, understanding, sympathy, for- bearance, generosity, fortitude and above all an inflexible determination."
'Press release 96.
given effect. We had an election here that has been stolen. We have the will of the people being subverted and per- verted, so we ought to do everything within reason that we can to encourage this man to leave; to bring pressure, if you will, on him to leave. It's important in terms of the entire hemisphere.
Q. Are there any hints that you can share with us this morning that Noriega might be considering step- ping down or leaving? Are there any discussions that you can share with us, going on between this country and his government, that might lead to that end?
A. As you know, there have been some discussions in the past. I'm not at liberty to comment beyond saying that. I think that, again, the Senators were right in terms of what the proper posi- tion of the United States should be with regard to suggestions that some- how the indictment should be dis- missed. I don't think you should antici- pate seeing President Bush entertain ideas such as that.
I think it's important that we con- tinue to do everything we can to bring public opinion to bear in order to en- courage this man to leave. It's very important in terms of the overall rela- tionship in the hemisphere.
Q. Are there any circumstances at all under which the United States should consider abrogating the Pan- ama Canal Treaties?
Oepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
27
THE SECRETARY
A. I don't think that that's the ap- propriate response. Again I think both Senator Graham and Senator Kasse- baum made it very clear [that] what you do when you start talking about that is turn this into a U.S.-versus-Panama and, in effect, versus-some-of-the-rest- of-Latin-America contest. That would be a mistake. I think it would be counterproductive.
Q. There's another headline this morning that we're all looking at, which is your Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, saying that if the United States goes ahead and modernizes the Lance missile in Eu- rope as it plans to do, the Soviets may have to develop a new missile of their own or even abrogate certain parts of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. It sounds like a pretty serious threat. I wonder what you respond to it?
A. My response would be that this is a matter that was specifically negoti- ated when the INF Treaty was nego- tiated— the elimination of the SS-23s on the part of the Soviet Union. This was debated back and forth for quite some time.
The Soviets responded, in effect, that they would agree to eliminate these missiles, and now they're doing so. And there was never any suggestion at all that the United States or the NATO alliance should not keep its short-range missiles up-to-date. That was never entertained during the course of that debate. All we're really talking about here is maintaining those missiles up-to-date that have a range of less than 300 miles.
Q. Do you take this as a serious threat on the part of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, or is he just trying to drive the wedge deeper between the United States and Germany?
A. I think it perhaps could be a lit- tle bit of a combination of both. This was discussed in our meetings there, during the course of the ministerial in Moscow. I think that the Soviets are concerned, of course, that what they'd much prefer to see is the entire de- nuclearization of Europe. They would like to see the alliance lose its resolve, lose its will.
The fact of the matter is the reason we've had peace for 40 years is because we have been strong, and we have kept our deterrent up-to-date, and we've maintained our strength. We really need to continue to do that.
Q. Let me be the devil's advocate for a moment and ask you, why not begin discussions as the Soviets pro- pose on the elimination or reduction of short-range missiles and tie it, as others have proposed, to a reduction in conventional forces and to other goals that we, in fact, have in Eu- rope? Why not get the talks going?
A. There are a lot of suggestions out there. I got that question during the course of my press conference in Brussels, and I think it's probably a mistake for the United States to react to each and every one of these so-called compromise proposals that come forward.
I should say this: It is important that there be a resolution of the imbal- ance in conventional forces before we start getting into negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons. It's the short-range nuclear weapon that gives us support for our flexible response strategy w^hich has kept the peace all these years. The minute you lose that in the face of major imbalances in the favor of the Soviet Union on conven- tional forces, major imbalances in the favor of the Soviet Union on short- range nuclear weapons, I think you lose something very, very fundamental.
Q. What's wrong with tying the two together — tying the negotiations to the idea that you negotiate not down to zero but only down to a cer- tain level, as Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, formerly special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters] has suggested? Why not start that?
A. Again let me say there are a lot of proposals out there that might make sense, but I think it's a mistake for us to pass judgment on each and every one of these as we move forward toward the summit.
We are engaged with the Germans, as you know; we are having ongoing discussions with them about the appro- priate way to bridge this gap. I think I said a couple of days ago that we're very hopeful that we'll find a way to bridge the gap. The alliance has always been able to resolve these problems in the past, and I'm very hopeful that we'll be able to resolve them in the future.
Q. But why not take a more ag- gressive posture? Why let the Soviets get all the public relations advan- tage? Why not float some new ideas of your own? Isn't there a sense that public opinion is beginning to turn?
There are editorials today — there have been editorials recently — saying) it's time for the United States to maki some moves — dramatic moves — of its own.
A. The United States is making some moves, not all of which are laid out there in the public domain. Again let me say that we have been having discussions with the Germans — extensive discussions. The important thing is not who wins a public relations victory but whether or not we make sure that we keep the alliance stron^u, we make sure that we bridge this gap ultimately, and we need to work towan that end. We don't need to be concern- ing ourselves with short-range public opinion victories.
I've got to say one more time what I said again in Brussels: It would be a terrible mistake if we fall into the trap of playing polities with Western secu- rity, and the Russians would dearly love to see that happen. They'd love Ili see us do that and start trying to play that game.
Q. It costs you, though, doesn't it? I have to say that you looked sur- prised and perhaps a little annoyed when Gorbachev gave you his pro- posals that cut 500 nuclear warheads from the European stockpile. These things come one after the other. They've almost become predictable. Didn't you expect —
A. You're quite right when you sa; they're predictable. And as far as we were concerned, that was predictable; and it was something, quite frankly, that we had specifically talked about here in Washington before the trip. So I would guide you off any suggestion that we were surprised. On the other hand the Soviets are coming our way. They are moving in our direction. The; are doing what we've been calling on them to do. For a long time, we've beer calling on them to unilaterally reduce some of their short-range nuclear weap ons the way the NATO alliance has. Two thousand four hundred weapons over the last 10 years we've not only eliminated, we have destroyed.
And they've now come with this very, very modest little step- — about 500 weapons that they're going to move from some of their client states in East ern Europe, not even out of Europe, not even back behind the Urals — and they're not suggesting that they're going to destroy them. So we say it's a good step, but it's a very small one and a very modest one.
28
Department of State Bulletin/July 198
THE SECRETARY
Q. Give us a sense of this Admin- stration's view now of Gorbachev, his iiospects on perestroika, his efforts t roform. You've just been there. We uid Defense Secretary Cheney saying few days ago that the prognosis for ircstroika was very poor, that Gor- liuhev was likely to fail and be re- ilaied by someone more militant. N'liat did you think? You've just come Kitne.
A. I've just come back from there, 11(1. as a matter of fact, I spent ' _ hours with the General Secretary. t's my view that they've got some ma- (ir problems. They're quite candid bciut talking about those and acknowl- duiiig that they've got these problems hat they've got to deal with.
It's our further view, as you proba- cy know — the view of everyone in our Ldministration, including Secretary ]heney — that we very much want per- stroika to succeed, because if they are uccessful, it will mean that there will 16 a more open and stable and secure ioviet Union. That will be in the best nterests of the United States. It would Iso be in the best interests of the ioviet Union and the world.
So we'd like to see that happen. Vhether or not he succeeds, though, is ping to depend really not on what we n the West do; it's going to depend ipon what happens in the Soviet Jnion, and it's going to depend upon he Soviet people.
Q. Let's move on to another area hat's really in the news today. Gen- ral Secretary Gorbachev is about to irrive in China on a history-making ummit there. What, from the U.S. loint of view, is there to worry about ir look for in this summit?
A. I don't think that there's a lot hat we should be worried about. In act, when we were in Beijing, Presi- lent Bush told Chairman Deng Xiao- ling that we welcomed the fact that the 'eople's Republic and the Soviet Union rere getting together. He has sent the chairman a message in the last several lays with regard to this subject, and t's not something that the United States ought to be worried about. It's lomething that we really ought to wel- :ome, and we do welcome.
Q. Does the United States have iny response specifically to the news ;his morning, which are the continu- ng student protests? There are a ;housand students camped as we speak in Tiananmen Square, and Gor- jachev is on his way. What's the U.S.
comment or observation on that stu- dent demonstration?
A. The comment of the United States is that we support freedom of e.xpression around the world. We sup- port self-determination, freedom of ex- pression, democratization. We take note of the fact that the authorities in Beijing have really not, as they quite frequently have in the past, cracked down on these demonstrations. These students have been permitted to ex- press their views rather freely if you look at what has been traditional in the past.
Q. And you applaud that re- straint, I take it?
A. Yes, we do.
Q. The chairman and some mem- bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have called on you and the President to withdraw the nomina- tion of Donald Gregg to be the Am- bassador to Korea. What do you say to that?
A. What I say is that the President stands behind this nomination, as do I. He has faith and confidence in his nom-
inee. He's served the President, as you know, as his national security adviser for the full 8 years that the President was Vice President of the United States.
It's quite true that we had some discussions with several Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee about this — talked to them about whether or not the nomination should be given a second look. It was, and the President is quite satisfied that the nomination should go forward and that the con- firmation process should go forward. And, quite frankly, we had hoped that that some of the Senators who are op- posing this nomination would have seen fit to sit down with the nominee before the hearing and discuss what they saw as some of the problems.
Q. Did you believe his testimony? Did you believe Gregg's testimony?
A. I haven't seen his testimony, so I'm not in a position to answer that question. As you know, I've been in the Soviet Union for the past week.
1 Press release 88 of May 1.5, 1989.
Secretary's Trip to Moscow and NATO
Secretary Baker visited Helsinki (May 9-10, 1989), Moscow (May 10-11), and Brussels (May 11-12). Following are remarks he made on various occasions during the trip.
REMARKS AT RECEPTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AND REFUSENIKS,
U.S. EMBASSY,
MOSCOW,
MAY 10, 1989'
Thank you very much Ambassador Matlock [U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock]. Let me start by apologizing to all of you for be- ing late. Our meetings ran late, and we have been running late ever since. I really apologize, but I am delighted to have the opportunity to come by and visit with you and, I want to thank you all for being here.
As you undoubtedly know, when- ever we sit down, government-to- government, with the Soviet Union, human rights is always at the top of our agenda because human rights occupies such an important place in our whole
system of government, politics, and society in the United States. I specifi- cally raised today the issue of re- fuseniks with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I want you all to know that we are going to keep up the pres- sure to resolve individual cases, but be- yond that, we are going to push to see that changes are institutionalized and human rights guaranteed. Despite the progress that has been made — and I think we should all candidly admit that — there has been progress, partic- ularly with respect to emigration. There are, nevertheless, substantial problems that remain. There are still hundreds of refuseniks who are denied exit permission, both new cases and old. We intend to continue to press for a resolution of these cases.
Other human rights goals that we have include family reunification, ex- panding the scope of civil and political liberties, and, of course, the legal and institutional reforms to secure the progress that's already been made, as I mentioned.
I want you all to know that the United States remains committed to the right of Soviet Jews to practice
29
THE SECRETARY
their religion and to participate fully in Soviet society. I should say that we wel- come the recent progress in the [inaud- ible] isolation of Soviet Jews, such as the opening of the Jewish Cultural Cen- ter and Judaic Studies Center in Moscow.
Let me close by saying that we look forward to the day when all believers may worship, study, and participate fully in Soviet society without discrimination.
JOINT STATEMENT
ON LEBANON, MOSCOW. MAY n, 1989^
In the face of the escalating level of bloodshed in Lebanon, the United States and the Soviet Union call on all parties to adopt and observe a cease- fire which would be an important first step toward ending the civil war in this country.
Tlie United States and U.S.S.R. favor the Arab League proposal first to consolidate the cease-fire and then to build the framework for a national dia- logue and reconciliation in Lebanon. They are prepared to use their good of- fices to join with others and promote a political solution to Lebanon, taking into account the interests of all sides.
The Soviet Union and the United States support the sovereignty, inde- pendence, and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
MOSCOW,
MAY 11, 1989'
I have what is a longer opening state- ment than I might normally make, but
1 want to give you — the reason I'm going to do this is to give you, as best I can, a feel for the discussions that we've had during the course of the past
2 days.
Let me start by simply saying I think this visit was very useful, and it was productive. I think we had con- structive talks. I'm very satisfied with the way in which the meetings went.
President Bush asked that I make clear to the leadership of the Soviet Union that the United States is ready and anxious to reengage across the full range of our relations. Over the past 2 days, [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze and I established a foundation for both continuity and change across our five-
part agenda. We've begun to add to the list of topics we will periodically ad- dress together and to deepen our en- gagement on matters we've discussed in the past.
I e.xplained that the President and I welcome perestroika, glasnost, and the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. We believe they have contrib- uted to a changing political environ- ment, one which offers an opportunity for both of our countries to expand the arena of our constructive interaction.
During these meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union sought both to adapt old policy frameworks as well as develop new ones to fit the changing times.
Let me add some specifics by touching, as briefly as I can, on each topic in our five-part agenda.
In the area of human rights, we
both sought further progress on indi- vidual cases and opened the way for co- operation on the institutionalization of rights in Soviet society.
First, the Soviets gave us the names of individuals who will now be free to emigrate, and we urged early positive action on the remaining re- fusenik cases which involve some 400-500 families.
Second, we moved close to agree- ment on a mechanism for the exchange of information on criminal cases aris- ing in one country which the other be- lieves to be political in character. Such a mechanism could help us free individ- uals who are political victims of an ear- lier era.
Third, the Soviets reported their progress in drafting new laws regard- ing freedom of conscience and emigra- tion. We understand it's their present intention that the Supreme Soviet would act on these laws after it convenes.
And finally, we agreed to future projects. We will engage in ongoing di- alogues or exchange programs in three areas: the rule of law, human rights and humanitarian issues arising on the international scene, and our respective experiences in dealing with social issues.
In the arms control area, we've agreed to I'eengage on the full range of our existing negotiations. This re- flects, I think, our country's interest in an active, constructive, and expanding relationship.
The NST [nuclear and space talks] negotiations will resume in Geneva be- tween June 12 and June 19, with the precise date to be set through diplo-
matic channels. The Standing Consult- ative Commission (SCO, which is charged with Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty verification and compli- ance, will resume meeting in mid-June. The nuclear testing talks will resume in Geneva on June 26. We will hold bi- lateral discussions on chemical weapons on the margins of next month's meetiim of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We discussed and agreed on the importance of the ongoing conven- tional armed forces in Europe (CFEi and confidence-building measures talks.
Second, we also agreed — impor- tantly in my view — to broaden the arms control agenda to include a new emphasis on the problem of chemical weapons and missile proliferation.
In the regional area, we placed, a.'^ some of you know, new emphasis on re- gional talks and made headway in crafting a common basis for U.S.- Soviet cooperation to try and resolve a number of conflicts around the globe. In particular, we described in detail our approaches in Central America ami the Middle East.
With respect to Central America, we agreed to work toward a political and diplomatic solution to the problem of Nicaragua and to support the goals of Esquipulas and Tesoro.
We related our objectives and uui' general strategies on a number of re- gional issues. We discussed specific possible roles which the Soviet Union could play, as well as roles which the United States could play.
On the new topic of transnational relations, we agreed to establish an ongoing working group. We also de- rived a work program for this new group which covers a range of issues, including protection of the environ- ment, coping with the effects of natural disasters, and combatting international terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.
In the bilateral area, [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze and I accepted the work plan developed by the working group which provides for intensified action in numerous areas, including the completion of negotiations on new or amended cooperative agreements and the opening of new cultural and infoi-- mation centers in our two nations. We have a 23-point agreed work program covering topics as diverse as research on world oceans, civil aviation, atomic energy, maritime boundaries, and so forth.
In conclusion, I also took the op- portunity of this brief visit to have
30
Department of State Bulletin/July 1989
THE SECRETARY
ur sessions outside the formal 3vernment-to-government agenda.
First, my wife and I had an inter- ting private dinner with [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze and his wife, 'e very much appreciated their warm jspitality.
Second, I inspected our uncom- eted office building to see the extent 'possible security penetrations yself.
Third, I met with three newly ected members of the Congress of teople's Deputies. I congratulated lem on their accomplishment and ex- ressed the President's and my strong iterests in the process of perestroika nd glasnost.
Finally, I met with a group of oviet refuseniks. I told them that the eople of the United States were moved y their sacrifice and that we would )ntinue to work for their freedom.
Q. You did not refer at all in this ammary to the Middle East. I won- ered if you could tell us what you light have accomplished with Shev- rdnadze and Gorbachev on the Mid- le East?
A. If I didn't mention the Middle last in the discussion of regional is- pes, I intended to, because we think lat there may be a fair amount of com- lon ground with respect to our ap- roach to the Middle East.
We talked about it at quite some ingth during the first day. We talked Dout the importance of giving the idea 'elections a chance, working with Is- ielis and Arabs to see if we can con- ert elections into a process — a broader rocess — that will ultimately bring Oout political negotiations. The [For- ign] Minister made the point that he links it is important to keep the possi- ility of an international conference on le table, and I told him that it was the osition of the United States that an in- ^rnational conference at an appropri- te time, properly structured, might 'ell be useful.
Q. Was there any discussion in our meetings with President Gor- .achev about the possibility of uni- iteral Soviet cuts in their tactical uclear short-range force, and did hat subject come up in general?
A. Which subject?
Q. The subject of short-range luclear forces.
A. The subject of short-range nu- lear weapons did come up in general. t came up primarily during the course f my meeting with the General Secre- arv, and we had a rather extensive and
in-depth discussion on the issue, during the course of which I set forth our posi- tion and he set forth his.
Q. Was there any common ground reached at all in that area?
A. I hope the fact we were able to discuss the issue for as long as we did and to the extent we did might produce some better understanding on his part of our position. And we agreed we would continue to disagree agreeably for the time being with respect to this matter.
Q. After this first trip of yours to the Soviet Union and these extensive discussions you've described, could you give us an assessment of where you think the cold war stands? Is it getting over? Have you got a start on getting it over? Could you tell me how you feel about that?
A. I answered that question in the United States not long ago, I think. What I said was, it seems to me, at least, that it is certainly moving in that direction. We may not quite be there yet. We think it's important. We think there are perhaps some object indica- tors out there that one might look to, but we are certainly moving in that direction.
We would, of course, as we've said before, be delighted to see an ex- pressed renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine. We would be very pleased to see the [Berlin] Wall come down. We applaud the fact they're rolling up the barbed wire on the Hungarian- Austrian border. So I think you have to say we are clearly moving in that direction.
Q. Can you return to the ques- tion of whether unilateral cuts in tac- tical short-range nuclear forces were discussed? And can you tell us wheth- er the General Secretary wanted to reduce or eliminate short-range nu- clear weapons?
A. Unilateral reductions were dis- cussed because, as you know, we have argued for some time, there is a signifi- cant imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact with respect to these weapons. Before we start talking about sitting down and negotiating them, it would be advisable, certainly from our stand- point and from the standpoint of main- taining a deterrence which we believe has maintained the peace for all these years, if that imbalance was reduced voluntarily and unilaterally. That's been an argument we've made for quite some time.
There was no in-depth discussion of a total elimination. There was a discus- sion of reduction.
Q. Do you believe it is realistic for the U.S. Administration to re- nounce negotiations as the way to solve the issue of tactical nuclear weapons?
A. We don't renounce it as a way to solve the issue. What we say is that it is very good politics to talk about this, and we acknowledge and recognize that; but that security is extraordi- narily important. It is our view that a minimal number of these weapons has contributed substantially to the main- tenance of security between East and West for many, many years. It's our view that an adequate mix of conven- tional and nuclear forces is required if we are going to maintain that security. It is a defensive posture; the NATO strategy of flexible response is a defen- sive strategy, not an offensive strategy. It has to do with deterring war and keeping the peace. That's what has happened for 40 years, and we ought to be very careful before we depart from these strategic concepts that have been successful.
Q. From the moment of the for- mation of the new U.S. Administra- tion, you have repeated [Israeli Prime Minister] Shamir's proposal for elec- tions in the occupied lands in the Middle East. Do you have your own concrete proposal which would speed up the process of peace in the Middle East?
A. The answer is, yes, we do have a proposal of our own which we have discussed at quite some length in the United States and which is very com- patible with the proposal that has been advanced by Prime Minister Shamir. It is our view that big, high-visibility ini- tiatives with respect to this very in- tractable problem are not likely to succeed unless and until there has been an improvement in the atmosphere and unless there has been a "tilling of the ground," if you will, in the area. So we have called for some reciprocal steps toward improving the atmosphere — steps that could be taken by Israelis and steps that could be taken by Palestinians.
For the first time ever, the United States now has a dialogue with the Pal- estine Liberation Organization (PLO), and we talk to them about these steps. We have always, of course, had a dia- logue with the Israelis, and we talk to them about taking steps.
department of State Bulletin/July 1989
31
THE SECRETARY
This is very compatible with the idea that Prime Minister Shamir ad- vanced which, by the way, we do not view, as someone suggested not long ago, as "warmed-over Camp David." There are some significant differences in what the Prime Minister of Israel is now proposing from the Camp David peace process. I won't run through all of them here now for you, but one is the Israeli recognition that this could and should lead to a broader political dia- logue, a broader political negotiation, a recognition on their part that at some point negotiations have to be held on the question of permanent status, a rec- ognition on their part that in those ne- gotiations on permanent status all options are open, and other items such as that. So the two ideas are very compatible.
Q. Are you indicating to us, when you say that it would be helpful to reduce the numbers of those short- range launchers and missiles uni- laterally first, that you would negoti- ate? And tell us, if you will, did the Secretary General ask you to negoti- ate specifically on that question?
A. No, I'm not suggesting that. What I'm saying is, before you get to the issue of whether or not there should be negotiations, there has to be a little less of an imbalance. There needs to be a greater congruence, if you will, in force structures. The alliance is at a significant disadvantage with respect to the numbers of tactical short-range nuclear weapons that are currently de- ployed today, and we are at a signifi- cant disadvantage as well with respect to conventional forces.
Q. But did the General Secretary ask you negotiate — sorry to persist — but did he ask you to negotiate these down?
A. Did he suggest the idea of nego- tiation? Yes, he did.
Q. The TASS news agency today charged the United States with in- stigating a fraudulent election in Panama. And, as you may or may not know, the Panamanian regime of Gen. Noriega declared the elections last Sunday to be nullified — their word. What is your reaction to events in Panama over the last 2 or 3 days?
A. Our reaction to those events has been pretty well stated, I think, by the President. Gen. Noriega has been very reluctant to accept the will of the Panamanian people. He has done every- thing he could to steal that election. And when it became e.xtraordinarilv
32
difficult to accomplish that, I suppose he's giving consideration to simply de- claring it null and void and starting over. But either way — either way you look at it, it is a perversion and a sub- version of the freely expressed will of the Panamanian people.
Q. You delivered a letter from President Bush to Mr. Gorbachev. Could you tell us a little bit about that letter? And also, did you get into any discussion about a summit be- tween Mr. Gorbachev and the President?
A. The question of a summit came up and was discussed, and we agreed we would further discuss that issue at the next ministerial which [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze and I have, which we suspect will be sometime in the month of September.
With respect to the question about the President's letter, the letter from the President to the General Secretary outlined broadly our views on the evolving relationship with the Soviet Union. It made some of the points that I made initially in my opening state- ment here this afternoon. The Presi- dent called attention to the reform effort in the Soviet Union. He empha- sized in the strongest terms our desire to see perestmika succeed. He pointed out that we believe these changes are significant, even revolutionary; that they create a basis for progress; and that we seek that progress.
It pointed out as well that our in- tention is to work seriously and care- fully step-by-step to prepare the ground to make our cooperation enduring.
Q. You started your negotiations here by discussing regional conflicts. You discussed Afghanistan and Cen- tral America. Do you think a compro- mise is possible on that? And you discussed the Middle East. Did you discuss Lebanon within that context?
A. Let me say that it was our view coming into these meetings that re- gional issues should have a greater em- phasis in the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. I'm very pleased to see that our inter- locutors here accepted that view, and regional issues were accorded a higher emphasis in these meetings. That does not in any way diminish the impor- tance of any of the other aspects on the agenda, such as arms control, human rights, and the others.
We did, indeed, discuss Lebanon, and we agreed upon a joint statement on Lebanon which is in the process of
being released and which will be avail- able to you.
Q. In view of what the Soviets told you about emigration, and par- ticularly embodying the liberal rules into their legislation, could you give us your assessment now of the possi- bilities of waiving the Jackson-Vanik restrictions?
A. We told the Soviets that once that more liberal emigration policy hadi been institutionalized, enacted into law, and once those laws were seen to be in the process of being implemented, we thought it would be appropriate to then address the question of whether ort not there ought to be a relaxation or re- peal of Jackson-Vanik and the Steven- son amendments in the United States.
Q. Regarding Central America, could you give us your assessment for the possibility now that the Soviets may decrease or stop their military assistance to Nicaragua?
A. We are very hopeful that will be the case. I'm an optimist, so I'd eveiT be optimistic. I would point you to what I said in my opening statement, though, when I said that we agreed tn work toward a diplomatic and political solution to the problem of Nicaragua and to support the goals of Esquipulas and Tesoro. I would argue that those goals clearly move in the direction of reducing, if not eliminating, that support.
Q. Just to return to the short- range nuclear forces (SNF) issue one more time — one. did General Secre- tary Gorbachev indicate to you that he is anticipating unilateral cuts? And, two, are you saying that we would welcome those cuts rather thar regarding them as simply a device to try to split NATO?
A. We would welcome the cuts in any event. In fact, we have been calling upon the Soviet Union to reduce their short-range nuclear weapons to bring the imbalance more into line; and we have said that's something that ought to be done before we even get to the question of negotiations.
Q. The first part of my question: Did he indicate to you that he is thinking about it?
A. 'You noticed I've dodged that about three times, haven't you?
Q. Did the discussions in NATO on the modernization of the Lance program come up, and did you offer the Russians your interpretation of the apparent split in NATO on this issue?
Department of State Bulletin/July 198{
THE SECRETARY
A. The answer to the last part of >rour question is no, I didn't offer them iny interpretation on where NATO nay or may not be on that. The ques- tion of modernization did, indeed, come jp, just as the question of negotiations ame up.
Q. Did General Secretary Gor- bachev bring up the Afghanistan tjuestion at any length, and could you tell us what his concerns were and now you responded to them? j A. The answer is no, he did not pring it up at any length. We did dis- cuss it in the ministerial, but he didn't bring it up in the meeting.
I Q. Could you describe how phevardnadze —
j A. We had a full discussion of the (ssue. Concern, I think, was expressed bn the part of the Soviet side about What they perceived as some inap- l^ropriate activities, perhaps, by Pakistan. We don't see it that way. We Bade the point during the course of ,hese discussions, as we have before, :hat it is not our desire to see a govern- Tient in Afghanistan that is hostile to ;he Soviet Union. At the same time, we ire very interested, as we think ^'akistan and other countries are, in seeing self-determination for the Af- ghan people.
Q. Just to clarify your last state- ment, you say that Mr. Gorbachev did lot bring it up at all?
A. He didn't bring it up at all.
INTERVIEW BY TASS
AND IZVESTIYA, VIOSCOW, VI .\Y 11. 1989^
3. What are the results of your 2-day ;alks in Moscow, and what are your mpressions of your meetings with the jeneral Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev?
A. I'm very satisfied with the I days of talks we've had here — my alks with [Foreign] Minister Shev- trdnadze and his associates, and my •ather e.xtensive meeting with the Gen- ?ral Secretary. 1 think our talks were constructive. 1 think they were helpful and useful. 1 believe that my interlocu- :ors shared that view.
Q. The fact itself that you are in Moscow means that the new Adminis- tration has finished and concluded, ar finishing and concluding, their ex- amination on vour national and secu-
rity policy. Can you elaborate in a few words what are the main outlines of the new policy of your Adminis- tration?
A. Let me answer your question by saying that we have, indeed, completed our foreign policy and national security review. We still have some work to do on some of the specific positions that, of necessity, will come up in the arms con- trol negotiations. But as I told the Gen- eral Secretary, and I told the Foreign Ministei", we expect to be ready by the time those negotiations resume. And, of course, one of the products of our talks here was the setting of dates for the resumption of all the arms control negotiations.
Q. What do you think is the chief element in the policy of continuity to- ward the Soviet Union proclaimed by President Bush?
A. As I told [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze, there will be a consider- able degree of continuity, not just in the overall policies that had been pur- sued by the prior Administration but in our negotiating positions in the arms control negotiations as well.
We hope that we can put new em- phasis on working cooperatively — the United States and the Soviet Union — to help solve some of the regional con- flicts around the world that have real potential for erupting into war, partic- ularly in these days when we have the added dangers of missile and chemical weapons proliferation. It's our view that if we can find a way to work to- gether on some of these issues in a cooperative way, rather than in a confrontational and competitive way, as we have too often in the past, it would be very, very good.
Q. The previous achievements in Soviet-American relations were con- nected with such a tool as a summit. What do you think about this mecha- nism of summits in the Soviet- American relations in the future?
A. We agreed today in our discus- sions with the General Secretary — he and I agreed — that summits are impor- tant. I told him that that was the view of President Bush, that President Bush wanted me to talk to him to ascertain, solicit his views about a possible sum- mit, the appropriate timing for such a summit. We had a full discussion of this issue, and we concluded that we should address the question further in my next ministerial meeting with [For- eign] Minister Shevardnadze.
Q. This is your first visit to this country, and, of course, it generated a lot of interest among the Soviet peo- ple. We would certainly like to know more about you as a person, about what ideas you want to bring into Soviet-American relations. Could you satisfy, at least a little, their curi- osity on the subject?
A. I just mentioned one of the ideas, and that is cooperation rather than competition and confrontation. I have also alluded to the fact that we think it would be useful to put a bit more emphasis on this problem of re- gional conflicts.
I have suggested that we add a fifth category of issues to the usual basket of issues normally discussed in these meetings; that is, transnational or global issues, matters such as the environment, terrorism, drug traffick- ing, the reduction of natural disasters. Together I think we could work on some of these problems.
I'm struck by the fact that we have cooperated very well where disaster strikes. Your earthquakes in Armenia, we were helpful. Our oil spill in Valdez, Alaska, you were very helpful. In fact, I think you still have a Soviet ship up there assisting us. These are examples, I think, of the way our two countries might better cooperate.
Q. As you know, the American space ship Apollo and the Soviet space ship Soyiiz have quite different strategies. But in one detail, they were almost 100% similar; it's the mechanism of docking. What was your docking with [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze? You know that your predecessor. Mr. Shultz, met 31 times with our Foreign Minister. How did this docking go?
A. At the conclusion of our meet- ing today, the [Foreign] Minister char- acterized our discussions as very friendly and as having laid a good foun- dation for the establishment of a fine personal relationship between the two of us. I must say to you that I strongly share that view.
The [Foreign] Minister and his wife were kind enough to entertain my wife and me last night at a private din- ner in their home. I thought that was very gracious. I thank him for his hos- pitality and look forward to reciprocat- ing when he next comes to the United States. I found that during my 3V2 years as Secretary of the Treasury, personal relationships are very impor- tant in getting things accomplished,
Department of State Bulletin/July 1989
33
THE SECRETARY
and the [Foreign] Minister and I talked about that last night, and I know he shares that view.
Q. Which specific steps should be taken, vou think, to raise trust be- tween the U.S.S.R. and the United States? As a part of the increasing U.S. -Soviet exchange, would you agree to send a member of your family to permanently work in Moscow? If that's a good idea, who would that be?
A. I don't have any members of my family that I can dictate to that way. We have something called freedom of choice in the United States. But I would certainly encourage — I do have an 11-year-old daughter, and when she gets a little bit older, if that was in any way a desire of hers, I would certainly be supportive of it, and I would encour- age It.
Q. With every turn around in or- bit, our planet is shrinking and the whole of mankind, including the Soviet Union and the United States, are in the same boat. So helping each other, we are helping all of mankind. You have several points of view in Washington, and even inside the Ad- ministration, about our perestroika. I think that some people say that per- estroika will fail. Some people say let's wait and see. Wouldn't it be more productive to say not wait and see, but help and see, because helping us you are helping yourself, because of this new development in the world, because we're in the same boat?
A. I've already said to you that we in the new Administration — and this goes for all of us, even someone who might think that perestroika is not going to succeed — we all, nevertheless, want it to succeed. We do not want to do anything that in any way obstructs that success or makes it more difficult, provided that it was in our national in- terest. We, after all, as you, have to continue to look after our own national interest.
We have not only a strongly held view that we want perestroika to suc- ceed, we have a strongly held view that whether or not it succeeds, it really is up to what happens here in the Soviet Union. It's up to your leadership and it's up to the Soviet people. It's not going to be determined by what we in the West do or don't do, as long as we are not obstructionists. As long as we cooperate, where cooperation is in our national interest. And I've just men- tioned to you that that's one of the
34
things that I would hope we would be able to achieve more of — that's more co- operation and less confrontation.
Q. This fifth basket is also, I think, a result of your new thinking.
A. It was an idea that I had during the course of my confirmation hearings by the U.S. Senate. And I told the [For- eign] Minister today I was very pleased that he agreed to include this fifth basket and that he and the General Sec- retary both agreed to put added em- phasis on the resolution of regional conflicts.
NEWS CONFERENCE,
NATO,
MAY 12, 19895
Let me start by simply saying that I've had an opportunity this morning to brief the NATO foreign ministers on my trip to the Soviet Union. I want to say a word or two about that briefing.
I commented that I thought we had constructive, useful, and productive talks there; we laid a good foundation, I think, for future meetings. It's quite clear the United States and the Soviet Union are reengaged across the full range of our relations. We were pleased with the acceptance by the Soviet Union of added emphasis on regional is- sues in connection with the full range of issues between us. We were pleased they were willing to engage with us on transnational, or global, issues — that is, issues affecting the environment, terrorism, drugs. And we were pleased they were interested in talking to us about the problems presented by mis- sile and chemical proliferation around the world.
Q. On the short-range nuclear missile problem that the United States has been having with West Germany, is it closer to resolution? Will it be a divisive issue at the sum- mit at the end of the month, do you think?
A. You know, it has been our hope all along it would be resolved before the summit. But it's a very, very important issue, involving as it does questions of alliance security, and we remain hope- ful it might be resolved before the sum- mit. It has not as yet been resolved.
Q. In your meeting this morning with [West German Foreign] Minister Genscher, did you and he come any closer to a meeting of the minds on how to deal with the issue of the SNF?
A. I think that we, of course, had the opportunity for another full e.\- change on the issue and I think — I hope — he better understands our posi- tion. I can say I think we have under- stood his position for quite some time. There remain differences between us, but we will continue to try and work to resolve those differences with [Foreign] Minister Genscher and with other ele- ments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Q. Do you see yet the outline of a way to resolve this before the NATO summit meeting here in a few weeks?
A. As I've said before, I'm hopeful we will be able to do that. We are en- gaged in the process of trying. I think I said a moment ago I remain hopeful. If we had bridged the gap, I would tell you, but we haven't as yet bridged that gap.
Q. Could you say whether you were surprised by Mr. Gorbachev's proposal yesterday for a unilateral re- duction, and if you feel that the tim- ing of that proposal, in particular, was in any way designed to try to ex- acerbate the split between the United States and the Germans?
A. I don't think it was necessarily designed for that purpose. I think it was designed with a view to public opinion in mind. We have felt for some time we might see such a proposal. Frankly, as most of you know, we have been calling upon the Soviets for a longv time to do just this. We have pointed out that the NATO alliance has, over the past 10 years, reduced — unilaterally reduced — its tactical nuclear weapons by some 2,400. This is a reduction of 500 the Soviet Union has announced. That is a very modest step by them when you consider the rather substan- tial imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact.
I think there are some other points that ought to be noted with respect to this proposal. This was a proposal to remove 500 weapons from the territory of allies of the Soviet Union, not a pro- posal to remove these weapons from Europe. So it's quite limited in that regard.
Further, there is no commitment to destroy these weapons. Let me say one more time: The NATO alliance over the past 10 years has unilaterally reduced — through destruction — 2,400 of its weap- ons of this nature.
Q. Has this proposal divided the alliance to any extent? Did you hear any difference of opinion?
Department of State Bulletin/July 198£
THE SECRETARY
A. As we went around the table lis morning, the alliance is absolutely, otally, completely unified with respect Jd this proposal. And each and every ne of the representatives there would tiaracterize it for you in the same way have characterized it for you. What's appening here is the Soviet Union is asically following the lead of the alli- nce. Finally, they are responding to 'hat had been repeated calls on our (art that they unilaterally reduce some 'f the very substantial imbalances that xist in their favor. So while it's a very lodest step, it's a step we should wel- ame, because it is in compliance, if you 'ill, or in furtherance of calls the [ATO alliance has been making for uite some time.
Q. Would you comment on the de-
i'lgn of the Soviet proposal that in- ludes bombs on aircraft, an issue hich I think— where NATO has not .nilaterally reduced in the last few jears?
A. That's correct. The design of it [lould give us, I suppose, some pause ecause it doesn't just refer to land- ased nuclear weapons. It refers to the ill range of nuclear weapons — land- ased nuclear weapons, bombs on air- lanes, and artillery pieces as well. Ind some might well argue that is con- stant with a Soviet goal that there be complete denuclearization of Europe. Q. Could the United States at the ummit accept the establishment of ome kind of high-level NATO panel 3 consider the issue of possibly enter- ig SNF negotiations in the future ithout making an explicit commit- lent one way or the other on when ctually to enter such talks?
.\. Look, there are any number of )rmulations out there that are being ^oposed from time to time by various arties that are interested in this de- ^te. I think the last thing in the world should do is answer hypothetical juestions about different types of for- jiulations if we really expect to have ny chance of making progress before le summit actually begins.
Q. The two proposals together — he proposals in the nuclear field and he proposals in the conventional ield being presented today in 'ienna — are considered at least by ■ne country to make it easier to pre- are negotiations with the aim of ob- aining mutually lower numbers
hen it comes to SNF. Do you agree
ith this?
A. Do I agree that's the purpose of their making these proposals?
Q. No, does it make it easier?
A. Does it make it easier to do what now?
Q. To prepare negotiations for the reduction.
A. Does it make it easier to enter negotiations? Let me say that when you consider the point I made a moment ago, this unilateral reduction they've announced is quite apparently designed for public opinion. I think the answer to that would have to be no. We are glad to see this move. We would sug- gest to you that both this move and the announcement they made with respect to conventional forces was in answer to calls that have emanated from the alli- ance from time to time for unilateral reductions on the one hand, such as we have accomplished, and for specifics with respect to their conventional weapons proposals. We put specifics on the table when we announced the NATO position in Vienna.
Q. Were there any voices in the meeting this morning suggesting that the United States should now enter negotiations?
A. There were none. But we really didn't debate this issue this morning. This morning's session was devoted al- most entirely to a read out on my meet- ings in the Soviet Union, both the ministerial meetings and the meetings with the General Secretary.
Q. In your comments yesterday in Moscow in the press conference, where you said before you start to talk about negotiations you have to bring this imbalance in short-range systems down. You seem to be making a connection between the size of the imbalance and the prospects for nego- tiations. Could you explain, if you do feel that is a proper connection, how these two things are connected?
A. I think it's proper to suggest, before we start talking about negotiat- ing with respect to these weapons, somehow there ought to be a resolution of the very significant imbalance that exists in favor of the Soviet Union.
I think we have to take due note of the rather major imbalance that exists with respect to conventional forces, be- cause the reason we think we need a land-based nuclear deterrent has a lot to do with the fact of those imbalances. And I should say we're talking here, of course, about a defensive military
strategy, the strategy of deterrence and flexible response. We're talking about a strategy that's been successful in maintaining the peace for 40 years so we have to be very careful as we move forward in this area.
Q. If Mr. Gorbachev's proposals in the conventional field were indeed implemented, it would clearly create equal levels on both sides. Now let's say that happens, would you negotiate then?
A. That's very hypothetical. I'm reminded of the old saying back home, "If the dog hadn't stopped, he would've caught the rabbit." I mean let's see it happen and then address that question.
Q. This is your first visit to the Soviet Union. I wonder if you could talk for a second, what was your reac- tion to what you saw and what you heard.
A. I should say I thought — as I have indicated here — we had some very meaningful meetings. I detected a de- sire on the part of the Soviet leader- ship to engage, and to engage across all areas, not just arms control, without diminishing in any way the importance of arms control.
I found them very interested in talking about ways in which we might move jointly to resolve some regional conflicts. I think this is important. We talked about whether or not there would be a way for the United States and the Soviet Union to move from a posture of addressing regional conflicts from the standpoint of confrontation and competition to one of cooperation. Maybe we can't, but we think it's impor- tant to explore that. I got the very dis- tinct feeling they think it's important to explore that.
'There were candid discussions dur- ing our meetings about some of the problems, quite frankly, that the Soviet Union faces today in the area of eco- nomic matters. We discussed some of the problems they are facing in trying to implement these rather dramatic and revolutionary changes that are taking place, both political and economic changes.
I think I've said before we think these changes are real. We think they present opportunities that we in the West should be alert to and we should respond to. It was the purpose of the President in sending me at this time to make clear to the Soviet leadership that we are not only ready but anxious to reengage across the full range of our relations.
department of State Bulletin/July 1989
35
THE SECRETARY
We have completed our foreign pol- icy and national security reviews. I should have mentioned in my brief opening comments that we have estab- lished dates now for the resumption of all of the arms control negotiations that are ongoing between us, the latest of which is June 26. The bottom line from all of this is that we have a new Admin- istration in the United States, but we are back, totally reengaged in our dia- logue with the Soviet Union.
Q. But doesn't it annoy you that Mr. Gorbachev used this first encoun- ter to, in effect, upstage the Adminis- tration? I mean it would be human nature, I think, to react other than that.
A. I don't know whether you would call it upstaging. Our view is that be- cause of the big imbalances that exist in weaponry across the full range, there's no way we're going to win by trying to play a public relations game of outbid- ding the Soviet Union with respect to arms control issues like this.
We must focus — and keep our at- tention focused — on what's really im- portant and that is the security of the West. We should approach this with prudence and with realism. Where we see deeds — as opposed to just words — we must be prepared to react. But we are entitled to look for deeds, and we are entitled to probe and look for real evidence of the so-called new thinking.
Q. Can you envision NATO's jubi- lee summit without prior bridging of the gap between Washington and Bonn? Would it really be a disaster?
A. A worse disaster would be if we let politics somehow endanger the secu- rity of the alliance. We simply cannot afford to do that.
The Challenge of Change in U.S.-Soviet Relations
'Press release 83 of May 12, -Press release 85 of May 13. ^Press release 84 of May 16. ■•Press release 86 of May 17. "Press release 87 of May 15.
1989.
Secretary Baker's address before the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) on May i, 1989.'^
I am honored to once again be here at the CSIS. Ever since its founding, I think this center has combined an un- derstanding of international problems with a vigorous debate over how Amer- ica should conduct its foreign policy. Those of us who have been privileged to serve this nation in one capacity or another — to serve this nation abroad or to participate in the formation of policy here at home — know full well the ar- dors of this task. We know, too, that assessments of reality are not enough. Judgments and words ultimately have to be turned into action if we are going to serve the public interest.
A Time of Change
The assessment of reality has become more difficult in today's world because the pace of international change has ac- celerated considerably. Some years ago, I happened across a scholarly study of the late 18th century entitled The Age of Revolutions, and perhaps one day historians might describe our times the same way.
Just consider for a moment, if you will, some of the trends which are transforming our world. Democracy, an idea and political system challenged for much of the postwar era, really is on the offensive. Millions of people in our own hemisphere and in countries such as the Philippines and Korea have achieved, now, democratic govern- ments. Millions elsewhere — in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, and in the People's Republic of China — are de- manding free institutions in a way that we've never seen before. So I think it is fair to say that the quest for democracy is the most vibrant political fact of these times.
Another great transformation that we are seeing is economic. Free mar- kets, private initiative have become the new watchwords of economic develop- ment because those concepts work — and we know this very well now — actually work in practice. And closely allied to economic change is technologi- cal progress. The new technologies of information and communication have
helped to create a global economy, an economy which transcends the tradi- tional boundaries of the nation state.
There have been other transformat tions as well. Emerging technologies open new horizons, I think, for greatei- military stability. Other trends, though, such as the proliferation of chemical weapons and missiles — as David [Ambassador David Abshire, CSIS president] mentioned to you — the proliferation of those weapons to volatile regions and to irresponsible states present us with greater dangers
And while we struggle to deal wit) traditional political and military prob- lems, I think we all must become in- creasingly aware of new transnational threats — threats such as environment; hazards, terrorism, the drug trade- that demand greater and greater intei national cooperation if they are going 1 be properly addressed.
Every nation has been affected in one way or another by these transfor- mations. And, as a consequence, realh: no international relationship has re- mained the same. This, of course, is especially true of U.S. -Soviet rela- tions. The result, I think, is a rare opportunity — a chance to transform our attitudes, our words, and, above all, our actions toward each other for the better. But this opportunity is also — and I think David touched on this as well — at the same time, a challenge — a challenge to understand first what is happening, and secondly, why and how to seize the opportunity for progress toward a freer and more peaceful international community.
The Promise of Perestroika in the Soviet Union
The challenge of change in U.S.- Soviet relations begins, I think, with change — fundamental change — in the Soviet Union. For nearly half a centun now, we and our allies have confrontec a Soviet superpower along the great fault lines of the postwar period. This; struggle has been rooted in two pro- foundly different visions — the demo- cratic vision and the communist visior We differ over the rights of the indivic ual; we differ over the power of the state; we differ over the rule of law, th use of force, the role of religion. In
36
Department of State Sulletin/July 19{
THE SECRETARY
;hort, we differ over what we consider 0 be the basic values of society.
While we may have erred from ime to time, on the whole, I think it's fair to say that we in the West have [)een very, very faithful to our vision. iJreat sacrifices have been made. The )urdens were — and, indeed, the bur- lens still are sometimes — very diffi- cult to bear. There were, and there dways will be, risks. But we upheld )ur values. And we prevented for 40 fears war in Europe.
Surely, some of the change we see low in the Soviet Union is a conse- [uence of our success. There would be 10 quest for democratic institutions f democratic institutions had failed. Phere would be less soul-searching of he communist vision if the democratic 'ision had somehow faded or disap- )eared. And an alliance of free nations, vorking together, sharing risks and re- ;ponsibilities while pursuing freedom ind extending economic progress, has ilways, I think, offered a rather con- 'incing alternative.
I think it can also be said, however, hat the dramatic changes which are weeping the Soviet Union are not due .imply to Western fortitude. It is also he failure of the communist vision to iroduce results, judged by its own itandards, that inspires calls fov per- stivika. It is the fear that outdated logma and unworkable institutions will eave Soviet society behind — isolated rem technological progress and the flobal economy — that really accelerates eform in the Soviet Union. And just as lurely, change is motivated also by the )elief of some in the Soviet Union that •evolutions have a tough time living by logans alone.
The President has said and I have laid that we have absolutely no wish to lee perestroika fail. To the contrary, ve would very much like it to succeed. ^nd that achievement could have great nternational effect.
As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze old the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af- airs, and I quote, ". . . we must labor ;olidly to convince the people that we ire thinking first and foremost about heir interests. . . . We are aware of ind declare the truth that foreign poli- cy cannot be divorced from domestic •ealities." A process that promises to ncrease the freedom and improve the veil-being of the Soviet peoples really s in everyone's interest. A process that )romises to change Soviet internation- il behavior toward diplomatic solutions
and problemsolving, rather than the use of force or intimidation, I think, offers hope for a radically improved international order.
...we have absolutely no wish to see perestroika fail.
That's why we've been so encour- aged by the words and the concepts of what General Secretary Gorbachev re- fers to as the "new thinking." And in a number of places, I think it's fair to say that words have turned into realities. The General Secretary pledged that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan on February 15, and they did. He signed the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, and SS-20s are being destroyed. Last December, he announced unilateral troop cuts in Eu- rope, and now we've seen Soviet tanks leaving Hungary. Soon we hope to see them destroyed.
The Soviets have begun releasing political prisoners. And, as we all know, great strides have been made in permitting freer emigration. Most im- portantly, the Soviets now talk of en- forcing the rule of law and other guarantees of individual rights which are very, very familiar and very basic to us in the West. Limited elections have taken place. The growing dissat- isfaction with the Soviet system and pressure for change is unmistakable, and it is widespread.
Words of hope are, indeed, not lim- ited just to the Soviet Union. In Po- land, the free labor union Solidarity has been legalized following unprece- dented roundtable agreements. And in Hungary, the mechanics of a multi- party system are actively being considered.
In the economic sphere as well, the spread of private ownership, coopera- tives, and decentralization of power creates some promising opportunities. Soon we may see the Soviets move forward to join the global economy. I think we would welcome, and welcome strongly, a Soviet economy open to world markets with a freely convertible ruble.
We also recognize, however, that in this critical area, as in many others, there are many hard choices to be made. It is far too early for us to know, of course, whether perestroika will or will not succeed. But it begins and it ends with the people of the Soviet Union, and they will determine wheth- er it succeeds or whether it fails.
New Thinking and Old Habits
These great changes, however, are not the only realities of the Soviet Union today. There is an uneasy and, I might add, a not always peaceful coe.xistence between the slogans of the new think- ing and the reality of both Soviet capa- bilities and Soviet actions. We must all, I think, face the fact that the Soviets continue to pose a significant military threat to Western interests. Even after the unilateral Soviet reductions in Eu- rope take place, the Warsaw Pact would retain a two-to-one edge in tanks and artillery. At a time when we hear talk of unilateral reductions, of the need to cut defense spending, and of the neces- sity to transfer precious resources from the military economy to the civil- ian sector, 3,500— that's right, 3,500— new Soviet tanks continue to roll off the production lines each year That happens to be a production rate five times greater than our own.
For all the talk of "defensive de- fense," Soviet military exercises still continue to show a marked inclination for taking the offensive. For all the talk of openness, the Soviets have yet to publish a real defense budget — a bud- get that would reveal what the Soviets really are spending on defense; a bud- get that would provide a guide to So- viet defense production; a budget, in effect, that would show the direction of future Soviet defense plans. If they were to publish such a budget, I think we could then evaluate the Soviet pledge to cut their defense budget by 14%, and we could measure its impact. Indeed, we challenge them to present such a budget and to publish openly, as we do, the details of their worldwide forces and deployments.
For all of the talk of a common Eu- ropean home — and we hear a lot of that now — the European house remains divided by Soviet force. If there is ever to be a true "common European house," the Soviets must no longer pre- vent the residents from moving from room to room. But, today, the [Berlin] Wall still stands, and the Brezhnev doc- trine remains unrenounced.
Pepartment of State Bulletin/July 1989
37
THE SECRETARY
Unfortunately, there are still many regions where the new thinking has yet to take root. We still see — and we've mentioned this from time to time — many signs of the old thoughts and the old actions in Central America where the Soviets sent over $500 million in military aid to the Sandinistas just last year. In the Middle East, long- range bombers have just been sent to Qadhafi. In Korea, the heavily fortified North — supported by Soviet arms and aid — still threatens the South. And in the Far East, of course, the Soviets continue their occupation of Japan's Northern Territories.
exchange and negotiations already ex- ists. Our purpose here, I think, should be to institutionalize these changes to make them, if we can, more difficult to reverse. And we want both Soviet in- tentions and capabilities to become more transparent.
Building Upon Past Successes: Human Rights and Arms Control
Human rights will always head the list. As a democracy, of course, we could not do otherwise and still be true to our own values. We wall always be con- cerned about how the Soviet Union and
Our foreign policy has to be based on an understand- ing of change in the Soviet Union, but it cannot wholly rely on that change to produce the results that we want.
An Active Agenda
So the reality of Soviet change, as I have described it from both sides, I think, is both promising and problem- atic. How do w^e address the very serious difficulties remaining on the agenda, while giving due credit to the remarkable progress that has been made in the past few years?
There are some who say that we don't need to do much of anything be- cause trends are so favorable to us. Their counsel is to sit tight and simply await further Soviet concessions.